Yeah, those explanations of what you mean by 'explanation' are clear as mud! :roll:

If you agree with that then explain what it is about our capacity to count that you think provides the conditions for the existence of those uncounted numbers. — Janus

An odd question. Which integers do you think are not countable?

The question at hand was, are there integers that have never been spoken nor though about.

An odd question. Which integers do you think are not countable? — Banno

I never said "uncountable" I said uncounted.. We both agree that there are integers which have never been spoken nor thought about (counted). But you seemed to be claiming that the existence of these integers is dependent upon our ability to count them. I can't make sense of that claim because it seems to suggest that those uncounted (not uncountable, mind) integers would not exist if we did not exist.

Yeah, those explanations of what you mean by 'explanation' are clear as mud! — Janus

They're not at all an "explanation of what I mean by explanation."

What "rules for explanations"? — Janus

Hopefully this link will work for you. — Terrapin Station

Yeah, those explanations of what you mean by 'explanation' are clear as mud! — Janus


They're not at all an "explanation of what I mean by explanation." — Terrapin Station

So "rules for explanations" is not "what...(you)... mean by explanation"?

What I was referring to was the issues with invoking "explanations"/hinging any arguments on whether there are "explanations" for something. The comments of mine referenced address the issue in more detail. I don't feel like typing it out in slightly different wording yet again. If you're interested, read some of those posts.

I read several and found nothing interesting, illuminating or relevant to what I understood we were "discussing" there.

I read several and found nothing interesting, illuminating or relevant to what I understood we were "discussing" there. — Janus

Cool. Guess we can't really proceed then. <shrugs>

Cool. Guess we can't really proceed then. <shrugs> — Terrapin Station

you would need to make sense of that claim by explaining the two-ness of the brain state in physical terms. Can you do that? — Janus


Yes, but first we need to go over what the "rules" for explanations are going to be. Can you do that with me?

Also, are you going to get to your alternate nonphysicalist account in terms that aren't just negations once we do that? Or are you never going to get around to that? — Terrapin Station

What I was referring to was the issues with invoking "explanations"/hinging any arguments on whether there are "explanations" for something. — Terrapin Station

Right, so first you make a claim (that the number 2 exists only as a brain state) and when I ask you for an argument in the way of explanatory support for that claim, you evade the question by saying that "first we need to go over what the "rules" for explanations are going to be. Can you do that with me?" and then by also making out that I have failed to provide an "alternative non-physicalist account" that I never promised. I was critiquing your physicality account not promising any alternative. (My "position" is basically a "negative" one of skepticism in case you hadn't noticed; I think there are problems with all positive standpoints when they are absolutized the way you do. What I am concerned with is not the nature of reality, but what we can sensibly say given the ordinary meaning of terms).

So, then when I ask for an explanation of what you mean by "rules for explanations" you link previous posts of yours and then when I tell you that those posts do nothing to clarify what you mean you go on to say that those posts do not contain any explanations of what you mean by "rules for explanations". Instead you say that you are referring to "the issues with invoking explanations/ hinging any arguments on whether there are explanations for something".

An argument just is an explanation for (why you claim) something. So, it seems that you cannot provide an argument for what you are claiming, and instead of admitting that choose to employ evasive tactics instead, which makes you a pretty useless interlocutor. or maybe just a troll after all.

Right, so first you make a claim (that the number 2 exists only as a brain state) and when I ask you for an argument in the way of explanatory support for that claim, you evade the question by saying that "first we need to go over what the "rules" for explanations are going to be. — Janus

As I relay in some of the posts you weren't interested in, there's no way that I'm doing an argument with anyone about explanations if we don't establish criteria for explanations first--criteria that are plausible and consistent with what the parties involved in the discussion count versus don't count as explanations of various things and why they count or don't count.

You said you weren't interested in this issue. So there's no way that I'm doing an argument that hinges on points about explanations. I'm opting out, because the problem with those arguments is that there's no criteria for explanations. No one cares about that, of course, at least not in these Internet arguments. They just plow ahead as if there's some clear, completely uncontroversial thing that "explanation" denotes in general . . . while there isn't at all. It's just a word that can be flung around like a sledgehammer that no one thinks to question. I consider that a waste of time.

If you don't understand what I'm talking about, read the posts I referenced. If you're not interested, that's fine. It's fine with me either way. But I won't be just moving on as if "explanation" is unproblematic.

All you are really saying is that different arguments depend on different presuppositions, as I already pointed out. If the presuppositions are too much at variance then no fruitful discussion is possible. Your presuppositions generally seem to be so much at variance with those of most others that it seems that you can rarely participate in any fruitful discussion.

Your style is such that you always do what you here accuse others of doing "plow ahead as if there's some clear uncontroversial" set of presuppositions which just make sense tout court (because they make sense to you). I don't think you are genuinely interested in what others think at all; if you were you would grant their presuppositions for the sake of argument and then try to discover if there are inconsistencies with those presuppositions in the arguments they present.

So, for example I see that you presuppose that only the physical exists, and hence that only physicalist explanations are sound. But the problem is that any argument, even a physicalist one, insofar as it is an argument that remains identical with itself, is semantic and logical. If the argument is taken not be identical with itself across time and its various physical instantiations then there remains nothing stable to argue about, and discussion would become pointless. And that just is how it seems to be with you. I have seen so many of your interlocutors frustrated by the various ways in which you make discussions go nowhere.

All you are really saying is that different arguments depend on different presuppositions — Janus

I'm saying things far more specific about "explanations," actually.

And part of it is that if S is going to issue an argument that hinges on whether something is an explanation, then S had better make clear what S's criteria for explanations are, in a manner that's plausible demarcation criteria for S's general usage of "explanation," as well as being able to say why S's criteria--especially if relatively novel--should matter in general/to others.

What a convoluted load of bullshit! Arguments do not "hinge on whether something is an explanation": all arguments are explanations and explications of their premises. All that matters is that the person presenting the argument should make clear what their presuppositions or premises are. That's all any argument amounts to: premises, the entailments of the premises, as well as other conjectures which might seem plausible and should not be inconsistent with the premises: explanation and explication.

Whether or not the argument matters to others is not the concern of the person presenting the argument: if others are not interested they don't have to and probably won't (if they are intelligent) respond. The only point of responding should be to discover and identify any inconsistencies or errors which are internal to the argument. But to criticize an argument from the perspective of premises which are alien to it is bad form, it's chauvinism and only creates a situation where talking past one another ensues.

What a convoluted load of bullshit! Arguments do not "hinge on whether something is an explanation": — Janus

Sure some do. For example, there are phil of mind arguments predicated on whether there's a physicalist explanation for mind. The answer for those who invoke these arguments is "No," of course.

It should have been obvious that I meant "arguments generally". But even in such special cases as the one you refer to here, it is a matter of interpretation. Such arguments are not "predicated on whether there is a physicalist explanation for mind", but they are predicated on a certain definition and understanding of mind, such that physicalist explanations must be inapt. In other words, that there is no physicalist explanation for mind is not the premise, but the conclusion. And remember, such arguments are inductive or abductive, not strictly deductive, so the conclusion is not "contained in" the premises.

It should have been obvious that I meant "arguments generally". But even in such special cases as the one you refer to here, it is a matter of interpretation. — Janus

I wasn't saying anything about "arguments generally." I'm referring to arguments that basically go, "There is no explanation for x, therefore . . . " ---doesn't at all have to be about phil of mind, by the way.

Perhaps you could cite a couple of examples of such actual arguments. Say one philosophy of mind and one not. The reason I ask is that I can't see how the mere lack of an explanation for anything could justify an argument for anything else.

So we can argue whether the arguments are really that? I have zero interest in that. The bottom line is that if you want to have a discussion that's going to hinge on claims about explanations, we'll need to go over explanation criteria before I'll participate. If you don't care if I participate, then you don't need to bother. It's up to you. I'm just giving you the requirement for my participation.

The bottom line is that if you want to have a discussion that's going to hinge on claims about explanations, — Terrapin Station

The problem is that I never intended to have a discussion that hinges on claims about explanations, and have not used that criterion at all; it was only you who brought that consideration into the conversation. I'm happy to leave it because I know how slippery you are, and it's not worth the effort.

You wrote this: "To say that a physicalist account of logic and semantics is possible then, would be to say that a comprehensive and intelligible explanation of all logic and semantics could be given in the language of physics (mathematical equations)."

An argument about that, including about whether it's possible, whether it's been accomplished, etc., would need to clarify criteria for explanations first.