This puzzles me. IS Terra's claim that the number 2 is a brain state? — Banno

Yes.

But that's nonsense, since it would mean that my 2 and your 2, being different brain states, are different numbers. — Banno

And indeed that's the case, a la it being a nominalistic truism that two instantiations of "the same" anything are not actually identical.

And here you are spinning the word "physical". — Banno

I have no idea what you have in mind there.

And indeed that's the case, a la it being a nominalistic truism that two instantiations of "the same" anything are not actually identical. — Terrapin Station

Then, since you are talking about a completely different thing to the rest of us, why should we pay you any attention?

Why not treat your argument as a reductio, and conclude that since it makes language impossible, it's wrong?

I'm not paying enough attention to sports stuff I'm trying to watch, so further replies will have to wait until my morning.

@Terrapin Station might have some grounding if his were the only possibility. But it isn't. Numbers are something we do; they consist in our counting and calculating. Knowing what 2 is, is not having a particular brain-state, but being able to count to 2, divide by 2, and so on.

It's curious how far the drive for reductionism will push folk.

You're assuming that an ontological account is necessarily a physicality account. In any case even granting that condition for the sake of argument, if you want to make it a coherent ontological account, then when you want to say a logical entity, for example the number 2, is identical with a physical brain state, you would need to make sense of that claim by explaining the two-ness of the brain state in physical terms. Can you do that?

And indeed that's the case, a la it being a nominalistic truism that two instantiations of "the same" anything are not actually identical. — Terrapin Station

Again this shows your physicalist prejudice. Of course two physical instantiations of any abstraction are not physically identical, but they are semantically and logically identical which shows that no coherent physicalist account of logic or semantics is possible. Physicalist accounts are not themselves physical, which, means that physicalist accounts are not, and cannot be, be given as a set of universally recognizable physical objects.

Say the account is given textually. The letters that make up the words, and the words themselves, and the sentences they make up, and the paragraphs that the sentences form and so on all have determinate physical configurations, but these determinate physical forms have no meaning to someone who does not speak the language the account is written in. Also two bodies of text with very different physical configurations can say the same thing, and yet there is no discernible physical relation between their configurations that could explain how that is possible.

You're assuming that an ontological account is necessarily a physicality account. — Janus

It's not a bad assumption, if only for the purpose of checking out possibilities. Whta woudl be the alternative?

if you want to make it a coherent ontological account, then when you want to say a logical entity, for example the number 2, is identical with a physical brain state, — Janus

There's no necessity here. Understanding 2 is being able to do stuff with 2.

you would need to make sense of that claim by explaining the two-ness of the brain state in physical terms. Can you do that? — Janus

No brain state, just a capacity to do certain things...

Of course two physical instantiations of any abstraction are not physically identical, but they are semantically and logically identical which shows that no coherent physicalist account of logic or semantics is possible. — Janus

Don't jump the gun. That @Terrapin Station has it wrong does not make it impossible.

It's not a bad assumption, if only for the purpose of checking out possibilities. Whta woudl be the alternative? — Banno

There was a typo there: it should have read "physicalist account". My point was just that the physical form in which all accounts are given is irrelevant, in terms of their mere physical configurations, to their meaning. Of course this is not to say that the conveyance of meaning is not effected by recognizable physical configurations, but to make the fairly obvious point that there is no necessary, or necessarily physically recognizable, connection between physical conformation and meaning.

There's no necessity here. Understanding 2 is being able to do stuff with 2. — Banno

You lifted that out of context. Omitted parts of the whole sentence including the part you quoted above

You're assuming that an ontological account is necessarily a physicalist account. In any case even granting that condition for the sake of argument,if you want to make it a coherent ontological account, then when you want to say a logical entity, for example the number 2, is identical with a physical brain state, you would need to make sense of that claim by explaining the two-ness of the brain state in physical terms. — Janus

should make it clear that I am not doing anything more than granting that assumption (that an ontological account is necessarily a physicalist account) for the sake of argument, and then going on to say what would be required to demonstrate the soundness of the assumption.

Don't jump the gun. That Terrapin Station has it wrong does not make it impossible. — Banno

I don't believe I have "jumped the gun" and nor do I think it is merely that Terrapin "has it wrong", but that it is reasonable to conclude that no such account is possible. So, a physicalist account (which is itself always a logical and semantic, as well as a physical, entity) would be an account in the language of physics.

To say that a physicalist account of logic and semantics is possible then, would be to say that a comprehensive and intelligible explanation of all logic and semantics could be given in the language of physics (mathematical equations). This seems obviously unsupportable, or at least it does not seem possible to discover any reason to believe it could ever be done.

To say that a physicalist account of logic and semantics is possible then, would be to say that a comprehensive and intelligible explanation of all logic and semantics could be given in the language of physics (mathematical equations). This seems obviously unsupportable, or at least it does not seem possible to discover any reason to believe it could ever be done. — Janus

Well, yeah. But do you conclude that there is stuff that is not physical? 'Cause that does not follow.

Well, yeah. But do you conclude that there is stuff that is not physical? 'Cause that does not follow. — Banno

What do you mean by "stuff"? If to be "stuff" is to be physical, then obviously it is merely a tautologous conclusion that there is, and can be, no stuff which is not physical.You said earlier that there were numbers which have never been written or spoken; are they "stuff"? Or do you say they are not physical and yet are existent or subsistent in some sense?

Indeed: so other things exist besides stuff.

Yes, it does seem we are committed to saying that. :grin:

Then, since you are talking about a completely different thing to the rest of us, why should we pay you any attention? — Banno

"Not identical" does not amount to "completely different" (in the sense of "completely dissimilar").

Why not treat your argument as a reductio, — Banno

Because I'm not saying anything contradictory.

since it makes language impossible — Banno

That's not at all the case. It simply has different claims about how language works--the underlying mechanics of it, than your account. Your account is not the only account possible, of course.

Numbers are something we do; they consist in our counting and calculating. — Banno

Not at all incompatible with my view of course.

Knowing what 2 is, is not having a particular brain-state, — Banno

So you don't agree with the standard jtb characterization of knowledge?

you would need to make sense of that claim by explaining the two-ness of the brain state in physical terms. Can you do that? — Janus

Yes, but first we need to go over what the "rules" for explanations are going to be. Can you do that with me?

Also, are you going to get to your alternate nonphysicalist account in terms that aren't just negations once we do that? Or are you never going to get around to that?

but they are semantically and logically identical which shows that no coherent physicalist account of logic or semantics is possible. — Janus

You can claim they're logically and semantically identical, of course.

Now can you explain how they are, explain how that works, etc.? We'll go over those rules for explanations first. Ready?

Physicalist accounts are not themselves physical, — Janus

Can you get to the ontological account of what they are in unique, non-negative terms already?

There was a typo there: it should have read "physicalist account". My point was just that the physical form in which all accounts are given is irrelevant, in terms of their mere physical configurations, to their meaning. Of course this is not to say that the conveyance of meaning is not effected by recognizable physical configurations, but to make the fairly obvious point that there is no necessary, or necessarily physically recognizable, connection between physical conformation and meaning. — Janus

He asked you what would be the alternative. You didn't tell him, aside from telling us what it wouldn't be.

So, a physicalist account (which is itself always a logical and semantic, as well as a physical, entity) would be an account in the language of physics. — Janus

Physicalism is NOT subservience in any regard to the science of physics.

By the way, re saying "Again this shows your physicalist prejudice," I'm a physicalist (and a direct realist, and a nominalist, etc.). I think that nonphysicalism is incoherent, it's obviously incorrect, and you've done nothing yet to make it coherent. So obviously I'm going to have a "physicalist prejudice," because I want to say things that are correct/accurate about what the world is like. The alternate views are obviously wrong, and defending them via used-car-salesman/Christian apologetics-styled tactics underscores what a mess they are.

Yes, but first we need to go over what the "rules" for explanations are going to be. Can you do that with me? — Terrapin Station

What "rules for explanations"? Are you going to propose that they must be in physicalist terms to count as explanations? That would be very convenient for you.

There are no rules for explanations which are not predicated upon some presupposition(s) for which no explanation can be given. I say that explanations must make sense to count as explanations. What makes sense for me might not make sense for you due to your different basic presuppositions.

Or are you claiming that there is only one true kind of explanation? What evidence could you present for such a claim? Consensus? But then it could only be one of your despised "arguments ad populum". That'd be real consistent!

Also, are you going to get to your alternate nonphysicalist account in terms that aren't just negations once we do that? Or are you never going to get around to that? — Terrapin Station

Where have I promised an "alternative non-physicalist account"? Account for what?

You can claim they're logically and semantically identical, of course. — Terrapin Station

If we cannot speak about the same things then there is no point conversing since we would just be talking past one another (talking past one another does seem to be an ineliminable entailment of your position, which explains why all "conversations" with you seem to end up the same way; in the Land of the Strawpeople).

Can you get to the ontological account of what they are in unique, non-negative terms already? — Terrapin Station

Physicalist accounts are semantic of course like all accounts. No negative terms there.

Physicalism is NOT subservience in any regard to the science of physics. — Terrapin Station

What is physicalism then? Whatever you want to say it is--- is this just your subjective understanding of physicalism, the meaning of which cannot be shared with anyone else (since there are no shared meanings, according to you)?

Your final paragraph there is nothing but rhetoric and says more about your prejudices than it does about anything else, so I won't waste time replying to anything specific in that.

It seems you've been waiting at the "Station" too long: I think it's time for you to finally catch that train. :wink:

This puzzles me. IS Terra's claim that the number 2 is a brain state?
— Banno

Yes. — Terrapin Station

"Not identical" does not amount to "completely different" (in the sense of "completely dissimilar"). — Terrapin Station

You are going to use some notion of language as communication between your homunculus and our homunculi, in which you homunculus takes his brain state 2 and translates it into "2" - the word - and utters it in some way, and then each of our homunculi take the "2" and translate it into thier brain state 2...

And then you will deny that there are homunculi, saying that they are brain states, and hence each homunculus does not talk to itself in a private language despite the need to translate brain states into English.

Or some such. It's never put together as a whole.

But 2 is a thing in a head, a physical state of some sort that is repeated every time... what? You count? You calculate? You do anything related to the second number?

Now so far as I am aware there is no evidence for this - no MRI brain scans that show that every single time Jimmy thinks of "2" such-and-such a nerve cluster fires, and this only happens when Jimmy thinks of "2". And of course such a correlation could not be falsified, anyway.

SO the theory is wishful in that regard.

It's also adding an unneeded entity. An entity that supposedly is needed to account for how counting and calculating with 2 are the same... they are both about the concept "2". But why bother adding this? Why not just use the same words for different things - counting and calculating and whatever.

That is, what there is, is doing things like calculating and counting, but what there isn't, is a distinct thing called "2".

This is pretty straight-forward Wittgenstein, where we drop the search for the meaning of "2" and instead look at what we do.

This is pretty straight-forward Wittgenstein, where we drop the search for the meaning of "2" and instead look at what we do. — Banno

It seems to be a corollary of your position that the existence of the number 2, just as with the existence of countless numbers which have never been thought or named, is, as well as not being confined to brain states, likewise not confined to "what we do".

Really? How?

Is the existence of the numbers that have never been thougt or named dependent on any human doing?

The capacity to count.

So, the existence of the numbers which have never been thought or named, that is have never been counted. is dependent on our capacity to count. How does that work?

1,2,3,4... and so on.

is dependent on — Janus

Oh, right! :groan:

When I asked how that works I was not asking how counting works, but I see no reason to doubt that you knew that.

So the existence of those uncounted numbers does depend on, not our counting them but on our capacity to count them? If you agree with that then explain what it is about our capacity to count that you think provides the conditions for the existence of those uncounted numbers.

You are going to use some notion of language as communication between your homunculus and our homunculi, — Banno

Since you're not just using "homunculus"/"homunculi" in a "decorative literary" manner--at least it doesn't seem like you are since you then go on to talk about denying them--I'd need to clarify just what "homunculus"/"homunculi" is amounting to. Otherwise I can't say whether I'm claiming or denying anything like that.

Re "private language," I'm not at all denying private language. Remember that I think that Wittgenstein is mostly garbage. I'm not a fan.

Discussions would proceed better here if there were some interest in different ideas, because of a genuine curiosity, rather than everyone just wanting to "prove everyone else wrong."

What "rules for explanations"? Are you going to propose that they must be in physicalist terms to count as explanations? That would be very convenient for you. — Janus

Hopefully this link will work for you. I've posted variations on this many times, because it's a crucial issue that never gets addressed (not just here, but in philosophy in general):

https://thephilosophyforum.com/search?Search=explanations&expand=yes&child=&forums=&or=Relevance&discenc=&mem=&tag=&pg=1&date=All&Checkboxes%5B%5D=titles&Checkboxes%5B%5D=WithReplies&or=Relevance&user=Terrapin+Station&disc=&Checkboxes%5B%5D=child

Most of the posts at the top of those search results are about this. I get tired of having to retype the same thing over and over in slightly different wording, so that's why I just gave you the search results.