I often feel as though you don’t understand what I’ve written, and then accuse me of sidestepping or not answering. I think my post addresses the question of why, if objective realism is not the case, that we all perceive common objects.

On the contrary I understand what you've written and I see clearly that the mere fact of the general form of our mental constitutions and social and cultural conditioning being more or less the same could only explain commonality betwwen the ways in which we perceive not the common content of what we perceive. If you disagree then you will need to explain how it could.

If we claim that we are made of physical entities, then we ought to explain how these give rise to experiences, and if we can't then there is something missing in the idea that we are made of physical entities, as it isn't an idea that fits the very fact that we experience. — leo

This is good point. If we are made of physical entities, then it appears our concept of the physical entity is missing something. How does a sperm cell and an egg cell join together and eventually become what we call conscious?

The mobius strip boggles the mind. We use concepts (if we still want to call them that) to divide experience into self and world. If we stretch out theoretical imaginations, we can imagine a pure plane of experience. (I cross it out because the 'ego' that experiences is one more experience.)

You may have already looked at this, but in case not:

Colours, sounds, temperatures, pressures, spaces, times, and so forth, are connected with one another in manifold ways; and with them are associated dispositions of mind, feelings, and volitions. Out of this fabric, that which is relatively more fixed and permanent stands prominently forth, engraves itself on the memory, and expresses itself in language. Relatively greater permanency is exhibited, first, by certain complexes of colours, sounds, pressures, and so forth, functionally connected in time and space, which therefore receive special names, and are called bodies. Absolutely permanent such complexes are not.
...
The apparent permanency of the ego consists chiefly in the single fact of its continuity, in the slowness of its changes. The many thoughts and plans of yesterday that are continued today, and of which our environment in waking hours incessantly reminds us (whence in dreams the ego can be very indistinct, doubled, or entirely wanting), and the little habits that are unconsciously and involuntarily kept up for long periods of time, constitute the groundwork of the ego. There can hardly be greater differences in the egos of different people, than occur in the course of years in one person. When I recall today my early youth, I should take the boy that I then was, with the exception of a few individual features, for a different person, were it not for the existence of the chain of memories. Many an article that I myself penned twenty years ago impresses me now as something quite foreign to myself.
...
Colours, sounds, and the odours of bodies are evanescent. But their tangibility, as a sort of constant nucleus, not readily susceptible of annihilation, remains behind; appearing as the vehicle of the more fugitive properties attached to it. Habit, thus, keeps our thought firmly attached to this central nucleus, even when we have begun to recognise that seeing hearing, smelling, and touching are intimately akin in character. A further consideration is, that owing to the singularly extensive development of mechanical physics a kind of higher reality is ascribed to the spatial and to the temporal than to colours, sounds, and odours; agreeably to which, the temporal and spatial links of colours, sounds, and odours appear to be more real than the colours, sounds and odours themselves.
...
That in this complex of elements, which fundamentally is only one, the boundaries of bodies and of the ego do not admit of being established in a manner definite and sufficient for all cases, has already been remarked. To bring together elements that are most intimately connected with pleasure and pain into one ideal mental-economical unity, the ego; this is a task of the highest importance for the intellect working in the service of the pain-avoiding, pleasure-seeking will. The delimitation of the ego, therefore, is instinctively effected, is rendered familiar, and possibly becomes fixed through heredity. Owing to their high practical importance, not only for the individual, but for the entire species, the composites " ego " and " body " instinctively make good their claims, and assert themselves with elementary force. In special cases, however, in which practical ends are not concerned, but where knowledge is an end in itself, the delimitation in question may prove to be insufficient, obstructive, and untenable.

Similarly, class-consciousness, class-prejudice, the feeling of nationality, and even the narrowest-minded local patriotism may have a high importance, for certain purposes. But such attitudes will not be shared by the broad-minded investigator, at least not in moments of research. All such egoistic views are adequate only for practical purposes. Of course, even the investigator may succumb to habit. Trifling pedantries and nonsensical discussions; the cunning appropriation of others' thoughts, with perfidious silence as to the sources; when the word of recognition must be given, the difficulty of swallowing one's defeat, and the too common eagerness at the same time to set the opponent's achievement in a false light: all this abundantly shows that the scientist and scholar have also the battle of existence to fight, that the ways even of science still lead to the mouth, and that the pure impulse towards knowledge is still an ideal in our present social conditions. — Mach

https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/ge/mach.htm

Legs -> Walking -> Movement.
Brain -> Awareness -> Consciousness.

If legs are restricted, it is impossible to walk. However, movement is still possible.
Can there be consciousness without awareness in the brain?

(The body of a brain-dead person can survive on life-support machines for a long time. So, without the brain, how do the body parts and organs detect, process and respond to stimulus? Is it all mechanical? Or are there parts of the neural network that are still functional? If so, perhaps consciousness is not of the brain, a notion we've always suspected, science has hints but nobody wants to admit it could be true. Is there something to this... ?)

I'll add a little more that sketches his character.

The primary fact is not the ego, but the elements (sensations). What was said on p. 21 as to the term " sensation " must be borne in mind. The elements constitute the I. s have the sensation green, signifies that the element green occurs in a given complex of other elements (sensations, memories). When I cease to have the sensation green, when I die, then the elements no longer occur in the ordinary, familiar association. That is all. Only an ideal mental-economical unity, not a real unity, has ceased to exist. The ego is not a definite, unalterable, sharply bounded unity. None of these attributes are important; for all vary even within the sphere of individual life; in fact their alteration is even sought after by the individual. Continuity alone is important. ...But continuity is only a means of preparing and conserving what is contained in the ego. This content, and not the ego, is the principal thing. This content, however, is not confined to the individual. With the exception of some insignificant and valueless personal memories, it remains presented in others even after the death of the individual. — Mach

Note how willing he is to let the 'valueless and personal memories' go. He takes the impersonal personally. The 'content' (the flame) is what's important and not the container (the candle). Of course we don't see the flame without its candle, so the body is the temple of god 'content.'

And this dude resisted the theory of the atom. That's how skeptical he was. Was his passion for understanding not spiritual somehow?

And here's the cash value:

The plain man is familiar with blindness and deafness, and knows from his everyday experience that the look of things is influenced by his senses; but it never occurs to him to regard the whole world as the creation of his senses. He would find an idealistic system, or such a monstrosity as solipsism, intolerable in practice.

It may easily become a disturbing element in unprejudiced scientific theorising when a conception which is adapted to a particular and strictly limited purpose is promoted in advance to be the foundation of all investigation. This happens, for example, when all experiences are regarded as " effects " of an external world extending into consciousness. This conception gives us a tangle of metaphysical difficulties which it seems impossible to unravel. But the spectre vanishes at once when we look at the matter as it were in a mathematical light, and make it clear to ourselves that all that is valuable to us is the discovery of functional relations, and that what we want to know is merely the dependence of experiences or one another. It then becomes obvious that the reference to unknown fundamental variables which are not given (things-in-themselves) is purely fictitious and superfluous. But even when we allow this fiction, uneconomical though it be, to stand at first, we can still easily distinguish different classes of the mutual dependence of the elements of " the facts of consciousness "; and this alone is important for us.
...
The biological task of science is to provide the fully developed human individual with as perfect a means of orientating himself as possible. No other scientific ideal can be realised, and any other must be meaningless.

The philosophical point of view of the average man - if that term may be applied to his naive realism - has a claim to the highest consideration. It has arisen in the process of immeasurable time without the intentional assistance of man. It is a product of nature, and is preserved by nature. Everything that philosophy has accomplished - though we may admit the biological justification of every advance, nay, of every error - is, as compared with it, but an insignificant and ephemeral product of art. The fact is, every thinker, every philosopher, the moment he is forced to abandon his one-sided intellectual occupation by practical necessity, immediately returns to the general point of view of mankind. Professor X., who theoretically believes himself to be a solipsist, is certainly not one in practice when he has to thank a Minister of State for a decoration conferred upon him, or when he lectures to an audience. The Pyrrhonist who is cudgelled in Moliere's Le Mariage force, does not go on saying " Il me semble que vous me battez," but takes his beating as really received.

Nor is it the purpose of these " introductory remarks " to discredit the standpoint of the plain man. The task which we have set ourselves is simply to show why and for what purpose we hold that standpoint during most of our lives, and why and for what purpose we are provisionally obliged to abandon it. No point of view has absolute, permanent validity. Each has importance only for some given end. ... — Mach

https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/ge/mach.htm

The primary fact is not the ego, but the elements (sensations). What was said on p. 21 as to the term " sensation " must be borne in mind. The elements constitute the I. s have the sensation green, signifies that the element green occurs in a given complex of other elements (sensations, memories). When I cease to have the sensation green, when I die, then the elements no longer occur in the ordinary, familiar association. That is all. Only an ideal mental-economical unity, not a real unity, has ceased to exist. ,,]all that is valuable to us is the discovery of functional relations, and that what we want to know is merely the dependence of experiences or one another. — Mach

Balderdash! Mach was a rank materialist, which I discovered when I first encountered him in 1979, Notice the reference to 'ideal mental-economical unity' (whatever that means) - but there's nothing ideal about sensations. According to traditional philosophy, ideas and sensations belong to completely different ontological levels, namely that of form and matter, respectively. Logic consists, not of the relationship of experiences, but of ideas (including number and arithmetical proofs etc.) These are not 'experiences' and nobody 'experiences' them. When you see a mathematical proof - well, you migjht have an experience, 'Eureka', or whatever, but the seeing of it is not an experience at all, it is the operation of reason, which solely concerns the relationship of ideas.

The philosophical point of view of the average man - if that term may be applied to his naive realism - has a claim to the highest consideration. It has arisen in the process of immeasurable time without the intentional assistance of man. ...The fact is, every thinker, every philosopher, the moment he is forced to abandon his one-sided intellectual occupation by practical necessity, immediately returns to the general point of view of mankind. — Mach

Nonsense on stilts, empiricism run amuck.

Here, gOd, as one of the few omniscient beings on this forum, you will appreciate the delightfully-named Afrikan Spir. The three short paragraphs on his philosophy contain more substance than anything ever composed by Ernst Mach qua philosopher. (I noted in particular the likely relationship between the section under Ontology with the Parmenides.)

Still another important event the work [Thought and Reality] of African Spir. ...This work clarified my ideas on the meaning of life remarkably, and in some ways strengthened them. The essence of Spir's doctrine is that things do not exist, but only our impressions which appear to us in our conception as objects. Conception (Vorstellung) has the quality of believing in the existence of objects. This comes from the fact that the quality of thinking consists in attributing an objectivity to impressions, a substance, and a projecting of them into space. — Tolstoy

That is consistent with my post of yesterday, which expresses a very similar idea.

reading that passage from Tolstoy again, a caveat - when Tolstoy says 'things do not exist', I would say 'things do not have inherent reality'. It means almost the same thing, but not quite, and the difference makes a difference. The difference is, that there are are degrees of reality, whereby objects exist in some sense, but are not intrinsically real; they can be more or less real. Whereas in modern thought, as existence is univocal, it has only one meaning - things either exist or don't exist.

So I would paraphrase the 'things do not exist, but only our impressions which appear to us in our conception as objects' as 'things do not possess inherent reality, but their reality is imputed by observers.' Which is, again, close in meaning to the Copenhagen interpretation attitude.

I largely agree. If we take 'mind-independent' in a sharp, metaphysical sense. But I think the opposite position fails for the same reason. What is the 'mind' but experience of the 'world' or 'non-mind'? — g0d

If 'mind-independent reality' is a contradiction, then that only matters if it's a contradiction for us. What is it that is 'for us' and 'not just me' that grounds intelligible conversation? You and I have to share a language and a sense of logic to even discuss the issue. So being in language together is (I argue) being in a 'world' together. — g0d

In the quote above, you open with There are. What is in this 'are'? 'Reality is socially constructed' seems to want to tell me about reality, about 'real' reality. — g0d

That's why I didn't want to use the word 'mind', because the word is imbued with the idea that the mind is part of an external world, but what word could I use? People mostly use language in a context where they presuppose an external reality, so the words they use refer to things that are part of an external reality, but I am not referring to an external reality myself. That's the difficult thing with language, the same words can be interpreted in many different ways.

My point of view is that every being has their own reality. But when I talk of beings, I do not mean they are part of an external reality that can be described in any way. To me there are only beings who create their own reality and influence the realities of one another. We might say there are only minds, or that these minds all make up one whole, but what sense would there be in speaking of an external world or of non-mind in that view? Whatever world I speak of, it would be my own, not some external one.

We can't even say that "there are only minds" is an objective statement of an objective world, because we see that many minds do not agree with that view. And I talk of "we" because we have a common ground, our realities partially intersect.

When I say "there are only minds who create and shape the reality of one another", I am not talking about a "real reality" that applies to everyone, I am talking about my own reality, this is what I experience. And in my reality, others have a different reality, sometimes with a lot of common ground, sometimes with little. And in my reality, your reality will have been changed through our interaction, maybe in a negligible way that you don't consciously notice, or maybe in a significant way. And maybe you will come to agree with that, maybe that will become part of your reality, that will become real to you too.

I can't talk of a world in which minds move through some objective space or time and experience that world. I do not experience an external world in which other minds are, I experience other minds. My world was created and shaped by other minds and by my own. Maybe others will come to see that too. Maybe they won't.

In my view, in the temporary intersection of our realities we find regularities, which we summarize in what we call scientific laws, and we make predictions from them, from which we create technology, which is a way to shape our shared reality. In that view scientific laws would not have a universal everlasting validity, they would apply to a temporarily shared reality, and they would be wrong or meaningless to someone who doesn't share that reality.

That is the post my post you are responding is a response to — Janus

No, that's not the post you quoted. Looks like we are not sharing the same reality?

But the mind-independent framework has a lot of intractable and unsettling problems. In that framework we cannot explain how we can experience anything. We never see things as they are. Free will is very limited or inexistent. Why do these things bother us so much? Maybe because they are not an accurate representation of existence. These problems go away if we stop assuming a mind-independent reality. — leo



The problems as I see them are largely about awkward language. I don't think we can solve them. — g0d

I think it's more than just language. I think it's our recent habit of using science as the one and only tool for examining the world. To use science makes a lot of sense to me, because it has proven so helpful in the past. But to apply it where it doesn't really work is pointless. Other perspectives than the scientific one can also have merit.

From my Twitter timeline this afternoon:

We never see things as they are. Free will is very limited or inexistent. — leo

We already went over the free will issue. Re "never seeing things as they are" why would we believe that? Especially when we don't have evidence of how things really are, where that's different than the way we are seeing things, BUT, if we have evidence of that, then we're saying that we can see things as they really are, so there's no way to support the claim that we can not.

And I talk of "we" because we have a common ground, our realities partially intersect. — leo

Right. At the very least we have some kind of intersubjective situation. We are both (partially) 'here' ---wherever or whatever 'here' is.

In my view, in the temporary intersection of our realities we find regularities, which we summarize in what we call scientific laws, and we make predictions from them, from which we create technology, which is a way to shape our shared reality. In that view scientific laws would not have a universal everlasting validity, they would apply to a temporarily shared reality, and they would be wrong or meaningless to someone who doesn't share that reality. — leo

I think I can meet you here. Science is only possible within a 'form of life' or 'understanding of being' or a context of know-how and sharing an ordinary language for a metalanguage. Thanks to Hume, we know that it's just in our blood to expect the persistence of such patterns. And then, as I'm sure you know, science itself is filled with approximations that make calculation convenient or possible. Beyond that there are conceptual difficulties. We have algorithms that give reliable predictions, but we don't have an intuitive grasp on 'why' they work. We trust them as we might trust buttons we push that happen to keep giving us what we want.

Yet in practical life there is such a strong experience of law & order that it's like sanity itself to recognize and adapt to the patterns we find and trust.

People mostly use language in a context where they presuppose an external reality, so the words they use refer to things that are part of an external reality, but I am not referring to an external reality myself. — leo

I agree with you. I suggest that philosophers try to theorize this external reality in ways that don't work out (contradictions, ambiguities, aporias.) Non-philosophers think in terms of the food in the cabinet and the guilt or innocence of the accused (roughly the distinction between dreaming and actual sensual experience of the shared as opposed to private reality.) But even philosophers appeal to 'world' as I intend it. 'World' is what our philosophical theses describe. 'There is no single reality' is aimed at some kind of a single reality, since otherwise it would have no use. We who speak only have reason to talk and listen inasmuch as we are in a single reality/world which we can inform one another about. Yet we don't seem to be able to get clear on what this reality is (pre-conceptual? a priori structure of cognition?)

Notice the reference to 'ideal mental-economical unity' (whatever that means) — Wayfarer

I think that just means that intelligence is directed. To make sense of things we have to simplify them. And make sense of things in order to live well.

Mach was a rank materialist, — Wayfarer

I can't make sense of this claim. The paper I linked to sure looks 'non-dual' to me. It's not far from James' metaphysics. What we have are 'elements' that are neither mental nor physical. As I read Mach, it's only for selfish/practical reasons that we have to tighten up and think in terms of ego versus world. This also reminds me of Hegel's 'speculative truth.' Objects are concepts are objects are concepts. Elements are intelligible unities in a network, with interdependent essences. Idealism is holism. Abstraction is grasping an element out of its context and losing information. The truth is only in the whole, and we live that evolving truth (completing or extending god-reality).

According to traditional philosophy, ideas and sensations belong to completely different ontological levels, namely that of form and matter, respectively. Logic consists, not of the relationship of experiences, but of ideas (including number and arithmetical proofs etc.) These are not 'experiences' and nobody 'experiences' them. — Wayfarer

I agree, but this idea/sensation distinction is one of those useful abstractions. We live in a world of apples and tornadoes. It's hard to for us to dry out out concepts. When we do we are left with math or symbolic logic. I think Kant was basically right on math. It's based on a shared intuition of space.

On logic, what can we mean by 'nobody experiences them'? It is raining or it is not raining. P v ~P is a tautology. If no one experienced the force of logic, then what are arguments?

And as far as seeing proofs goes, I say look again at the proof without words of the Pythagorean theorem. Where is logic in that? The truth of that theorem can be grasp by spatial intuition being pointed in the right direction.

Nonsense on stilts, empiricism run amuck. — Wayfarer

I'm surprised you say that. What have you done today/tonight? Surely you have moved through the usual world of objects. You ate some food. You didn't doubt that the floor was beneath your feet, and that it was an 'external' floor that others could walk on. Naive realism looks like the default position of everyday life. It requires philosophy to think that it's all a dream or the intersection of private dreams, etc.

you will appreciate the delightfully-named Afrikan Spir. — Wayfarer

In his Journal (2 May 1896) Tolstoy wrote: "Still another important event the work [Thought and Reality] of African Spir. I just read through what I wrote in the beginning of this notebook. At bottom, it is nothing else than a short summary of all of Spir's philosophy which I not only had not read at that time, but about which I had not the slightest idea. This work clarified my ideas on the meaning of life remarkably, and in some ways strengthened them. The essence of his doctrine is that things do not exist, but only our impressions which appear to us in our conception as objects. Conception (Vorstellung) has the quality of believing in the existence of objects. This comes from the fact that the quality of thinking consists in attributing an objectivity to impressions, a substance, and a projecting of them into space". — wiki

But this reading sounds just like Mach, who responded to Kant and had a problem with the thing-in-itself (along with other post-Kantians).

To navigate existence as a whole, we find patterns in the pieces of existence, some of which we classify as self and others as world.

But usually we are something like naive realists, IMO. We are 'Conception' and we 'project' objects into space. Except we just experience them as objects that are already there.

We are both (partially) 'here' ---wherever or whatever 'here' is. — g0d

But even philosophers appeal to 'world' as I intend it. 'World' is what our philosophical theses describe. 'There is no single reality' is aimed at some kind of a single reality, since otherwise it would have no use. We who speak only have reason to talk and listen inasmuch as we are in a single reality/world which we can inform one another about. — g0d

If there are only minds, then there is no mind-independent 'here' or 'world' that our minds are in. In that view it is wrong to attempt to imagine minds moving or changing in some 'world', because there is no such world, the concepts of space and time do not apply to minds. Where we do encounter is within our realities.

What use is it to talk of a single reality if we can say nothing at all about it? Just like it is seen as meaningless to talk about what's outside the universe, in the view here it is meaningless to talk about a single reality.

And if we participate in creating our reality and in shaping the realities of one another, then in principle it would be possible to shape the realities of others to the point that we all see the same objective reality, in which subjectivity is gone. And that would be the death of our minds.

Mach was a rank materialist,
— Wayfarer

I can't make sense of this claim — g0d

I think I was incorrect, that Mach wasn't a materialist but a naturalist and monist.

agree, but this idea/sensation distinction is one of those useful abstractions. We live in a world of apples and tornadoes. It's hard to for us to dry out out concepts. When we do we are left with math or symbolic logic. I think Kant was basically right on math. It's based on a shared intuition of space. — g0d

I think that abstraction is more than simply a technique. The ability to grasp and form concepts is basic to language and reason. To refer to a neo-thomist explanation, 'As Aristotelians and Thomists use the term, intellect is that faculty by which we grasp abstract concepts (like the concepts man and mortal), put them together into judgments (like the judgment that all men are mortal), and reason logically from one judgment to another (as when we reason from all men are mortal and Socrates is a man to the conclusion that Socrates is mortal). It is to be distinguished from imagination, the faculty by which we form mental images...and from sensation, the faculty by which we perceive the goings on in the external material world and the internal world of the body (such as a visual experience of the computer in front of you, the auditory experience of the cars passing by on the street outside your window, the awareness you have of the position of your legs, etc.).'

So what I'm questioning is the idea that everything amounts to a form of 'experience' - logic and reason don't arise from experience, but are an innate capacity. But, 'innate capacities' are generally verboten to empiricists with their dogma of the 'blank slate' onto which everything is 'inscribed by experience'.

The other point I objected to is the role given to evolution. I seem to recall, Mach was one of the earliest scientists to philosophise on the basis of Darwinian theory. It seems to me, he assigns a degree of creativity or invention to evolution which I am questioning - when he says 'The fact is, every thinker, every philosopher, the moment he is forced to abandon his one-sided intellectual occupation by practical necessity, immediately returns to the general point of view of mankind'. But I'm not trying to defend a doctrine of 'creation'; my view is that at the point humans are able to use language and reason, they transcend the biological and our capacities are no longer explicable in purely biological terms. So it's the reduction of all the elements of human capacity to sensation and experience that I'm objecting to. But perhaps it's not materialism, so I was mistaken in that regard. But it fails to come to terms with the sense in which the mind generates or constructs our world-view, instead seeing it in biological terms. I’ll read the paper later.

If there are only minds, then there is no mind-independent 'here' or 'world' that our minds are in. — leo

But what can it mean for you to say what you said above? About what is it true?

What use is it to talk of a single reality if we can say nothing at all about it? Just like it is seen as meaningless to talk about what's outside the universe, in the view here it is meaningless to talk about a single reality. — leo

Is it meaningless for us to talk about a single reality? Or just for you? For me there's a performative contradiction in arguing against a single reality. Or rather the good arguments against a single reality are well aimed at bad conceptualizations of the single reality.

The single reality I have in mind is manifest in the very structure of our communication, the same communication we use to give artificial names to it like the 'physical.'

The ability to grasp and form concepts is basic to language and reason. — Wayfarer

I agree. It's a faculty. I believe that Hegel called it the 'understanding,' which tears organic unities to shreds.

So what I'm questioning is the idea that everything amounts to a form of 'experience' - logic and reason don't arise from experience, but are an innate capacity. But, 'innate capacities' are generally verboten to empiricists with their dogma of the 'blank slate' onto which everything is 'inscribed by experience'. — Wayfarer

Well I agree. But I don't see too many blank-slaters. Or if people still like the empiricists it's not for that. To be sure there are probably non-philosophers who still hold such crude views.

my view is that at the point humans are able to use language and reason, they transcend the biological and our capacities are no longer explicable in purely biological terms. — Wayfarer

I agree. I personally think we can't just ignore biology though. For instance, I don't believe in the afterlife because I do think my consciousness depends on the life and health of my brain --and therefore, at least these days, on the heath of the rest of the body. No brain, no consciousness. I can't prove that. If there was disembodied consciousness, it would be hard for us to verify it for obvious reasons. Especially in the context of wild claims from criminals who hear voices.

In the same way a UFO very well could grab a human for experiments and let them go. But if one thinks that most stories like this are false, then the true is lost in the haystack. I would need to see it happen.

It's the same with genuine spiritual experiences. They exist in the context of fakers. To me that is one reason why thinkers tend toward explaining things in terms of the familiar. And then anything too esoteric is almost by definition outside of (public) reason. One gets it or not. A sign is flashed. Let those with ears to hear...

Anyway, here's an example of Mach's relative open-mindedness.

In this investigation we must not allow ourselves to be impeded by such abridgments and delimitations as body, ego, matter, spirit, etc., which have been formed for special, practical purposes and with wholly provisional and limited ends in view. On the contrary, the fittest forms of thought must be created in and by that research itself, just as is done in every special science. In place of the traditional, instinctive ways of thought, a freer, fresher view, conforming to developed experience, and reaching out beyond the requirements of practical life, must be substituted throughout. — Mach

I think it's our recent habit of using science as the one and only tool for examining the world. ... Other perspectives than the scientific one can also have merit. — Pattern-chaser

Hi. I agree that other perspectives have merit. I'm not so sure that humans have ever used it as their one and only tool or that they ever could.

Hi. I agree that other perspectives have merit. I'm not so sure that humans have ever used it as their one and only tool or that they ever could. — g0d

Hey, sorry for the absence, been busy with shit. I have read your previous responses, and we will circle back upon them when the time is right. For now, let me jump in...

Science, or at least its general methodology is definitely the best known tool by which we, as a whole, can obtain a high degree of objective knowledge. But this in no way suggests that objective knowledge is superior to non-objective knowledge, and by that measure, neither can science be declared as the superior method for obtaining knowledge. Knowledge of my self, my life, who I am and where I stand is something that science cannot touch, at least not at the purest levels of subjectivity, and something that I would suspect has been on every true philosopher's mind at one time or another. For me, such subjective knowledge is infinitely important. Nevertheless, science shows excellent results.

I personally think we can't just ignore biology though — g0d

It's not a matter of ignoring it, but of extending it beyond it's domain of applicability. This is precisely what many a 19th century scientific rationalist wanted to do. Mach is a giant and I really am not disposed to trying to read a lot of his material, but I think this indicative statement from SEP might suffice:

Scientific thought arises out of popular thought, and so completes the continuous series of biological development that begins with the first simple manifestations of life.…. Indeed, the formation of scientific hypotheses is merely a further degree of development of instinctive and primitive thought, and all the transitions between them can be demonstrated.

The issue I see with it is that of biological reductionism. What does the theory of the origin of species set out to explain? As the name implies, the origin of species. I question the legitimacy of extending it to include the origin of science, or of the intellect, or of rationality as a faculty or capacity, because it implicitly or even explicitly reduces these capacities to those which can directly be understood for the advantage for reproduction that they obviously might provide.

You see, this is very much the kind of thinking that is the subject of the 'argument from reason'. That is a deep theological and philosophical argument, but it is basically a critique of metaphysical naturalism - which is what Mach's theory seems to be.This is that 'Reasoning requires insight into logical relations. A process of reasoning (P therefore Q) is rational only if the reasoner sees that Q follows from, or is supported by, P, and accepts Q on that basis. Thus, reasoning is valid only if it involves a special kind of causality, namely, rational insight into logical implication or evidential support. If a bit of reasoning can be fully explained by non-rational causes, such as fibers firing in the brain or a bump on the head, then the reasoning that arises from such bases is inherently untrustworthy.’ Or as Leon Wieseltier put it in his review of Daniel Dennett's 'Breaking the Spell'

Dennett does not believe in reason. He will be outraged to hear this, since he regards himself as a giant of rationalism. But the reason he imputes to the human creatures depicted in his book is merely a creaturely reason. Dennett's natural history does not deny reason, it animalizes reason. It portrays reason in service to natural selection, and as a product of natural selection. But if reason is a product of natural selection, then how much confidence can we have in a rational argument for natural selection? The power of reason is owed to the independence of reason, and to nothing else. (In this respect, rationalism is closer to mysticism than it is to materialism.) Evolutionary biology cannot invoke the power of reason even as it destroys it.

This actually is a really deep conundrum in modern philosophy, we can't just brush it off. Even though theists such as C S Lewis and Alvin Plantinga have used this argument in support of theism, non-theistic philosophers such as Max Horkheimer have also argued along similar lines in respect of the 'instrumentalisation of reason'. And I suspect Ernst Mach is one of those who set this wheel in motion.

You may have already looked at this, but in case not:
https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/ge/mach.htm — g0d

And this dude resisted the theory of the atom. That's how skeptical he was. Was his passion for understanding not spiritual somehow? — g0d

Thanks for the link, I have read the quotes you cited here but I will read the whole thing. I agree that not all physicists are rude or not open-minded to ideas that go against their cherished beliefs or theories, but they are the exception rather than the rule. And there may have been more exceptions in the past than there are today. Ernst Mach, Hendrik Lorentz, Henri Poincaré, Nikola Tesla, Henry Margenau, Arthur M. Young, David Bohm, John Stewart Bell, and many more that aren't well known, but they are still a tiny percentage. But then again they had in common that they did philosophy and not just physics. When you do physics only, you are stuck thinking within the mainstream theories of the era, seeing the assumptions at the root of the theories as truth rather than as assumptions.

But what can it mean for you to say what you said above? About what is it true? — g0d

I started the sentence with "If", "If there are only minds", "If there are only minds, then there is no mind-independent 'here' or 'world' that our minds are in". If you disagree with that sentence, I would be interested to hear what makes you disagree, because in my reality I don't see how it could be wrong.

If there are only minds, then nothing is not mind, so there is no 'here' or 'world' that is not mind. This is true to me because this is what I see, just like "the sky is blue" is true to me if I see something that I call sky which has the color that I call blue. I am involved in creating my truth.

Is it meaningless for us to talk about a single reality? Or just for you? For me there's a performative contradiction in arguing against a single reality. Or rather the good arguments against a single reality are well aimed at bad conceptualizations of the single reality. — g0d

It is meaningless to me if I assume that there are only minds and that minds do not see the same reality. If you tentatively make the same assumptions, and you do not see it as meaningless to talk about a single reality, then again I would be interested to hear what makes you disagree, because to me this points to your reality being different to mine in a way that I cannot yet grasp.

The single reality I have in mind is manifest in the very structure of our communication, the same communication we use to give artificial names to it like the 'physical.' — g0d

If I see/hear you using the word 'tree', and you see/hear me using the word 'tree', and I see you point a finger towards what I call a tree, and you see me point a finger towards what you call a tree, does that imply we are having the same experience, seeing the same thing? That same word could refer to very different experiences. Now if there is repeated consistency and agreements between how we name our experiences, then we can say there is a common ground between our realities. Does it imply there is one single reality? Are we going to agree on everything? What of people who don't see that tree? Is there something wrong with them, are they delusional because they don't see the single reality that you assumed exists?


It seems to me that as soon as there is subjectivity in our experiences, we can't reconcile that perfectly with a single objective reality. For instance, if you see something that others don't see, then others can attempt to explain why you see that in terms of what they see. If there is a single reality, then in principle they could find an explanation, such as your brain being different in some way to theirs. But if there is subjectivity in the way others see your brain, then they wouldn't all come up with the same explanation, some might even not find an explanation. Or even if they agree on an explanation, you may not agree yourself because they have not seen what you have seen, and they may not see how their explanation does not account for what you have seen.

There is comfort in the idea of a single reality. When we stick to what we agree on, it seems like there is indeed one reality. And when there is a disagreement that doesn't get resolved, we say the other is wrong, or delusional, or we agree to disagree, or we say that some day we might be able to explain that disagreement in terms of something we agree on. Today many people agree on the idea of a single physical reality, but they can't explain how is it that they can experience anything at all in such a reality. At that point there is only faith holding that single reality together. Minds believing in it.

[Mach]resisted the theory of the atom. — g0d

There were quite a few German scientists of that period who opposed atomism on philosophical grounds. I seem to remember this attitude was one of the things that drove Ludwig Boltzmann to suicide.

‘ Mach also became well known for his philosophy developed in close interplay with his science. Mach defended a type of phenomenalism recognizing only sensations as real. This position seemed incompatible with the view of atoms and molecules as external, mind-independent things. He famously declared, after an 1897 lecture by Ludwig Boltzmann at the Imperial Academy of Science in Vienna: "I don't believe that atoms exist!"[14] From about 1908 to 1911 Mach's reluctance to acknowledge the reality of atoms was criticized by Max Planck as being incompatible with physics. Einstein's 1905 demonstration that the statistical fluctuations of atoms allowed measurement of their existence without direct individuated sensory evidence marked a turning point in the acceptance of atomic theory. Some of Mach's criticisms of Newton's position on space and time influenced Einstein, but later Einstein realized that Mach was basically opposed to Newton's philosophy and concluded that his physical criticism was not sound.’ ~ Wiki

Again though basic principle seems to be ‘only sensation is real’ and abstraction is like a form of ‘generalised sensation’. So Mach was opposed to materialism, not from the same perspective as idealist philosophers, but because if only sensation is real then the positing of real external existents is unwarranted. That is why he is counted as a source of later logical positivism. But whilst he might be opposed to materialism, like all positivists he is completely opposed to the idea of there being a metaphysics. And I defend metaphysics on the basis that abstractions such as universals and number, are real, and can’t be derived from empirical principles.

It seems to me that as soon as there is subjectivity in our experiences, we can't reconcile that perfectly with a single objective reality. — leo

A Heraclitus quote which has always stuck with me is ‘whilst the many live each their own private world, the wise have but one world in common.’ (Quoted in The Aristos, John Fowles.)

Now you can see that modern science in a sense is striving for that ‘common world’ also, which is the world of primary objects and forces that can be shown to be ‘the same for all observers’. This notion is elaborated in great detail on Thomas Nagel’s important book, The View from Nowhere (review here.) Again, the particular contribution of modern scientific method was to bracket out the individual, the subjective, by discerning what could be quantified and validated by all observers. Or that was the theory. But as Nagel says, ‘Among philosophers of mind, the prevalent form of objective blindness is a cult of the method of the physical sciences, which leads in extreme cases to the outright denial of subjectivity. Against this Mr. Nagel insists that the subjectivity of consciousness is an irreducible feature of reality and it must occupy as fundamental a place in any credible world view as matter, energy, space, time and number.’

The blind spot, again.

Today many people agree on the idea of a single physical reality, but they can't explain how is it that they can experience anything at all in such a reality. At that point there is only faith holding that single reality together. Minds believing in it. — leo

This is strongly connected to the original post. The faith you speak of, is the faith that reality is physical and objective, or in any case, is amenable to discovery by the sciences. But as we have been discussing, this approach brackets out the subjective, as it presumes that whatever is real is indeed objective and quantifiable, but then what of the myriad points of view that seem to possess a reality of their own?

Again, I think the solution lies in the direction of ‘transcending subjectivity’ i.e. transcending the sense of self-hood, but not on the basis of according sole reality to the so-called ‘objective domain’. That’s the sense in which it is basically a spiritual quest.

Now you can see that modern science in a sense is striving for that ‘common world’ also, which is the world of primary objects and forces that can be shown to be ‘the same for all observers’. This notion is elaborated in great detail on Thomas Nagel’s important book, The View from Nowhere (review here.) Again, the particular contribution of modern scientific method was to bracket out the individual, the subjective, by discerning what could be quantified and validated by all observers. Or that was the theory. But as Nagel says, ‘Among philosophers of mind, the prevalent form of objective blindness is a cult of the method of the physical sciences, which leads in extreme cases to the outright denial of subjectivity. — Wayfarer

I agree, thanks for the reference, I will check it out.

This is strongly connected to the original post. The faith you speak of, is the faith that reality is physical and objective, or in any case, is amenable to discovery by the sciences. — Wayfarer

Yes, this is why I am posting in this thread ;)

I think the solution lies in the direction of ‘transcending subjectivity’ i.e. transcending the sense of self-hood, but not on the basis of according sole reality to the so-called ‘objective domain’. That’s the sense in which it is basically a spiritual quest. — Wayfarer

It seems to me that in the idea of transcending subjectivity there is still the idea of finding something objective 'out there', some eternal objective truth. I am more of the idea that we do not find the 'out there', we create it, and that when we create it it becomes real, to us. That we and others before us have created or shaped what we experience, and that we are the ones changing it. That if we insist in believing that scientific laws are the truth, are objective, are eternal, and we silence those who disagree, and we dismiss any experience that doesn't follow these laws as hallucination, or delusion, or imagination, then we will create such a world where nothing can transcend these laws, because in a profound sense we will stop experiencing anything that transcends these laws.

Many thought-provoking ideas here, thanks. I guess that one couldn’t have such without at least a little provocation, lol. In trying to sort out the players and positions (sounds like a sporting event), I found the Wikipedia on the relationship between science and religion helpful. Like this:

• Events in Europe such as the Galileo affair of the early-17th-century, associated with the scientific revolution and the Age of Enlightenment, led scholars such as John William Draper to postulate (c.  1874) a conflict thesis, suggesting that religion and science have been in conflict methodologically, factually and politically throughout history. Some contemporary scientists (such as Richard Dawkins, Lawrence Krauss, Peter Atkins, and Donald Prothero) subscribe to this thesis. However, the conflict thesis has lost favor among most contemporary historians of science.[12][13][14]
  
  Many scientists, philosophers, and theologians throughout history, such as Francisco Ayala, Kenneth R. Miller and Francis Collins, have seen compatibility or interdependence between religion and science. Biologist Stephen Jay Gould, other scientists, and some contemporary theologians regard religion and science as non-overlapping magisteria, addressing fundamentally separate forms of knowledge and aspects of life. Some theologians or historians of science, including John Lennox, Thomas Berry, Brian Swimme and Ken Wilber propose an interconnection between science and religion, while others such as Ian Barbour believe there are even parallels.

So in a generalization, there could be said to be perhaps three or four meta-positions: “Winner takes it all” aka the science vs religion worldview death match (Dawkins and creationists). The “two ways of looking at the same reality” view (Ayala, Teilhard de Chardin, et al). The “separate spheres” aka non-overlapping magisteria position (Gould). And the related view of “mostly separate, with some overlap and interconnection” (Wilber, et al). For whatever it is worth, I find all except the first (“only one winner”) interesting and worth exploring...