Gettier Differently

creativesoul

I assume that we are all familiar. If one follows the 'logic' Gettier follows, there seems to be a problem with JTB. I'm arguing here that it is Gettier's logic that is the problem. It's first seeded and later arrived at. This post will not cover all of the problems of either case. They run deeper than that, and as such are plentiful. There are accounting errors, as far as I can tell...

Firstly, Gettier changes Smith's belief by changing both the meaning and the truth conditions of it. He does so by invoking the so-called 'rules of logical entailment' and in doing so turned a false belief into true one.

That's completely unacceptable. Logic preserves truth. The rules of entailment do not. Therefore, the rules of entailment do not constitute adequate justificatory ground for the argument Gettier makes.

Remember, in the first case, Smith was - by Gettier's own admission - justified in believing that he would get the job. Smith thought to himself "I am going to get the job". Smith believed that he had secured the job. That is to think of and/or about oneself, not another.

That sort of thought/belief is self-reflective. It cannot be about anyone else. It turned out to be quite false. Yet Gettier's sleight of hand was invoking the rules of entailment as his own justification for changing an undeniably self-reflective thought/belief into belief about someone else. That move is unjustifiable here.

"The man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job".<----------that is not a valid move for either Smith or Gettier, unless the referent of "the man with ten coins in his pocket" remains unchanged.

alcontali

There are other reasons why knowledge is a justified belief and not necessarily a justified true belief.

For example, a mathematics theorem is a conclusion that necessarily follows from the explicit construction logic of an abstract, Platonic world, i.e. its set of axioms. If "true" means that a proposition appears in the real, physical world, then not one theorem in mathematics is "true". A provable mathematics theorem is still entirely valid knowledge.

Therefore, the JTB definition for knowledge is wrong. It must be JB instead.

This is the same conclusion as Gettier's, but obtained in a different way.

creativesoul

Smith is justified in believing that Jones owns a Ford. We'll grant Gettier there as well. However, Smith could not know that Brown was in Barcelona because he did not believe it, despite Gettier's other sleight of hand. Smith stated the disjunction because he believed it to be impossible that Brown was in Barcelona. That's why people state such ridiculous things on purpose. They find them beyond the ability(impossible) to be true. Such is the flavor of sarcasm.

Jones owns a Ford or I am a money's uncle. The second disjunct is not a belief. Only the first is.

creativesoul

This is the same conclusion as Gettier's, but obtained in a different way. — alcontali

I don't see the similarity.

creativesoul

The barn facade is the same problem. Accounting malpractices. The belief is that the facade is a barn. Another barn or sheep actually being present somewhere outside the scope of one's sensory perception is irrelevant here. The belief is about that which has been singled out.

What's left of Gettier?

creativesoul

If "true" means that a proposition appears in the real, physical world, then not one theorem in mathematics is "true" — alcontali

If "true" means that a proposition appears in the world, there is something terribly wrong with the framework.

alcontali

The correspondence theory of truth requires some kind of legitimate isomorphism between the true proposition and the history of the universe. Furthermore, I completely agree with Bertrand Russell that the alternative, i.e. the coherence theory of truth, is nonsensical.

With "appearing in the real world", I meant structurally isomorphic with the real world, in line with Bertrand Russell's considerations on the matter.

alcontali

I don't see the similarity. — creativesoul

Gettier concludes that JTB (Justified True Belief) must be JB (Justified Belief). I conclude the same conclusion (JTB --> JB) but for different reasons.

In the debate, Is "justified true belief" a good definition for knowledge?, I agree with the answer: SImply put "Justified belief" is enough As stated so clearly by Gettier.

creativesoul

The correspondence theory of truth requires some kind of legitimate isomorphism between the true proposition and the history of the universe. — alcontali

I like everything I've read from and about Russell. I agree that coherence alone is inadequate/insufficient. I diverge from convention correspondence schools primarily with regard to propositions and all that they entail. I reject propositions in lieu of thought/belief statements. Belief cannot be reduced to propositions. Statements can. Thought/belief is long before statements.

creativesoul

↪alcontali

SImply put "Justified belief" is enough As stated so clearly by Gettier. — alcontali

Regardless of what Gettier says...

I disagree.

We cannot know a falsehood.

alcontali

Thought/belief is long before statements. — creativesoul

Agreed. However, as long as thought/belief has not been expressed in language, it cannot be communicated unambiguously. We still use lots of body language, but probably not in the context of philosophy.

creativesoul

Thought/belief is long before statements.
— creativesoul

Agreed... — alcontali

Therefore to hold that all belief is propositional in content is a mistake, unless one also holds that propositions are somehow existentially independent of language. Such would have to be the case if thought/belief is prior to language and all thought/belief is propositional in content.

alcontali

I disagree. We cannot know a falsehood. — creativesoul

Statements that have no correspondence with the real, physical world are not (necessarily) false. They are simply not "true" as meant in the correspondence theory of truth.

For example, if we construct an abstract, Platonic world in which there are two symbols, S and K, and two rules [1] Kxy = x [2] Sxyz = xz(yz), then we can trivially demonstrate by applying both rules that (SKx)y = y. Therefore, SKx is the identity operator in this abstract world.

Is the claim about the identity operator "true"? (In terms of the correspondence theory)

No, because the SKI combinator calculus corresponds to absolutely nothing in the real, physical world. It is just a system of rules that create a new abstract, Platonic world.

The proposition that SKx is the identity operator is certainly provable in the SKI Platonic world, as it can be justified through standard symbol manipulation. Hence, it is a justified belief (JB), i.e. knowledge. However, it has absolutely nothing to do with the real, physical world or its associated "truth".

creativesoul

Statements that have no correspondence with the real, physical world are not (necessarily) false. They are simply not "true" as meant in the correspondence theory of truth. — alcontali

Statements of thought/belief. That is what I'm talking about here.

For example, if we construct an abstract, Platonic world in which there are two symbols, S and K, and two rules [1] Kxy = x [2] Sxyz = xz(yz), then we can trivially demonstrate by applying both rules that (SKx)y = y. Therefore, SKx is the identity operator in this abstract world. — alcontali

I'm granting all this. It's true by definition. Different animal altogether.

alcontali

I'm granting all this. It's true by definition. Different animal altogether. — creativesoul

Worse than that!
It is not even true!

It is merely provable (from the construction logic of that abstract, Platonic world).

Furthermore, provable and true are entirely distinct concepts.

The correspondence theory's truth is absolutely never provable, simply, because we have no access to the (axiomatic) construction logic of the real, physical world, i.e. the notorious theory of everything.

Furthermore, Gödel's incompleteness theorems proves that there are statements that are (logically) true but not provable.

Of course, logically "true" does not mean correspondence theory's "true".

Logically "true" just means that there is an abstract, Platonic world in which statements are being mapped on a set of arbitrary truth values, one of which is arbitrarily called "true"; while these truth values satisfy a given set of rules, as specified in lattice algebra.

In other words, Gödel's incompleteness does not mean anything in the real, physical world, but it is definitely provable in the abstract, Platonic world of number theory.

creativesoul

The correspondence theory's truth is absolutely never provable, simply, because we have no access to the (axiomatic) construction logic of the real, physical world, i.e. the notorious theory of everything. — alcontali

I would disagree here.

Correspondence is easily provable. That's what verification/falsification methods look for.

creativesoul

↪alcontali

You'll quickly get beyond my comprehension level using such mathematical jargon. Can you make the case in plain language?

alcontali

Correspondence is easily provable. That's what verification/falsification methods look for. — creativesoul

Provable, according to proof theory, means that the proposition necessarily follows from the construction logic of the world (in which you prove it).

You cannot possibly achieve that with the real, physical world.

It just cannot be done.

That is why science, for example, which merely experimentally tests in the real, physical world, does not prove anything. Contrary to popular belief, there is no such thing as a scientific proof. General philosophy also does not prove anything.

It is not possible to prove anything at all about the real world.

At best, you can collect some kind of evidence.

That is why insisting on the correspondence theory's truth for knowledge claims is such a faulty proposition. Provable knowledge is never (correspondence theory's) true.

creativesoul

Provable, according to proof theory, means that the proposition necessarily follows from the construction logic of the world (in which you prove it).

You cannot possibly achieve that with the real, physical world.

It just cannot be done. — alcontali

There's a certain amount of irony here. I mean do you live somewhere else, aside from the real physical world?

Validity is a measure of coherency. Coherency is insufficient for truth. "Logical truth" is a misnomer.

creativesoul

Provable knowledge is never (correspondence theory's) true. — alcontali

Rubbish. We can know all sorts of provable stuff, and did, long before this school of thought you espouse was invented.

I can know that I'm typing on a computer. My typing can be shown. There is no better proof of my typing than watching it happen.

alcontali

I can know that I'm typing on a computer. — creativesoul

What you see with your own eyes is true, if you are eyes are not lying to you, but it is never provable.
Try to (objectively) prove that you are typing on a computer. You cannot. It is simply impossible to do that.

This link is a good explanation as to why it is not possible to prove anything about the real, physical world.

alcontali

There's a certain amount of irony here. I mean do you live somewhere else, aside from the real physical world? — creativesoul

Our conversation takes place in a virtual world. It is just an elaborate simulation of artifacts of the real, physical world. The "page" you see in front of you is not physical. It is virtual. It is not fully an abstract, Platonic world, because it still requires running processes on multiple computer systems. It is still close, though. You could see things on that screen that are totally imaginary but look completely real. These things will not be real. They will still be virtual.

The real, physical world is just one of the many worlds we operate in. The Platonic and virtual worlds in which we operate are equally relevant; sometimes even more relevant that the real, physical world.

I happily operate in all three types of worlds.

Terrapin Station

↪creativesoul

For once we completely agree. I've pointed out this very issue before (and I think I might have posted either here or on the old board about it).

As you say, this one critique can't cover all Gettier examples, as there are so many different types of Gettier examples, but many of them proceed via assuming that logical conventions are applicable where they don't really work.

Terrapin Station

If "true" means that a proposition appears in the real, physical world, — alcontali

While we're at it, what would it "mean" for a proposition to "appear in the real, physical world"?

(Ah, you cleared that up a post or two later: With "appearing in the real world", I meant structurally isomorphic with the real world, in line with Bertrand Russell's considerations on the matter. )

Would you say that it doesn't make sense to use "true" and "false" in logic?

Terrapin Station

Gettier concludes that JTB (Justified True Belief) must be JB (Justified Belief). — alcontali

?

That's not what he's saying. The typical approach to the Gettier problems, by the way, is not that JTB is wrong, but that it needs to be better qualified. So, for example, it requires that the justification doesn't turn out to be only accidentally supportive.

Terrapin Station

I reject propositions in lieu of thought/belief statements. Belief cannot be reduced to propositions. Statements can. Thought/belief is long before statements. — creativesoul

"Proposition" and "statement" are usually treated as synonymous.

alcontali

That's not what he's saying. The typical approach to the Gettier problems, by the way, is not that JTB is wrong, but that it needs to be better qualified. — Terrapin Station

Well, with the entire field of mathematics not being correspondence-theory "true", the "T" in JTB is simply too much of a problem. If math is knowledge, then JTB is wrong. It must be JB instead.

Terrapin Station

Well, with the entire field of mathematics not being correspondence-theory "true", the "T" in JTB is simply too much of a problem. If math is knowledge, then JTB is wrong. It must be JB instead. — alcontali

Couldn't you say that mathematical statements correspond to relations/the way relations work, at least within the system that we've set up?

deletedusercb

Well, with the entire field of mathematics not being correspondence-theory "true", the "T" in JTB is simply too much of a problem. If math is knowledge, then JTB is wrong. It must be JB instead. — alcontali

And I think it should be JB. As an adjective 'true' is just silly. Justified we can work with. Best justified is also workable. But to add the adjective 'true' implies that it is both justified and true,w hen in fact all we have access to is the justification. We have no extra process where we can then go and determine whether it is true. OK, we can checked off justified or best justified, now let's see if we can check off true. If, for example, there is some obvious counterevidence, well that would weaken the justification. It would not longer be justied or well justified. Truth is for the Pope. And even he will then justify - well or not is another issue.

creativesoul

...to add the adjective 'true' implies that it is both justified and true,w hen in fact all we have access to is the justification. We have no extra process where we can then go and determine whether it is true. OK, we can checked off justified or best justified, now let's see if we can check off true... — Coben

Popular line of thought, but false on several levels.

We have some access to what's happened and/or is happening. That's all we need(assuming a meaningful claim) to check if the claim is true(or not).

Truth is for the Pope. — Coben

Rhetorical drivel based upon a gross misunderstanding of truth and the irrevocable role that it plays in all thought/belief and statements thereof, including your own.

creativesoul

Throw truth out the window, and you get the conditions for Trump.

Gettier Differently

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