As I said, the issue here is one of convention. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, didn't mean to ignore what you've said, MU, just trying to see how it fits into my understanding.

I surely agree that there's much convention involved in the matter, starting with the particular ccontent of what people report about their experiences. This is pretty much what I meant by the historical and social context. People express their experiences in terms of the conventions of their particular social context.

Indeed, as you've noted, we express our various explanationsdof phenomena in the terms and framework of some set of conventions or other. But not all explanations are equal. Different explanations fulfill different purposes and have different consequences, reliableness, and degrees of confirmability.

But there's also a more general convention at play jere across history and cultures--namely that such experiences are of some kind of breakthrough from some other realm of reality. The particulars of this realm are often understood in terms that reflect the conventions of the particular social context, but the pattern of realm crossover is virtually universal. This, and other patterns that are found across cultures, are taken by some people as evidence of the existence of some other actual realm that's non-physical, and perhaps timeless. But that's just one category of explanation. The various sciences, increasingly the cognitive and evolution sciences, offer alternative, naturalistic explanations for the ubiquity of such patterns.

And since you ask, I am perfectly willing to claim that sociological, cultural, psychological, and other such perspectives also provide much additional understanding about religious belief, behavior, and experience. — Brainglitch

Sure, but they only provide an understanding of religious belief, behavior and experience 'from without' as they are seen as objectified empirical phenomena.

The various sciences, increasingly the cognitive and evolution sciences, offer alternative, naturalistic explanations for the ubiquity of such patterns. — Brainglitch

Maybe that's because they've literally started to see through the space-time matrix which, until now, science has taken for granted.

But I think it needs to be made clear that the attempt to explain what may be called 'questions of ultimate concern' in scientific or naturalistic terms, is inherently reductionist. And why? Because science itself relies on quantification of objective and measurable data. Call that 'objectification'. But such an attitude forgets what has already been excluded in the historical development of scientific method.

What secular reason is missing is self-awareness. It is “unenlightened about itself” in the sense that it has within itself no mechanism for questioning the products and conclusions of its formal, procedural entailments and experiments. “Postmetaphysical thinking,” Habermas contends, “cannot cope on its own with the defeatism concerning reason which we encounter today both in the postmodern radicalization of the ‘dialectic of the Enlightenment’ and in the naturalism founded on a naïve faith in science.”

Does Reason Know what it is Missing?, Stanley Fish, NY Times.

Now natural sciences might well open up new vistas on the territory previously regarded as being in the domain of philosophy and religion - indeed they already have. But the point about those older discipines is that in them, the subject is also the object. Spiritual philosophies can be quite scientific in a sense - in fact there is traditional term for such an approach, the 'scientia sacra'. But it is not an arms-length, third-person study, in the way that science is, in that it requires rigourous and disciplined self-awareness and moral commitment.

But there are some very insightful scientists whose work is not at all hostile to such perspectives, and many cutting-edge disciplines and fields that draw on both (about which there are many excellent interviews on Closer to Truth. See for instance Donald Hoffman's interviews.)

Gosh. What a long thread for an OP that was just a hit and run that was simply a crude expression of opinion contained not a single philosophical argument (or any other sort of argument in fact)!

I see that the OP has never returned.

Provided a pretext for one of my favourite topics, though.

I see that the OP has never returned. — andrewk

In Wayfarer's words, "driveby contributor".

But not all explanations are equal. Different explanations fulfill different purposes and have different consequences, reliableness, and degrees of confirmability. — Brainglitch

This statement betrays a slight scientific bent. The term "equal" is inapplicable here, it is derived from a scientific reductionism which intends to reduce all qualities to quantities. When we compare one description, or explanation, to another, we cannot start with any assumptions of equality. Even that a plurality of descriptions might be differing descriptions of the same thing, is something which must be determined, i.e. that they are referring to the same thing. If we enter this process of determination with any premise of equality, such that we assume that two explanations are of the same thing for example, then we allow the possibility of mistake. So we dismiss equality altogether, and move to your second suggestion, which is purpose.

Purpose necessitates inequality in a number of different ways. What is relevant here, is that one's intended purpose influences the aspects of the observable object which, that individual has interest in, thereby influencing one's attention, consequently influencing one's description, explanation, or observation. "Purpose" is highly influenced by, but if you allow free will, not dictated by, social and historical context. The limits to the influence of social and historical context are the extent to which we follow conventions. Of course we must allow that conventions are themselves "becoming", coming into existence and evolving. This is the manifestation of free will, how we are, in actuality unconstrained by conventions. Conventions are the means by which the free willing being constrains the physical world, not vise versa.

But there's also a more general convention at play jere across history and cultures--namely that such experiences are of some kind of breakthrough from some other realm of reality. — Brainglitch

If you understand what I described in the last paragraph you will see that we must allow as "very real", the expressions of individuals which are completely non-conventional. It is only by allowing the merit of the non-conventional that we allow the constraints of conventions to be transcended, and the evolutionary process to proceed. But the interesting thing here, which you have just pointed to, and which Wayfarer is highly in tune with, is that once we transcend the conventions of the particular culture which we exist within, we approach another layer of much more general conventions which seem to be proper to all of humanity.

There appears to be a true separation between these two layers. This I believe is due to the separation between what is important to us here and now, within an individual's life within a particular culture, and what is important in the very long term, important to life in general. So one set of conventions focuses the attention according to the intentions of here and now, very short term, while the other looks to the most long term intentions, I'll call this the timeless. This creates the separation, as the intermediary intentions become negligible, unimportant.

The particulars of this realm are often understood in terms that reflect the conventions of the particular social context, but the pattern of realm crossover is virtually universal. This, and other patterns that are found across cultures, are taken by some people as evidence of the existence of some other actual realm that's non-physical, and perhaps timeless. But that's just one category of explanation. The various sciences, increasingly the cognitive and evolution sciences, offer alternative, naturalistic explanations for the ubiquity of such patterns. — Brainglitch

Our terms of description and explanation are proper to the short term conventions, the societal constraints of common communication. That is why, when we move to describe the constraints of the timeless, the descriptions can only be understood according to the conventions of a particular culture. Despite the fact that one tries to explain something which transcends all social contexts, that individual is restricted in this effort by the constraints of a particular social context.

Now we've come full circle back to the concept of "equality". It is concepts such as these, equality, mathematical principles, identity (the notion that we are actually talking about the same thing), which are common to all cultures, that validate and justify the assumption of a non-physical, timeless reality.

Here's the difficulty with respect to purpose. Communication evolves from the very short term intention. Mathematics and other fundamental logical principles strive toward the long term, the timeless, to be always true. Science is relegated to an intermediary position. It tries to uphold and adhere only to the highest standards of timeless principles, but it is nonetheless forced by the particulars of social context to conform to short term principles. This is an act of the materialist short term intentions overwhelming the timeless. In this position science exposes weakness in timeless principles (ones that aren't actually timeless), while also exposing weakness in short term principles (ones which aren't consistent with proper long term principles). As I alluded to above, the intermediate position is somewhat unimportant, expendable, as the evolutionary forces produce the necessity of freeing the timeless from the constraints of social context. The important point being that the constraints of social context (conventions) must be transcended.

This statement betrays a slight scientific bent. The term "equal" is inapplicable here, it is derived from a scientific reductionism which intends to reduce all qualities to quantities. When we compare one description, or explanation, to another, we cannot start with any assumptions of equality. Even that a plurality of descriptions might be differing descriptions of the same thing, is something which must be determined, i.e. that they are referring to the same thing. If we enter this process of determination with any premise of equality, such that we assume that two explanations are of the same thing for example, then we allow the possibility of mistake. So we dismiss equality altogether, and move to your second suggestion, which is purpose. — Metaphysician Undercover

Pretty soapboxy.

And mistaken.

All I meant by "not equal" was, as I said, that different explanations have, for example, different purposes, different consequences, different degrees of confirmability. There are many other differences, of course (including explanatory power, predictiveness, logical coherence with other knowledge, falsifiability, etc.) Not only was I not priveleging scientific explanations, I was, in fact, acknowledging the legitimacy of explanations based on presuppositions and concepts different from those of science.

Also, you might note that the mentioned different purposes and different consequences do not entail reducing qualities to quantities, as you mistakenly insist. And though the reliableness of propositions can be measured quantitatively, even reliability is routinely judged qualitatively instead.

Purpose necessitates inequality in a number of different ways. What is relevant here, is that one's intended purpose influences the aspects of the observable object which, that individual has interest in, thereby influencing one's attention, consequently influencing one's description, explanation, or observation. "Purpose" is highly influenced by, but if you allow free will, not dictated by, social and historical context. The limits to the influence of social and historical context are the extent to which we follow conventions. Of course we must allow that conventions are themselves "becoming", coming into existence and evolving. This is the manifestation of free will, how we are, in actuality unconstrained by conventions. Conventions are the means by which the free willing being constrains the physical world, not vise versa.

Nothing I've said is inconsistent with this.

If you understand` what I described in the last paragraph you will see that we must allow as "very real", the expressions of individuals which are completely non-conventional. It is only by allowing the merit of the non-conventional that we allow the constraints of conventions to be transcended, and the evolutionary process to proceed. But the interesting thing here, which you have just pointed to, and which Wayfarer is highly in tune with, is that once we transcend the conventions of the particular culture which we exist within, we approach another layer of much more general conventions which seem to be proper to all of humanity.

There appears to be a true separation between these two layers. This I believe is due to the separation between what is important to us here and now, within an individual's life within a particular culture, and what is important in the very long term, important to life in general. So one set of conventions focuses the attention according to the intentions of here and now, very short term, while the other looks to the most long term intentions, I'll call this the timeless. This creates the separation, as the intermediary intentions become negligible, unimportant.

Well, people's expressions may be "very real," but that doesn't entail that we must accept that what they say is true, or even intelligible, just because they've expressed it, whether what they assert is conventional or not.

And if what someone else happens to care about is pragmatic applicability, or demonstrable predictiveness, or rigorous logical coherence with the rest of what he construes as knowledge, or empirical corroboration, or possible at least in principle to falsify, for example, and the very real expression at issue does not deliver these, then one would reject such expressions at least as irrelevant. On the other hand if, rather than these concerns, what someone cares mostly about is something else, such as, for example, a metaphysical explanation based on different concepts and presuppositions, and unencumbered by requirements of demonstrable predictiveness, falsifiability, etc. then this person will not judge certain of the very real expressions to be irrelevant, but rather as constituting important knowledge.

Gotta stop here, for now at least.

Really? Do explain. — darthbarracuda

Why? Was it not clear to you from my last post in which I mentioned other possibilities? Given these other possibilities, your assertion is simply false; as would be the assertion that it is necessary to eat with a knife and fork; as would be the assertion that the fact that we eat dinner makes it necessary.

You're going to have to argue, then, that infinite regresses or spontaneous creation acts are reasonable. Because if we are arguing from with a certain metaphysical framework, then they are, from what I and many others can tell, are not coherent. — darthbarracuda

All I have to do is argue that there are other possibilities, which there are. For there not to be, they'd have to entail a contradiction, which you'd need to demonstrate.

Infinite regress is incoherent, and labeling something with a different name doesn't change the ontological role it plays. — darthbarracuda

You need to demonstrate that infinite regress is incoherent, as opposed to simply stating it as if it were an established fact.

And yes, of course, I haven't denied that, but your labels are unclear and may well be inappropriate. So, to be clear, I'm just talking about the possibility of a first cause, not specifically about anything theological, hence my conscious decision not to adopt any theological terms like the ones that you've used.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plotinus/#2 — darthbarracuda

No, I'm not going to read an encyclopaedia entry about Plotinus. You can quote it if doing so will somehow support your claim that this represents what is typical, and if you don't think that it does, then it was pointless to provide that link.

I don't really wish to elaborate on the details of my experience. Although I would like to point out that I've had several of these experiences. And I continue to experience them, even this afternoon at church. I was so overwhelmed by what I was experiencing I had to fight back tears throughout. This is a feeling I can't really put into words. I cannot seem to do it much justice by trying to intellecualise it. It's a level of joy and experience that simply cannot be conveyed it would seem.

I think it's quite simply magic. And there will never be a a science for what is magical. There is no way of understanding it well by any means of intellectualism. No matter how hard I try.

I'd say it has to be experienced. But I imagine the default position otherwise would be indifference/ignorance. Seriously some of the replies here give me the impression that a lot of philosophers are emotionally unwell - you're simply missing the point. And somehow getting yourself worked up about it. While under the impression that you can establish yourself as correct, when you simply haven't experienced my experience. It's madness. I did chuckle a bit when someone suggested I was mentally ill in the very same breath as a lot of bitter and resentful shit they'd written.

I think some people might have got the impression I was proposing a position here. The initial post doesn't make good philosophy. But it also doesn't make bad philosophy. It's clearly not a philosophical argument. And while I might have reacted similarly in the past I now find such behaviour baffling. You're simply missing the point. And then getting worked up about it.

Some people are quite intellectually developed. But they seem to lack the emotional maturity to develop a valid viewpoint here.

This doesn't apply to all. A lot of people have had something quite reasonable to say. But I do feel for the others. I've been there. Hopeless and relentless intellecualising in the pursuit of an answer that is really quite simple when you find it. God, that is.

It's important to trust your feelings. They provide much more accurate insight than words ever could. Such is faith.

ply="Sapientia;29005"]

You're the one who seems unwell. That's a very cynical outlook. You logic isn't consistent

I don't really wish to elaborate on the details of my experience. — colin

Typical. Well, this is a philosophy forum, and your post and attitude are unphilosphical. I don't really care about these experiences of yours that you came here to boast about and use as an excuse to insult others, and which you refuse to even describe in detail so that they can be considered and discussed properly.

I was so overwhelmed by what I was experiencing I had to fight back tears throughout. — colin

I think it's quite simply magic. — colin

>:O

The initial post doesn't make good philosophy. — colin

Indeed.

But it also doesn't make bad philosophy. — colin

Yes, it does. We only have your testament to go by, your reasoning is weak at best, and you've left out important details which you refuse to go into.

You're the one who seems unwell. That's a very cynical outlook. You [sic] logic isn't consistent — colin

Coming from someone who believes in magic, thinks he has had experiences of God, and has a history of mental illness...

Nobody disputes that you've had some kind of powerful experience.

What is debatable, though, is your assertion that your experience involved a supernatural being--God--connecting with you, and that this therefore entails that God exists, and atheism is false.

So, your experience is yours, and you are free to interpret it any way you please, but your propositions are on the forum table open for discussion.

One counter to your assertion, for example, is that your own brain generated the experience, and therefore, you have not shown that atheism is false.

I'm not here to validate my experiences to you. All I'm trying to share is that religious experiences have rendered any argument you could come up with meaningless to me. Whether that be in favour of God's existence or otherwise. The way I see it I have experience in the matter, while your understanding is purely theoretical.

When you focus on technicalities you lose sight of what's obvious. I used to crave information that I considered factual to develop my understanding of existence. Now I just go with what I know to be true without reasoning it. Does something have to be technically validated when you know it to be obviously true? Or is that just madness?

I was once a master philosopher. Now I've grown up and can move on with my life. It was kinda fun being right about everything. But it was ultimately quite a sad existence.

The opinions of others on this matter are quite irrelevant to me now that I've had these experiences. That's all I wanted to let you all know. So maybe be wishful and hope that you too might find God. Otherwise, let it go.

Goodbye.

I was once a master philosopher. Now I've grown up and can move on with my life. It was kinda fun being right about everything. — colin

Then you were not a master philosopher at all. To be quite crude about it, you were an incompetent one. Remember Socrates: 'all I know is that I know nothing'. That is a master philosopher.

And now it seems that you again think you are right about everything. All that has changed is your belief about what that everything is.

'm not sure what the "doctrine of divine simplicity" does here. Nor why Dawkins thinks that a complex universe needs a complex designer (or what a complex designer is for that matter). — Πετροκότσυφας

That is where we started! I was arguing that Dawkins' depiction of an 'infinitely complex being' - larger and more complex than the universe itself - is a misunderstanding and misrepresentation of deity. Let's leave it at that.

Dawkins' inference is simply that surely an intelligence that could in every infinite detail and interrelationship intend, design, comprehend, know how to create, and manage the universe would be more complex than the complexities we limited humans are able to observe.

Sure, that might hold if you are operating under the presupposition that intelligence is mechanistic or modular.

Unlike the controversial Mr Dawkins, I have no problem with the notion of divine simplicity, as long as it is not coupled with the assertion that the divinity is a 'person'. Since persons are the most complex things that we have ever encountered, it seems strange in the extreme to say that something that is perfectly simple is also the most complex thing.

I have no doubt that a Thomist could supply a word salad long enough to feed a billion Cookie Monsters (if Cookie Monsters ate salad, which - sadly - I suspect they don't) to explain why the two are perfectly compatible, but that would do nothing to make the suggestion any less ridiculous to my paltry human imagination.

Complexity can indeed excede the complexity of the causal agent, as, for example, when a vast and intricate ecosystem is caused by a beaver damming a stream, but nobody has said the beaver intended, designed, created out of nothing, and comprehended it in every infinite detail and inter-relationship.

In which, he demonstrates his non-understanding of what it is that he is criticizing. It is an anthropomorphic projection. He is projecting God as a kind of super-engineer, a manufacturer on a cosmic scale.

That is why I keep referring to the scathing critique of his book by Terry Eagleton, aptly called 'Lunging, Flailing, Mispunching'.

Dawkins speaks scoffingly of a personal God, as though it were entirely obvious exactly what this might mean. He seems to imagine God, if not exactly with a white beard, then at least as some kind of chap, however supersized. He asks how this chap can speak to billions of people simultaneously, which is rather like wondering why, if Tony Blair is an octopus, he has only two arms. For Judeo-Christianity, God is not a person in the sense that Al Gore arguably is. Nor is he a principle, an entity, or ‘existent’: in one sense of that word it would be perfectly coherent for religious types to claim that God does not in fact exist. He is, rather, the condition of possibility of any entity whatsoever, including ourselves. He is the answer to why there is something rather than nothing. God and the universe do not add up to two, any more than my envy and my left foot constitute a pair of objects.

This, not some super-manufacturing, is what is traditionally meant by the claim that God is Creator. He is what sustains all things in being by his love; and this would still be the case even if the universe had no beginning. To say that he brought it into being ex nihilo is not a measure of how very clever he is, but to suggest that he did it out of love rather than need. The world was not the consequence of an inexorable chain of cause and effect. Like a Modernist work of art, there is no necessity about it at all, and God might well have come to regret his handiwork some aeons ago. The Creation is the original acte gratuit. God is an artist who did it for the sheer love or hell of it, not a scientist at work on a magnificently rational design that will impress his research grant body no end.

Pretty soapboxy. — Brainglitch

"Soapboxy", I like that. Does that mean I have something to stand on?

And mistaken. — Brainglitch

The fact is though, that you used "equal", and so I commented on your use of that word. If you meant something different from "not equal", then the mistake is yours for using that word, which is not the word you should have used. You were talking about qualitative differences, and I was merely pointing out that it is a mistake to even talk in terms of equality. Yes, you are absolutely right to say that different explanations are "not equal", this we can take for granted. All I was pointing out, is that your use of the term betrays a perspective which already assumes an equality, an identity, as "same", such that you had to verbally negate this equality, in order to discuss the fact that there are different ways of explaining things.

My point was, that once you negate this equality, you have no principle of identity whereby you can claim that Colin and you for example, are even talking about the same thing. So as soon as you acknowledge that explanations differ, as you say there are differences between explanations, we need to produce some principles of identity if we want to feel confident that we are describing the same thing. Notice that Colin is crafty, and avoids any specifics concerning the experience, so that we have absolutely nothing to identify with.

Well, people's expressions may be "very real," but that doesn't entail that we must accept that what they say is true, or even intelligible, just because they've expressed it, whether what they assert is conventional or not. — Brainglitch

But we have to first identify what is being referred to by the explanation, or description, before we can make any judgements about the truth or falsity of the description. When the description is a description of one's own personal inner experience, how are you, as another, able to identify that experience in order to verify what is being said about it? The only access which you have, to enable identification, is through the means of the other's description. You can only identify that experience through the other's description of it. The described experience can be assumed to be no other than the description of it, without an accusation of lying. So how could you say that the description is false unless it contained inconsistency, or blatant contradiction? But Colin is careful not to go there.

This leaves me wondering what you think personhood consists in.

Dawkins is responding to the widespread fundamentalist christian notions of "Intelligent Design" and couching his critique consistent with their widely preached notions of God.

Unlike the controversial Mr Dawkins, I have no problem with the notion of divine simplicity, as long as it is not coupled with the assertion that the divinity is a 'person' — AndrewK

I get that. I think the bottom line is, that the 'fundamental ground' - that from which everything is derived - is not an 'it', any kind of stuff, energy, or material substance, but is in some sense alive - like sentient energy (although words and images fail here).

Right - he only understands it in terms of fundamentalism, because he himself is a type of fundamentalist. That is where Karen Armstrong's response to Dawkins is useful - she shows the history of how this widespread misconception became common currency.

I don't find atheism entirely plausible, meaning I find the notion that the universe, and all of its composition, all of its laws, all of its evolutionary principles, consciousness, beauty, etc. all just appeared from nowhere.

I don't believe such fundamentalist notions are either widespread or widely preached. I would say that if you don't go to fundamentalist churches or mosques or listen to teleevangelists then you will be unlikely to encounter fundamentalist teachings.

Necessary conditions for my notion of personhood include consciousness, self-consciousness, non-predictable response to stimuli, possession of emotions, preferences and making plans for the future.

I'll leave you all with one more insight before I go. After all I did come here to spread positive feeling and I do feel I owe it to the philosophical community, which provided me with an intellectually strict basis with which to begin to know God -- thus totally reinforcing my faith once I'd found it. That is, to be constructive here.

I found God (and thus, joy and fulfillment) when, and only when, I opened myself to it. That is, when I really embraced positive behaviour to connect with others. Often at my own discomfort. But I was determined to at least know that I tried my best and couldn't find God. That is, before I discarded the idea that gave many millions such a seemingly profound sense of joy, that deep down I knew I was just envious of. My point is, it takes work. You have to earn enlightenment. Otherwise, it would lack any meaning.

After years of laughing at religious people, and condescending them from way up on my high horse, I came to learn that I was no cleverer than any of them. Much stupider actually! Although I was a much more fluent communicator than most of these people, and my competence in debate was far more advanced... I had obsessively developed these skills to distract from my own insecurity.

These people were bright enough to simply know what is obvious to me now. They're wired correctly. They simply know what feels good and keep at it. They can see it without figuring it out. They know what's right without having to spend much time or effort justifying it. And really, it is so simple.

An example of my past intellectual delusion is that I used to think emotive language was for morons. Now I know better. I don't make the strongest arguments any more. But my viewpoint is far more contagious. And I'm far more loved for it.

So... try to be positive in your thinking and behaviour. Really try. Until you've learned these behaviours. And I'm sure you too will then see enlightenment. The mindstate that knows no definitive description.

Its just, some of us have learned to know better, while others are still searching. And I guess that's all there is to it.

Kind wishes to all.

The widely preached fundamentalist Chridstian ID reasoning is that the complexity we observe in the world cannot possibly exist unless if was intended--designed, comprehended in its infinite details, created, and actively sustained by an intelligence capable of doing such a thing. By which they mean God as they conceive of him.

Dawkins is responding to these widespread notions of "Intelligent Design," and couches his response to them in the language and concepts of their widely preached and published notions of God.

But we have to first identify what is being referred to by the explanation, or description, before we can make any judgements about the truth or falsity of the description. When the description is a description of one's own personal inner experience, how are you, as another, able to identify that experience in order to verify what is being said about it? The only access which you have, to enable identification, is through the means of the other's description. You can only identify that experience through the other's description of it. The described experience can be assumed to be no other than the description of it, without an accusation of lying. So how could you say that the description is false unless it contained inconsistency, or blatant contradiction? But Colin is careful not to go there. — Metaphysician Undercover

As I said to Colin, no one is challenging his claim to have had a powerful experience. What we are able to address in such instances, though, is the propositional content of what a person has put on the table.

Consider this less contentious analogue: Grandma reports to us that she awoke in the middle of the night to go to the bathroom last might, and her cat, Mister Paws, was waiting for her on the bed when she got back. He purred and snuggled her, and somehow communicated to her that he was doing fine, and didn't hold a grudge against the guy who flattened him with the cement truck last week.

Do we believe that Mr. Paws is alive and well in the great beyond and broke through and made contact with Granny, who is intransigently convinced, or do we think the more likely explanation for Granny's experience is that Granny's grieving brain generated the whole incident?

Do we believe that Mr. Paws is alive and well in the great beyond and broke through and made contact with Granny, who is intransigently convinced, or do we think the more likely explanation for Granny's experience is that Granny's grieving brain generated the whole incident? — Brainglitch

In this case, Granny has offered us some specifics. Mister Paws was on her bed. But we might know Mister Paws was buried in the ground, dead, with a cement block on top. So with a few other premises we can deductively conclude that for some reason granny is not giving us accurate information.

Colin hasn't given us such specifics. All Colin said in the op is that he had "profound religious experiences", and he now knows that God exists. We cannot disprove the descriptions of his experiences because he hasn't provided any. All we can do is to attack the claim that he knows that God exists, if we happen to believe otherwise. But unless we have some proof that God does not exist we have no justification for attacking Colin's claim of profound religious experience, nor his claim to know that God exists. It is completely logical that someone else could know something which is contrary to your belief, if there is no evidence to back up your belief.

I found God (and thus, joy and fulfillment) when, and only when, I opened myself to it. That is, when I really embraced positive behaviour to connect with others. Often at my own discomfort. But I was determined to at least know that I tried my best and couldn't find God. That is, before I discarded the idea that gave many millions such a seemingly profound sense of joy, that deep down I knew I was just envious of. My point is, it takes work. You have to earn enlightenment. Otherwise, it would lack any meaning. — colin

I empathize with this experience. For much of my life I scoffed at the idea of God, and especially religion. I never went to church, and as a child I considered that to be a ridiculous exercise. But of course I heard mention of God, and in the back of my mind there was insecurity in my atheist practise, a feeling of "what if" God was real. I knew that I needed reason to truly reject God. So I worked hard to find that reason, read the Bible, studied religious materials, and guess what? It didn't work. All that hard work, to find reason to reject God only allowed me to find God.