What about the question, 'is the Universe an intentional creation, or is it the product of unconscious processes?' Who is an 'expert' on that question? — Wayfarer

Looking for an expert? Look no further. With confidence I'll fill that position.

You get the point. — BrainGlitche

If you mean, the point of that post, I'm afraid I don't. What I am saying is that to explain religion in historical or sociological terms, rather than its own terms, is reductionist. It is of course true that Christians will describe the Divinity in terms of the Biblical tradition, and Hindus in line with the Vedas; that I regard as a manifestation of what can be called 'archetypal psychology' (pace Jung and Mircea Eliade)

I think that what is interesting here is that you actually agree with Dawkins, you just do not seem to realise it. — 'Πετροκότσυφας"

Thanks for your comments, I can see you are learned, but I fear we're getting into very substantial topics here.

But I must insist as a matter of principle, apart from fact, that I don't agree with Dawkins. Getting back to the point at issue: Dawkins claims that a God must be larger and more complex than the entire universe, to have created a Universe, and then he says it is ridiculous to believe in such a being. To which a believer will respond: it would be, and we don't!

This view is plainly an anthropomorphic projection, but aside from that, it is also a failure of the imagination. It is the product of a particular kind of mentality, a mind-set, of Enlightenment scientific rationalism, which can only understand a particular kind of causation. I don't think that Dawkins (or his ilk) would comprehend the original philosophical meaning of the term 'first cause'. So whenever he attempts to think of a first cause, he will do so in the terms in which he is expert, which is, in terms of antecedent material factors, terminating in some scientifically understandable physical event. So 'God' can only be a kind of super-designing agent, because he must think in those terms. (There is an agonising video of Dawkins in earnest discussion with his 'friendly adversary' Alistair McGrath, where Dawkins says he can conceive of life as having been created by an advanced interstellar race, but never by such a grotesque creature as his understands God to be, where he's plainly struggling, but failing, to understand McGrath's point.)

So Dawkins is unable to appreciate why such an attitude may be an error, without in some sense rising above, or stepping outside of, the mindset which gave rise to it; which I'm sure Dawkins could never do (or at least he has never demonstrated any ability to do). So given his assumptions, then such a God could never exist. And I agree with that, but I don't think it actually says anything. Yes, there are many fundamentalists, and probably many well-meaning Christians, who believe in an anthropomorphic sky-father, but that doesn't justify his ignorance of the deeper meanings behind the idea.

As to why I would say that 'God is not an existent' - that is a completely different matter. Here I'm referring to the idea of God 'beyond existence', in the traditionalist sense.

As you are probably aware (and not many will be) in traditional philosophical theology, the nature of the reality of the First Cause, is different to the nature of the realiity of phenomenal beings. There is an authoritative statement of such a conception in the writings of John Scotus Eireugena, in his philosophical treatise, The Periphyseon . I'm not able to try and summarise a work of such immense scope in a post, but I refer to it for one reason only, and that is its conception of the fact that there are levels of being or reality, and that things that exist on one level of reality, do not exist on another. A very brief edited excerpt:

According to the first mode [of the four species of being], things accessible to the senses and the intellect are said to exist, whereas anything which, ‘through the excellence of its nature’ (per excellentiam suae naturae), transcends our faculties are said not to exist. According to this classification, God, because of his transcendence is said not to exist. He is ‘nothingness through excellence’ (nihil per excellentiam).

The second mode of being and non-being is seen in the ‘orders and differences of created natures’ (I.444a), whereby, if one level of nature is said to exist, those orders above or below it are said not to exist:

For an affirmation concerning the lower (order) is a negation concerning the higher, and so too a negation concerning the lower (order) is an affirmation concerning the higher. (Periphyseon, I.444a)

According to this mode, the affirmation of man is the negation of angel and vice versa (affirmatio enim hominis negatio est angeli, negatio vero hominis affirmatio est angeli, I.444b). This mode illustrates Eriugena's original way of dissolving the traditional Neoplatonic hierarchy of being into a dialectic of affirmation and negation: to assert one level is to deny the others.

I don't want to get into the intricacies of different theological models, but just to illustrate the awareness of these kinds of 'modal metaphysics', which have long since vanished from the domain of discourse in the West. Of course, other philosophies and spiritual systems will have different models, but 'in all of them, there are "levels of being" such that the more real is also the more valuable; these levels appear in both the "external" and the "internal" worlds, "higher" levels of reality without corresponding to "deeper" levels of reality within. On the very lowest level is the material/physical world, which depends for its existence on the higher levels. On the very highest/deepest level is the Infinite or Absolute' (John S Ryan).

Whereas, physicalism, which Dawkins is proposing as the underlying rationale for his view, denies any kind of modal metaphysics - there is only one true existent, namely, matter~energy, and we're all products of that. And this view itself, is actualy a product of the antecedent theological tradition, but transformed, or deformed, virtually beyond recognition, by the dominance of materialism.

Here is a very simple representation (from Integral Philosophy) of the basic idea behind an hierarchical ontology:



Yes, but then everyone else will disagree, and it will be Groundhog Day all over again. ;-)

...it seems you'd have thrown down a Summa Theologica... — Heister Eggcart

This work explores, and expands Aristotelian concepts such as matter, form, potential, actual, the four types of causation. Without a prior understanding of how Aristotle developed these concepts himself, the work would prove to be a very difficult read.

I'll add that many of the modern theologians that I've read are just poor writers. They'll use terminology with established meanings, yet ruin it with poor writing. — Heister Eggcart

It's a real shame to see deep conceptual structures completely ruined, laid to waste, simply through misuse of words. Words of philosophical significance enter the mainstream, and pick up common meaning. Then the philosophical concepts which these words originally signified are completely hidden, lost behind those who use the words in the haphazard way. The ruin is caused by those who are insisting that the words have no meaning deeper than the common meaning, and are not tied to any deeper, foundational conceptual structures.

It is uncontroversially true that the content of the vast majority of reported religious experiences from people throughout history and across the world is a function of their historical and social context. No coincidence that Moses got the Ten Commandments from Yahweh rather than Lord Krishna or Osiris or Jesus or Athena or Uranus or Ishtar or Bigfoot or the wee faeries ... — Brainglitch

Of course whatever is communicated must be communicated in the language and the terms of the culture in which it is communicated; but from that obvious fact it does not follow that the content of the experience is a function of the culture. The form the experience takes and the form the communication takes will certainly be mediated by the culture, just as people are; but to say that the experience is a "function" of the culture is to claim that it is exhaustively produced by cultural forces and that claim is yet to be be justified. Even if it is accepted (as would be reasonable) that the way in which experiences of any kind are communicated is a culturally mediated phenomenon that is not enough to show that the communications of experiences are exhaustively determined by culture and certainly not that the experience itself is exhaustively determined by culture.

Note that I never said that what people report as religious experiences is "nothing more than functions of the cultures i which they occur." But it is clear that people draw on content from their own context to explain their experiences. And if we are to take them at their word, then their experiences would justify us in believing in whatever supernatural beings they report encountering. Or, we can accept that they had some kind of powerful experience, but understand their interpretations of them as dependent on their particular historical and social context.

Well you didn't say originally that they are "in part functions of culture", so what you said did imply that they are nothing more than the functions of culture.

If we take those who report spiritual experiences at their word, then their reports would justify a belief that they were convinced that they had encountered a supernatural or a spiritual (or at least a 'more than empirical') being. Spiritual experiences, and the descriptions of them, do not justify the belief of anyone other than the person who has the experience or another person who has had a similar experience that resonates profoundly with the description of the spiritual experience. Spiritual experiences or intuitions are not like empirical experiences or intuitions; they cannot be demonstrably confirmed or disconfirmed within inter-subjective experience and discourse. And the beings that are to be encountered in such descriptions are not like the determinate entities to be found in descriptions of empirical experiences; so there is really no determinate entity to be believed in in a determinable way. This is why so many theistic/atheistic arguments are exercises in believing there is disagreement on the mistaken basis of talking about different things while all the time imagining that the same things are being talked about in the same way.

This work explores, and expands Aristotelian concepts such as matter, form, potential, actual, the four types of causation. Without a prior understanding of how Aristotle developed these concepts himself, the work would prove to be a very difficult read.

Which makes theology all the more confusing, but sometimes it can be fun! O:)

It's a real shame to see deep conceptual structures completely ruined, laid to waste, simply through misuse of words. Words of philosophical significance enter the mainstream, and pick up common meaning. Then the philosophical concepts which these words originally signified are completely hidden, lost behind those who use the words in the haphazard way. The ruin is caused by those who are insisting that the words have no meaning deeper than the common meaning, and are not tied to any deeper, foundational conceptual structures. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your username makes me think you're some philosophers' hitman, ready to deal a long and excruciatingly complex mental death to any who dare not love the ways of truth >:)

The truth can pack a pretty good punch itself. I think that might be what Colin refers to in the op.

Maybe you bullied him into saying it's the truth, :-O

If you mean, the point of that post, I'm afraid I don't. What I am saying is that to explain religion in historical or sociological terms, rather than its own terms, is reductionist. It is of course true that Christians will describe the Divinity in terms of the Biblical tradition, and Hindus in line with the Vedas; that I regard as a manifestation of what can be called 'archetypal psychology' (pace Jung and Mircea Eliade) — Wayfarer

It is entirely legitimate to explain anything in whatever way such explanation provides insight.

The OP assertion can be expressed as "I experienced God, therefore God exists."

It is this that I've challenged. One of my challenges is that if we accept this argument as sufficient for rational others to subscribe to the existence of God, then we should subscribe to belief in the existence of various other deities and supernatural beings and happenings as similarly reported throughout history and across cultures. And we know that the particular deities, beings and events that people report are a function of their particular context.

Also, note that the OP and the vast majority of reported encounters with the supernatural specify a particular being, not some plastic "Divinity." They encountered Yahweh, or the God of Christianity, or Mary, or the risen Jesus of Nazareth, or Saint X or the Angel Y, or Lord Krishna, etc. Dismissing what they actually report, and saying that they're all really just encounters with the same amorphous "Divinity" is a claim from your theology, not theirs.

With proper philosophy, perhaps, but it seems you'd have thrown down a Summa Theologica or, let's say more contemporarily, any of the more religious works by Kierkegaard. — Heister Eggcart

I've never read any Kierkegaard (except for the occasional quotation referenced in secondary sources), so I can't comment on that. Though I should point out that I've actually thrown very few books, and only threw away one book out of disgust, to the best of my recollection (the less said about that, the better...I will say only that it was a New Agey-type book which I bought on a whim years ago, and turned out to be one of the worst things I'd ever read).

I agree with you that the OP doesn't constitute any kind of argument. That was actually the first thing I said in this thread. But subsequently it has provided the opportunity to write about a subject of interest, so here we are.

In respect of the 'plastic divinity' - nice expression, by the way! - it's simply that if one were to accept the claims of all of those who say 'ours alone is the truth', then it is very easy to argue that if they all say that, then they all cancel each other out, there is no truth to be had - which is another common Dawkins style of argument.

So I am referring to the idea of an underlying truth, a philosophia perennis, of which the various specific traditions are instances. I know that claim is contestable, but in a pluralistic society I prefer it to the alternative.

Oh go on, A, what was it....?

Incidentally apropos of your comment on Krauss some pages back, herewith two critical reviews, one from a physicist, one from a philosophical theologian.

I wonder what Lemaître would think of Krauss.

Oh go on, A, what was it....? — Wayfarer

The New Agey book wasn't particularly philosophical, so don't worry. Beyond that, the less said about it, the better (though I will say that, beyond the ideas and purported phenomena being discussed, the writing style itself was absolutely atrocious, which added to my disgust).

Incidentally apropos of your comment on Krauss some pages back, herewith two critical reviews, one from a physicist, one from a philosophical theologian.

Yes, I've read the one by Albert. I haven't even read the Krauss book (as I pointed out), much less endorsed it. No doubt I could find laudatory reviews, as well. My point about his book A Universe from Nothing was only the sort of theistic arguments he was attempting to rebut (prime mover-style arguments, in this case). Whether he rebutted them successfully is immaterial here.

But the thing is that even the great theologians of theistic traditions understand causality, agency, love etc in this way and it is when their interpretation of scripture is not reconcilable with such understandings that they try to revise their understanding. That's why their writings exist, that's what they try to accomplish. — Πετροκότσυφας

Perhaps you could provide a citation showing where a great theologian proposed a model of divinity similar to that critiqued in The God Delusion.

as if Dawkins and the New Atheists are the only manifestation of the Enlightenment…

Not at all, I am referring to scientific materialism, scientism, neo-darwinian materialism, and so on, of which these writers are representative. The Enlightenment was obviously multi-faceted.

A good analogy would be a certain kind of opponent of post-modernism, specifically the one who never bothered to read and try to understand any of it. It's the same issue, it's a dead matter to them.

Fair point.

I had thought, myself, that I don't want to be 'a believer' - I associate that kind of mentality with a certain kind of gullibility or soft-headedness. That is why I investigated religious thought through comparitve religion and anthropology and the like. But as I'm neither materialist, nor atheist, then I have to accept that the alternatives to materialism are in all likelihood regarded 'theistic' or at any rate that is how they are usually described.

But the fact that I think there is anything there to be studied, means I am probably what most would mean by a 'believer'. So obviously I must think there is something to learn in it - and I do.

But it's also a question of there being so many things to study, and so little time. There are areas of modern philosophy I know I will never have neither the time nor motivation for.

I take issue with such arbitrary groupings

Also a fair point. The problem is, in a forum, and in respect of such large issues, one has to use some generalisations, otherwise it would turn into a postgraduate seminar.

I, who ascribe to a neo-platonic hierarchy, can very well act more like you who who share a flat physicalist ontology with Dawkins.

Sorry? You think I'm advocating physicalism? I'm sorry if my writing is so atrocious.

It isn't that I don't want to discuss theological points, it's more that once you delve into the details of such arguments, they can become very big topics. But suffice to say, I don't believe in the 'flat physicalist ontology' of the secular intelligentsia. I think that the idea of an 'hierarchy of being' is represented in all the world's cultures and that it represents something of great importance which has generally been forgotten. Sorry if I hadn't made that clear.

Woh, this discussion grew fast...

If Colin saw God like I have seen my hand, then his laughing off atheists is understandable. If Colin did see God in this way, I'd ask he show me. — Hanover

But we both know that that ain't the case, right? I mean, not with absolute certainty, but there's no way in hell he'd be able to show you, and I think that the most plausible explanation is that this is because he didn't experience God in the first place, and, at the least, that he didn't experience God in a way similar to seeing your hand.

As a a devout non-atheist, I find the whole certainty thing about God's non-existence as troubling as the certainty espoused by the theists. It's obvious that there is a universe and its obvious we don't know how or why it got here. Some bow down in humility to this fact and some boast that they know our existence is all just meaningless coincidence. I'd say both need to just admit they have no inkling of the answer. — Hanover

But we should both be certain of the nonexistence of God in accordance with some conceptions. I am, at least.

I still find the nonexistence of any God more plausible than the existence of any God, even in accordance with the more plausible conceptions. And I think that consistency, which includes avoiding special pleading, is important, and seems to favour atheism, since questionable exceptions to a more sceptical position often seem to be made by non-atheists with regards to the existence of God.

Whether it's an example of a "No True Scotsman" fallacy or what, I don't know, but you can't just deny those religionists who say things you don't like, and then claim that Dawkins et al are philosophically naive for grappling with their arguments. — Arkady

Yeh, that was my suspicion. That his interpretation was being favoured and used to exclude others - despite their existence, and despite the large number of adherents, and despite any theological literature which seems to accord with such an interpretation - and then blaming Dawkins for not seeing things his way, or for choosing to focus on other theistic positions.

Suffice to say if you never believed that Adam and Eve was a true story, the fact that it is not doesn't have any particular significance.

To me this shows that we usually try to be specific in the process of "othering" or when we feel that we are put in a group we don't think we belong - not through the process of understanding. That's in essence the difference between polemics and scholarship. — Πετροκότσυφας

These discussions are more polemics than scholarship.

But please answer me this. You say above that you 'ascribe to a neo-platonic hierarchy'. I presume, therefore, that the passage I quoted previously from Scotus Eiriugena would be meaningful to you.

I ask this, because I think that notion of a hierarchy of being, which is basic to neoplatonism, is generally absent from modern philosophy. Would you agree with that?

//edit//

You can look up Berkeley's "De Motu", around the 30th paragraph. — Πετροκότσυφας

I have found that reference. (I don't want to read up on Al-Ghazali, as I have no background in Islamic studies.) Berkeley's discussion at this point is about the cause of motion - that motion in nature is a consequence of 'God continuously acting'. However I still don't think there is anything in this discussion which overturns the 'doctrine of divine simplicity', i.e. that depicts God as a complex being or a 'super-manufacturer' in the sense criticized by Dawkins.

...the fact that every event must have a cause necessitates the existence of an uncaused Prime Mover of pure actuality. — darthbarracuda

That is simply false.

Indeed, infinite regresses and spontaneous creation acts do not seem to make sense, so it is conceptually necessary to postulate the existence of something that is not affected by the normal cause and effect we see every day. — darthbarracuda

That argument doesn't support your claim. It only supports a weaker revised version which mirrors your use of "it seems to make sense". Although that reduces to the even weaker "it seems to make sense to some people, but not others".

So within our metaphysical framework, we seem to be required to postulate the existence of a Prime Mover, or God. Otherwise we must provide a different framework, or show how God is not necessary in our original framework. — darthbarracuda

Easy. Infinite regress or a first cause without the inappropriate labels of "Prime Mover" or "God".

Additionally, God is typically not seen as "complex", but rather necessarily "simple". The Neo-Platonists and their neighbors taught that complexity cannot explain complexity. Simplicity is what does all the explanatory work, for all complex structures can be reduced to their components. — darthbarracuda

You might be right, but I find that doubtful, and you'll need more than a reference to the Neo-Platonists and "their neighbours" to back up your claim that this is typical. The omni- attributes are typical, and they seem to imply complexity, as does an intelligent designer. Hard to deny, actually, I'd say. And those Biblical verses I linked to earlier on page one seem to back this up.

I think the theist can persuasively argue that a complex system entails a complex designer, but I don't see how it follows that a designer cannot create a system more complex than himself. — Hanover

Sure, that seems possible. But if the theist-in-question is to go down that route, then he or she mustn't also contradict him or her self by, for example, claiming that this designer is God, as defined in a manner similar to that of Anselm and others, as that than which nothing greater can be conceived. There might be a way around that particular criticism, by, for example, taking advantage of the ambiguity of "greater". But, prima facie, the two seem to clash.

It is entirely legitimate to explain anything in whatever way such explanation provides insight.

The OP assertion can be expressed as "I experienced God, therefore God exists."

It is this that I've challenged. — Brainglitch

What I think is at issue here is the conventions employed when we describe our experiences. It is by means of these conventions that my description of my experience is consistent with how you would describe your experience, or consistent with an experience which you would think is possible. There are certain conventions whereby "I experienced God" is a perfectly legitimate statement. However, there are atheists who would openly challenge such conventions, claiming that there is no such thing as God, therefore any convention which allows for such a description is illegitimate.

In comparison, consider empirical sciences, and the conventions in play, whereby observations are described. In high energy physics there are conventions whereby certain phenomena are described in terms of elementary particles. There are scores of such "particles", referring to different observations incurred under distinct conditions. But these aren't "particles" in any common sense use of the word "particle", this is something completely different. It is simply the accepted convention, within the field of physics, to refer to "elementary particles" in describing such observations.

Now, just like an atheist would oppose the conventions whereby an individual might refer to an "experience of God", an 'anti-particle physicsist' might oppose the conventions whereby physicists refer to "elementary particles" in describing these observations. There is really no difference here. In theology, the conventions are in place which allow us to say that we have experienced God, in the same way that physicists claim to have observed elementary particles. But just like atheists claim that it is impossible for the individual to experience God, because God does not exist, it is equally justified to claim that it is impossible that physicists have observed elementary particles, because fundamental particles do not exist. Just like the atheist argues that "God" is a misconception, we could equally argue that "elementary particles" is a misconception.

In each case, it is simply a question of whether the person describing one's own experience is doing so in a way which is acceptable to others (conventional). And of course, what is acceptable to some, is not acceptable to others.

I agree with you that the OP doesn't constitute any kind of argument. That was actually the first thing I said in this thread. But subsequently it has provided the opportunity to write about a subject of interest, so here we are.

In respect of the 'plastic divinity' - nice expression, by the way! - it's simply that if one were to accept the claims of all of those who say 'ours alone is the truth', then it is very easy to argue that if they all say that, then they all cancel each other out, there is no truth to be had - which is another common Dawkins style of argument.

So I am referring to the idea of an underlying truth, a philosophia perennis, of which the various specific traditions are instances. I know that claim is contestable, but in a pluralistic society I prefer it to the alternative. — Wayfarer

If it's legitimate to propose that people's reports of their alleged religious experiences are not really about the particular supernatural beings and events they say they are, but rather are evidence of some kind of "underlying truth, a philosophia perennis, of which the various specific traditions are instances." then why is it not legitimate to simply observe that the actual content they report is a function fo their social and historical context?

Furthermore, given our understanding of the brain's irrepressible tendency to automatically and largely non-consdciously construct some kind of meaningful explanatory narrative for our experiences--often a complete confabulation--I propose that the particular content the brain uses in these constructions would be drawn from the person's own context, and that the "underlying truth" about such reports is that they are fictions generated by brains doing exactly the kind of thing we know brains do.

That is simply false. — Sapientia

Really? Do explain.

That argument doesn't support your claim. It only supports a weaker revised version which mirrors your use of "it seems to make sense". Although that reduces to the even weaker "it seems to make sense to some people, but not others". — Sapientia

You're going to have to argue, then, that infinite regresses or spontaneous creation acts are reasonable. Because if we are arguing from with a certain metaphysical framework, then they are, from what I and many others can tell, are not coherent.

Easy. Infinite regress or a first cause without the inappropriate labels of "Prime Mover" or "God". — Sapientia

Infinite regress is incoherent, and labeling something with a different name doesn't change the ontological role it plays.

You might be right, but I find that doubtful, and you'll need more than a reference to the Neo-Platonists and "their neighbours" to back up your claim that this is typical. — Sapientia

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plotinus/#2

If it's legitimate to propose that people's reports of their alleged religious experiences are not really about the particular supernatural beings and events they say they are, but rather are evidence of some kind of "underlying truth, a philosophia perennis, of which the various specific traditions are instances." then why is it not legitimate to simply observe that the actual content they report is a function fo their social and historical context? — BrainGlitch

Because it is reductionistic, i.e. provides an explanation in terms other than those in which the reports are presented. I have studied comparitive religion, there are entire schools of thought in anthropology and sociology in which these issues are debated. Freud for instance was a convinced atheist, he provided a compelling account of how the Crucifixion myth was really an instance of sublimated Oedipal anxiety. Emile Durkheim believed that Gods represented the collective social order. Max Weber's The Protestant Work Ethic was another very influential essay in sociology of religion. Examples can be multiplied indefinitely, comparative religion is a massive body of literature. Now such arguments often have their merits, I'm not saying that they are to be dismissed, as they often contain important insights and novel perspectives. But I also don't think they do justice to the subject matter when they attempt to 'explain it away' or show that it's 'really' simply a consequence of a socio-economic factor or ingrained cultural conditioning. That is why books like Wiliam James' 'Varieties of Religous Experience' and those of comparative religionists like Mircea Eliade, and first-hand accounts of mystics, are important - they present the reports of experience as real data, not as something to be rationalised or explained away. And they present many things which can't be explained or assimilated by our Western scientific-secular mindset.

Speaking of the way 'the brain constructs', that applies to all of us and to every kind of cultural narrative, including science. We nowadays have this smug sense of modern superiority, but most people's insight into the implications of this fact is skin-deep in my view. It is arguable that contemplative prayer and yogic practices actually work by providing insight into this process of 'world-construction'.

And finally, amongst the varieties of religious experience, one thing not to loose sight of is the understanding that there are insights or visions or states of being which are 'salvific' (in just the way our drive-by contributor says). There really are conversion experiences, sometimes in terms like 'seeing the light', sometimes ineffable or incommunicable, which forever change the understanding and outlook of the subject. That can manifest across a whole spectrum of experiences, such as emotionality or weeping or falling into states of rapture, on the one hand, to a sublime and detached intellectual vision into the eternal order of things, on the other, that you might find in the Western philosophical tradition. And many points in between. All of those states are represented at some point in the Christian tradition as well. But most of us prefer to think about them from our assumed position, the conventional categories into which we have slotted our understanding of 'science' and 'religion' and 'philosophy'.

Because it is reductionistic, i.e. provides an explanation in terms other than those in which the reports are presented. — Wayfarer

First, note that the terms in which the reports are presented differ substantively from person to person, and demonstrably are terms from their own particular historical and social contexts.

Second, explanations from perspectives based on premises and concepts other than those used by the people reporting and interpreting their experiences are neither illegitimate nor necessarily reductionist. This is exactly how science hss advanced our understanding of the world, such as when it proposes explanations contrary to the shaman's, that the child's sickness is caused by microbes, rather than by the evil eye from the old lady who lives alone down by the river, and that seizures are caused by neurological malfunction rather than by demon possession.

But when science is applied to subjects where it has no jurisdiction is precisely when it morphs into 'scientism'. And that is no more so than when it is applied to subjects rather than objects. And please spare the faithful the 'angry thunder god' hypothesis, it is patronising in the extreme. Certainly there are religious superstitions, but to equate religion and supersition is the essence of scientism.

But when science is applied to subjects where it has no jurisdiction is precisely when it morphs into 'scientism'. And that is no more so than when it is applied to subjects rather than objects. And please spare the faithful the 'angry thunder god' hypothesis, it is patronising in the extreme. Certainly there are religious superstitions, but to equate religion and supersition is the essence of scientism. — Wayfarer

No jurisdiction?

If there are observable phenomena (the assertions people make about their experiences), and empirical data (the content of their explanations), then it is entirely within the "jurisdiction" of science to propose explanations.

Note that what you call "the angry thunder god hypothesis" quite pointedly reveals that legitimate--not to mention demonstrably reliable--explanations need not be based on the same premises and presuppositions and concepts as explanations "from within"--which is the whole point I was making. I was not equating religion and superstition. (Though now I do have the impression that you want to reject the innunerable superstitious aspects of religion as "not true religion.")

If there are observable phenomena (the assertions people make about their experiences), and empirical data (the content of their explanations), then it is entirely within the "jurisdiction" of science to propose explanations. — Brainglitch

What 'science' deals with that? How do you go about it 'scientifically'? I mentioned before, although apparently I need not have bothered, that I have studied these exact questions through comparative relgion and anthropology, which in regards to this subject, are pretty close to what could be called scientific.

But again, if you're claiming that the variety of religious experiences 'really are' able to be understood through sociological, cultural, psychological, or other such perspectives, then you're implicitly rejecting the idea that there is any valid object of religious cognition.

So - are you?

What 'science' deals with that? How do you go about it 'scientifically'? I mentioned before, although apparently I need not have bothered, that I have studied these exact questions through comparative relgion and anthropology, which in regards to this subject, are pretty close to what could be called scientific. — Wayfarer

Your point?

Do you assume that I haven't studied the same subjects, and read the books you mentioned?

But again, if you're claiming that the variety of religious experiences 'really are' able to be understood through sociological, cultural, psychological, or other such perspectives, then you're implicitly rejecting the idea that there is any valid object of religious cognition.

So - are you?

What I claim is that there are various ways of looking at, ways of understanding and explaining the phenomena at issue, and it is perfectly legitimate to do this from perspectives outside the perspective "from within"--which you privelege as the only legitimate one. Explanations from other perspectives are based on very different presuppositions and concepts than those used in the ones you characterize as "from within," and, in fact, we have advvanced our understanding of innumerable phenomena throughout history by adopting perspectives from outside the prevailing one.

And since you ask, I am perfectly willing to claim that sociological, cultural, psychological, and other such perspectives also provide much additional understanding about religious belief, behavior, and experience.

Right - but not the only one. If 'accounts of religious experience' are only ever understood in such terms, then they have no intrinsic value or purpose. Whereas what they say they're about is the disclosure of the eternal, which in my view is definitely out of scope for naturalism.

What I claim is that there are various ways of looking at, ways of understanding and explaining the phenomena at issue, and it is perfectly legitimate to do this from perspectives outside the perspective "from within"--which you privelege as the only legitimate one. — Brainglitch

As I said, the issue here is one of convention.

Whereas what they say they're about is the disclosure of the eternal, which in my view is definitely out of scope for naturalism. — Wayfarer

The convention of natural science is one which takes time for granted. Under this convention, eternality, as understood in theology (outside of time), is not even a possible subject.