You didn't have to use the word "aware" to be saying that. Nothing anthropomorphic about it by the way. Frogs have senses, brains, etc.

There is a pov (Maturana) wwhich would view 'awareness' to be anthropomorphic.
But from now on, I will not be continuing a conversation which is tangential to my opening thesis.

Just because we name something, it does not follow that that thing does not(or did not) exist in it's own right(in it's entirety) prior to our naming it.

Ah...the "Tis so/No it aint game" !:grin:

I have no idea how you arrived at that based upon my reply.

Check out the Rorty clip above. The relativity of 'existence' thesis renders 'things in their own right' meaningless i.e. Kant's 'inaccessihle noumena' was abondoned by later phenomenologists as a useless concept.

I'm still undecided if I'm a relativistic nihilist or a nihilistic relativist. What to emphasize more, no absolute truth, or meaningless of life...any omniscient opinions? Is truth independent from meaning or meaning from truth? I'm leaning there's no absolute truth so life has no meaning, to me. So is existence relatively pointless? Sorry if I annoyed anyone but don't worry, after we die it probably won't matter anyway.

Here is a Rorty link giving a backcxloth to my assertion.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s3enH7ntOAM — fresco

Is there a particular part of this lecture that you'd say hones in on what you want to focus on in this thread? I'm just asking because I'm 15 minutes into it already and I'm wondering when Rorty is going to get to anything like what we've been discussing so far. (And that's actually making it more difficult for me to appreciate Rorty's presentation, because I'm focused on waiting for the punchline with respect to this thread to arrive.)

Okay. He is not going to announce the thesis directly. His reinforcement of the Nietzchseian view of ' description' versus 'realism', and his dismissal of science as a 'general pursuit of truth' in favor of a 'paradigmatic functionality operation which defines its local evidence' can both be taken as supportive of the thesis. More specifically, I take dismissal of 'evidence for God' in favour of acknowlegement of the 'emotional functionality of religious belief', is supportive of my 'futility' point which follows from the thesis.

At the end of the day, Rorty's iconoclastic attack on 'epistemology', has inevitable repercussions on its bed fellow 'ontology'. My assertion about the word 'existence' could be taken as an expression of that.

Yeah, right after I stopped to ask I saw that he got more into the stuff you were talking about.

First, leading up to that, when he says, "Religious beliefs give us a way of thinking of our lives which puts them in an emotionally satisfying context," which seems to be an important premise in his view for what follows, (a) that's not actually disagreeing with the "symbolic" view of religion that he said he didn't find useful, and (b) it doesn't seem to be saying anything other than it's a fiction that some people find it rewarding to believe or to at least act "as if" it were true. Or at least it's consistent with (b).

He says, "Science oversteps its bounds when it tells us we have no right to believe in God . . ."--science doesn't actually say anything like that. Science isn't going to tell us what rights we do and don't have. Anthropology might tell us what rights people say they and others do and don't have, but since there aren't any non-human facts about rights, science can't tell us any.

Then he says, "This way of reconciling science and religion requires us to abandon the idea that there is one way the world really is." No it doesn't. Nothing like that follows from noting that some people find emotional satisfaction in believing or "as if-ing" religious beliefs.

Re "easiest if one thinks of beliefs as tools . . . rather than [something like claims for representing reality]" In making a claim that "x is a tool for y" we're making a claim about what reality is like.

This is already too many different topics to discuss at once, and it's just from a couple minutes of a 60-minute video.

Check out the Rorty clip above. The relativity of 'existence' thesis renders 'things in their own right' meaningless i.e. Kant's 'inaccessihle noumena' was abondoned by later phenomenologists as a useless concept. — fresco

I reject Kant's Noumena for different reasons than I reject Rorty's notion of truth as a property of true propositions(that's not just Rorty's by the way). I reject them both, nonetheless. Some things exist in their entirety prior to our awareness and/or naming them. That stands good and against the relativity of "existence".

Check out the Rorty clip above. The relativity of 'existence' thesis renders 'things in their own right' meaningless i.e. Kant's 'inaccessihle noumena' was abondoned by later phenomenologists as a useless concept. — fresco

Given that Existence was one of Kant's modal categories of understanding, perhaps Kant was arguing for your very position, namely that existence isn't 'noumenal' i.e. it is an expression of human judgement rather than an assertion of an absolute property.

Some things exist in their entirety prior to our awareness and/or naming them. That stands good and against the relativity of "existence". — creativesoul

The relativism of the knowledge of existence is the problem here. Even if everything in existence was absolute prior to our knowledge of it, we can only relate to it through our reletavistic understanding. Anything and everything we can know about existence is a reletavisic truth approximation.

The relativism of the knowledge of existence is the problem here. Even if everything in existence was absolute prior to our knowledge of it, we can only relate to it through our reletavistic understanding. Anything and everything we can know about existence is a reletavisic truth approximation. — Merkwurdichliebe

Well, seems to me that it is the very phrase "the relativism of the knowledge of existence" that is the problem here along with "relativistic truth approximation". What do those phrases even say, and what are they saying it about? What is the referent of either? Why talk like that? I mean, what good comes of it?

What does the absolute/relative dichotomy add to our understanding aside from unnecessarily complex and confusing language use?

I personally find that the absolute/relative dichotomy is yet another inherently inadequate framework. I mean, what on earth does it even mean to be "absolute in existence"?

Some things exist in their entirety prior to our becoming aware of them. Some things do not. We can know that, and we can be certain of it.

What does the absolute/relative dichotomy add to our understanding aside from unnecessarily complex and confusing language use? — creativesoul

It sets up the dialectical extremes that the discourse is confined to.

I mean, what on earth does it even mean to be "absolute in existence"? — creativesoul

Absolute existence refers to that which exists in and of itself, independent of its relation to other things - a self-contained and self-sustained reality. This contrasts with relative existence, which refers to that which has existence for another, dependent on its contingent relations.

Some things exist in their entirety prior to our becoming aware of them. Some things do not. We can know that, and we can be certain of it. — creativesoul

Of course things can exist prior to our knowledge, but this has nothing to do with whether something has relative or absolute existence.

So first, we should consider existence. What is it? Is it reducible to the concepts apprehended in abstract thought, like gravity as it exists-in-itself? No, this is only the idea of gravity. From the perspective of thought, that gravity exists in itself is an idea. From this perspective, there is every reason to say that gravity has existed for eternity. But the idea of gravity is not actually existing until substantiated as a particular concretion.

Where is concrete existence other than in the direct and immediately experience of the individual in himself. Actual gravity is found in my direct and immediately experience of it, the fact that I don't witness everything float into space that isn't nailed down. My direct knowledge of the existence of gravity is dependent upon many relations, thus, it is gravity as it is for me, and not as it is in itself. Anything that exists for another is relative being.

What does the absolute/relative dichotomy add to our understanding aside from unnecessarily complex and confusing language use?
— creativesoul

It sets up the dialectical extremes that the discourse is confined to. — Merkwurdichliebe

The discourse is about existence. Since when is existence confined to discourse?

So first, we should consider existence. What is it? Is it reducible to the concepts apprehended in abstract thought, like gravity as it exists-in-itself? — Merkwurdichliebe

The papaya tree in my yard is not a concept. It exists. It existed prior to our talking about it. We need language to talk about the tree. The tree does not need to be talked about.

From the perspective of thought, gravity exists in itself as an idea, and from this perspective, there is every reason to say that gravity has existed for eternity. But the idea of gravity is not actually existing until substantiated as a particular concretion. — Merkwurdichliebe

Gravity and the idea of gravity.

What's the difference on your view?

The discourse is about existence. Since when is existence confined to our language? — creativesoul

It's actually about whether existence is relative or absolute. How we define and use these words in this discussion is of supreme importance.

Existing is one of those slippery terms, like "thinking". The key here would be to establish a criterion for talking about "existing" as existence/being, for the simple fact that we are talking about it. It is important that we don't confounded the actuality with the idea.

If you agree, I know you are the man for the job. :wink:

Gravity and the idea of gravity. — creativesoul

"Gravity as it exists" is a phenomenon that can only be immediately/directly apprehended, with or without knowledge of it.

"Gravity as idea" is based on the prior knowledge of an existing phenomenon. Before "gravity as idea" was ever conceived, we can be quite certain that it was common sense that a high enough fall resulted in a "splat!". "Gravity as idea" is an advanced product of linguistic thought/belief, and it is not confined to the immediacy of actual existence, but can be projected onto the thought of possible existence.

Interesting but perhaps blinkered discussion above.
Surely you guys are missing the point that human word 'existence' implies 'functional for human purposes'. The 'tree' is changing biologically in a continuous manner, but it functionally persists and that persistence is coined by the abstract persistence of the word 'tree'. And in what sense is the functional 'thing' we call 'tree' still a unified entity for other species like birds ? Maybe for a hypthetically 'speaking' bird it's a 'perch' or 'a bunch of perches'.
So IMO, a 'thing-In-itself' is meaningless, because 'thinghood' already implies species respecific functional persistence relative to its lifespan needs.

Interesting but perhaps blinkered discussion above. — fresco

That's how our discussions always seem to go. creativesoul is a very patient interlocutor.

Surely you guys are missing the point that human word 'existence' implies 'functional for humans'. — fresco

I'm trying not to miss that point. In fact, I find it quite impossible to think of existence as it would be for a bird.

To say I am existence (that all existence in itself is reducible to my existing), is very problematic. So I won't say it.

I can only think of existing as it is for me, but this is not existence as it is in itself, it is an abstraction of it - a thought/belief about existence/being. Moreover, I can only talk amongst other humans about it as an idea, and how it might necessarily pertain to things like trees and birds.

So, you see, the way I approach "existence" is all too human.

a 'thing-In-itself' is meaningless, because 'thinghood' already implies species relative specific functional persistance relative to its lifespan. — fresco

Actually, 'thing-In-itself' implies how it is for itself, and not for another. Any species specific functional persistence would necessarily imply how a thing is for another. Even if there is existence in and of itself, it only matters insofar as it appears for us. It is all quite relative.

Ah...maybe you have not spotted that even the thing you are calling 'I' has 'existence' evoked by this transient communicative context. Like the 'tree' that 'I' is a word implying multiple transient functions.
I am making the point here that no 'thing' has permanence even though 'words' are suggestive of that.
Next time you have an internal debate with yourself, you might reconsider what 'I' means !

I am making the point here that no 'thing' has permanence even though 'words' are suggestive of that. — fresco

That is the whole problem, words treat reality as though it is still. This is why it takes great care to talk about "existence/being" .

.maybe you have not spotted that even the thing you are calling 'I' has 'existence' evoked by this transient communicative context. — fresco

The thing that I am calling "I" has an immediate, direct, and irrational existence that is private to me. The actual existing "I" merely has linguistic, sentiential, rational existence that functions to reference something else. For me, despite its indirect functionality, the former "I" has greater existence, regardless of the fact that it is impossible for another person to access this direct existence of mine. Although my existence is relative for everyone else (dependent on particular relations), it is absolute for me as the existing one called "I".

Well...its a comforting assertion, especially when I bring to mind that crazy 'I' from last night's dream, which was pewrfectly happy with itself at the time !

That was existence for you at the moment of its occurence, was it not?

I find that thought very comforting too. :grin:

I did post a while back asking a simply question (not addressed to anyone in particular so no one bothered with it).

Simply put is “existence” a “fact” or a “truth”. If the former it is relative, if the later it is absolute. Skimming through the above posts there is little to no effort being made in distinguishing what is being talked about here regarding the difference between facts and truths.

I find this quite disconcerting ... I’m baffled how this point has seemingly been glossed over (or did I simply miss it being addressed?)

I find this quite disconcerting ... I’m baffled how this point has seemingly been glossed over (or did I simply miss it being addressed?) — I like sushi

I think we were all implying things as truth and fact, but maybe you could elaborate more on your reasoning here:

Simply put is “existence” a “fact” or a “truth”. If the former it is relative, if the later it is absolute. — I like sushi

I'm interested.

In constructive logic, the logical rule for introducing existential quantification replaces a proposition that directly refers to a particular, say "My cat is named 'Zeus' ", with a similar proposition that is non-referring, e.g "There exists a cat named Zeus'". Conversely, constructive logic guarantees that an existential quantifier can always be replaced by a reference to a particular bearing the relevant properties.

By constructive logic, "X exists" doesn't refer to a spiritual essence of a particular to which one is presently acquainted,i.e. uniqueness, but merely expresses the ability to locate or to create at least one object possessing the observational properties described by the predicate 'X'.

So the meaning of "Elvis Presley does not exist", "Unicorns don't exist", and so on, without further assumptions, merely expresses the inability to create or to find objects described by the respective predicates.

The difficulty here, is to reconcile the fact that we can talk about unicorns whilst at the same time claiming that we cannot exhibit them. This can be reconciled by first giving unicorns a constructive definition within a hypothetical universe of discourse in which unicorns can be said to exist according to our definitions, and then afterwards asserting that such a constructive definition is inapplicable within our actual universe.

In other words, the non-existence of an object is understood to refer to a constructed object within one universe, that has no equivalently constructed partner within another universe, thereby making non-existence a relation between two universes.