Bohr argued that there were no 'things in their own right' we call 'electrons', only consistent human 'interactions' with an aspect of the world it was convenient to explain by the word 'electron'. Einstein, perhaps in line with his role in establishing 'the reality of atoms', disagreed. — fresco

Agree! I've read quite a few accounts of the Bohr/Einstein debates and I'm in favour of Bohr's attitude (which together with Heisenberg and several others became retrospectively named the 'Copenhagen interpretation'.) Whereas Einstein insisted that there must be a real object that existed independently of the act of measurement - hence his exasperated question 'does the moon continue to exist when we're not looking at it?'

Notice the similarity of 'things in their own right' and the Kantian ding an sich - I presume that is intentional - and the nub of the issue, also. We can know a lot about such phenomena (obviously) - short of what they really are.

We can know a lot about such phenomena (obviously) - short of what they really are. — Wayfarer

You said it yourself. They are phenomena. What is phenomena? Knowing a lot about something entails knowing what they really are. If you don't know what they are, effectively you don't know what you're talking about.

If you don't know what they are, effectively you don't know what you're talking about. — Harry Hindu

If you know you don't know something, that's something you know. But in your case, I've never observed that. :-)

If you know you don't know something, that's something you know. — Wayfarer

That is assuming that you know what knowing really is.

TO ALL
There have been many 'mentions' over night (uk) and it is difticult to answer all of you in detail.

The main (Pragmatist) point I want to re-iterate is that questions that imply a regress of definition (language chasing language) fall into what I take to be Wittgenstein's 'language on holiday'. Language is 'not on holiday' when it applies to communicative situations which involve decision about subsequent action either individually or jointly....
e.g. 'Does global warming exist ? ' only has significance if an answer implies subsequent action.
...in short, everyday usage of 'existence' is relative because it involves 'what's it got to do with us ?'

What I am reacting against by using the term 'seminaritis', are academic scenarios such as 'atheists' arguing with 'believers' about 'evidence for the existence of God'. This never happens in 'real life' where the labels 'atheist' and 'believer' never arise except in social conflict situations, like for example, in discussion of 'educational curricula'. In 'real life', believers and atheists just 'get on with it' with or without the functionality of a God' concept.

I note that some dissenters are arguing from pov's like 'this is epistemology not linguistics' but it is this academic labelling which is under 'pragmatic' attack. Concepts stand or fall on the basis of their contextual functionality...and all we've got as thinkers is 'concepts' !

as per usual, you guys still haven’t moved past semantics. no wonder it is said that “philosophy is dead;” the philosophers today know nothing of the nature of being.

One of the most celebrated philosophers of 'being', Heidegger, characterized it as involved with 'caring in time', i.e. 'being' involves 'implications for self action'. The fact that he later promoted 'language' to the fore in his philosophy with 'Language speaks the Man' seems to have escaped you.

Thankyou for that comment about 'physiology'. As far as I can tell, all I must admit to are 'other interlocuters' who agree (structurally couple) with this one regarding contextual interactions. Thus shared 'words' like 'common physiology' constitute 'contextual behavioral co-ordination facilitators' with respect to human projects. Obviously, it is difficult to think of universal concepts like 'physiology' in that way, so instead I think of culture specific words like duende which is a common Spanish term used by flamenco lovers to denote a particular 'emotional essence' of the music.
By admitting to 'other intelocuters' I believe I am serving an ontologically minimum requirement for the social interactions we call 'linguistic', and the acquistion experiences of shared words' . In that way the only 'absolutist' digression I might be accused of with respect to 'existence' is that 'interactions exist'., but since these are transitory I claim to escape a major aspect of absolutist.

e.g. 'Does global warming exist ? ' only has significance if an answer implies subsequent action.
...in short, everyday usage of 'existence' is relative because it involves 'what's it got to do with us ?' — fresco

Whether you're using "significance" in the "meaning" (semantic) sense or in the "importance" (value) sense, both are assigned by individuals, with potentially as much variation as we can imagine, and neither are therefore limited, in general, to answers that imply subsequent action.

What I am reacting against by using the term 'seminaritis', are academic scenarios such as 'atheists' arguing with 'believers' about 'evidence for the existence of God'. This never happens in 'real life' where the labels 'atheist' and 'believer' never arise except in social conflict situations, like for example, in discussion of 'educational curricula'. In 'real life', believers and atheists just 'get on with it' with or without the functionality of a God' concept. — fresco

Not sure what you're talking about there. In real life, people have discussions/arguments about stuff like that often enough. It's not something most people do most of the time, but no discussion is aside from the most superficial interaction about the weather and the like.

I note that some dissenters are arguing from pov's like 'this is epistemology not linguistics — fresco

You're referring to me there. It's really just a way to point out that maybe you're trying to talk a bit "above your head." You presented a representationalist / non-representationalist dichotomy as if there was a well-established one specifically in philosophy of language. If that's the case, I'm not very familiar with it (though I am at least cursorily familiar with some representationalism talk in that field). So then you started getting a bit patronizing about that, and when I pressed you for info about it, it turned out that you were referring to phil of perception (or more broadly epistemological) representationalism vs alternatives (where the alternatives, by the way, aren't actually commonly grouped together under an "anti-representationalism" heading).

as per usual, you guys still haven’t moved past semantics. no wonder it is said that “philosophy is dead;” the philosophers today know nothing of the nature of being. — TheGreatArcanum

For one, should I be surprised that you'd reach conclusions about "philosophers today" based on posts on this board?

I acknowledge that discuesions about 'the existence of God' do occur in what what we might call 'real life' since it can be viewed as a socially contentious issue. However, I assert these 'debates' are always going to be futile precisely because 'existence' is wrongly, in my view, taken to mean 'an absolute state of being' rather than 'a concept like any other which stands or falls on its utility'.

As for your seeming objection to my philosophical 'label jumping', it may indeed be that your appreciation of nonrepresentationalism' has not yet reached the stage of iconoclasm of traditional philosophical,analysis. An extreme view of traditional labelling might relegate that process to a form of 'intellectual dancing'. And just embellish that point, it might be worth reassessing Bohr's position on 'existence' by noting his comments to the effect that 'language has no more than a poetic relationship to physics'. Hence we might assume that attempts to place his ideas under traditional ontological or epistemological labels would appear to be problemic.

I read your whole post, but I like to focus on one issue at a time, because that's a constant desire of mine, for folks to focus when we're doing philosophy:

However, I assert these are always going to be futile — fresco

Just curious here what you consider futility to be in this context. Is it that you're looking for consensus, and you think it's futile if we don't achieve that (this is just a guess to give you an example of the sort of thing I'm looking for in asking you)?

The main (Pragmatist) point I want to re-iterate is that questions that imply a regress of definition (language chasing language) fall into what I take to be Wittgenstein's 'language on holiday'. Language is 'not on holiday' when it applies to communicative situations which involve decision about subsequent action either individually or jointly.... — fresco

No. The above quote is what Witt meant when he used the phrase, "language on holiday". You are taking his phrase and reusing it in a way that is incoherent.

Witt is often regarded as an anti-philosopher in virtue of his expressed beliefs that “most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false but nonsensical.” Witt even suggested that the subject he was dealing with is “one of the heirs of the subject that used to be called ‘philosophy.’”

Wittgenstein demotes philosophy to a sort of organization of thought, a clearing away of cobwebs. According to Wittgenstein, unlike empirical problems, philosophical problems can be solved “by looking into the workings of our language… in such a way as to make us recognize those workings: in despite of an urge to misunderstand them. The problems are solved, not by reporting new experience, but by arranging what we have always known. Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of our language.”

What you have done is take Witt's own words and twist them into something incoherent and not what he meant, which is no different than bewitching (or insulting) our intelligence by means of your use of language.

Incoherent to you perhaps, just as some of your comments are incoherent to me !
BTW I note that W's 'meaning is use' is conspicuously absent from your analysis.

If it is incoherent, then how are we using words in the first place rather just putting scribbles on a screen? If it is incoherent, are we necessarily using language at all?

Terrapin Station
9.2k

as per usual, you guys still haven’t moved past semantics. no wonder it is said that “philosophy is dead;” the philosophers today know nothing of the nature of being. — TheGreatArcanum


For one, should I be surprised that you'd reach conclusions about "philosophers today" based on posts on this board? — Terrapin Station

Please...not when I am drinking orange juice just above my keyboard.

Now I gotta clean the keyboard...and it is an odd, not even, year.

...Futile because 'evidence' in the case of 'God' is in the eye of the beholder. The 'utility' of the concept is a psychological and social issue,outside contexts in which 'evidence' is a consensual criterion.

...Futile because 'evidence' in the case of 'God' is in the eye of the beholder. The 'utility' of the concept is a psychological and social issue,outside contexts in which 'evidence' is a consensual criterion. — fresco

I'll bypass for a moment whether I agree that evidence in the case of God is in the eye of the beholder, because what I want to focus on is why you'd think that whether something has utility isn't in the eye of the beholder.

Let's say that Joe says that the concept of God has utility and Betty says it does not. How do we move past the eye of the beholder there in your view?

.Futile because 'evidence' in the case of 'God' is in the eye of the beholder. — fresco

Why would we talk about evidence differently only in the case of God?

Why is evidence for your existence different than the evidence for God?

This another great example of Witt's "language on a holiday" - where you "use" the term "evidence" in a way that makes it incompatible with what we already understand it to mean.

Let me say it one more time, 'existence' and 'evidence are words triggering concepts the utility of which differs according to the context in which they are used. From this pov all concepts exist by virtue of the words which evoke them, but the concept of evidence presupposes a context open to the possibility of social consenus about the utility of another concept like 'God'. On the nonrepresentational view of language, words do not represent 'things in themselves'. The strong Pragmatist's view is that 'things in themselves' is a dysfunctional or meaningless concept.
As an atheist, I cannot dispute 'the existence of God' for 'believers', because the concept is functional for them, albeit dysfunctional for me. 'Evidence' has nothing to do with it especially when 'faith' is cited as a key issue, and 'observation' remains nebulous and contentious.

Could you answer the question I was interested in:

"Let's say that Joe says that the concept of God has utility and Betty says it does not. How do we move past the eye of the beholder there in your view?"

Let me say it one more time, 'existence' and 'evidence are words triggering concepts the utility of which differs according to the context in which they are used. From this pov all concepts exist by virtue of the words which evoke them, but the concept of evidence presupposes a context open to the possibility of social consenus about the utility of another concept like 'God' — fresco

You're forgetting that the words are used to trigger concepts in other minds via communication. The concept of existence exists as something non-verbal in your mind, which you then translate into verbal form for communicating, but if the same concept isnt triggered in another mind when you use that word, can you really say that the concept was triggered by your use of the word?

As an atheist, I cannot dispute 'the existence of God' for 'believers', because the concept is functional for them, albeit dysfunctional for me. — fresco

Delusions are functional for those that have them, but not for me.

Existence' is a human concept, and like all concepts requires context in which it is meaningful. The issue was perhaps highlighted my Niels Bohr's argument with Einstein about the existence of 'electrons'.
Bohr argued that there were no 'things in their own right' we call 'electrons', only consistent human 'interactions' with an aspect of the world it was convenient to explain by the word 'electron'. Einstein, perhaps in line with his role in establishing 'the reality of atoms', disagreed.
A current book by Rovelli (the Order of Time) underscores Bohr's view with the phrase 'things are just repetitive events.
This proposed 'relativity of existence' seems to me to render most philosophical discussion of 'ontology' to be what Wittgenstein called Geschwätz (idle chatter).
Any thoughts ? — fresco

I think Bohr was simply pointing out our inability to verify, in this case the extreme requirement of actually seeing one, the actual existence of electrons because they're beyond the reach of man or machine. It doesn't mean electrons don't exist as matter behaves as they do (electricity or chemical bonding).

Bohr was exposing human limitations and not that existence is relative and not absolute. A blind man can't see a tiger but can still be eaten by it. It'd take a foolish blind man to say the existence of tigers is relative or context-dependent.

We don't. We simply avoid joint projects in which theistic belief could be an impediment.
If your Joe-Betty scenario involves raising children, one tends to give way to the other.

I disagree. Bohr was in tune with Heisenberg here who said..'we never observe nature directly...only the results of the questions we ask of it'.
This, for me, is an acknowledgment of at least four related issues:
(1) Kant's point about the inaccessibility of noumena (2) Nietzshe's point there is no description -reality distinction (3) Psychological views that perception is selectively active, not passive (4) Measurement begins with 'the nominal', i.e. human naming ,of the selected phenomenon.

The particular case of 'the electron' brings these to the fore, not because of 'size issues' but 'uncertainty' and 'complimentarity' issues highlight point 2.

Your 'blind man' scenario is interesting from a 'comparative physiology across species' pov (...'dead insects dont 'exist' for hungry frogs...) and also the specific human issues of shared language reflecting shared needs. Human use of transducers to enhance active perception could be said to be exemplified by the blind man's stick.

Facts are not truths. What more is there to discuss? I guess the question then morphs slightly to ask “Is existence a fact or a truth?”

Facts are relative and truths are absolute. Ignoring such fundamental distinctions merely leads to a confused discussion where we talk past each other without realising we’re doing so.

'Delusions' are defined primarily by social consensus regarding 'inappropriate behavior'. The fact that what we call 'brain functioning' may be correlated with this is a more recent view which has tended to replace 'spiritual possession'.

I disagree. Bohr was in tune with Heisenberg here who said..'we never observe nature directly...only the results of the questions we ask of it'.
This, for me, is an acknowledgment of at least four related issues:
(1) Kant's point about the inaccessibility of noumena (2) Nietzshe's point there is no description -reality distinction (3) Psychological views that perception is selectively active, not passive (4) Measurement begins with 'the nominal', i.e. human naming ,of the selected phenomenon.

The particular case of 'the electron' brings these to the fore, not because of 'size issues' but 'uncertainty' and 'complimentarity' issues highlight point 2.

Your 'blind man' scenario is interesting from a 'comparative physiology across species' pov (...'dead insects dont 'exist' for hungry frogs...) and also the specific human issues of shared language reflecting shared needs. Human use of transducers to enhance active perception could be said to be exemplified by the blind man's stick. — fresco

I agree. Our answers are only as good as our questions but that doesn't mean there are no answers to questions we haven't asked does it?

On the contrary all I would argue that ' truths ' are relative except perhaps 'religious' ones. 'Truth ' is a word like any other whose meaning is embedded in a particular transient context.

Truth ' is a word like any other whose meaning is embedded in a particular transient context. — fresco

The concept of truth is too basic to define, so there aren't multiple definitions.

The word "truth" could mean hotdog in some contexts, but that's not philosophically interesting.