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l

Do you know or only believe you have hands? How does such a belief arise? Isn't this something that occurs early in development, that is, at an early age. First comes the deed or the act, that is how bedrock beliefs arise (at least those that form apart from language, and many or most of those within language). — Sam26

It's interesting to note that foundational doctrines and structuralist assertions within the field of philosophy have only led to very few bedrock or hinge propositions. Such, as "I think, therefore, I am", and the next closest thing as the Principle of Sufficient Reason, which has been discredited as of late. Hence, I find a discrepancy between the intuitionalist assertions such as "If a lion could speak, we would not be able to understand its speech." and what Wittgenstein asserts in his On Certainty. He kind of highlights this with the assertion that it may be raining outside; but, one could doubt this, legitimately or alternatively with his assertion that you cannot disprove the existence of a rhinoceros within the room, where he was speaking with Russell about.

What do you think?

It's interesting to note that foundational doctrines and structuralist assertions within the field of philosophy have only led to very few bedrock or hinge propositions. Such, as "I think, therefore, I am", and the next closest thing as the Principle of Sufficient Reason, which has been discredited as of late. — Wallows

Actually there are many bedrock beliefs, in fact, too many to list. The examples you give are not bedrock. The following are some...

2+2=4
I have hands.
I live on the Earth.
My name is Sam.
This is a tree.
That is a person.
etc, etc.

Wittgenstein's ideas about hinge-propositions are quite unique as far as I can tell. And by the way, his ideas are not the same as traditional foundationalism.

And by the way, his ideas are not the same as traditional foundationalism. — Sam26

What may I ask are they? I haven't yet figured out this aspect of Wittgensteins philosophy?

l

I'm repeating myself in a lot of ways, but it helps to re-word some of these ideas to make them a bit clearer. As I've already stated there are two kinds of hinge-propositions or bedrock beliefs. First, there are those that occur in language. For example, the rules of chess are bedrock to the game, along with the board and pieces. Second, there are those that occur prior to language. For example, the belief that we have hands is something we learn prior to language, and the belief manifests itself when we use our hands. What can be confusing is that we can state these prelinguistic beliefs once we learn a language, as Moore did (I have hands.). So, how do we know when a beliefs is prelinguistic? Any belief that manifests itself in our acts or actions is most likely a hinge-proposition or bedrock belief.

If you mean by prelinguistic as intuitionalist, then I agree.

No it's not an intuition. It's more than that.

Then what is it?

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So, juxtapose what you have just said with:

327. If a lion could talk, we wouldn’t be able to understand it.

I must insist that this is at the very least some derivative of intuitionalist thought. Don't you think?

What Wittgenstein is talking about on p. 223 has nothing to do with what I'm talking about.

No, again it has nothing to do with intuitionalist thought. It's quite different. Why would you think that?

What Wittgenstein is talking about in 327 has nothing to do with what I'm talking about. — Sam26

Here is the context:

323. “What is internal is hidden from us.” — The future is hidden from us. — But does the astronomer think like this when he calculates an eclipse of the sun?

324. If I see someone writhing in pain with evident cause, I do not think: all the same, his feelings are hidden from me.

325. We also say of a person that he is transparent to us. It is, however, important as regards our considerations that one human being can be a complete enigma to another. One learns this when one comes into a strange country with entirely strange traditions; and, what is more, even though one has mastered the country’s language. One does not understand the people. (And not because of not knowing what they are saying to themselves.) We can’t find our feet with them.

326. “I can’t know what is going on in him” is, above all, a picture. It is the convincing expression of a conviction. It does not give the reasons for the conviction. They are not obvious.

327. If a lion could talk, we wouldn’t be able to understand it.

So, Wittgenstein even uses the expression "internal", "in", "enigma"(?, intentions?). Which, then finally culminates in the statement of 327. Perhaps he is trying to imply that the grammar the lion would use, would be fundamentally different than our own, or that its frame of reference is not the same as that of English speakers. Which, can only lead to the conclusion that internally the lion is quite different than us. Yes?

I'm not sure what any of this has to do with On Certainty. I'm sorry but I don't see the connection between any of this and my points in my paper.

I'm not sure what any of this has to do with On Certainty. I'm sorry but I don't see the connection between any of this and my points in my paper. — Sam26

Sorry, I was just bringing up some questions that I've accumulated in regards to Wittgenstein's Investigations, that are lingering in my mind.

Thanks for your input.

No problem Wallows, I wasn't complaining just asking.

In PI Wittgenstein examines "Moore's Paradox", namely the sentence "It is raining, but I believe that it is not raining" and as I recall he concludes, in contrast to moore, that the sentence does indeed have sense when spoken about oneself in the present, namely as a situation in which one comes to realize that one's verbally expressed beliefs are in contradiction with one's actual behavior.

So the sentence "It is raining, but I know that it is not raining" also makes sense, when one is verbally certain about one's beliefs but comes to question one's behavioural "bedrock". So philosophers shouldn't equate behaviorally implied beliefs with verbally expressed beliefs.

Ironically, lucid dreamers use the presence of their dream hands within a dream as a cue to detect that they are dreaming. Said in this dream situation, is the sentence "I know I have hands" a hinge proposition or an epistemological claim? If a dreamer insisted the former they would fail the reality check and remain non-lucid.

Ironically, lucid dreamers use the presence of their dream hands within a dream as a cue to detect that they are dreaming. Said in this dream situation, is the sentence "I know I have hands" a hinge proposition or an epistemological claim? If a dreamer insisted the former they would fail the reality check and remain non-lucid. — sime

I would say that anytime it makes sense to say, "I know I have hands," whether dreaming or not, then it's not a hinge-proposition. Wittgenstein gives an e.g. in On Certainty where it makes sense to say "I know I have hands," e.g., after waking from an operation with bandaged hands. Hinge-propositions, as you probably know, are non-epistemic. It's senseless to say "I know...," or "I doubt..." if it's hinge or bedrock. If someone insisted in saying that such a proposition was epistemic, it would just be senseless, as in Moore's propositions.

I'm not sure I follow the reality check idea in reference to bedrock beliefs.

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I agree with just about everything Sam26 has said. I would not use the term "foundations" to characterize Wittgenstein's bedrock propositions but then I don't want to call them "propositions" either. I am not sure that they are pre-linguistic because I think that even bedrock "propositions" can change or evolve over time and it they were truly pre-linguistic, I don't think that would be the case but I am ready to be persuaded otherwise. Wittgenstein gives an example that goes something like "no human has ever visited the moon" which of course is no longer bedrock but would have been through most of human history. I also wonder about notions like up/down which are probably bedrock for any human living on earth but might not be if future humans live in space. I am totally spitballing here as I am new to this forum and do not have my copies of OC or PI with me. I do think that the issues Sam26 addresses are some of the hardest to understand and are consequently, the most misunderstood in Wittgenstein's philosophy.

It is true that some bedrock propositions change over time, but not all. For example, Moore's propositions, for the most part will not change, unless in the future we evolve into beings that have no need for hands, but then, other bedrock beliefs will fill the gap. It is true that bedrock propositions/beliefs are contingent, so I guess given enough time most or all of them might change. Although it's difficult to think how being a person separate from other persons would ever change.

Let me just say again that I'm expanding on what Wittgenstein is saying in his notes, I'm not claiming that Wittgenstein would agree with me, or that this is where he was leading.

Do you think Wittgenstein's goal in OC was at some foundationalist attempt, despite there being a lot of controversy about logical foundationalism in the TLP, and contextualism or correspondence in the Investigations?

Do you think Wittgenstein's goal in OC was at some foundationalist attempt, despite there being a lot of controversy about logical foundationalism in the TLP, and contextualism or correspondence in the Investigations? — Wallows

No, that wasn't his goal, although some might think so based on some of the things he said. I don't agree with your characterization of the TLP or the Investigations.

I hope things are well with you Wallows.

By the way, I'm starting my own forum. The forum will be mostly on the philosophy of Wittgenstein. I just started it today.

https://philosophicalthinking.createaforum.com/general-discussion/

No, that wasn't his goal, although some might think so based on some of the things he said. I don't agree with your characterization of the TLP or the Investigations. — Sam26

Could you expand on your views of the TLP's theory of truth along with the Investigations? And, ultimately his final views on theories of truth found in the OC?

I hope things are well with you Wallows. — Sam26

Just squeaking along. :blush:

On page one starting with post #2 I talk about the Tractatus. In the Tractatus the theory of truth is the correspondence theory, or the picture theory.

There is no theory of truth in the PI.

Keep in mind that I'm constantly re-writing these posts.

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