Propositions are beliefs, they are statements that are true or false. — Sam26

"I believe in freedom, justice, and equality." Is that proposition true or false?

Well, do you believe 12x12=144? — Sam26

I don't believe it, I know it. I know how to calculate and I've done the calculations. Others have done so as well.

38. Knowledge in mathematics: Here one has to keep on reminding oneself of the unimportance of the 'inner process' or 'state' and ask "Why should it be important? What does it matter to me?" What
is interesting is how we use mathematical propositions.
39. This is how calculation is done, in such circumstances a calculation is treated as absolutely
reliable, as certainly correct.

The state of mind or belief regarding the calculation is unimportant.

42. ... To think that different [mental] states must correspond to the words "believe" and "know"
would be as if one believed that different people had to correspond to the word "I" and the name
"Ludwig", because the concepts are different.

If hinge propositions are beliefs then it is not that they differ from epistemic propositions because of different corresponding mental states.

179. It would be correct to say: "I believe..." has subjective truth; but "I know..." not.

You have claimed that Moore's "I know ..." are hinge propositions and that hinge propositions are beliefs. But Moore does not claim that they have subjective truth, he presents them as objective evidence in support of the existence of the external world. He claims not simply to believe but to know.

245. So if I say "I know that I have two hands", and that is not supposed to express just my subjective certainty, I must be able to satisfy myself that I am right. But I can't do that, for my having two
hands is not less certain before I have looked at them than afterwards. But I could say: "That I have
two hands is an irreversible belief."

"I know that I have two hands" is not a belief. It does not express just my subjective certainty. The irreversible belief that I have two hands is not a proposition.

I say, "I have hands," that's a belief. — Sam26

You are equivocating. Moore does not say: "I have hands", he says, "I know I have hands" which is not the same as saying "I believe I have hands".

10. ... it is only in use that the proposition has its sense.

What is the ordinarily use the proposition "I believe I have hands"?

I do not doubt I have hands simply because I have been using them my whole life. The belief that I have hands is something that develops at some point after I have been using my hands. A newborn baby does not suck its thumb because it believes it has a hand or a thumb. It does not grasp things because it believe it has hands and that there are things to be grasped. As it gets a bit older it does not watch it's hand move as it moves without its being able to control the movement or gradually gain control of it because it believes it is it's own hand and that there are things to be held with it. It reaches and grasps. These actions are not manifestations of mental states.They are not mind dependent. This is why Wittgenstein points to other animals. Not all animals have brains and thus do not have mental states, and yet they are able to respond to their environment.

"I believe in freedom, justice, and equality." Is that proposition true or false? — Fooloso4

It's true that you believe in those things. Is it not?

I don't believe it, I know it. I know how to calculate and I've done the calculations. Others have done so as well. — Fooloso4

You're saying what Moore is saying, that is, it is on par with his claim to know he has hands. This is what Wittgenstein is arguing against. What would it mean to doubt that 12x12=144? If it does not make sense to doubt it, it does make sense to claim to know it. This is what OC is all about. Hinges are not epistemological.

The state of mind or belief regarding the calculation is unimportant. — Fooloso4

I'm not sure what this has to do with what we're talking about. In terms of meaning this is true, meaning has nothing to do with your state-of-mind.

You are equivocating. Moore does not say: "I have hands", he says, "I know I have hands" which is not the same as saying "I believe I have hands". — Fooloso4

Don't talk to me like I no nothing about the subject, as if I haven't read Moore's papers. He actually says, "Here is one hand." But these are things he claims to know, as he argues with the skeptics.

I don't think I ever said that propositions are necessarily beliefs. — Sam26

If propositions need not be beliefs, then you shouldn't say that propositions are beliefs.

What!? There's a big difference between propositions being beliefs, and propositions necessarily being beliefs, which is what you seem to suggest I was saying.

You said on the previous page that "All propositions are beliefs" which implies that propositions are necessarily beliefs.

Well, you got me on that one, I did say "all."

I hate to get picky, but one use of the word 'all' is to speak generally. So, if I say "all of you are sinners" does that mean the babies in the audience too? Does 'all' always have the force of necessarily each and every?

Well, you got me on that one, I did say "all." — Sam26

I'm not trying to "get" you, Sam, except to get you to acknowledge that propositions need not be beliefs, which you appear to have done.

]

I can solve this problem.

There, I deleted all my posts. Oh, I left a few undeleted, so I must be wrong. Goodbye to all. This was a waste of my time.

I apologise if I said something to upset you. That was not my intention.

It's true that you believe in those things. Is it not? — Sam26

Your claim was not that one believes what he claims to believe but that the belief is true or false. It is true that I believe those things but that does not mean that what I believe is true or false. The proposition: "The earth is flat" is not true because I believe it is.

You're saying what Moore is saying, that is, it is on par with his claim to know he has hands. — Sam26

Wittgenstein makes a clear distinction between Moore's propositions and mathematical propositions.

10. Then is "2x2=4" nonsense in the same way, and not a proposition of arithmetic, apart from particular occasions? "2x2=4" is a true proposition of arithmetic ...

I'm not sure what this has to do with what we're talking about. In terms of meaning this is true, meaning has nothing to do with your state-of-mind. — Sam26

It is your claim that 12x12=144 is a belief and that belief is a state of mind. Wittgenstein, in the cited quotes, denies this. Contrary to your claim about mathematical belief he says "mathematical knowledge". 12x12=144 is an epistemic hinge.

Don't talk to me like I no nothing about the subject, as if I haven't read Moore's papers. He actually says, "Here is one hand." But these are things he claims to know, as he argues with the skeptics. — Sam26

Accusing you of equivocating is not to say you know (or no) nothing about the subject. On the contrary, to equivocate is to use language to hide or obscure a distinction that undermines your claims. Moore's claims cannot be hinge propositions if, as you claim, hinge propositions are statements of belief.

What people seem to forget is that Wittgenstein, in his later philosophy, is giving us a method of doing philosophy that is more of an art than a science. He is not presenting theories that put forth dogmatic ideas; in fact, one could argue that Wittgenstein’s philosophy is fighting against dogmatism, and deemphasizing general theories of meaning.

It is the uniform nature of our words that lends itself to theorizing about the general use of meaning. This can be seen clearly in the study of epistemology, namely, what it means to know is not some clearly defined idea without shades of gray. What we get are a variety of uses that do not give us the clarity we are striving for, especially as philosophers. For the most part language hinders our desire for exactness, and our desire for absolute meaning. Instead what we see are words that have a variety of meanings, largely dependent on how they are used in a variety of social activities or "forms of life." The tendency, is to draw arbitrary lines of meaning in order to provide clarity. Where we draw these lines depends on how we view a particular use or definition, that is, what we are stressing. As we stress a particular view of meaning we naturally form an arbitrary boundary that causes more confusion. We tend to get tunnel vision when looking for exactness.

The logic of use that Wittgenstein fosters is one in which the logic is elastic, not given to mathematical precision; and this is seen in the contrast between the exactness of the Tractatus, versus the more elastic view of meaning shown in his later philosophy. His later view is not saying there is no precision, only that we tend to want precision where none can be found. Meaning is not always clearly delineated, but spans a wide variety of uses given in a host of language-games and social activities.

However, there is still another problem, and it is seen by those who think they understand Wittgenstein (including yours truly). The problem is in the application of use as meaning, that is, we find ourselves over emphasizing a particular use that is not in the spirit of Wittgenstein’s enterprise. We tend to push a particular use that is too restrictive, that is, a use that does not allow for the expansive nature of "our forms of life." Thus, we fool ourselves into thinking we are doing what Wittgenstein suggests, but in the final analysis we are using a distorted view of use to perpetuate the very thing Wittgenstein is trying to steer us away from.

Some thoughts on “forms of life.”

What does Wittgenstein mean by “forms of life?” There seem to be at least four ideas behind Wittgenstein’s idea of forms of life. First, the biology associated with human forms of life, i.e., we share breathing, eating, walking, sleeping in common with all human forms of life. Second, the social cultural forms of life, and the wide variety of social cultural forms of life, such as, language, religious beliefs, political beliefs, games, rule-following, scientific pursuits, etc., etc. Third, that which forms our natural and historical environment, viz., living on Earth, the Earth has one moon, the moon didn’t pop into existence five minutes ago, etc. And, fourth, the forms of life associated with other biological animals. All of these make up our forms of life, and they help condition our grammar, and thus our language-games. Our language-games are embedded within the human forms of life.

Forms of life have developed over time, and as such, have been cultivated from more primitive forms of life (“in the beginning was the deed” -Wittgenstein) including the non-linguistic forms of life.

“Being sure that someone is in pain, doubting whether he is, and so on, are so many natural, instinctive kinds of behavior towards other human beings, and our language is merely an auxiliary to, and further extension of, this relation. Our language-game is an extension of primitive behavior (Z 545).”

If we see forms of life within this wide context, we can begin to understand why Wittgenstein would say, “If a lion could speak, we could not understand him (PI).” Even human language-games, embedded in certain cultural beliefs, can leave us wondering what they mean by the use of their words. If you extend this to lions, one can see why this would be problematic.

Are language-games synonymous with forms of life? This question is probably driven by statements like, "And to imagine a language-game is to imagine a form of life (PI 19)." It's true that our language-games are intertwined within the fabric of our forms of life, and it's also true that language-games themselves are forms of life. However, it's not true that a language-game is logically connected with a form of life, i.e., we can imagine forms of life without language. "Language-game...[or] the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life (PI 23)." Language-games cannot be imagined without a form of life, but that doesn't mean that forms of life necessarily require language. Again, forms of life can be activities completely devoid of language.

What does Wittgenstein mean by grammar? Wittgenstein's basic definition of grammar is, the rules that govern the use or the meaning of words (PG 133). The rules are arbitrary and are not "accountable to any reality." Wittgenstein maintains that the rules of grammar, which guide the use and thus meaning of our words, are similar in function to the rules of chess, which govern the use of the pieces. The rules prescribe and proscribe certain move in language and rule out others. Rules also provide a standard whereby we can adjudicate certain moves as opposed to others. This adjudication allows us to regard certain moves successful and others not. One can also regard the rules as command like. He also refers to the rules as convention (PI 355).

Glad to know that there is a thread related to Wittgenstein about commentaries on his work. Thanks to @Sam26 for starting it up years ago. I also want to share a brief paragraph of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations.

66. Consider for example the proceedings we call "games." I mean board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games, and so on. What is common to them all? - Don't say: There must be something common, or they would not be called "games" - but look and see whether there is anything common to all. - For if you loom at them you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that. To repeat: don't think, but look! -- Look fir example at board-games, with their multifarious relationships. Now pass to card-games; here you will find many correspondences with the first group, but many common features drop out, and others appear. When we pass to ball-games much that is common is retained, but much is lost - Are they all "amusing"? Compare chess with noughts and crosses. Or is there always winning and loosing, or competition between players? Think now of games like ring-a-ring-a-roses; here is the element of amusement, but how many other characteristic features have disappeared!

And the result if this examination is: we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing.
I can think of no better expression to characterise these similarities than "family resemblances" [...] and I shall say: "games" for a family.

This paragraph had an important impact in the 1970s, psychologists and linguists. Many human concepts family resemblance categories rather than classical concepts (Aristotelian).

I consider all of this very interesting in terms of linguistics, but I am quite lost in distinguishing Wittgenstein's categories from Aristotle's. If someone could help me, I would appreciate it so much!

Many human concepts family resemblance categories rather than classical concepts (Aristotelian). — javi2541997

Wittgenstein's and Aristotle's categories have different purposes, in that they are trying to achieve different things.

Aristotle's categories are trying to divide the world into features that are independent of each other, for example, organic vs non-organic, where something exists vs when it existed, the properties of an object vs what the object can do using these properties, etc.

Wittgenstein on the other hand is concerned with finding those words within language that may not be thought as independent of each other, such that chess and football fall within the same category of game.

Aristotle would not have an interest in the difference between chess and football as such difference does not contribute to our understanding of how the word is divided into independent categories, whereas Wittgenstein would have an interest in the difference as they are both part of the same category of "game".

Aristotle is using categories to discover differences, whereas Wittgenstein is using categories to discover similarities.

Aristotle is using categories to discover differences, whereas Wittgenstein is using categories to discover similarities — RussellA

Thank you RussellA, I appreciate your help and how you explained it so clearly. :up:

On the other hand, the Wittgenstein's text that I quoted previously is integrated in a book of Steven Pinker that I am currently reading and this psychoolinguist says: Concepts in the mind pick out categories in the world, and the simplest explanation of concepts is that they are conditions for membership in a category, a bit like definitions in a dictionary. Most of our everyday categories, and not just games, show Wittgenstein's family resemblance and crisscrossing features.

I understand now that language categories are listed for searching similarities instead of differences. For example: The word "vegetables" is criss-crossed by many different products but similar each other.

I understand now that language categories are listed for searching similarities instead of differences. — javi2541997

Well, that's not quite true, Wittgenstein's analysis looked at both differences and similarities. Both are important in linguistic analysis.

I am not arguing if it is true or not, I am just trying to understand both of them. :sweat:

Concepts in the mind pick out categories in the world — javi2541997

Given that concepts in the mind pick out categories in the world, the question is, which came first, the concept in the mind or the category in the world.

Either i) first there are concepts in the mind which then pick out categories in the world or ii) concepts are created in the mind by picking out categories in the world.

Which better explains the world, Innatism or Behaviourism.

For the Innatist, we are born with certain concepts, and then use these concepts to discover categories in the world, such as the category table. For the Behaviourist, there are categories in the world that we discover in order to create concepts in the mind, such as the concept table

Where does the essence of the table exist - as innate concepts in the mind or Platonic Forms in the world.

Where do family resemblances exist - in the mind or in the world.

Malcolm tells the following story

In response to a comment about Hegel by Drury, Wittgenstein said: 'Hegel seems to me to be always wanting to say that things which look different are really the same.Whereas my interest is in showing that things which look the same are really different.' He had thought about using a sentence from King Lear, 'I'll teach you differences', as a motto for his book.

Where do family resemblances exist - in the mind or in the world — RussellA

Neither and both. For Witt, these are not categories in the sense of boxes within which the particulars fit. If that were the case, there would be something common to all the particulars. But there is nothing common to all the words that share a family resemblance.

67:“ Why do we call something a "number"? Well, perhaps because it has a—direct—relationship with several things that have hitherto been called number; and this can be said to give it an indirect relation ship to other things we call the same name. And we extend our con cept of number as in spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre. And the strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibres. But if someone wished to say: "There is something common to all these constructions—namely the disjunction of all their common properties"—I should reply: Now you are only playing with words. One might as well say: "Something runs through the whole thread— namely the continuous overlapping of those fibres.”

Furthermore, the existence of the particulars is neither strictly in the mind (which is not a box) nor in the world. It is in the relational practices that make linguistic meaning dependent on the enacting of material configurations through our engagement with the social and non-human world. Think of mind though the 4EA moniker: Embodied, Embedded, Enactive, Extended, and Affective.

Whereas my interest is in showing that things which look the same are really different — Fooloso4

As Wittgenstein said, board games and card games may not have anything in common, but they do have similarities, which he calls "family resemblances".

PI 66. Consider for example the proceedings that we call "games". I mean board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games, and so on. What is common to them all?—Don't say: "There must be something common, or they would not be called 'games' "—but look and see whether there is anything common to all.—For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that.

PI 67. I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than "family resemblances"; for the various resemblances between members of a family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way.— And I shall say: 'games' form a family.

Furthermore, the existence of the particulars is neither strictly in the mind nor in the world. It is in the relational practices that make linguistic meaning dependent on the enacting of material configurations through our engagement with the social and non-human world. — Joshs

Wittgenstein writes that the meaning of a word exists in the relation between the mind and the world.

PI 43. For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.

Wittgenstein may well be either an anti-realist or idealist

From the IEP article on Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889—1951)
Wittgenstein’s place in the debate about philosophical Realism and Anti-Realism is an interesting one. His emphasis on language and human behaviour, practices, etc. makes him a prime candidate for Anti-Realism in many people’s eyes. He has even been accused of linguistic idealism, the idea that language is the ultimate reality.

Anti-realism is a belief opposed to Realism, which contends that there are things that exist mind-independently.

If Wittgenstein is in fact either an anti-realist or idealist, where there is no mind-independent world, then as for Wittgenstein the meaning of a word is in its relation between mind and world, and as for Wittgenstein the world exists in the mind, then it follows that for Wittgenstein, the meaning of a word must also exist solely in the mind.

If Wittgenstein is in fact either an anti-realist or idealist, where there is no mind-independent world, then as for Wittgenstein the meaning of a word is in its relation between mind and world, and as for Wittgenstein the world exists in the mind, then it follows that for Wittgenstein, the meaning of a word must also exist solely in the mind. — RussellA

There are other ways of thinking about the relation between mind and world than in terms of the binaries realist vs anti-realist or empiricist vs idealist. One need not post mind as having an ‘inside’ that can be distinguished from an outside.

One need not post mind as having an ‘inside’ that can be distinguished from an outside. — Joshs

:up:

There are other ways of thinking about the relation between mind and world than in terms of the binaries realist vs anti-realist or empiricist vs idealist. — Joshs

What other ways are you thinking of, of how the subjective mind of colours, pains, fears and hopes relates to the objective world of rocks, mountains, supernova and gravity.

There are other ways of thinking about the relation between mind and world than in terms of the binaries realist vs anti-realist or empiricist vs idealist.
— Joshs

What other ways are you thinking of, of how the subjective mind of colours, pains, fears and hopes relates to the objective world of rocks, mountains, supernova and gravity. — RussellA

Joseph Rouse argues:

“Realism is the view that science aims to provide theories that truthfully represent how the world is--independent of human categories, capacities, and interventions. Both realists and antirealists propose to explain the content of scientific knowledge, either by its causal connections to real objects, or by the social interactions that fix its content; the shared presumption here is that there is a fixed "content" to be explained. Both scientific realists and antirealists presume semantic realism--that is, that there is an already determinate fact of the matter about what our theories, conceptual schemes, or forms of life "say" about the world. Interpretation must come to an end somewhere, they insist, if not in a world of independently real objects, then in a language, conceptual scheme, social context, or culture.”
By contrast, a postmodern view of science rejects “the dualism of scheme and content, or context and content, altogether. There is no determinate scheme or context that can fix the content of utterances, and hence no way to get outside of language. How a theory or practice interprets the world is itself inescapably open to further interpretation, with no authority beyond what gets said by whom, when…. we can never get outside our language, experience, or methods to assess how well they correspond to a transcendent reality

Merleau-Ponty states:

“We must now show that its intellectualist [idealist] antithesis is on the same level as empiricism itself. Both take the objective world as the object of their analysis, when this comes first neither in time nor in virtue of its meaning; and both are incapable of expressing the peculiar way in which perceptual consciousness constitutes its object. Both keep their distance in relation to perception, instead of sticking closely to it.