If you can't internalize the meaning of moral statements or moral behaviors, then how could you know they are statements with moral meaning, — Janus

In general, there's no requirement that you directly experience something (and so know it by acquaintance) to know it in the propositional sense. For example, it's impossible for us to directly experience neutrinos, but we know they exist via indirect evidence, via inferential reasoning, analogical reasoning, abduction, etc. We know that others have minds, make moral judgments, and so in this way.

That's a bad analogy, because the existence of neutrinos is known via predictions and precise measurements of observed and quantifiable phenomena which confirm those predictions. Nothing like that is possible with the moral thought and behavior of others.

The analogy didn't say anything about predictions. That's not what it was about.

Not that it's true that you can't make predictions with respect to others mental content.

Well, what was it about then?

Just what I explicitly typed. The short version was the first sentence: "In general, there's no requirement that you directly experience something (and so know it by acquaintance) to know it in the propositional sense."

Neutrinos are known only by observing that predictions obtain, and that they obtain is only known via precise measurement, so I still say it was a bad analogy. What would you claim are the bases of inferences that others have moral feelings, thoughts and dispositions, and that their behavior is morally motivated?

You raise great points. If you have the time, I would greatly appreciate it if you could address a few questions.

• To what extent is there value in simply allowing that the behavior of others is morally motivated, or at least has potential to be morally motivated?
• Should one's response to the actions of another fully conscious human being depend on whether those actions were or weren't morally motivated? (Why or why not?)
• By what process does one infer, learn, or call to mind, the morals of oneself?

These are good questions. I don't have a lot of time right now, but I can offer some quick thoughts.

• Yes, I think we pre-reflectively take it for granted that others are morally motivated, and that is a good thing, because it means that we trust others until they give us reason not to.

• I'm not convinced there are any fully conscious human beings, but I think we would be justified in responding differently to actions that we believed were motivated only by self-interest than we would to those we believed to be morally motivated. I think responding differently is justified by the expectation that people should be morally motivated if they wish to live in community; otherwise we would be justified in seeing them as being predatory, or if they were pretending to be morally motivated when not being so motivated, we would be justified in thinking them dishonest or hypocritical.

• This goes back to my argument with Terrapin. I think our ability to entertain moral thoughts and feelings is the result of being socialized and educated, as well as having the capacity to empathize, a capacity which may or may not be genetically determined or may be more or less genetically and culturally determined. So, moral values are introjected by observing and interacting with others, and coming to understand what constitutes moral feeling and thought. Once we have the idea of moral thought and feeling we can, ideally at least, observe our own thoughts ,feelings and actions and come to recognize which are morally motivated and which are not.

In my view ethics and moral thought are more art than science.

I would like to know what others here think/believe to be the difference between what counts as being moral and what counts as being ethical in terms of kinds of belief.

I know what I think, based upon what's been set out heretofore.

Guilty by association.

I'm still curious to see how far we can take it, and what it will look like when we arrive to a reasonable conclusion. — Merkwurdichliebe

In addition to the ones we've already arrived at, I presume?

If morals/morality is only internal to individuals, then my morals/morality are internal to me, Joe's is internal to Joe, yours are internal to you, etc.

But you somehow took this to imply "So then, your morals, and praxis' morals are internal to me." So I'm asking you to explain how you're figuring this. — Terrapin Station

I'm figuring this, because if there is no way for me to apprehend the morals of others, how can I claim, with any reasonability, that they actually have morals too. And even if there was something in another, something that I could not deny, there still remains no way to determine that it is morality.

Thanks for your answers. It sounds to me that morals are being discussed at several levels here (of an individual, between individuals, between communities, etc) and this raises a few additional questions. For example, is it possible to view the morals of a community as a sort of 'strongly recommended advice' to people who might wish to join that community without causing significant internal agitation or potentially upsetting another community?

In addition to the ones we've already arrived at, I presume? — creativesoul

You wise ass. :grin: Of course.

That's a bad analogy, because the existence of neutrinos is known via predictions and precise measurements of observed and quantifiable phenomena which confirm those predictions. Nothing like that is possible with the moral thought and behavior of others. — Janus

Actually there are theories of intelligence that are exactly like that, and would apply to moral thought and behavior of others. See: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/On_Intelligence

What would you claim are the bases of inferences that others have moral feelings, thoughts and dispositions, and that their behavior is morally motivated? — Janus

The vast amount of stored memory we possess of observed and quantifiable phenomena (in the form of sense data patterns) which confirm predictions.

Some things are neither external nor internal. Some things consist entirely of different elements from both groups. Those things cannot be properly accounted for by using one or the other.

Morals are one such thing.

I woot'n be uh nuthins with mah head all full uh stuffins...

Some things do not have a precise spatiotemporal location.

Morals are one such thing.

Morals require others. Others are external. Morals require external. Morals require brains. Brains are internal. Morals require internal.

Need we go on here?

after the wave of interlopers that invaded earlier today, I would say that the methodology is solid, and will at least stand up to, more or less, weak contention. — Merkwurdichliebe

I, myself, am not entirely sold. It's my theory(well, clearly upon the backs of many an intellect). I do recognize the scope of rightful application.

Morals require others. Others are external. Morals require external. Morals require brains. Brains are internal. Morals require internal.

Need we go on here? — creativesoul

Well said.

The dichotomy of internal/external has been rendered inherently inadequate for the task of setting out the origen of morals. It's a sideshow that leads to gross misunderstandings...

Not known for my succinctness... feeling a bit ornery tonight...

There's much to liked about many of the veins of thought herein. It would serve us well to find the common threads binding them all.

The problem is that predicted and observed behaviors, which are themslves not precisely quantifiable also tell us nothing necessary about motivation.

What would you claim are the bases of inferences that others have moral feelings, thoughts and dispositions, and that their behavior is morally motivated? — Janus

I do not want to speak on behalf of praxis. I do think that the above are good questions. I'd like to offer my answers.

Ask them. Listen to their answers. That's more than adequate ground to conclude that others have moral thought/belief.

Look to how different people employ the term "moral". What do all those different people's uses have in common, if anything at all? If there is a central vein that is part and parcel to each regardless of that which is subject to particulars, then we bookmark it as a means for setting it aside. We must do that prior to establishing/determining the scope of it's relevancy and what can be garnered and/or gleaned from it.

With knowledge of what counts as being moral in kind, we can rightly and confidently say - sometimes at least - that another's behaviour was morally motivated.

The problem is that predicted and observed behaviors... ...tell us nothing necessary about motivation. — Janus

What is the term "necessary" doing here?

Predicted and observed behaviour can tell us something about motivation.

I woot'n be uh nuthins with mah head all full uh stuffins... — creativesoul

Mammy?

The dichotomy of internal/external has been rendered inherently inadequate for the task of setting out the origen of morals. — creativesoul

I concur. Inadequate, irrelevant, superfluous, confounding.

Up to this point, we've done fine discussing the source of morals without resorting to the dichotomy of internal/external. The notion of internalization that has been thrown around here should not be understood as an antonym to externalization, but more as an analogue to personalization or appropriation.

There's much to liked about many of the veins of thought herein. It would serve us well to find the common threads binding them all. — creativesoul

Time to get to it.

I don’t know if utilitiarian is the source of morals, I would assume it comes from pragmatism, or experimentation of what could be useful; passed down through evolution—-or it’s how a fastidious fellow might look for errors he sees around him. I’m pretty sure Plato developed forms of moral understanding and Kant bypassed it to influence people into right or wrong.
Although the source of morals is truly immemorial to a time before the antiquity. People knew something was above the others. There had to be useful rules, and in doing so moral guidelines. Maybe women noticed Don’t spit on the floor, don’t smoke inside, don’t kill people. God could have a major role in morals. Morals are developed over time, so certain morals originate later than others.

Look to how different people employ the term "moral". What do all those different people's uses have in common, if anything at all? If there is a central vein that is part and parcel to each regardless of that which is subject to particulars, then we bookmark it as a means for setting it aside. We must do that prior to establishing/determining the scope of it's relevancy and what can be garnered and/or gleaned from it. — creativesoul

There is something some people don't seem to understand (I don't necessarily mean Janus, I haven't been following your conversation). Sometimes it is impossible to investigate directly. For instance, when the subject matter is a "universal thread that unifies a concepts across all particular instantiations", broad/general speculation does not tell us much. Here, it is wise to elucidate the more relevant particulars of morality in order to adequately understand the universal thread that binds them all.