In sociology and other social sciences, internalization (or internalisation) means an individual's acceptance of a set of norms and values (established by others) through socialisation. — Merkwurdichliebe

Right, so that it was something external prior to the internalization.

The problem is that you can't literally have morals/morality, values, etc. that are external.

So the theory is flawed, because it has an errant ontology. That's just the point. We're talking about the source of something. We can't do that very well with misconceived ontology.

So an instruction booklet on badminton would be a source of morals? Since it provides conditions under which a particular school is move is right or wrong? Badminton is an example of human behaviour, no? — Isaac

That is what we are seeking to work out in our thought experiment.

An instruction booklet on badminton would, indeed, be a source of morals if we could show it to be an ethical authority, or if it could be said to act by judging itself to be good or bad.

Right, so that it was something external prior to the internalization.

The problem is that you can't literally have morals/morality, values, etc. that are external. — Terrapin Station

So then, your morals, and praxis' morals are internal to me. That seems odd, to say the least.

There you go again, imposing your irrational solipsist loop on us. Some one's theory is indeed flawed. :brow:

Can you identify the most egregious error so far? Or if that's too difficult for you, many just pick one of the worst.
— praxis

Primarily, this is supposed to be a discussion about the source of morals. No one has defined either what is meant by 'source', nor what is meant by 'morals'. A discussion cannot even start without that, and I don't mean by that some kind of anthropological investigation into all the ways the word is used (that would be pointless unless we are to invoke some kind of global wordsmith who ensures all our uses are compatible). I mean a commitment to a class of uses. We can start there. — Isaac

Creativesoul and Merk have put a good deal of effort into attempting to develop a universal criterion for what counts as a moral thing.

Well that was a bunch of gobbledygook.
— Terrapin Station

Clearly that doesn't bother him. On the contrary, he must get a kick out of it. He's enthusiastically adopted creativesoul's gobbledygook, and he doesn't even seem embarrassed about it.
— S

@creativesoul
It seems, I have my own fan club.

I appreciate those with the patience and prescience to work out their thoughts systematically. Unfortunately there are very few who possess the wherewithal to do this. Most get bogged down in semantics and rhetorical drivel over definitions. And, we are left with flimsy argument by ellipsis.

I would find it much more interesting if more philosophers would develop their systems alongside each other so that they could be compared and contrasted. (You, creativesoul, and I have corrected many errors that we presupposed by doing this.)

@praxis

I was thinking about the distinction between ethical authority and moral agency. The ethical authority always judges the other - it determines right and wrong. The moral agent judges himself - he decides how he ought to behave. His judgement can be based on authority (the approval of another), yet on a deeper level, it can be grounded in principle (obligatory duty).

I never addressed the OP, I just realized.

First I'm not asking for what is right or wrong, rather were do our sense of right and wrong come from.

Personally I developed this thesis:

We start life with the need to continue our species existence.

Then we move to develop them independently (divine command, unitilitarianism, and whatever else) then to form governments with some degree of state control we use contractarianism.

After these steps we try to spread our morality to others as a sense of approval solidarity, the idea being we don't want to live thinking we did something wrong (not wanting our morals challenged) need to live cooperatively for mutual benefit on a large scale.
Those we disagree with are our enemies and we treat them how our independent morals demand (so different for everyone).

I'm sure I haven't covered all my bases so I'm asking for, people to point out my mistakes and contribute new ideas I haven't come up with yet. — hachit

Strikethrough and bolding are my suggestions. Moral issues are often politicized to promote a particular party or ideology. Things like abortion and capital punishment are used by politicians to whip-up support for themselves or their party, without really caring about the moral issue. Unfortunately, it's typical for this to be more about gaining and maintaining wealth and power than it is for promoting human flourishing.

There are theories of moral developmental reasoning. I think kohlberg's is considered a little out of date.

There are theories of moral developmental reasoning. I think kohlberg's is considered a little out of date. — praxis

I didn't mean to invoke Kohlberg. :grin:

Oh, but you did.

Seems relevant to me. I have no problem harvesting certain concepts for my own use. Doesn't mean I'm Kohlbergian.

So then, your morals, and praxis' morals are internal to me. — Merkwurdichliebe

Could you explain how that makes sense to you (as something you're figuring is implied by my comments)?

Strikethrough and bolding are my suggestions. Moral issues are often politicized to promote a particular party or ideology. Things like abortion and capital punishment are used by politicians to whip-up support for themselves or their party, without really caring about the moral issue. Unfortunately, it's typical for this to be more about gaining and maintaining wealth and power than it is for promoting human flourishing.

Yes, I know the government don't care about morals, and people try to manipulate people with there morals. That is were I expect that contracteinsm is a thing but there are examples of times it not the case because contracteinsm says you get someting in return.

Could you explain how that makes sense to you (as something you're figuring is implied by my comments)? — Terrapin Station

If morals are only internal, and have no external analogue, then what I said follows. No ifs, ands, or buts.

We can't do that very well with misconceived ontology. — Terrapin Station

The "misconceived ontology" at work here is your facile solipsistic thinking in terms of <internal > and <external>.

If morals are only internal, and have no external analogue, then what I said follows. No ifs, ands, or buts. — Merkwurdichliebe

If morals are only internal, then you internally possess my morals because?

Try that with something else that is internal to individuals. If desires are only internal, then you possess my desires because?

The "misconceived ontology" at work here is your facile solipsistic thinking in terms of <internal > and <external>. — Janus

Learn what "solipsistic" conventionally refers to.

Typical lame response designed to make yourself look as though you know more than your interlocutor instead of engaging with the actual ideas.

If morals are only internal, then you internally possess my morals because?

Try that with something else that is internal to individuals. If desires are only internal, then you possess my desires because? — Terrapin Station

See what I mean? The rationale is ridiculous

How about just explaining how you think it would imply that you somehow have my morality?

But you're using the term in some mysterious, unconventional way.

No, I'm not. If you say that nothing external to the mind/body can be internalized then you could have no contact with the external world, which is tantamount to saying that there is no external world, and to say this would be to proclaim solipsism. Of course you don't say there is no external world, but that is only because you apparently cannot work out the logical implications of what you do say.

How about just explaining how you think it would imply that you somehow have my morality? — Terrapin Station

Huh? I don't follow.

If you say that nothing external to the mind/body can be internalized — Janus

I said nothing even remotely resembling that. Not that it has anything to do with the conventional definition of solipsism.

then you could have no contact with the external world, — Janus

That doesn't follow from "nothing external to the mind/body can be internalized." Again, not that I'm claiming anything like "nothing external to the mind/body can be internalized," but nevertheless, "then you could have no contact with the external world" doesn't follow from it.

"You could have no contact with the external world" would be (epistemological) solipsism, but "thinking in terms of internal and external" certainly wouldn't be and wouldn't imply solipsism.

I'm not saying anything like "You could have no contact with the external world" in general, by the way.

If morals/morality is only internal to individuals, then my morals/morality are internal to me, Joe's is internal to Joe, yours are internal to you, etc.

But you somehow took this to imply "So then, your morals, and praxis' morals are internal to me." So I'm asking you to explain how you're figuring this.

The state provides many services in exchange for our loyalty or participation, such as law enforcement, emergency services, etc.

I haven't said that you say that; I acknowledged that you haven't. I said it is the logical consequence of what you do say.

Right, so that it was something external prior to the internalization.

The problem is that you can't literally have morals/morality, values, etc. that are external. — Terrapin Station

If you say there can be no morals (no moral behavior, thoughts, attitudes or whatever) external to your mind then how would that not be solipsistic?

If you acknowledge that there are moral behaviors (in the sense of morally motivated behaviors) then why would you say that that those behaviors cannot be imitated (internalized)?

If you say there can be no morals (no moral behavior, thoughts, attitudes or whatever) external to your mind then how would that not be solipsistic? — Janus

First off, the world isn't solely comprised of morals. That's all I'm talking about there--morals.

Secondly, even if we were saying that it's "solipsistic about morality," I'm not actually saying anything solipsistic about morality. I'm neither saying that no morality other than one's own exists nor that one can only know that only one's own morality exists.

First off, the world isn't solely comprised of morals. That's all I'm talking about there--morals.

Secondly, even if we were saying that it's "solipsistic about morality," I'm not actually saying anything solipsistic about morality. I'm neither saying that no morality other than one's own exists nor that one can only know that only one's own morality exists. — Terrapin Station

Yes, and I'm talking about moral solipsism, and saying the logical consequence of that is epistemological solipsism. But to discuss that would take us off-topic, so let's, for the sake of being on topic and for the sake of simplicity stick with the issue regarding morals.

If you can't internalize the meaning of moral statements or moral behaviors, then how could you know they are statements with moral meaning, and therefore how could you know that any morality other than your own exists?