rescues the a priori origin of the pure concepts of the understanding and the validity of the general laws of nature as laws of the understanding, in such a way that their use is limited only to experience, because their possibility has its ground merely in the relation of the understanding to experience, however, not in such a way that they are derived from experience, but that experience is derived from them, a completely reversed kind of connection which never occurred to Hume.
Hume's beliefs about causation are antiquated. He didn't consider that there might actually exist natural law. — Relativist
I think this is a case of non-overlapping magesteria. Deduction is distinct from induction. Necessity is a feature of the former but not the latter and causality is an inductive inference.
Perhaps Hume means to say that causation isn't a necessary relationship but wouldn't that be repeating the obvious, afterall isn't causality induction? — TheMadFool
The existence of natural law does not imply uncaused, contingent things can't exist. Adolf Grünbaum makes the case here. — Relativist
But when it comes to knowing the relationship between a cause and its effect, no such logical necessity applies, as what we really observe is only the habitual or recurring conjunction of cause and effect. We customarily call that 'causal' but it doesn't have the same binding necessity as deductive proofs. So how can we claim to know that there is such a relationship? That is his challenge. — Wayfarer
Correct me if I'm wrong but I don't believe Hume said that it was possible that events can be uncaused. — StreetlightX
Which is, to your point, a conflation of ontology with epistemology. — Maw
But in order to make this point, he argued that there's no reason to believe that events couldn't occur without causes. — Dusty of Sky
Produce the quote. We can take it from there. — StreetlightX
n other words, the validity of such principles as 'the relation of cause and effect', is said to be one of the foundational elements of knowledge itself. So where Hume, the empiricist, presumes that all knowledge is derived from experience only, Kant is showing that, in order for experience to be intelligible at all, such fundamental categories as the relation of cause and effect must obtain. — Wayfarer
I think the causal order we observe goes above and beyond what would be necessary just to allow us to differentiate between moments in time. We've discovered highly intricate principles of cause and effect both at the microscopic and macroscopic level. These principles aren't prerequisites of experience. We've been experiencing things for thousands of years without knowing about microbiology or general relativity. — Dusty of Sky
So why are we capable of making scientific discoveries and using them to great effect (e.g. modern technology)? To me, it seems like the best answer is that causal relations we infer into our observations actually exist in reality. — Dusty of Sky
I also have to agree with other posters that only deduction can be known for certain, and that Hume was right to say, in cases of inference, there can be no absolute certainty that causality exists. — ernestm
Hume said that it was possible for events to not have causes. — Dusty of Sky
Would you mind, and how would I be wrong, if I re-wrote your statement as: Kant pointed out to Hume, the question of causation has to do with the synthetic a priori logic of our pure understanding, and in no way our common experience, which had thus far been described by mere habit. — Mww
Once it is established (by experience and the phenomenological examination of experience) just what is essential to all coherent experience (that it be spatial, temporal, causal etc) is a priori in the sense that further actual experiences do not need to be examined in order to know that these conditions will necessarily apply. — Janus
Once logically established, yes, but such establishment is the purview of reason, not common experience. — Mww
My understanding is that the synthetic a priori conditions of and for possible experience requires prior experience in order to establish just what are the necessary general conditions of and for experience. Once it is established (by experience and the phenomenological examination of experience) just what is essential to all coherent experience (that it be spatial, temporal, causal etc) is a priori in the sense that further actual experiences do not need to be examined in order to know that these conditions will necessarily apply. — Janus
I'm not approaching you in a combative stance, by the way... — creativesoul
I think we agree much more than we disagree. — creativesoul
Hume said that it was possible for events to not have causes. — Dusty of Sky
"We can never demonstrate the necessity of a cause to every new existence, without shewing at the same time the impossibility there is, that anything can ever begin to exist without some productive principle" (Treatise of Human Nature, Book1, Part 3, Section 3) — Dusty of Sky
As you can see, Hume didn't say anything of the sort. His thesis is that we can never demonstrate the existence of a cause. Again, Hume wrote about human understanding - how we come to know, whether we can know - not about the nature of things. He didn't actually have much to say about metaphysics and ontology, he was mainly concerned with epistemology. — SophistiCat
In a way, his epistemology was his metaphysics - what is known is identical to what is. — Merkwurdichliebe
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