There's an easy way to show that I'm wrong, to establish that it's not b.s.--how? Well, simply reference a study done under the rubric of physics that claims that "the brain 'maximizes entropy.'"

Re very non-specifically mentioning Penrose, for example, I'd guess that you're referring to The Emperor's New Mind. I read that, though quite some time ago, so I don't recall anything Penrose said in it about entropy, but at any rate that's a popular work that doesn't count as any sort of research, and it's especially not physics research. — Terrapin Station

http://physicsworld.com/cws/article/news/2016/oct/18/consciousness-is-tied-to-entropy-say-researchers

These results are similar to the recent simulation of a Mott Transition which indicated that the Big Bang was cooked neither too hot nor too cold, but just right. That contradicts the classical mathematics which quantum mechanics are formulated in, but indicates the brain is organized around both content and what's missing from this picture. For example, the visual centers have proven to be organized around what's missing from this picture.

http://phys.org/news/2014-01-discovery-quantum-vibrations-microtubules-corroborates.html

Those are just the first two best websites I could find in 30 seconds. I offer free lessons in how to use a dictionary and search engine before possibly inserting your foot into your mouth.

the notion of "consciousness" of these papers seems to be different from the ability to have phenomenal experience and qualia, it seems to refer to high level consciousness

the notion of "consciousness" of these papers seems to be different from the ability to have phenomenal experience and qualia, it seems to refer to high level consciousness — Babbeus

The particulars of Penrose's theory never impressed me much, he's just too metaphysically oriented in his approach if you ask me and quantum mechanics have proven to be metaphorical. However, he consulted neurologists to figure out where quantum mechanics might be in the brain. My own suspicion is that a universal recursion in the law of identity is what we are observing and what is consciousness or awareness and knowledge or memories are indivisible complimentary-opposites with their identities inevitably going down the nearest convenient rabbit hole or toilet of your personal preference.

Among other things it would explain why both our neurons and a black hole convey any mass, energy, and information with the highest efficiency for anything their size. It would also mean everything that exists can be described using a simple systems logic as revolving around what does not exist. Similar to some of the newer quantum Field Theory ideas, but can reconcile thermodynamics with Relativity and quantum mechanics using a distinctly contextual or metaphorical approach that leverages the symmetry.

http://physicsworld.com/cws/article/news/2016/oct/18/consciousness-is-tied-to-entropy-say-researchers — wuliheron

Thanks for at least attempting an answer here. First, it's better to link to the actual paper, rather than a news article about the paper.

The actual paper is "Towards a statistical mechanics of consciousness: maximization of
number of connections is associated with conscious awareness" by R. Guevara Erra, D. M. Mateos, R. Wennberg and J.L. Perez Velazquez

You can read it here: https://arxiv.org/pdf/1606.00821v1.pdf

Is the paper a physics study? Not really. The authors' professional affiliations are:

* Laboratoire Psychologie de la Perception, CNRS and Université Paris Descartes, Sorbonne Paris Cité, Paris, France
* Neuroscience and Mental Health Programme, Division of Neurology, Hospital for Sick Children.
* Institute of Medical Science and Department of Paediatrics, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada.
* Krembil Neuroscience Centre, Toronto Western Hospital, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada.

If you had said, "Some cognitive scientists/medical researchers have claimed . . . " I wouldn't have questioned that part. They do utilize some concepts from physics in the analysis they're doing, but it's a cognitive science paper, not a physics paper.

At any rate, I'd agree that they are making a claim about "maximized entropy," although it seems to me that the conceptual assumptions they're making about order/disorder, and subsequently the application of the term "entropy," as well as the actual empirical phenomena they're analyzing to make their claim--oscillations from MEG/iEEG/EEG recordings, not to mention the analysis that they're employing, is quite ridiculous.

The other paper, "Consciousness in the universe: a review of the 'Orch OR' theory," by Stuart Hameroff and Roger Penrose, isn't about entropy.

And again note that Hameroff's professional affiliation is this:

Anesthesiology, Psychology and Center for Consciousness Studies, The University of Arizona, Tucson,

That's also not really an empirical research paper.

the notion of "consciousness" of these papers seems to be different from the ability to have phenomenal experience and qualia, it seems to refer to high level consciousness — Babbeus

What would you say the difference is? Are you referring to reasoning with "high level consciousness" maybe?

What would you say the difference is? Are you referring to reasoning with "high level consciousness" maybe? — Terrapin Station

For example if someone is in deep sleep (possibly drug induced) or is in a coma I would say he has a far lower level of consciousness than if he is awake and the brain is working at full potential.

Why would you believe that people are conscious while in a coma?

Anyway, I would agree that there's a difference between consciousness, when present, while asleep and while awake, although it seems to be more of a qualitative difference.

Why would you believe that people are conscious while in a coma?

Anyway, I would agree that there's a difference between consciousness, when present, while asleep and while awake, although it seems to be more of a qualitative difference. — Terrapin Station

In a universal recursion of the law of identity it would display four fold supersymmetry vanishing into indeterminacy. Pattern matching ruling the universe would mean there are possibly four rudimentary types of consciousness with autism possibly being one. Everything can be described as both social and creative in distinctive ways with a recent study indicating that our immune system seems to play a huge role in how our brain functions and how social we are in general. It should also be able to explain how quorum sensing works.

Why would you believe that people are conscious while in a coma? — Terrapin Station

I would believe it with a certain specific connotation of the word "conscious", check these:

• https://www.theguardian.com/science/neurophilosophy/2011/sep/02/detecting-covert-consciousness-vegetative-state
• http://www.cam.ac.uk/research/news/scientists-find-hidden-brain-signatures-of-consciousness-in-vegetative-state-patients
• https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4147439/

In a universal recursion of the law of identity it would display four fold supersymmetry vanishing into indeterminacy. — wuliheron

You're joking, right?

But studies like this:

"In the 2006 study, Owen and his colleagues used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to investigate if a 23-year-old woman in a persistent vegetative state would respond to a series of pre-recorded spoken statements. Owen and his colleagues found that the statements produced brain activation patterns that were very similar to those observed in healthy volunteers, in regions known to be important for the processing of speech."

Only tell us about observable phenomena, while consciousness isn't actually third-person observable.

We believe that consciousness is correlated with particular observable third-person phenomena, of course, and I believe that mental states are identical to particular brain states, but we don't know, and can't know, exactly what the correlations are.

The nature of qualia is such that they are, by definition, a first-person experience, or rather, they are intrinsic to the nature of first-person experience. Therefore the difficulty in saying what constitutes qualia, is that they are never an object of experience. That may sound trite, but scientific analysis, generally, presumes that it is studying an object of experience, something which can be measured, compared, and made subject to observation. That is why the hard problem is hard, and why the eliminative materialists, such as Daniel Dennett, have to insist that qualia are insignificant, illusory or by-products - because qualia are something that can't be accomodated by any third-person perspective. If they're real, then materialism is false, so naturally, Dennett, Churchlands, etc, are obliged to insist that they're not real.

The problem with the equation of mental states and brain states is that to say that something is 'identical' is to assert equivalence, to say that 'X=Y'. Mental and logical operations, such as the law of identity, consist solely of the relationships of ideas. Ideas can be represented in any variety of media, including brain-states, but ideas themselves are not actually physical objects. So it is not possible that ideas and brain-states are the same.

You're joking, right? — Terrapin Station

No joke, it would explain why the LHC mass of the Higgs Boson suggests cosmic ray energy level experiments are required to settle the issue of supersymmetry as reflecting just how fundamental symmetry and asymmetry are in a paradox of existence or universal recursion of the law of identity. It means reality is fundamentally analog with digital logic merely representing causality. I like to say reality without dreams and vice versa is impossible. This is the logic the NSA and Google and everyone wants for designing a super Von Neumann architecture among other things.

You must send me some photos from your planet some day.

You must send me some photos from your planet some day. — Wayfarer

Same planet, different karmic universe. An unusual metaphorical scalar version of John Wheeler's Participatory Anthropic Principle where its difficult to say just who is being created and who or what is doing all the creating. Curioser and curioser.

OK forgive the sarcasm. But the thread is about a specific topic, namely, qualia, which I've already noted, is a clunky piece of philosophical jargon only found in debates conducted by a clique of academics. Nevertheless, it is a particular topic, with a particular scope, which doesn't include the LCH, Wheeler, super-symmetry, and all the rest.

I think the term 'qualia' attempts to designate a supposed entity which is a hypostatization of the quality of experience. I don't think we experience qualities of experience at all; we experience activities involving things and those activities have qualities. So we experience the activity of drinking beer and the beer has a taste. We don't experience the quality of the taste of the beer; we experience the taste of the beer, and we assign different qualities to the different tastes of beer. Of course, language with all its ambiguities is never going to perfectly pin this down. But I think it is out of the ambiguities of language that the idea that qualia somehow actually exist grows.

OK forgive the sarcasm. But the thread is about a specific topic, namely, qualia, which I've already noted, is a clunky piece of philosophical jargon only found in debates conducted by a clique of academics. Nevertheless, it is a particular topic, with a particular scope, which doesn't include the LCH, Wheeler, super-symmetry, and all the rest. — Wayfarer

If qualia are merely an abstraction that doesn't relate to physical reality then why don't we just call them that?

There's a relevant quote in the Wikipedia article, from the first mention of the term in the literature:

There are recognizable qualitative characters of the given, which may be repeated in different experiences, and are thus a sort of universals; I call these "qualia." But although such qualia are universals, in the sense of being recognized from one to another experience, they must be distinguished from the properties of objects. Confusion of these two is characteristic of many historical conceptions, as well as of current essence-theories. The quale is directly intuited, given, and is not the subject of any possible error because it is purely subjective.

Clarence Irving Lewis, Mind and the World Order (1929).

So, different from abstractions because they involve experience, whereas abstractions, like mathematical laws, do not.

No joke, — wuliheron

Then I suppose I have to suggest insanity.

So it is not possible that ideas and brain-states are the same. — Wayfarer

Even if we decide that ideas and brain states are not the same thing.
Without brain states ideas are not possible.

Then I suppose I have to suggest insanity. — Terrapin Station

Feynman said, "I learned very early the difference between knowing the name of something and knowing something. The first principle is that you must not fool yourself and you are the easiest person to fool. It is in the admission of ignorance and the admission of uncertainty that there is a hope for the continuous motion of human beings in some direction that doesn't get confined, permanently blocked, as it has so many times before in various periods in the history of man.

See that the imagination of nature is far, far greater than the imagination of man. I think it's much more interesting to live not knowing than to have answers which might be wrong. We are trying to prove ourselves wrong as quickly as possible, because only in that way can we find progress."

That's an interesting citation W and seems to be pretty much in accord with my own thinking about qualia.

Good points, schopenhauer1 — Terrapin Station

Thank you.

What do you see as the relevance of the Feynman quote--that your brilliance is being too easily dismissed?

Without brain states ideas are not possible.

I think what you're thinking is that you can provide an account of ideas with reference to brain-states - but what is 'an idea'?

You might say it is something that can only exist 'in a mind' or 'in a brain'. But if you take the primitives of mathematics and geometry - natural numbers and geometrical forms and theorems - these are able to be discovered by any mind, so they're not in the mind, in the sense of being the product of brain-states. They are only perceptible by a mind, but they are not created by the mind; any mind that perceives that A=A, will be perceiving the same thing.

H. sapiens has evolved to the point where such things as numbers and forms can be recognized by them, but they're not the originators of those things, nor can they be feasibly described in terms of neurology, in my view. That is simply the wish to provide an account for mental activities in terms that are explicable by neuroscience. It all goes back to one of the fundamental materialist dogmas, that 'the brain secretes thought'. I think, however, it can be shown that thought (in the sense of ideas, as defined above) are of a different order to the kinds of things that neurology can be expected to explain.

I think it helps to understand Dennett's OLP and Wittgensteinian roots. Dennett is not denying the beetle-in-the-box. He is instead saying that language that purports to talk about the beetle is misleading and illusory. As you mention, qualia is not an object of experience. But that doesn't mean for Dennett (as also for Wittgenstein) that there is nothing there. It only means that qualia should not be reified as an object of experience.

"But you will surely admit that there is a difference between
pain-behaviour accompanied by pain and pain-behaviour without any
pain?" — Admit it? What greater difference could there be? — "And yet
you again and again reach the conclusion that the sensation itself is a
nothing" — Not at all. It is not a something, but not a nothing either!
The conclusion was only that a nothing would serve just as well as a
something about which nothing could be said. We have only rejected
the grammar which tries to force itself on us here.

Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 304

You might say it is something that can only exist 'in a mind' or 'in a brain'. But if you take the primitives of mathematics and geometry - natural numbers and geometrical forms and theorems - these are able to be discovered by any mind, so they're not in the mind, in the sense of being the product of brain-states. They are only perceptible by a mind, but they are not created by the mind; any mind that perceives that A=A, will be perceiving the same thing. — Wayfarer

An A is a symbol for a distinct object from anything which is Not A.
In order for A to equal A it must also be true that Not A is never equal to A.

This to me simply means that at some fundamental physical level distinct points in space are real.
I can not grasp the notion of forming such notions of distinct abstract identities, like A, were it not true in a physical reality that no such distinction could be drawn.

To my mind at a fundamental level it must be physically possible to draw distinction else it would not be possible to form such distinction in the abstract.
I can make no sense of the notion that the possibility for forming relationships between distinct objects is possible abstractly but is not also possible in a physically real sense.

H. sapiens has evolved to the point where such things as numbers and forms can be recognized by them, but they're not the creators of those things, nor can they be feasibly described in terms of neurology, in my view. That is simply the wish to provide an account for mental activities in terms that are explicable by neuroscience. It all goes back to one of the fundamental materialist dogmas, that 'the brain secretes thought'. I think, however, it can be shown that thought (in the sense of ideas, as defined above) are of a different order to the kinds of things that neurology can be expected to explain. — Wayfarer

I am a monist.
I believe it is most philosophically efficient to define reality as a single form, not separate things as with dualism or pluralism.

To me it boils down to semantic preferences.

I just think it is more philosophically tidy to define reality such that abstractions of the mind are not immaterial things.

In my mind all abstracts are made possible from possibility which is physically real.
That is to say a given set of relationships or distinctions can be drawn because such things occur in reality.
If distinctions and relationships among distinctions where not a physical possibility it makes no sense to me to say they exist exclusively in the abstract.
To my mind the abstract is founded upon the physical because if distinction and relationships could not physically occur I can make no sense of what it would mean for them to occur in the abstract.

As you mention, qualia is not an object of experience. But that doesn't mean for Dennett (as also for Wittgenstein) that there is nothing there. It only means that qualia should not be reified as an object of experience. — AndrewM

But Dennett is an eliminative materialist, which Wittgenstein never was.

Dennett's view is that what we take to be qualia, what appears to us as first-person experience, really is the snap, crackle and pop of synapses. They can be explained as such 'without residue'. That is why he says, only half-jokingly, that humans are moist robots (and then adds 'and so what?')

I think the real motivation for Dennett (and others of his ilk) is a deep-seated fear of the un-knowability of the mind. There's an interesting quote floating around out there, by John B Watson, founder of behaviourism (in my view, the godfather of eliminativism) where he frankly states that he wishes to eliminate 'mind' from all forms of scientific discourse, because it is a relic of a superstitious past. The mind is, in my view, and I think his, irredeemably spooky, so a thorough-going objectivism can't admit its reality.

That is why Dennett is dismissive of arguments for the reality of the first-person perspective. His whole life's work is to try and demonstrate that the first-person perspective can be reduced to third-person descriptions of natural processes, with nothing left out. Which is the gist of the argument between Chalmers and Dennett.

The mind is, in my view, and I think his, irredeemably spooky, so a thorough-going objectivism can't admit its reality. — Wayfarer

I don't believe the distinction between the mind and the brain is necessary.

I have never seen any argument such that by force of logic we must conclude that the mind and brain are not terms indicating the exact same phenomena.