They are undeconstructible because they count, for Derrida, as among the conditions of their deconstruction. Deconstruction would be 'impossible', would be unable to take place, were they deconstructible. It's probably easier to show this for democracy than it is for justice, so we can stick with that. Recall that for Derrida:

"Democracy is the only system, the only constitutional paradigm, in which, in principle, one has or assumes the right to criticize everything publicly, including the idea of democracy, its concept, its history, and its name. Including the idea of the constitutional paradigm and the absolute authority of law. It is thus the only paradigm that is universalizable, whence its chance and its fragility. ... The expression “democracy to come” takes into account the absolute and intrinsic historicity of the only system that welcomes in itself, in its very concept, that expression of autoimmunity called the right to self-critique and perfectibility." (Rogues).

This universality of self-critique, in which democracy can, by its very nature, undermine itself, functions as a condition for its deconstruction: were some part of democracy closed-off from self-critique, were some aspect of democracy a priori placed outside the space of re-evaluation, then there would not be democracy. This is the 'idea' of democracy that cannot be deconstructed, without undermining the very possibility of democracy itself. One can think of it like: democracy is always in the making, always in process - constitutively. Were one able to say, definitely, once and for all ('outside' time, one might say), and with some kind of a priori guarantee that 'this is democratic', then this would be, precisely, undemocratic (it would not be open to re-assesement by the demos, because already established and guaranteed before hand).

With the 'idea of justice' the idea is similar: were one able to achieve justice once and for all, were justice not always open to re-evaluation, there would be no such thing as justice. The argument here is a bit more complex, and there's an element of time or temporarily that I've not discussed that makes proper sense of the 'undeconstructibility' of the idea of justice, but that's a bit much to go into right now for me. Long story short: deconstructing either the idea of justice or the idea of democracy would undermine each.

Agreed. He makes for awful reading.

Good for a test of concentration and patience if nothing else. He’s someone I’ll have to pay attention to in the future in order to almost fully dismiss him. As yet the jury is out and more evidence is being looked at :)

I’d love to see a reading group here on Derrida! That would an interesting experiment to witness! Haha

There was one on Voice and Phenomenon here a while back.

I dislike his writing style, but believe that he, along with Heidegger, offers the most radical rethinking of Western philosophy today. I know I'm in the minority on this forum with that view, but before you dismiss him, immerse yourself in Heidegger(if you haven't already). I can't imagine penetrating his prose without this background, not that it will guarantee intelligibility.

I disagree, plain and simple. Heidegger was a hack. Try reading Husserl before you get carried away.

Note: Heidegger said nothing much that Husserl hadn’t already said. He likely assumed the huge body of Husserl’s work would never see the light if day.

If you think Heidegger was a hack ,then I wouldn't bother to read any more Derrida. Or Rorty. Or Dreyfus. Or Gendlin. Or Gallagher. Or Merleau-Ponty. Or Deleuze. Or Lyotard. Or Levinas.Or Gadamer. Or Nietzsche. Or Zahavi(one of the most respected current interpreters of Husserl). You may as well cross off your list the most interesting work being done on theories of emotion(Ratcliffe, Slaby) as well.

Maybe you could offer some specific criticisms of Heidegger's work.

All post-war French philosophers and intellectuals tend to sound ridiculous in English. However, after living in France for a few years I started to understand them better.

The key difference, I think, with philosophy in the English world is that there are much more sophisticated political and philosophical debates within French society, and continental societies in general, at dinner parties and over coffee as well as television and the Radio (it's a national pass-time). There is also not as strong a conformism of opinion, so you can easily get into a debate about "Marxism", or any topic, in casual conversation. Of course there's still an "intellectual class", but in general there are more topics up for debate and even more so within the intellectual class; and, importantly, there's a very radical part of the culture constantly both protesting and criticizing the government; the yellow vest protests are in no way out of no where. You can be driving along and two philosophers are introduced on the radio and they start debating contemporary events, in particular politics.

In short, continental intellectuals live much closer to the idea that concepts have consequences, not just due to the social discussions above but also being "in the thick of it" vis-a-vis the Nazis and then right next to the Soviet Union; not to mention the French Revolution and all the intellectualizing around that.

Whereas in the English world, it's usually a given that philosophical discussion is only really between academically trained philosophers, maybe the odd mathematician can join (but no one else!) and so discussion may as well be completely precise and laid out for highly technical criticism. If obvious truths are uncovered it is assumed that (in the US, England and other English speaking countries) that the political pundits will ignore those truths and stay to their scripts, and even moreso the general population; that to change opinions generally take some sort of marketing campaign, so in the English world if intellectuals come to this question then the political debate is how to make a marketing campaign to get people to believe at least a few points issuing from the actual debate, taking into account the unmovable cherished beliefs and a general lack of critical thinking; and it's a given that only a few would ever bother to read, much less understand, what the actual political and ethical points are in any profound way.

Whereas "on the continent" there's a natural defense against the intense propaganda in Western media, due to a language barrier where a lot of propaganda simply sounds dumb when translated.

As such, at least this is how my perspective changed after living in France, intellectuals like Derrida aren't trying really to win debates with other technical philosophers, but rather trying to have a direct cultural impact. So if we approach Derrida from an analytical perspective, it seems he just fails and therefore is irrelevant, but if we consider his goal is to say something directly to the culture, both trying to convey some important truth while provoking thought and inspiring action, then I think he starts to make more sense, and that he assumes a significant portion of the culture will read him and take those ideas into yet more conversations affecting yet more people.

Likewise, from this perspective, he is talking to French people, trying to stir them up, and uses a lot of French mannerisms and idiosyncrasies, and small ironies that sound fine in French; but when translated to English it's never clear what's what, so everything is up for mystification.

When a translated passage isn't clear, it's even more unclear because it's difficult to know what might be translator error or choice. Since it's "philosophy" the translator chose always the driest possible rendering.

So, I took the liberty of translating from scratch the paragraph as a little exercise to see what the translation choices are. In my version I try to render the more conversational tone that the original French has (it's still quite obtuse, but not as obtuse as the cited English translators version in obtuseness, given, of course we can't forget, only if it is obtuse at all to begin with; but, then again [and knowing what we have already discussed as well as the rest of the discussion] is not as obtuse as it may seem; so we must keep this in mind).

This transformation and this opening of Marxism conforms to what we were calling an instant ago the spirit of Marxism. If the analysis of this Marxist kind rests indispensable, therefore, it appears radically insufficient where the Marxist ontology, which is the foundation of the science or Marxist or the Marxist critique, also contains itself, must contain, and you really can't go without it regardless of modern or post-modern denigrating, a messianic eschatology. Paradoxically, at this title at least, and of course it necessarily is included in but cannot naively be counted as just another ideology or theology for which it calls for critique and demystification. In so saying, we cannot claim that this messianic eschatology that is common to both the religion it criticizes and to the Marxist critique must simply be deconstructed. If it is indeed common to both, excepting the content (and if we must deal with the fact that of course neither of them could accept it, this epokhe of the content, then we can proceed here with just what is essential to messianism in general, the thought of a better future to come), then it is also the formal structure of the promise that follows from them [overflows] or precedes them. Well, what rests also irreducible to all deconstruction, what also stays as indeconstructible as the possibility of deconstruction itself, is perhaps a certain experience of the emancipatory promise; perhaps even the formality of a structural messianism, a messianism without religion, a messiah, even, without messianism, an idea of justice - which we differentiate always with the idea of laws or even people's rights - and an idea of democracy - which we differentiate with how it's currently understood and it's particular characteristics today. (Allow me to refer here to “Force of Law” and The Other Heading) So here we are, and maybe we must now think, and think differently, to ask ourselves where it's going, that is to say where it is leading the Marxism which leads by interpreting it, and so cannot go anywhere without transformation, and not where it would lead us given where it has already been or where it could have gone.

Returning to the neo-evangelism of Fukuyama [...]

-- Posters translation of Spectre de Marx, P 101-102.

Maybe we could start a thread on the concept of “Dasein”?

The main one would be the definition (or rather lack of) of the term “dasein”. I’ve asked for people to produce this on multiple occasions and generally get nothing more than opinion on the matter. Someone has pointed out that apparently B&T is more of a continuation from some of his earlier stuff and that that gives a better gist of what “dasein” means. I’d still say the the concept doesn’t hold up in the text B&T and if it’s bette explained in previous texts why not go over it for the sake of clarity? The swathes of redundant text in B&T make it all the more suspect given that more often than not the reader is better served reading the final paragraph of each section and ignoring the fluff between that seems to do little more than reiterate Husserl’s terms into his own particular vernacular whilst utterly disregarding the purpose set out by Husserl.

By all means go ahead and give some concrete quotes from B&T regarding “dasein”. If you keep at it you’ll find “dasein” means anything and everything Heidegger wants making the point of the concept vacuous and purposefully (or maybe ignorantly?) misleading.

I’m not in the habit of avoiding things I don’t like nor do I think there is nothing of interest in Heidegger’s work. Maybe calling him a “hack” hurts you fro reasons only you can address - not really my issue.

If you wish me to be charitable then I would admit that he gave further clarity to SOME of Husserl’s concepts, and Husserl himself was far from concise too!

Husserl carried forward Kant's transcendental thinking but abandoned his categories for the intentional activity of a transcendental ego. Heidegger rejected the transcendental ego, a self-identity(auto-affection) supposedly protected from the contingency of history and time. Husserl based intentionality on pure, pre-reflective consciousness. Heidegger rejected the idea of a pre-reflective consciousness , and in fact unraveled the idea of consciousness as an objectifying abstraction masking of a more primordial basis of meaning making. Husserl believed in a distinction between perception and language, between expression and reference. Heidegger rejected this separating of symbolization and expression.Husserl's notion of the object is bound up with and embraces traditional understanding of logic. Heidegger determines logic to be a derivative and limited modality of interpretation.

Pragmatists, post-structuralists, social constructionists, and enactive cognitive psychologists are among those who have followed Heidegger's critique of Husserl's solipsistic transcendental ego.

One is understanding the meaning of Dasein for Heidegger when one grasps his series of equi-primordial concepts:Temporality, Care, Attunement and Discourse. Temporality is the well-spring out of which Dasein as Being in the world emerges. What are traditionally divided up into sensation, perception, cognition, affect, and language are united for Heidegger as temporality. Understanding is the cognate aspect, attunement-care the motivational-affective aspect, discourse the linguistic-communicative aspect.

This may seem a big incoherent muddle to you , but to me it is profoundly useful, and particularly with regard to language and affectivity, is being embraced more widely by psychological theorists who want to move beyond the trandtional split between affect and cognitiion, and between perception and linguistic conceptualization.

All I’ve ever asked for is a coherent definition of Dasein. No one, to date, has been able to point to the text and link up his multiple applications of the term to produce anything useful to me. This is a flaw.

In Husserl’s terminology are Care, Temporality, Attunement and such applicable? What is the Epoche to Heidegger and/or horizons? Also, where does Intentionality fit in?

From my understanding Heidegger partook in a singular aspect of Phenomenology, that being a concern with language and interpretation. For Husserl this seemed to be regarded as merely one fragment of the enterprise of Phenomenology (the science of consciousness).

From my understanding Heidegger partook in a singular aspect of Phenomenology, that being a concern with language and interpretation. For Husserl this seemed to be regarded as merely one fragment of the enterprise of Phenomenology (the science of consciousness). — I like sushi

From Husserl's vantage, this is precisely what Heidegger did, and this is why Heidegger was so disappointing to him. Huseerl's great achievement from his point of view was an absolute starting point and grounding of science and logic in acts of meaning. In order to justify an absolute ground, it was necessary to assume a transcendental foundation, but not that of Kant. One wa to see more clearly the split between Heidegger and Husserl is to see how Merleau-Ponty broke away from Husserl. That split was less radical, with Merleau-Ponty continuing to make use, in altered form , of many of Husserl's concepts. But nonetheless, Merleau-Ponty's researches in psychopathology and neurology led him to question how the ego can take in the world and direct itself toward objects without the particularities of those objects changing the sense of the ego that is aiming at them.

"We cannot apply the classical distinction of form and matter to perception, nor can we conceive the perceiving subject as a consciousness which "interprets," "deciphers," or "orders" a sensible matter according to an ideal law which it possesses. Matter is "preg-nant" with its form, which is to say that in the final analysis every perception takes place within a certain horizon and ultimately in the "world." We experience a perception and its horizon "in action" rather than by "posing" them or explicitly "knowing" them. Finally the quasi-organic relation of the perceiving subject and the world involves, in principle, the contradiction of immanence and tran-scendence.'

Notice his focus on being-in-the-world as prior to the self-identity of the ego. That's not too far from Dasein as being-in-the-world. The main pieces are all here, for instance, temporality as a having been that presences from the future(that just means we understand the world and ourselves moment to moment by framing the 'now' in relation to what is just past. Our history is always carried along with us and shapes the 'now', but at the same time that history is reinterpreted by our future-oriented goals. The now is always pointing beyond itself, it is anticipatory. This is somewhat like Husserl's notion of time consciousness,, but for Husserl the just past is literally retained as is, for a second or two, whereas for Heidegger the just past is reshaped by the present.) . Care is just the idea that in intending , we are always in a relation of significance with the world. The world that we are involved with always matters to us in a particular way. The way things matter to us shapes the very meaning of the objects we encounter, in a way that it doesnt for Husserl, who focused on how perception is always giving us shifting aspects of objects. Heidegger was concerned to show that objects only exist for us meaningfully in pragmatic contexts in terms of what we need them for, how we use them and interact with them. Unlike for Husserl , objects don't have any aspects that are independent of this pragmatic 'mattering'.

Attunement, as affectivity, mood ,emotion, is just how we are affected by the engagements that matter to us. We always have some affective attitude ,even in neutral theoretical contemplation.
So in sum, Heidegger thought that human experiencing was too self-reflexively mobile to allow for the justification of the formal transcendental certainties that Husserl offered. Like Merleau-Ponty , he thought that the world intervenes in the very heart of self-identity, such that the 'I' that comes back to itself moment to moment, is always a different one,

Thanks. I think I see what you’re saying, and it is quite possible my view differs from Husserl’s or I’ve misunderstood him - for the better.

It’s a tough call given that Husserl was rather vague in his last work. I only agree in part with what you’ve presented here and if I’m wrong then it’s because I don’t assume the “transcendental ego” to be what you or others think, and that the epoche is similar to, but the same as, solipsism (a concept I’ve had extreme difficulty conveying to others - and which seems to be, at least partly, derived from Nietzsche).

The main one would be the definition (or rather lack of) of the term “dasein”. — I like sushi

He tries to do this throughout B&T, which is in large part a reinterpretation of human existence, away from its associations with mind, consciousness, subjectivity, etc. and towards a sort of non-dualistic openness onto the world.

You can say Dasein is the "there of Being" or some such, but that doesn't help much until you understand what he means by Being. I'd at least read through the work so you can see where he & Husserl apparently diverge. Too complex (for me at least) to define Dasein in a way that's quick & accessible.

Also, I don't think he tried to conceal the debt he owed Husserl; if he was trying to do that he probably wouldn't have dedicated Being and Time to him.

First off, he certainly didn’t conceal his appreciation of Husserl - B&T was dedicated to Husserl.

I am going to reread B&T sometime this year (I hope) alongside Husserl’s Logical Investigations and a revisit to Crisis. Initially I read B&T and couldn’t fathom what ‘dasein’ meant; after grappling for some time. I the simply ploughed onward and do perfectly understand that the later part of the book opens into some nice perspectives on and reiterations of Husserlian concepts - that is not to say there is nothing original in Heidegger’s work either! What I found was that the concept was never concretely addressed at any point in the book. To me it seemed more like an illusion, or deliberate avoidance, of the initial “proposition” of ‘dasein’.

As we can see above Josh refers to ‘dasein; being understood via other distanced concepts like ‘temporality,’ and ‘care’. This seems to be what Heidegger does - purposefully or not. That is he fools the reader into believing they understand the concept of ‘dasein’ whilst NEVER explicitly exposing a definition of ‘dasein’.

As for viewing Husserl, as Josh seemed to outline, as professing any kind of certainty is contrary to what Husserl explicitly states in Crisis. It is also worth noting Husserl’s ideas developed over time and didn’t remain rigid - he made attempts to amend issue from the critique he received. The critique, exposirion, give by the likes of Derrida is utterly laughable in regards to ... I forget the paper, something about mathematics, logic and measurements? It is no coincidence that both Foucault and Derrida fed of Heidegger’s work either; which Husserl certainly regarded as counterproductive to Phenomenology. To regard Phenomenological Hermeneutics as Phenomenology is akin to equating social sciences to the scientific method - this is likely because Husserl was an actual scientist whilst none of the above mentioned three were (which is a problem if the main point of Phenomenology was to compliment objective science with a grounding in a subjectively scientific grounding; a task Husserl readily admits as an endless task but believed it a worthy one).

The claim of “solipsism” is also unfair - but certainly common. Bracketing is not the same as solipsism, and it is certainly a limited idea full of traps and pitfalls (of which I believe Heidegger jumped into rather than “fell”).

The interpretation of experience is not limited to application of worded language. The phenomenon is not a phenomenon “of” - in the sense that “Intentionality” is always of an “Object,” but not an “object” in the usual material sense. Husserl recognised (I believe from what he says) that worded explication isn’t enough and that science suffers with abstract ideas brought into worded explication. The very concept of “eidetic” is self refuting. It is in the verbose confusion that I believe Hiedegger fools himself and the reader by making claims of finite interpretation. Again a KEY point in bith Nietzsche and Husserl regarding “theoretic man,” “scientific man,” and the “infinite” and “finitude” of experience in regards to our cosmological state (relatable to Eliade’s “Heirophant” and our natural means of demarcating experience - which is one area where Heidegger does good work within the limits of “languages”; meaning written, spoken and the differences between these and how they’re approached).

Don’t get me wrong! I understand what I’ve written above is nothing more than a gist, and an incomplete one at that! I certainly don’t profess to have a full understanding of either Husserl or Heidegger, and if some people find either useful to them or not who am I to argue? My ideas and thoughts are still quite plastic (I hope!) in these areas, and I’m not massively committed to any particular view and my perspective of Husserl and Heidegger is undoubtedly shaped by my own limited understandings - which is why I frequent forums; to learn to articulate myself and contest my more rigid ideas.

Apologies! I’ve taken this discussion off-track. If I need to reply to anything else on this subject I’ll create a create a clean thread with link back to this one.

So, back to Derrida ;)

First off, he certainly didn’t conceal his appreciation of Husserl - B&T was dedicated to Husserl. — I like sushi

I may have misunderstood your initial point - Heidegger assumed "much of the body of Husserl's work would never see the light of day" - to mean that he could safely steal the latter's ideas, or repackage them without significant changes, without this being noticed. If that's not what you had in mind then my bad.

I do appreciate your more detailed (and less snarky) engagement with Heidegger's work. In some way(s) the notion of dasein is definitely enigmatic - even after his attempt to lay out fundamental features - in the sense that in order to understand it fully one must have already made the "leap" beyond the inner/outer split underlying subjectivity into an understanding of the self as the "clearing" of Being. Reminds one a bit of Wittgenstein's preface to the TLP (no one will understand this book unless they've thought the same or at least similar thoughts) or the Buddhist notion that "only a Buddha can recognize a Buddha."

So it's less a definition than a description of a way of being (or being-in-the-world); an experience of the (pre-theoretical) way that we exist in which the old conceptual apparatus does not suffice to describe the phenomenon. This being so, to offer a definition that others will quickly understand without further ado, by using the old conceptual framework, will only lead to confusion. IMO that's not a cowardly evasion -- that's the nature of Heidegger's undertaking, in which he's struggling to describe the being of human beings interpreted in the light of our relatedness to Being. Yeah, sounds like jumbled, meaningless mess but I do think he was sincere in the endeavor.

The remainder of your post was interesting. As far as Husserl goes, my knowledge is extremely limited - mostly indirect through Heidegger & Heidegger scholars - so I can't add anything on that front. Heidegger makes it clear how much he was influenced by Husserl's phenomenological method - but also the significant areas where the two part ways - and as far as I know he (Heidegger) may have lifted more of his teacher's ideas than he let on. I would have to have a thorough knowledge of both to make that judgement, which I clearly do not.

FWIW I have my own (amateur) criticisms of Heidegger's philosophy, and I do appreciate when others sense potential shortcomings in his work, or offer insightful challenges to his guiding suppositions, etc. I think I'm just used to quick dismissals from people who almost always reveal how little effort they've made to understand him. Not saying you did this (you obviously have a good deal of knowledge concerning Husserl's thought), but that's what I've come to expect.

Put it this way, scholars of Husserl have spent a long time sifting through his copious unpublished works - and we’re talking a HUGE amount of writing. They, not me, have said that a number of the concepts and ideas attributed to Heidegger in B&T were seemingly written by Husserl years prior to Heidegger writing B&T.

Follow that up with the fact that he outed him to the Nazi’s and took his place in university once he was forced into exile and I grow a little suspicious.

I’m not taking sides, and find it silly to do so, because they were both just people playing with ideas. From Husserl’s writing (of what I’ve looked at) there is more caution and admittance of a lack of clarity (and there is quite a lot of that seen in how he develops, and drops, ideas over time).

My major critique of B&T is that the ‘fundamental’ concept of ‘dasein’ is a ghost - there is no substance to it and the defense of this is that it’s of no substance. You cannot at once claim to have made something explicit whilst also admitting it is impossible to make it explicit - at least when Husserl talks of the “absolute ego” he does so more in line with Kantian noumenon (in the negative sense; not making the mistake some positive claim).

Anyway, I forgot I’d say not more ... I’ll snark at Derrida now ;) Hey! I’m just in the habit of attacking with venom and if people who’ve read Heidegger feel the need to jump to his defense I don’t quite understand why - but I’ve done the same myself in the past *shame on me!*



If Derrida meant he couldn’t deconstruct them then he misses his own ubiquitous method. That is one can always suppose one is under the influence of a paradigm (democracy is a paradigm). To suggest that all can be reduced to a democratic principle of being is to fall under the assumption that there is an underlying structural truth - something he is not generally well known for claiming.

To be fair to Derrida I do believe he might of been someone in the spirit of Protagoras. I do think there is a certain comedic element, born through arrogance, on the part of the Socratic philosophers who deemed to be able to define concepts verbally (somewhat ironically in partial contradiction to Socrates basic principles of thought; the man who knew nothing.)

Oh and in order to avoid confusion I should also add that Heidegger’s views on dasein seem to have shifted through the years: in B&T it’s a bit of a paradox that we are dasein even if we don’t understand ourselves as such. This would seem to challenge my previous statement that it requires a “leap” in order to truly understand what he’s getting at. The later Heidegger seems to think that dasein is a possible way of being (an increasingly unlikely one in this age of technology) and not a given; one which is aware of a relatedness to Being & purposely cultivates the “clearing” given to it — the “shepherd of Being” stuff that’s more poetic than strictly philosophical.

Nice post. Oddly, I think your view of dasein’s lack of substance aligns in some way significant way with Heidegger’s own, to wit, that we’re a sort of nothingness in which things are revealed (and concealed). Sounds absurd, of course, but there are similar ideas in Eastern thought (specifically Buddhist & more specifically Zen emphasis on no-self) & also in the Western mystical tradition (e.g Kenosis). May be mystical mumbo jumbo, unworthy of serious philosophical reflection, but it’s not without precedent & does make a bit of sense intuitively (at least to me).

I have certain reservations about any theological claim on “nothingness” and certainly do see a slippery slope to hell (pun-intended) on the buddhist path.

I find the relation between nihilism and buddhist philosophy to be a curious one. Meaning, the buddhist start from a position of assuming nothing whilst the nihilist (the general ‘nihilist’ btw; just incase someone throws a spanner the works about ‘this’ or ‘that’ sect of nihilism!) starts off assuming everything and then finds nothing. One stares up from the abyss and the other stares down - I cannot honestly say which one is ‘better’ from my perspective, but one seems more enticing than the other and therefore is more likely to store up a whole lotta hellfire prior to exploding?

I think your reservations are warranted. I may try to comment on this topic in some detail a bit later, as it will take some time to put forth what I take to be Heidegger’s views, but yeah, I think you’re right to be a bit apprehensive about the path he takes (and by extension the Buddhist position, as far as I understand it), especially in the later work.

We’re a sort of nothingness in which things are revealed (and concealed). — Erik

Nothing, yes, or absencing. I prefer the 'in-between', since it is not as if there are things first , with the nothingness of Dasein added on it them as that which discloses them. Both Dasein and things have no existence apart from this in-between. 'Things' are themselves transformations, transformations of us! Besides, nothingness ca be confused with an absence of meaning, and that is not what the -no-thing means to Heidegger. Being as the -in-between is redolent with possibilities of meaning and sense.

“The 'as' expresses the fact that beings in general have become manifest in their being, that that
distinction has occurred. The 'as' designates the structural moment of that originarily irruptive
'between'. We simply never first have 'something' and then 'something more' and then the
possibility of taking something as something, but the complete reverse: something first gives
itself to us only when we are already moving within projection, within the 'as'. In the occurrence
of projection world is formed, i.e., in projecting something erupts and irrupts toward
possibilities, thereby irrupting into what is actual as such, so as to experience itself as having
irrupted as an actual being in the midst of what can now be manifest as beings. It is a being of a
properly primordial kind, which has irrupted to that way of being which we call Da-sein,
and to that being which we say exists, i.e., ex-sists, is an exiting from itself in the essence of its
being, yet without abandoning itself.

Man is that inability to remain and is yet unable to leave his place. In projecting, the Da-sein in
him constantly throws him into possibilities and thereby keeps him subjected to what is actual.
Thus thrown in this throw, man is a transition, transition as the fundamental essence of
occurrence. Man is history, or better, history is man. Man is enraptured in this transition and
therefore essentially 'absent'. Absent in a fundamental sense-never simply at hand, but absent in
his essence, in his essentially being away, removed into essential having been and
future-essentially absencing and never at hand, yet existent in his essential absence. Transposed
into the possible, he must constantly be mistaken concerning what is actual. And only because he
is thus mistaken and transposed can he become seized by terror. And only where there is the
perilousness of being seized by terror do we find the bliss of astonishment-being torn away in
that wakeful manner that is the breath of all philosophizing.”(Fundamental Concepts of
Metaphysics, p.365)

The later Heidegger seems to think that dasein is a possible way of being (an increasingly unlikely one in this age of technology) and not a given; one which is aware of a relatedness to Being & purposely cultivates the “clearing” given to it — Erik

It may be that it is thinking Being explicity that is not a given for the later Heidegger. He recounts the various ways that Being has been inadequately thought throughout history(Plato represents Being as idea and as the koinonia of the Ideas, Aristotle represents it as energeia, Kant as position,
Hegel as the absolute concept, Nietzsche as the will to power). He also seems in these later writings to equate Dasein with man.

"Because one everywhere represents the destiny of Being only as history, and history only as a kind of occurrence, one tries in vain to interpret this occurrence in terms of what was said in Being and Time about the historicity of man (Dasein) (not of Being). By contrast, the only possible way to anticipate the latter thought on the destiny of Being from the perspective of Being and Time is to think through what was presented in Being and Time about the dismantling of the ontological doctrine of the Being of beings". (Time and Being 1962)

if we consider Derrida's goal is to say something directly to the culture, both trying to convey some important truth while provoking thought and inspiring action, then I think he starts to make more sense, and that he assumes a significant portion of the culture will read him and take those ideas into yet more conversations affecting yet more people. — boethius

On the other hand, Derrida hated interviews, always insisting that his thought could not possibly be properly understood in a few sentences, and that it required a deep background in a host of philosophical traditions and authors. This doesn't sound like someone who expected to take on the role of public intellectual. Even when he became something of a celebrity, journalists for popular publications wouldn't dream of asking his opinion on the latest political event, as they do with writers like Bernard Henry-Levy. Also, he always said that he was much better received in the U.S. than in France. That is why he spent so much time lecturing in the U.S.

On the other hand, Derrida hated interviews, always insisting that his thought could not possibly be properly understood in a few sentences, and that it required a deep background in a host of philosophical traditions and authors. This doesn't sound like someone who expected to take on the role of public intellectual. — Joshs

Yes, I didn't make it clear in my post that he's still talking to an intellectual class, who then take ideas and make art or write articles and books or organize protests and movements (but higher education is free, so these people are much more mixed up in society). France has a public education system, and as I mentioned a pass time of debate, so there's a context where it's possible to impact the culture outside of television. The linking of television, punditry and intellectual, (i.e. marketing a simplified version of one's ideas rather expressing them) is exactly the framework I'd say we'd take more or less for granted in the English world if you want to impact the culture, but in France you can "write complicated philosophy" and enough people read it to have an impact. As I mention, it's still an intellectual class he's talking to, but one with more influence.

Also, he always said that he was much better received in the U.S. than in France. That is why he spent so much time lecturing in the U.S. — Joshs

But well received by who? The analytic philosophers? The establishment? Or cultural revolutionaries of one sort or another?

But even so, I think there was a similar "cultural conversation" happening in the US at that time, but largely confined to the liberal arts milieu; the silent majority was the majority as demonstrated several times (whereas in France this post war intellectual criticism resulted in May 68).

Aw for today, I'm not sure someone comparing Marxism in a Messianic framework would be so well received today, even at the universities.

Also, I didn't mean to imply that the educated French are big fans of Derrida, in my view his overall objective is to challenge people and not make a following; my point is just that there's a context in which his writing make a lot more sense, compared with when I tried reading him in English from an English monde-intellectual perspective.

The problem of translating an intentionally opaque thinker with thoughts "too complicated" for interviews is also a barrier.

This is not a defense of Derrida, just that he's not necessarily trying to debate solely with technically focused philosophers and win debates with them, and someone interested in philosophy in the English world is likely, at least it was my case, to view other technical philosophy enthusiasts as the only audience for philosophy and the only people who can appreciate "being thoroughly beaten" (likely he does not view those debates as winnable in any case, but the analytic philosophy malaise of "if you want to make money then you'll have these; if your a theist you'll want to argue this or that; if you care about nature then it can be defended; if you want to destroy the world you'll need these precepts" is where focus on analysis leads). After living on the continent for sometime, in my view as very focused not solely on ideas and analysis itself, but to an equal degree on how ideas are live in the cultural setting, how they change (how people change) and are trying to understand those living cultural ideas, to discuss and attempt to change them; in so doing, it's a much more "mystified" conversation, as we can't be exactly sure what those ideas are, what people actually believe, what new informations would convince them of what (of course now we have facebook and big data, so problem solved).

Thanks for the elaboration on Heidegger's thinking & nothingness. You articulated the position much better than I could have and therefore saved me the trouble of following through with my own views (which roughly match yours).

If you think Heidegger was a hack ,then I wouldn't bother to read any more Derrida. Or Rorty. Or Dreyfus. Or Gendlin. Or Gallagher. Or Merleau-Ponty. Or Deleuze. Or Lyotard. Or Levinas.Or Gadamer. Or Nietzsche. Or Zahavi(one of the most respected current interpreters of Husserl). You may as well cross off your list the most interesting work being done on theories of emotion(Ratcliffe, Slaby) as well. — Joshs

Sounds like one of the more sensible suggestions I've seen you make. ;-)