we only have dispositions for or against any behavior in the biological world [rather than the social-interaction world]. — Terrapin Station
I give up on this conversation :( — Devans99
The Source of Morals.
Per my education, and subject to correction, this nutshell sketch. The original virtues were the virtue of the warrior king winning his wars - and protecting or bringing glory to himself and his people or both. This devolved to the idea of the king who was good even if he lost, good in terms of his other actions or his intentions. And this to the idea of the good man, good as to both actions and intentions, with a slow evolution to considerations of intentions.
The time frame from inclusive of the Homeric ideals, of Achilles and Odysseus, and earlier, through to Kant and his deontology, the categorical imperative. Still a work in progress, though apparently and for the most an argument between Utilitarianism and Deontology, which is to say an argument that on one side is a little older than the US, at around 1760, and on the other, the mid-1800s.
The Greek virtues of Aristotelian balance, Stoicism, and Epicurean acceptance were more essentially attitudinal than behavioral. Please, correction/refinement welcome! — tim wood
A perspective seeking to exit the merry-go-round:
Suppose that all our “dos” are driven by “wants” … this including our doing of reasoning: since wants are emotive, as per Hume, reasoning is foundationally driven by underlying desires. Further suppose that our wants are in search of a resolution to that wanted. Reasoning, then, is arguably an optimal means of discovering how to best obtain and thereby satisfy our wants.
Given any degree of realism (here not confused with physicalism), there will then be constraints to how these wants can obtain their sought after aim of resolution. These constraints will then—in some way or another—(pre)determine which actions can factually satisfy our wants and which actions (though intending to so satisfy) cannot.
Those behaviors that factually satisfy our wants will then be logically correct means of so satisfying. They will be the right behaviors for us. And, since what we want is for our wants to be satisfied, right behaviors will constitute good, beneficial, behaviors for us. That aim, whatever it might be, that satisfies all our wants will then be conceptualized by us as complete good: “the Good” as Plato worded it.
And vice versa: all our intentions and subsequent acts to satisfy our wants that are fallaciously conceived to so satisfy our wants will then be wrong behaviors to engage in—for they always lead to frustrated wants and, in due measure, suffering. They will be deemed to be bad behaviors by us for this very reason.
To the same degree that there occur universal and fundamental wants among all humans (or mammals, or life in general), there will then also logically result aims that are universally good to that cohort considered. Being universally good, these aims will hold existential presence in manners that are impartial to the (sometimes fallacious/wrong) intentions of individual beings to satisfy their wants. In this sense, then, this universally good aim (or maybe aims) shall then, by certain definitions, be validly labeled that which is objectively good.
Within this general train of thought, then, subjective want-driven good entails there being some objective good—which can be expressed as “that end which satisfies all wants”—that, whether or not obtainable within our current lifetime in complete form, is nevertheless pursued by all subjective beings.
Discerning what this objective good is can itself be a fallacy of reasoning (a wrong/bad appraisal) or a discovery of what is in fact true (a right/good appraisal). Disparity between discernments of what is objectively good then leads to divergent ethical norms—as well as to, at times, what are labeled acts of evil by the society at large.
***This hypothesis is to illustrate that there is no entailed logical contradiction between subjective good/bad and objective good/bad.
As to Hume’s dilemma when looked at from this offered vantage: figure out what the logically and factually correct aim is that satisfies your wants (this factually correct aim being an “is) and then you logically derive what should be done to get there (this being an “ought”) … thereby deriving ought from is.
So, here, good and bad are determined by wants which naturally entail their own resolution as aim/goal--and this within the constraints of some form of realism. — javra
Per my education, and subject to correction, this nutshell sketch. The original virtues were the virtue of the warrior king winning his wars - and protecting or bringing glory to himself and his people or both. This devolved to the idea of the king who was good even if he lost, good in terms of his other actions or his intentions. And this to the idea of the good man, good as to both actions and intentions, with a slow evolution to considerations of intentions. — tim wood
I don't believe that biology and neuroscience are advanced enough. No neuroscientist or biologist could examine human tissues and determine why some people are, for example, conservative and others are liberal. — praxis
Sure, so start with the first phrase you quoted.
"If you substitute those terms in what I wrote"
You are not familiar with the idea of substituting one set of terms for another?
Or did you quote that part superfluously? I mean, I hope we don't need to start with explaining words like "if," or combinations like "If you" etc. — Terrapin Station
. They are mutually dependent. — praxis
Are you really saying anything other than, "altruism is good", and, "morality should be about altruism"? I doubt it, and I don't think that that sort of thing is a good example of critical thinking skills at work. — S
We ''automatically'' treat family, friends and anybody we bond with in a good way. — TheMadFool
What is morality about then? It's a social thing isn't it? What would one person do with morality? — TheMadFool
I am one person. What I'd do with morality is seek to improve my character — S
Why would you do that? In which world does character have any moral value except in a social setting? — TheMadFool
I'd (unfortunately) guess that most families wouldn't actually agree with that.
2h — Terrapin Station
That would be this world. I would do that because it matters to me. — S
Indeed you did. Thank you for it! Yours worth the read!Allow me to go further... — Merkwurdichliebe
I said about morality being essentially a social phenomenon — TheMadFool
I appreciate the thought. I guess it makes sense to be good to yourself. This doesn't make complete sense to me though. Can you explain to me how a world populated by one single sentient being can have any moral dimension? — TheMadFool
I don't believe that biology and neuroscience are advanced enough. No neuroscientist or biologist could examine human tissues and determine why some people are, for example, conservative and others are liberal.
— praxis
I don't think we're that advanced, either. But the quote above is an example of the fallacy of moving the goalposts. I never suggested, or never meant to suggest, that. It's not all or nothing, and an explanation which goes some way towards explaining the source of morality is better than no explanation at all, or a bad explanation. — S
I stand by my claim that your objection to what you see as a problem with my explanation, namely your assertion that it doesn't explain the divergence of moral judgements, is a faux-problem. It's not a problem with my explanation, it's a problem you have with it. — S
What I have actually said is that moral judgement is founded in emotion, and emotion can be explained (not perfectly!) through neuroscience. — S
The person who judges cannibalism to be wrong would have experienced negative emotions about cannibalism... — S
Biological affect is theorized to consist of two basic dimensions, namely pleasure vs. displeasure and high arousal vs. low arousal. How these feelings are interpreted in different circumstances conforms to a conceptual framework, a framework imparted to us by our culture. — praxis
How these feelings are interpreted in different circumstances conforms to a conceptual framework, a framework imparted to us by our culture. — praxis
The general term for the process is learning. But I suppose you could also say conditioning. — praxis
The general term for the process is learning. But I suppose you could also say conditioning.
— praxis
Let's get more specific, though. How does someone literally learn a concept? — Terrapin Station
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