Valuing reality is a form of pleasure. — Devans99
If the pleasure machine cannot give that then the pleasure machine is not working according to specification. — Devans99
No it isn't. And even if it was, that would be irrelevant. — S
It is a form of pleasure else people would not be inclined towards doing it; we do things that are pleasurable to us (in the widest possible sense). — Devans99
And the pleasure machine needs to replicate this form of pleasure else its not doing its job. — Devans99
Then everyone excepting the very stupid would get in. — Devans99
No, you can call it a form of pleasure as many times as you like, but that won't make it true. People value things because they see them as being of worth or benefit. Whether that gives them pleasure is beside the point. — S
'People value things because they see them as being of worth or benefit' - IE they get some form of pleasure from them. — Devans99
Nurture influences, but can't provide morals. — Terrapin Station
x influencing y is different than x being identical to y.
I’m interested in your response to what I wrote. — praxis
Of course it provides morals — praxis
Going back to the cloned baby S scenario, the cloned S would have no choice in what moral order was imparted to him. Depending on the culture, it might impart an order where cannibalism is acceptable or an order where it’s not. — praxis
How can something be a moral stance when there's not even any disposition towards allowing versus not allowing some behavior? — Terrapin Station
Again, I’ve not denied disposition. I’ve pointed out that disposition is inadequate to account for the plurality of moral frameworks. Can you or S do that?
And is there a natural disposition towards something like religious celibacy? If not, then how can it exist? — praxis
I’ve pointed out that disposition is inadequate to account for the plurality of moral frameworks. Can you or S do that? — praxis
And is there a natural disposition towards something like religious celibacy? If not, then how can it exist? — praxis
Conversely, are you a cannibal or do you have the potential to be someone who genuinely feels that cannibalism is not immoral, and can happily munch away? — praxis
Here was what I claimed that you disagreed with. Nurture doesn't actually provide moral stances in any sense, because we don't actually have dispositions for or against any behavior in the "nurture" versus "nature" world. — Terrapin Station
I wouldn’t have disagreed with something that I can’t determine the meaning of. — praxis
we don't actually have dispositions for or against any behavior in the "nurture" versus "nature" world
I can't tell whether that is merely nonsense, or complete gibberish. — Janus
If you substitute those terms in what I wrote, we'd have, "we don't actually have dispositions for or against any behavior in the social-interaction [rather than the] biological world," or in other words, we only have dispositions for or against any behavior in the biological world. You can't have a disposition for or against--basically, a judgment or a preference for/against--any behavior in the social-interaction world. — Terrapin Station
Why can't this be explained through biology, of which evolution and neuroscience are a part? — S
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