Of course it's true that if you don't give me the hundred dollars and I beat the shit out of you, then you will know that the threat was sincere; and it is in this sense that it could said that threats are kind of negative promises; it is only if you don't do what I want that you will discover whether the threat was sincerely intended. In the case of the promise you discover its sincerity only if you do what we agreed upon; if I will honour the pact or not. In the case of threats it is only if you already "dishonour the pact" (I put that in scare quotes to indicate that there really is no honour or pact in the case of threats) that you discover whether I will "honour" it. There is always honour and virtue involved in promising; whereas there is no honour or virtue in threatening. — Janus

I understand the importance of interdependence. I understand, as well, that academic philosophy has had ongoing issues - seemingly irresolvable - for centuries about many topics, morality notwithstanding. I understand that many of the brightest and well intended minds have studied and came to varying conclusions about it. I would think that if the problems were resolvable - given any of the methods of approach - then they would've been resolved. They're not.

If there is ever good reason to be particularly critical of the methods at work, it would be in such circumstances as these.

There is always honour and virtue involved in promising... — Janus

So, this gets to the problem in a hurry...

People promise to cause injury. Assuming such promises cannot be honourable and virtuous...

Either there is not always honour and virtue in promising or not all people who say "I promise..." are making promises.

So what do we do here?

Do we say that those kinds of promises aren't promises, simply because we want to be able to say that all promises are honourable and virtuous? Or do we realize that not all promises are honourable and virtuous, and adjust our thought/belief and/or worldview accordingly?

Not all promise making is good.
— creativesoul

This is just an instance of moral relativism. — Mww

Looks like a true statement about a particular kind of speech act to me.

Promising itself follows a procedure grounded in a law of willful choosing, which is always morally good. Just because promising is always morally good, it does not follow that which is promised must also be good, as measured by the relativism of the law chosen to ground it. This is what allows us to say, well, he did what he had to do, which would be true no matter what he actually did.

So, promising to kill another's family is always morally good.

I cannot agree with that.

I meant what I wrote. — creativesoul

As you wish.

I cannot agree with that. — creativesoul

Hardly anybody does.

Moral judgment. Moral consideration. Moral discourse. Moral conceptions. Moral worthiness. Moral admonition. Moral thought/belief. Moral understanding. Moral argument. Moral position.

What makes all these different things moral in kind?

What do they all have in common such that any and all things having that common denominator counts as being moral.

Is there anything - on this view - that counts as immoral? — creativesoul

So morality is opinion about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette.

S has an opinion that x is permissible. X is thus moral to S.

S has an opinion that x is not permissible. X is thus immoral to S.

Is it more than just sharing a namesake - being called such?

Is there anything - on this view - that counts as immoral?
— creativesoul

So morality is opinion about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette.

S has an opinion that x is permissible. X is thus moral to S.

S has an opinion that x is not permissible. X is thus immoral to S. — Terrapin Station

Moving the goalposts.

?

(In other words, maybe you could explain the "moving the goalposts" comment?)

So, on your view, all opinion about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette are moral opinions in kind(the kind we call "moral"), and none of them are capable of being true/false.

Do I have this much right? — creativesoul

Yes, that's right. — Terrapin Station

Is there anything - on this view - that counts as immoral? — creativesoul

So morality is opinion about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette. — Terrapin Station

Morality is moral opinion?

I don't understand what you're asking. Morality is opinion-based. There's no reason to repeat the word "moral" (a la "Morality is moral opinion"). You can't be asking me if I think it's opinion-based. How many times do we each need to repeat me saying that the nature of morality is "opinion(s) about the relative permissibility . . . " before you'd know that I'm saying it's opinion-based?

Just making sure I'm following you...

S has an opinion that x is not permissible. X is thus immoral to S. — Terrapin Station

If all opinions about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette count as being moral opinion, and S has an opinion that x is not permissible, then it is S's moral opinion that x is not permissible, and that statement "X is not permissible" cannot be true/false.

Is this right?

Yes, obviously. No moral stance is true or false.

...

Morality is opinion-based. — Terrapin Station

If morality is strictly delineated and/or defined as being moral opinion, which it is on your view - then it makes no sense to say that morality is opinion-based. In order for something to be based in/upon something else, there must be a difference between the two. According to the position you're arguing for, there is not - cannot be.

You've used the exact same definition for what counts as being moral in kind and what morality is.

Morality is opinion about X. Opinion about X is moral in kind. Morality is moral opinion. That is what you've claimed. There is no difference. There must be in order for one to be based in the other.

I'm ok with the equivalence, so long as you at least acknowledge it here, and realize that something cannot be based upon only itself.

In your opinion. — creativesoul

You don't believe that "No moral stance is true or false" is a moral stance, do you?

You've used the exact same definition for what counts as being moral in kind and what morality is. — creativesoul

Yes. What does "in kind" refer to if not what something is/what its nature is?

I'm just making sure I have it right...

So, being moral is being about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette, and being immoral is not?

You don't believe that "No moral stance is true or false" is a moral stance, do you? — Terrapin Station

If it is about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette, it is a statement reflecting a stance that is moral in kind - by your own definition.

Not all promise making is good.
— creativesoul

This is just an instance of moral relativism.
— Mww

Looks like a true statement about a particular kind of speech act to me. — creativesoul

Have we got to the stage where simply calling something an instance of moral relativism is supposed to be some kind of slur or criticism? Or was that said with indifference, in a matter of fact sort of way?

Either way, for once I agree with you both. It is indeed an instance of moral relativism, and it does indeed, at least to me, look like a true statement about a particular kind of speech act.

So, promising to kill another's family is always morally good.

I cannot agree with that. — creativesoul

Wait, what? You're being sensible. Are you feeling alright?

I cannot agree with that.
— creativesoul

Hardly anybody does. — Mww

Yes. It's called common sense.

If they do not believe that they will do what they say, then sincerity is lacking. Insincerity is not equivalent to falsehood. On my view a promise is not the sort of utterance that can be true/false. — creativesoul

Do we say that those kinds of promises aren't promises, simply because we want to be able to say that all promises are honourable and virtuous? Or do we realize that not all promises are honourable and virtuous, and adjust our thought/belief and/or worldview accordingly? — creativesoul

Earlier I responded to your first statement above by saying that promises are not true or false in a propositional sense, but that they may be true promises or false promises depending on whether the one promising sincerely intends to keep the promise. I said further that so-called false promises are not truly promises at all, they just appear to be promises.

Thinking about it further it occurred to me that promises can be understood to be true or false propositions in two ways:

First, if we think of promises as statements of intention, then promises will be true or false depending on whether they correspond or fail to correspond to the intention they state. If I promise to pay you for the work you carried out on my behalf, and I have no intention of paying you for the work, then the so-called promise, as a statement of intention to pay you, is false.

Second, if we think of promises as statements about what will be, then promises will be true or false depending on whether the states of affairs they claim will obtain do or do not obtain. If I promise to pay you for the work, and I do not pay you for the work, then the promise, understood as a statement about what will come to pass, is false.

I agree! Plus it's funny and I like it! :cool:

So, being moral is being about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette, and being immoral is not? — creativesoul

The nature of morality is that it's opinions of the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette,

S has an opinion that x is permissible. X is thus moral to S.

S has an opinion that x is not permissible. X is thus immoral to S

Why in the world do we have to keep posting the same thing over and over?

If it is <an opinion> about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette, it is a statement reflecting a stance that is moral in kind — creativesoul

Sure. So do you believe that "No moral stance is true or false" is that?

Why in the world do we have to keep posting the same thing over and over? — Terrapin Station

We're not. You are.

If what counts as being moral in kind is being about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette, and what counts as being immoral in kind is being about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette, then there's no difference between the two.

Nicely done. I'm going to reply... I promise! :wink:

You don't seem to be reading what I'm writing.

Did you read "The nature of morality is that it's opinions of the relative permissibility. . ." For example. When I answered what "moral in kind" is, I was saying what morality is.

Maybe you don't understand the phrase "relative permissibility"? Relative permissibility includes "permissible" and " impermissible" for example, right?

It's ridiculous that I'm having to explain any of this to you, by the way, because it would indicate a near-imbecilic level of reading comprehension, understanding and reasoning abilities.

It's ridiculous that I'm having to explain any of this to you, by the way, because it would indicate a near-imbecilic level of reading comprehension, understanding and reasoning abilities. — Terrapin Station

This made me laugh out loud...

Still grinning.

Yeah, austere gum-flapping and Socratic dialogues each have their place, but....helps not to take this stuff too seriously.