All your disagreements here seem to consist in one what I would see as a misunderstanding. Ethics is about how best to live; that is what it consists in. Obviously though this will be context-based. If you want to live alone, then nothing I have said about participating in community applies to you. (Having said that an argument could be made that a solitary life can never be the best life for a human being, given that we are social creatures). — Janus

You do not need to explain to me what ethics is about, nor do you need to be doing ethics. That is not helping at all. My objection is that that is off topic. We should be doing meta-ethics instead.

So, to repeat what I have said in other posts, if you want to participate in community then exploitation is going to be a stumbling block to your aim. Most people do want to participate, so exploitation is ethically wrong for them. If you are a criminal who lives on the fringes, then this will not apply to you, except that if you want participate in a criminal sub-culture it will apply in that context, but not in the larger context of the whole society. — Janus

No, repeating your problematic comments won't help either. I have no interest in agreeing or disagreeing with content I judge to be off topic.

To get back on topic, tell me in what sense this is a moral truth, and how you know it to be true. That would be meta-ethics, as confirmed by the Wikipedia article.

Ethics and moral philosophy are not really much different except that moral philosophy is usually taken to involve others; whereas ethics does not necessarily by definition do so. There's no point trying to browbeat me into agreeing that I am not doing meta-ethics and that I am thus "off-topic" because that would only be so on your interpretation of a definition, which I don't accept. I see nothing in the wiki article you quoted which is out of accordance with what I am doing here. — Janus

Sigh. Explain to me how your conditionals are in any way relevant to the sort of meta-ethical questions on the set agenda of this discussion, as opposed to those on your own agenda, which seems largely descriptive and normative. How does saying that if you want to work towards a harmonious society, then you should be a virtuous person, address any meta-ethical problem set out in the Wikipedia article that has been on the set agenda here. It doesn't tell us what morality is, it doesn't tell us about moral truths, or moral truth theories, or the meaning of moral statements, or how a moral truth is known, or anything about moral relativism or universalism or objectivism or absolutism. It seems frankly useless and irrelevant.

Judging from your last reply you continue to totally misunderstand what I have been saying, and it seems that our interpretations of what ethics consists in are too divergent to allow for any productive discussion; so I think I will leave it there.

Judging from your last reply you continue to totally misunderstand what I have been saying, and it seems that our interpretations of what ethics consists in are too divergent to allow for any productive discussion; so I think I will leave it there. — Janus

Yes, fine. But it's very annoying that you refuse to cooperate and are adamant about talking about what you want to talk about, in spite of my objections.

But I hope you still get around to addressing my lengthy post from earlier. I put quite a bit of effort into that, and you've already done me an injustice by ignoring or being very short and dismissive of a number of my earlier comments, although I have set that aside and moved on.

Also I think it is an ethical truth that if you exploit others you also exploit yourself.
— Janus

That is moving more in the right direction. Talking about whether there are any moral truths, and if so, in what sense they are moral truths, and how they are known to be so, is meta-ethics. So these are the kind of follow-up questions which you should be addressing. — S

And if you're interested in furthering this meta-ethical discussion at some point, then let me know.

Don't we all "talk about what we want to talk about"? Whether something is or is not relevant to a whole field such as meta-ethics is largely a matter of interpretation; it will depend on your founding assumptions and problematics. If we both want to talk about the same kinds of things then there is a chance that we could have a fruitful discussion. I don't think I have done you any more injustice to you than you have done to me; the way I see it is that perhaps we have done each other the injustice of talking past one another.

But that would only be an injustice (i.e. morally wrong) if both our aims are to have a free discussion with full acknowledgement of, although not necessarily agreement to, each other's founding assumptions and problematics. That said, if you want to enumerate some definitive points I will attempt to address them.

And if you're interested in furthering this meta-ethical discussion at some point, then let me know. — S

I don't understand why you single this out. If exploiting others equals exploiting ourselves that will be so on the basis of some facts about human nature. I could say the same about murder, rape, torture and so on, too.

Don't we all "talk about what we want to talk about"? Whether something is or is not relevant to a whole field such as meta-ethics is largely a matter of interpretation; it will depend on your founding assumptions and problematics. If we both want to talk about the same kinds of things then there is a chance that we could have a fruitful discussion. I don't think I have done you any more injustice to you than you have done to me; the way I see it is that perhaps we have done each other the injustice of talking past one another.

But that would only be an injustice (i.e. morally wrong) if both our aims are to have a free discussion with full acknowledgement of, although not necessarily agreement to, each other's founding assumptions and problematics. That said, if you want to enumerate some definitive points I will attempt to address them. — Janus

I don't recall deliberately ignoring several of your replies, as you have done to me, which is, in my judgement, a greater injustice than name-calling, ad hominems, and whatnot. And it is a bit of affront to expect me to do more work than I've already put in by putting together an enumerated list for you. Remember quid pro quo.

I don't understand why you single this out. If exploiting others equals exploiting ourselves that will be so on the basis of some facts about human nature. I could say the same about murder, rape, torture and so on, too. — Janus

Exactly: the specifics don't matter. It doesn't matter whether it is murder, rape, torture, and so on. I only singled that out because you explicitly spoke of it as a moral truth, which, as I said, is heading in the right direction in my assessment. I am interested in talking in general about the questions I raised there, or by doing so in relation to any example of your choosing. That is, talking about whether there are any moral truths, and if so, in what sense they are moral truths, and how they are known to be so, and that sort of thing. This is meta-ethics. It is like the metaphysics, epistemology and semantics of ethics itself, not how we should live and whatnot, which is just to do ethics.

I don't recall deliberately ignoring several of your replies, as you have done to me, which is, in my judgement, a greater injustice than name-calling, ad hominems, and whatnot. — S

I haven't had time, apart form any other considerations, to respond to every 'mention', and have not deliberately ignored anything which in my judgement is an apposite reply, and does not rely on distorting what I have said or not acknowledging its basic assumptions. If you showed that what I said was inconsistent, not with your basic assumptions, but with my own; or if you could show that my basic assumptions were wrong, then that would be fine. I don't care about 'name-calling, ad hominems and what-not"; my skin is too thick for that. I see things the way I see them, as I have no doubt you do too; but I am open to being convinced otherwise.

From your standpoint there is no way to judge the relative merits of our different viewpoints, because what matters is personal preference; and we would be seen to simply have different personal preferences. From my viewpoint some personal preferences are more generally workable in the communal context than others. Of course, I can try to convince you till the cows come home that I am right and you are wrong, that there are objective (in the sense of inter-subjectively validated) moral truths, but as long as you do not acknowledge any independent measure, meaning 'beyond both of our, or any other, viewpoints' it won't matter what I say, and I would most likely be wasting my breath. I don't want to do that; it's nothing personal.

For me, in the ethical context, to be right simply means being effective in promoting what nearly all of us want; to live in harmony, and being wrong simply means being defective in promoting it.

I don't see that as reflective of a productive, cooperative, philosophical attitude. I see that as shutting down philosophical discussion and demonstrating an unjustified unwillingness to engage.

I don't believe we've reached a stage where there's nothing left but to simply agree to disagree. There are unresolved and unaddressed problems, and the ball is in your court.

I've tried multiple times now to kick-start a discussion with you over these issues.

OK, you're entitled to your viewpoint; however mistaken it may be. That is one thing upon which I have no doubt we agree. I honestly don't believe I have "shut down any philosophical discussion" I've just tried to avoid engaging where it has proven,and seems it will continue, to be fruitless. I am not a religious person, and I reject any notion of a divine, transcendent lawgiver, so I have no faith to defend here; I am just calling things the way I see them. I see moral behavior as being a part of the natural and cultural order.

Why are you judging that it would be fruitless? If it is not akin to religious faith, then why won't you elaborate where appropriate and attempt to meet your burden of justification or concede? Don't make this a circumstantial ad hominem about me, effectively suggesting that I'm closed-minded and predisposed to reject whatever you come up with, so it would be pointless.

When a sincere speaker says "I promise to plant a rose garden on Sunday", then it follows that if that person thinks making a promise confers a duty to satisfy that promise, then they will believe there ought be a rose garden planted on Sunday.

How do you justify removing the bolded sections? — Isaac

If the person making the promise does not think doing so confers a duty to keep their word, then either they are ignorant of what a promise means, or it is an insincere speech act.

I specified sincerity intentionally. It matters. I admit that the use of "follows" is off-putting, particularly given the brevity.

This approach to promises isn't about anyone's approval. It's about meaning. It's relevant because one can most certainly derive an ought from an is without presupposing another ought. Facts, on my view, are what has happened. The kind of fact depends upon the content of the events. Moral facts would be actual circumstances/situations involving acceptable/unacceptable behaviour. Making a promise is a moral fact. Note here that I am not, nor have I, been using the term "moral" as a synonym for "good" or "acceptable". I am not arguing that one ought keep their promise.

I'm simply pointing out what making a promise means, and then further pointing out how just simply understanding the language use causes expectation that is only taken into proper account with an ought.

This could be shown with nearly anything said...

The only point being that one can most certainly derive an ought from an is. Seeing how the text offered earlier doesn't have Hume saying that it cannot be done, perhaps this is a waste of time anyway.

I have that book... I ought look for it. :yum:

When a sincere speaker says "I promise to plant a rose garden on Sunday", then it follows that there ought be a rose garden planted on Sunday.

You disagree, apparently.
— creativesoul

And I do, too. It shows that you do not understand logical validity. — S

Sigh...

As I see it I have already elaborated ad nauseum. What could be gained by further elaborations? It would just be more repetition of the same. I don't need to justify my viewpoint to you unless you can show that it could be thought to be inconsistent with its own presuppositions in some way.

I haven't claimed your viewpoint is internally inconsistent; but I have claimed that it is, along with Terrapin's, inconsistent with a general phenomenological account of human life and hence inadequate and I have given my reasons for that contention. You don't have to agree, in fact I doubt you will ever agree, so I have little motivation, beyond a general respect for you, to respond at all, since there is no way to prove which of us is right given that we will interpret the evidence differently.

As I said if you want to focus on some specific points I have made that you disagree with and you lay our your reasons for disagreeing then I will respond, provided I judge that you haven't distorted the point in order to disagree with it.

I admit that the use of "follows" is off-putting, particularly given the brevity. — creativesoul

Off putting? A very poor choice of words, more like, if you didn't mean it in the logical sense. You're on a philosophy forum. Think before you speak. How could you not have foreseen the problem of a misunderstanding arising as a result of this?

And besides, if you weren't talking about logic, then you've missed Hume's point, as he was. He was saying you can't logically get from an "is" to an "ought". He wasn't merely rejecting common sense assumptions about promises being kept, or common sense assumptions about an "ought" from an "is". His point was about logic, about the limits of reason.

If person A promises to plant a rose garden on Sunday, then it follows that there ought be a rose garden the day after, not because one ought keep his/her promise, but rather because that is exactly what the promise means. It means nothing else.
— creativesoul

Yes, there ought to be a garden; that is all the consistency between a promise made and an obligation to it, by the same person, means. Whether or not the ever is, or ever was going to be, a garden, is irrelevant with respect to the relationship between a promise and the obligation presupposed by it. — Mww

I'm always baffled by what could possibly motivate someone to argue against these... some of the simplest utterances to understand. Very young children know exactly what making a promise means. It's a convention, no doubt.

As I see it I have already elaborated ad nauseum. What could be gained by further elaborations? It would just be more repetition of the same. I don't need to justify my viewpoint to you unless you can show that it could be thought to be inconsistent with its own presuppositions in some way.

I haven't claimed your viewpoint is internally inconsistent; but I have claimed that it is, along with Terrapin's, inconsistent with a general phenomenological account of human life and hence inadequate and I have given my reasons for that contention. You don't have to agree, in fact I doubt you will ever agree, so I have little motivation, beyond a general respect for you, to respond at all, since there is no way to prove which of us is right given that we will interpret the evidence differently.

As I said if you want to focus on some specific points I have made that you disagree with and you lay our your reasons for disagreeing then I will respond, provided I judge that you haven't distorted the point in order to disagree with it. — Janus

Sigh. More work. Great.

I don't want you to repeat yourself. It is the parts which we've already explored up until I think you've encountered an obstacle which is still causing a problem which I want to deal with. But since you shut things down at the time, it would now require me to go to the efforts of going back through the discussion to find what exactly the problems were, and present them to you again, and I don't know if I want to go through that, especially since you haven't reassured me of your cooperation. You expect me to go through all of that, only for you to potentially dismiss it or ignore it altogether like you've done before? Again, it would have to be quid pro quo. That's essential. I would need your assurance that it would be worth my time and effort.

"If person A promises to plant a rose garden on Sunday, then it follows that there ought be a rose garden the day after, not because one ought keep his/her promise, but rather because that is exactly what the promise means. It means nothing else."

I don't understand this. If a promise means that what it says ought to done, is this not the same as to say that promises should be kept? You might say that is only if the person making the promise is sincere, in which case the promise will be kept, to the best of their ability to keep it. But something made by and insincere person, which appears to be a promise, is not actually a promise.

If a promise means that what it says ought to done, is this not the same as to say that promises should be kept? You might say that is only if the person making the promise is sincere, in which case the promise will be kept, to the best of their ability to keep it. But something made by and insincere person, which appears to be a promise, is not actually a promise. — Janus

A promise is when one voluntarily enters themselves into an obligation - to the very best of their ability - to make the world match their words.

I'm not arguing that a promise means that what it says ought to be done.

I'm always baffled by what could possibly motivate someone to argue against these... some of the simplest utterances to understand. Very young children know exactly what making a promise means. It's a convention, no doubt. — creativesoul

Your bafflement must be because you misunderstand Hume's point. He wasn't an idiot, and nor is anyone arguing his point here. Of course he knew what a promise meant, as does everyone here. That doesn't even begin to address the problem. You insult his intelligence, and that of others. You act as though you're a genius. That illusion still needs to be shattered, but your psychological defences are strong.

I'm running a bit short of time now today; so I am going to have to stop. I don't recall "shutting down' on any objections you presented which were not either distortions or made through the lens of presuppositions which I don't share. I will (always subject to available time) answer any objections which seem to show that my position could be thought to be to be inconsistent with its own presuppositions; that's the best I can offer.

A promise is when one voluntarily enters themselves into an obligation - to the very best of their ability - to make the world match their words.

I'm not arguing that a promise means that what it says ought to be done. — creativesoul

I am running out of time, but I can't let this go! Is it not the case that to say that sincerely promising or "voluntarily entering into an obligation- to the very best of their ability- to make the world match their words" is the same as to say that what is sincerely promised ought to be done? I can't see any difference there.

I'm not arguing that a promise means that what it says ought to be done. — creativesoul

I can't quite work out whether you're massively backtracking or you're just being extremely unclear.

A promise is when one voluntarily enters themselves into an obligation - to the very best of their ability - to make the world match their words.

I'm not arguing that a promise means that what it says ought to be done.
— creativesoul

I am running out of time, but I can't let this go! Is it not the case that to say that sincerely promising or "voluntarily entering into an obligation- to the very best of their ability- to make the world match their words" is the same as to say that what is sincerely promised ought to be done? I can't see any difference there. — Janus

This is the very best question that has been asked.

I'll work on an appropriate response.

There is an actual distinction between making a promise and making a statement about that promise.

Who here disagrees?

Get your popcorn Banno things are beginning to get interesting.

A promise is when one voluntarily enters themselves into an obligation - to the very best of their ability - to make the world match their words.

I'm not arguing that a promise means that what it says ought to be done.
— creativesoul

I am running out of time, but I can't let this go! Is it not the case that to say that sincerely promising or "voluntarily entering into an obligation- to the very best of their ability- to make the world match their words" is the same as to say that what is sincerely promised ought to be done? I can't see any difference there. — Janus

Making a promise is a meaningful act with tremendous social significance. It means that the speaker has given their word. This aims to rest uncertainty, and build trust and confidence. It is to assure the listener that the speaker is going to do what they say that they are going to do. It is harmoniously used everyday involving situations where there is an immediate and/or urgent need for the speaker to reassure the listener that what's promised to be done will get done.

Looking at another situation where promises are made...

Imagine that a guy owes some very unsavory characters a large amount of cash that he does not have. He cannot pay. He knows that these are dangerous people:Eyewitness style. Further envision a promise being made to the guy from the unsavory ones to harm the guys family if the guy didn't pay up.

If the guy doesn't pay, then his family ought be dead. I'm not condoning the act. I'm saying that knowing the meaning of a sincerely made promise creates expectation.

I am not saying that all promises ought be kept.

I'm saying because the guy knows what a promise means, then if he could neither pay nor warn his family, he would expect them to die.

Let five years go by without him ever having the ability to check and see. He gets asked by someone who knows, "So, Joe. What going on with your family? What do you think happened?"

"They ought be dead by now" would be quite the appropriate response.

I would not say that he was voicing his approval, but rather his expectation based upon his knowledge of what making a promise means and believing that the speaker was sincere.

...

Lots to reply to and not much time today, so I might expand on some of this later.

First I think I ought to justify and circumscribe the discussion. @S is right to restrict it to meta-ethics, otherwise we get wildy off-topic, but I feel differently to him about the extent to which your comments are meta-ethical. The way I understand your argument in the terms S provided is this;

What is the meaning of moral terms or judgments? (moral semantics) - Moral judgements mean that an action is or is not in accord with the rules devised by that community to promote their continued harmonious existence. Your evidence for this is that all such judgements seem to be aimed at achieving this goal, and therefore it is likely that this is what moral terms mean.

What is the nature of moral judgments? (moral ontology) - Moral judgements do not have any real existence in an ontological sense, that would require a religious text, or divine command to which you do not ascribe. Moral judgements are contained within people's minds, but they are not expressions of mere preference, they are expressions of a very specific type of preference which is always mediated through the community rules. Your evidence for this is the similarity in the properties of those judgements we call 'moral' which you feel any definition needs to take account of.

How may moral judgments be supported or defended? (moral epistemology) - Initially moral judgements may be supported by adherence to the community rules (like an incorrect move in chess) but those rules themselves may be questioned by their own objective of community harmony, and your evidence for this is the fact that all moral rules have this aim, therefore anything which doesn't is not a moral rule, but simply some other kind of rule.

Have I made any massive error understanding you there? If not, then it is those aspects (the meta-ethical argument) and those alone that I'd like to discuss, if that's OK with everyone involved.

What I have said is that within and across cultures it is generally agreed that murder, rape, torture etc. of their own people is wrong, and I think, absent any evidence to the contrary, that this is so is justifiably believed. — Janus

I've bolded the important bit. If I have your meta-ethical argument right, then quite a lot of it hangs on the universality of community harmony. Your claim seems to be that ethical questions are those related to promoting community harmony because that seems to be the common factor in all things ethical. My counter to that, is that something individual precedes such judgements and that something is a universal component of ethical judgement which (being antecedent) has the better claim to be what morality is.

The antecedent stage is evident in the decision about who is and who is not a 'member of the community'. Take the witch trials of the late middle ages. It is documented that women, for all sorts of personal reasons (grudges, debts, politics) were declared 'witches' and therefore outside of the community, and so murdered. As with the Jews in Nazi Germany, the intention to murder came first, second came the ostracisation necessary to make that murder acceptable. So the intention was to murder someone who was (at the time of the intention) very much a member of the community.

This repeats itself through most of modern human history. People are not seen as outsiders first and then second treated by some moral rule based on community membership. People decide they are going to commit some act of murder, theft, torture, whatever first, and then ostracise the person to whom they intend to do these acts, in order to make them more socially acceptable.

So, the best you can say is that people do tend to describe behaviours that promote social harmony as 'moral' and those that don't as 'immoral', but I don't see there being any universal agreement at all on what behaviours do, in fact, promote social harmony and which do not.

Absent of this agreement, I don't think you can support the meta-ethical theory that moral judgements consist of a conference with inter-subjectively agreed rules. Something which we still call 'moral' seems to come before that, and is entirely subjective.

most of us would at least say we should sacrifice our own prosperity and comforts to help others close to us, and even people in general, including those of other communities; the question is whether we actually would make sacrifices when it came down to it, or whether we would instead start making excuses for not doing so. — Janus

All of which supports the argument that some entirely subjective decision is being made, first about what we are actually going to do, and second about what we are going to say to make our actions seem socially acceptable. The second part seems only to be acting on a desire to seem more of a socially useful person than one actually is.

If 'moral' judgements are toe defined as that sub-set of all judgements which relate to promoting social harmony, then the persons actual moral judgement is the one defining their actions. The concurrence with social rules seems entirely a secondary pragmatic matter, otherwise it wouldn't be so appealing to merely fake agreement.