They had little choice but to be complicit, and it was not considered murder because the Jews were not accorded status as properly human by the Nazis; they were considered to be a disease to be eradicated. — Janus
I am not asserting normative judgements; I am saying that what is near universally valued and dis-valued reflects the reality of the human situation and is the only guide to working out what is generally right and wrong for human life. — Janus
Of course in actual situations there are moral issues which are not so clear cut; the underlying principle is the same, but it is not always so easy to determine right and wrong, and there is thus, especially in our modern individualistic culture, some diversity of opinion. But I don't think the general diversity, even on these more nuanced issues is all that significant. — Janus
I gave the example of abortion before, Virtually no one questions the sanctity of the individual lives of, if not everyone, then at least members of their own culture, so attitudes that are pro or anti-abortion turn on the definition. — Janus
On the central issues there is little or no variance across cultures. If you think there is then give an example. — Janus
It doesn't have to agree with what I have said, but if you want to disagree then you should disagree with what I have actually said, and give good reasons why If you go off on a stupid rant. claiming that I am sounding like a "religious zealot, or some such shit, then I won't respond. If you genuinely want to discuss then you should be able to do so civilly without getting all defensive, and casting aspersions and so on. I don't think you realize how boring that it. — Janus
I don't think that his claim would be a valid appeal to authority, because he's not actually appealing to an authority. They are an authority on herd-morality, not on morality. If you want to know about herd-morality, obviously it makes sense to consult the herd. — S
In Nazi Germany murder of Jews was commonplace and ordinary citizens were entirely complicit.
— Isaac
They had little choice but to be complicit, and it was not considered murder because the Jews were not accorded status as properly human by the Nazis; they were considered to be a disease to be eradicated. — Janus
I haven't yet read Janus say that we ought to adhere to these rules (without the accompanying if we want a harmonious society). — Isaac
Maybe I've just missed it (or forgotten it). Possible in this meandering thread, but I'm currently reading his argument as saying that morality is a set of rules a culture creates (much like the rules of chess) and just as certain moves in the chess are objectively incorrect, by those rules, certain behaviours ae objectively immoral, by those rules. — Isaac
I see it as trivial because we could agree or disagree over the antecedent in the conditional, over the aim, whilst meta-ethics is left behind, neglected. — S
I'm a fairly thorough-going quietist, for me philosophical questions aren't about finding out what actually is the case, I'm actually very uninterested in what actually is the case. — Isaac
Obviously models which are wildly out of sync with 'what is the case' are going to be next to useless, and so correspondence with reality matters, but it only matters to the extent that it makes the model useless. — Isaac
Anyway, all that is to say that what interests me here is how someone like Janus supports their argument, what the scaffolding looks like from my perspective on the ground. I have to ask "what's that piece there for?" and "why doesn't that bit actually support the thing it's supposed to be holding up?". People, in my experience, don't like questioning their own scaffolding, so if I want answers I usually have to be quite harsh in my persuit. — Isaac
But ultimately, no matter how harsh I am, it's his scaffolding I'm interested in, not the 'actual way the world is'. — Isaac
Maybe that's not a very good fit for this site either, in which case I apologise for derailing the thread, but I hope the two approaches can co-exist. — Isaac
I agree with you only in part, and the other part is wildly different from how I see it. — S
I'm quietly pleased I shocked you! — Isaac
It would certainly be good to co-exist as your persistence compliments my interests. There's no better check of how the scaffolding works than to give it a good kicking, and you certainly deliver a good kick. — Isaac
That would be a very interesting discussion to have some time. — Isaac
Either not all utterances of ought are moral utterances, or Hume is wrong. — creativesoul
This is a big aside, but don't people realize that when they write so many long posts in such a short period of time that most of what they're writing isn't going to be addressed or even digested very well (if read at all)? — Terrapin Station
It's not flawless... — creativesoul
A method is only as successful as it's implementation. — creativesoul
We're not seeking perfection. We're setting out which is the most likely to increase goodness while decrease unnecessary suffering. If everyone did this, there is no doubt that the world world be a much better place than if not. So, it also consistent. — creativesoul
When a sincere speaker says "I promise to plant a rose garden on Sunday", then it follows that there ought be a rose garden planted on Sunday.
You disagree, apparently. — creativesoul
When a sincere speaker says "I promise to plant a rose garden on Sunday", then it follows that there ought be a rose garden planted on Sunday.
You disagree, apparently. — creativesoul
When a sincere speaker says "I promise to plant a rose garden on Sunday", then it follows that there ought be a rose garden planted on Sunday.
You disagree, apparently.
I say, given those conditions, "there ought be a rose garden planted on Sunday" is a true statement in the same way that all true statements are. Correspondence to what has happened.
You disagree apparently. — creativesoul
If person A promises to plant a rose garden on Sunday, then it follows that there ought be a rose garden the day after, not because one ought keep his/her promise, but rather because that is exactly what the promise means. It means nothing else. — creativesoul
Yes, all of which I have raised a challenge to, all of which you have ignored.
People absolutely and evidently do not all agree that murder is wrong across all communities.
In Nazi Germany murder of Jews was commonplace and ordinary citizens were entirely complicit. Columbus murder hundreds of natives on arrival in America and that was considered perfectly acceptable. Murdering slaves for most of modern civilisation was seen as merely regrettable.
All wars are murder to those who don't agree with the justification for the war.
Rape was considered a legitimate 'spoil of war' for the best part of 200 years during both the viking and the Mongol expansions.
Torture is used today by one of the world's largest democracies.
The whole fucking third world is exploited to save a few pence on our commodities and no one gives a shit. — Isaac
Is it really sensible to think that everyone should be ruled by their passions? — Janus
The whole fucking third world is exploited to save a few pence on our commodities and no one gives a shit. — Isaac
Meta-ethics is the branch of ethics that seeks to understand the nature of ethical properties, statements, attitudes, and judgments. Meta-ethics is one of the three branches of ethics generally studied by philosophers, the others being normative ethics and applied ethics.
While normative ethics addresses such questions as "What should I do?", evaluating specific practices and principles of action, meta-ethics addresses questions such as "What is goodness?" and "How can we tell what is good from what is bad?", seeking to understand the nature of ethical properties and evaluations.
Some theorists argue that a metaphysical account of morality is necessary for the proper evaluation of actual moral theories and for making practical moral decisions; others reason from opposite premises and suggest that studying moral judgments about proper actions can guide us to a true account of the nature of morality.
According to Richard Garner and Bernard Rosen,[1] there are three kinds of meta-ethical problems, or three general questions:
What is the meaning of moral terms or judgments? (moral semantics)
What is the nature of moral judgments? (moral ontology)
How may moral judgments be supported or defended? (moral epistemology)
A question of the first type might be, "What do the words 'good', 'bad', 'right' and 'wrong' mean?" (see value theory). The second category includes questions of whether moral judgments are universal or relative, of one kind or many kinds, etc. Questions of the third kind ask, for example, how we can know if something is right or wrong, if at all. Garner and Rosen say that answers to the three basic questions "are not unrelated, and sometimes an answer to one will strongly suggest, or perhaps even entail, an answer to another."[1]
A meta-ethical theory, unlike a normative ethical theory, does not attempt to evaluate specific choices as being better, worse, good, bad, or evil; although it may have profound implications as to the validity and meaning of normative ethical claims. An answer to any of the three example questions above would not itself be a normative ethical statement. — Wikipedia
I should have amplified the question to not only ask whether it is sensible to think that people should follow their passions, but also to ask whether it is sensible to believe that they do follow their passions and only their passions. — Janus
The purpose of ethics is to understand how best to live, and to practice in accordance with that understanding. So, the first principle for anyone who wants to live in a community is how best to harmonize with the other members of the community. — Janus
I just don't think the idea that ethics consists in individual's feelings alone is adequate to give a comprehensive account. — Janus
If you want to participate in a community then you should care, not only about yourself, but about the community; otherwise you are not really participating, but exploiting. If you want to benefit from the community without giving anything in return, without caring about the other members or the welfare of the whole community, then you are basically a disingenuous, even dishonest, individual. This is on account of the fact that you could not be honest about your intentions, because if you were you would be shunned. That might work for you for a while but it cannot but end badly. — Janus
Also I think it is an ethical truth that if you exploit others you also exploit yourself. — Janus
This cannot be the best way to live, and if ethics is about how best to live, then it cannot be ethical at all, by any measure. — Janus
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