The example remains about meta-ethics. There is an argument in moral realism for various forms of ethical naturalism such as these. They are still meta-ethical positions. The meta-ethical argument is that the universality of concepts creates an abstractly real truth. It ignores any normative instruction aside from that which comes along with the weight of authority. I don't agree with that, but I don't think we could sustain an argument that it isn't even a meta-ethical position. It is one, just not a well supported one.

If we require him to support his interpretation of these moral judgements, then we run the risk of committing the same fallacy as Tim, that were asking him to support his position, but from our understanding of what morality is.

As I said before, what 'morality' is, is still an open question. For us it is the preferences which guide a certain class of actions and that seems to well describe the situations in which we use the term. For others though, 'morality' just is a set of rules. Rules that we are not actually obliged to stick to (thus avoiding the is/ought problem)

I haven't yet read Janus say that we ought to adhere to these rules (without the accompanying if we want a harmonious society).

Maybe I've just missed it (or forgotten it). Possible in this meandering thread, but I'm currently reading his argument as saying that morality is a set of rules a culture creates (much like the rules of chess) and just as certain moves in the chess are objectively incorrect, by those rules, certain behaviours ae objectively immoral, by those rules.

This far, I see nothing normative about all that. It is not saying that the 'ought' is universal, only the rules. We can ignore those rules as we see fit, but doing so would be 'incorrect' in the same way as moving a bishop perpendiculaly is 'incorrect'.

For those people I believe the universality of those rules can challenged, even from within their own paradigm. But if I've missed a glaring claim to universality of an 'ought' (a normative claim), then by all means set me right. Its been a long thread and I wouldn't be surprised if I missed it.

They had little choice but to be complicit, and it was not considered murder because the Jews were not accorded status as properly human by the Nazis; they were considered to be a disease to be eradicated. — Janus

Exactly. So what use is the universality of proscription against 'murder' if the meaning of 'murder' is just redefined to suit whatever objective society had at the time. If 'murder' does not have a consistent meaning, then its proscription is not a universal belief.

Basically, it's meaningless to say everyone agrees we shouldn't kill X, but we all disagree on what X is.

They had little choice but to be complicit — Janus

They absolutely did have a choice. There's tons of archive evidence of ordinary people willingly colluding in order to obtain Jewish property.

I am not asserting normative judgements; I am saying that what is near universally valued and dis-valued reflects the reality of the human situation and is the only guide to working out what is generally right and wrong for human life. — Janus

First of all, thank you for engaging. :up:

I think that there's a massive problem with logical relevance here.

The first part of what you say, that "what is near universally valued and dis-valued reflects the reality of the human situation", seems logically impotent, although the "human situation" part is ambiguous, which is a bit of a problem. If this is just a descriptive fact about moral judgements, then okay, but we need to take it further to make it logically relevant.

The second part of what you say, as far as I can make out, is either descriptive and quite clearly false, or normative and irrelevant, depending on what you really mean. If you mean exactly what you said, that this is "the only guide to working out what is generally right and wrong for human life" then that's false, because, for example, Isaac and I have just been discussing our shared method of going by your gut. And if it's normative, in other words if you really mean that it should be the only guide, then that's missing the point.

Of course in actual situations there are moral issues which are not so clear cut; the underlying principle is the same, but it is not always so easy to determine right and wrong, and there is thus, especially in our modern individualistic culture, some diversity of opinion. But I don't think the general diversity, even on these more nuanced issues is all that significant. — Janus

Significance is the key word. I actually agree - or would agree - with you on much about this, at least under the right conditions. The exceptions to what you and I both judge to be the most important moral judgements, like that murder and rape are wrong, are indeed insignificant in important respects. Herd-morality is king in these respects, and my own morality doesn't clash with it. Herd-morality, in practice, or in a certain sense, dictates right and wrong. But it is extremely important to remember your history here, because it shows that this hasn't always worked out too well.

But herd-morality can never override my morality in any conflict, so ultimately my morality is king.

Where I would strongly disagree is if you assert meta-ethical significance. If you draw a logical link between the descriptive and normative on the one hand, and the meta-ethical on the other, such that you reach an unwarranted conclusion about the latter. The premises do not reasonably lead to the conclusion. It always seems to come back to, "Morality is herd-morality, so anything that differs from herd-morality is insignificant!", but that is begging the question. I reject your implicit premise, so the logical consequences of your premise are themselves irrelevant in the bigger picture of this debate.

I gave the example of abortion before, Virtually no one questions the sanctity of the individual lives of, if not everyone, then at least members of their own culture, so attitudes that are pro or anti-abortion turn on the definition. — Janus

Isn't that just suggesting something along the lines that we can find resolutions over normative ethical issues which are considered to be controversial, like abortion? Yes, that's true. We can go by some method whereby we accordingly reach a resolution. But that doesn't seem to say much if anything about meta-ethics, so again, it seems there's a problem of logical irrelevance.

This is the massive problem with what the Kantians here are wasting so much time doing. Like I said earlier, the categorical imperative is itself effectively a logical conditional or a demand, which is a giant problem in this meta-ethical context. Where has been the response to this? Granted, this was mostly directed at Tim, but it was made in public, and I suspect that it was read by multiple people, yet ignored or dismissed. Isn't it a giant problem in this context to merely say, "Well, IF you were to treat this as a universal maxim...", or to merely DEMAND that we act as though something were a universal maxim?

On the central issues there is little or no variance across cultures. If you think there is then give an example. — Janus

The problem again is logical relevance. If it isn't there, then why should I engage, except to point this out?

It doesn't have to agree with what I have said, but if you want to disagree then you should disagree with what I have actually said, and give good reasons why If you go off on a stupid rant. claiming that I am sounding like a "religious zealot, or some such shit, then I won't respond. If you genuinely want to discuss then you should be able to do so civilly without getting all defensive, and casting aspersions and so on. I don't think you realize how boring that it. — Janus

Yes, fair point, but you've been guilty of this sort of behaviour also. We should both try harder to avoid that kind of thing. On my part, I will try, at least with you, because I have more respect for you than I have for certain others. But it will have to be a quid pro quo thing.

And you know my stance on this sort of thing, I think. I am very capable of setting aside the pettiness, the insults, the ad homs, the things which don't really need to be said, but are said anyway. I am quite extreme on that, I think. It is against the guidelines here, but if you were to call me a cunt or a fucking idiot after every single sentence, I could still address whatever substantial point you made alongside that. It's about getting your priorities straight.




Also, I want to add following here, because I think it was salient:

I don't think that his claim would be a valid appeal to authority, because he's not actually appealing to an authority. They are an authority on herd-morality, not on morality. If you want to know about herd-morality, obviously it makes sense to consult the herd. — S

In Nazi Germany murder of Jews was commonplace and ordinary citizens were entirely complicit.
— Isaac

They had little choice but to be complicit, and it was not considered murder because the Jews were not accorded status as properly human by the Nazis; they were considered to be a disease to be eradicated. — Janus

That book I referenced earlier, Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans And The Holocaust by Daniel Jonah Goldhagen.

I haven't yet read Janus say that we ought to adhere to these rules (without the accompanying if we want a harmonious society). — Isaac

I've argued that that's trivial in a strict sense, not generally speaking. I see it as trivial because we could agree or disagree over what we ought to do, or over the antecedent in the conditional properly ordered (the part about a harmonious society), disagree over the aim, or differ in what we want, because that leaves meta-ethics behind. It neglects it.

Maybe I've just missed it (or forgotten it). Possible in this meandering thread, but I'm currently reading his argument as saying that morality is a set of rules a culture creates (much like the rules of chess) and just as certain moves in the chess are objectively incorrect, by those rules, certain behaviours ae objectively immoral, by those rules. — Isaac

Okay, but then my point against that is that it rules out our morality determined by appealing directly to our respective guts. That doesn't count? It seems his position is far too rigid and narrow.

I don't rely on a rulebook, and like you have argued, and I have argued, there's a strong case against this. Imagine if we applied the rulebook method in a different time and place. That is a horrifying thought. That certainly counts as "doing morality", but to call that morality itself is strongly objectionable.

My understanding is that Janus wants to set aside certain statements which he considers of central importance, and that many others consider of central importance, like that murder and rape are wrong, but I question the assumed meta-ethical support of suggesting that they're anything other or more than exactly what I've said they are.

I see it as trivial because we could agree or disagree over the antecedent in the conditional, over the aim, whilst meta-ethics is left behind, neglected. — S

I get what you're saying, I think we just have a different focus and I'm willing to concede that mine might not be right for this thread. I'm a fairly thorough-going quietist, for me philosophical questions aren't about finding out what actually is the case, I'm actually very uninterested in what actually is the case. I'm more interested in how different ways we can model 'what is the case' are useful to us for whatever we personally want them for.

Obviously models which are wildly out of sync with 'what is the case' are going to be next to useless, and so correspondence with reality matters, but it only matters to the extent that it makes the model useless.

Anyway, all that is to say that what interests me here is how someone like Janus supports their argument, what the scaffolding looks like from my perspective on the ground. I have to ask "what's that piece there for?" and "why doesn't that bit actually support the thing it's supposed to be holding up?". People, in my experience, don't like questioning their own scaffolding, so if I want answers I usually have to be quite harsh in my persuit.

But ultimately, no matter how harsh I am, it's his scaffolding I'm interested in, not the 'actual way the world is'.

Maybe that's not a very good fit for this site either, in which case I apologise for derailing the thread, but I hope the two approaches can co-exist.

That book I referenced earlier, Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans And The Holocaust by Daniel Jonah Goldhagen. — S

I was searching for that exact reference. Thanks.

I'm a fairly thorough-going quietist, for me philosophical questions aren't about finding out what actually is the case, I'm actually very uninterested in what actually is the case. — Isaac

:scream:

Obviously models which are wildly out of sync with 'what is the case' are going to be next to useless, and so correspondence with reality matters, but it only matters to the extent that it makes the model useless. — Isaac

I'm slightly less aghast. But only slightly.

Anyway, all that is to say that what interests me here is how someone like Janus supports their argument, what the scaffolding looks like from my perspective on the ground. I have to ask "what's that piece there for?" and "why doesn't that bit actually support the thing it's supposed to be holding up?". People, in my experience, don't like questioning their own scaffolding, so if I want answers I usually have to be quite harsh in my persuit. — Isaac

Ah, okay. I get that.

But ultimately, no matter how harsh I am, it's his scaffolding I'm interested in, not the 'actual way the world is'. — Isaac

:scream:

Maybe that's not a very good fit for this site either, in which case I apologise for derailing the thread, but I hope the two approaches can co-exist. — Isaac

No, that's perfectly fine, in a sense. It is just that it is fundamentally different from how I see it. I agree with you only in part, and the other part is wildly different from how I see it. I'm a moral anti-realist, but not a metaphysical anti-realist.

I'm quietly pleased I shocked you! It would certainly be good to co-exist as your persistence compliments my interests. There's no better check of how the scaffolding works than to give it a good kicking, and you certainly deliver a good kick.

I agree with you only in part, and the other part is wildly different from how I see it. — S

That would be a very interesting discussion to have some time.

I'm quietly pleased I shocked you! — Isaac

:grin:

It would certainly be good to co-exist as your persistence compliments my interests. There's no better check of how the scaffolding works than to give it a good kicking, and you certainly deliver a good kick. — Isaac

With steel-capped boots! :grin::up:

That would be a very interesting discussion to have some time. — Isaac

Agreed. But you better not make me any more sceptical than I already am! I'm trying to build something, lol. Please don't collapse my scaffolding! :lol:

Please don't collapse my scaffolding! :lol: — S

Wouldn't dream of it! [...surreptitiously kicks at a loose-looking pole].

Either not all utterances of ought are moral utterances, or Hume is wrong. — creativesoul

The first is true, the second theoretically true, depending on one’s metaphysical bent. But there’s also a third, in which Hume never said no ought can be derived from any is, but only that if some moral theory adventurist wanders thereupon he should show his work. Of course, Hume then presumes such efforts to be ill-founded. Leave it to those wishing to make mountains out of molehills, in a rush to publish any old thing with his name attached, and we end up with a philosophical dilemma that never was. Also, it should be noted that Kant didn’t address this false dilemma in his moral philosophy, because it didn’t exist (Black, 1964). And conceding that Kant read and understood Hume very well indeed, it is easy to suppose no import should have been given to it even if it now does.

First of all is the exposition of the “problem”. For context, from the book itself, this is easy to find at the very end of the reference pagination, so one doesn’t have to scroll or thumb page after page for the backdrop on what he’s saying here:

“.....I cannot forbear adding to these reasonings an observation, which may, perhaps, be found of some importance. In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark’d, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz’d to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, ’tis necessary that it shou’d be observ’d and explain’d; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention wou’d subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceiv’d by reason....”
(THN 3.1.1.,1739)

Make of it as you wish. If you don’t already have a full text, and if you’re at all interested, especially in the context, and if you’re on an IPad, maybe any device....dunno.....you can highlight and go right to the reference pagination.
https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/hume-a-treatise-of-human-nature

All that to say this: Hume was wrong, but only with respect to the very last sentence of the passage, insofar as we do see that the distinction between vice and virtue is founded on the relations of objects and is most certainly “perceived” by reason.

And all that is to say that he doesn't actually offer up an argument in support of his claim which contradicts that of Hume. Not even yet another regurgitation of Kant.

What I find interesting is that he is willing to entertain the thought that Hume was wrong about something or other, but not apparently Kant. Kant, it seems, was infallible. If the Word of Kant says nothing of the problem, 'tis no problem. So sayeth the prophet, Mww.

This is a big aside, but don't people realize that when they write so many long posts in such a short period of time that most of what they're writing isn't going to be addressed or even digested very well (if read at all)?

This is a big aside, but don't people realize that when they write so many long posts in such a short period of time that most of what they're writing isn't going to be addressed or even digested very well (if read at all)? — Terrapin Station

This is an even bigger aside, but I once wrote a post so long that I would fall asleep whilst writing it, and I would continue to write it whilst I was asleep. Back then, posts were called "books". It ended up being published in the year 1807. I wrote it under a pseudonym, and I gave it the title, The Phenomenology of Spirit.

It now exists solely as a warning never to fall asleep whilst writing a book on philosophy.

It's not flawless... — creativesoul

Nope, it isn’t. It’s philosophy, which presents an inherently logical possibility, which experience will either confirm, deny or not address at all.
——————

A method is only as successful as it's implementation. — creativesoul

Exactly. Under this paradigm, to be moral is to choose a worthy principle and act accordingly; to be immoral is to choose a worthy principle and act contrary to it. Humans always have choice, but they also have choice to disregard their own best interests. Like...it is morally good to let an ex-girlfriend have her own life; it is immoral to let and ex-girlfriend have her own life yet key the new boyfriend’s brand new Mustang.
——————-

We're not seeking perfection. We're setting out which is the most likely to increase goodness while decrease unnecessary suffering. If everyone did this, there is no doubt that the world world be a much better place than if not. So, it also consistent. — creativesoul

Well said. I might say we do set out to find perfection, but recognize our own imperfections which naturally prohibit exemplifying what we find.

“The first rule of culture: let each man be the best he was created capable of being”- Carlyle

"Under this paradigm...". And there, ladies and gentleman, lies the inherent weakness. Also, what's worthy or not is obviously a matter of subjective judgement, not a matter of deferring to the Word of Kant. I don't subscribe to a version of divine command theory where Kant is God.

This worthy of careful attention.

When a sincere speaker says "I promise to plant a rose garden on Sunday", then it follows that there ought be a rose garden planted on Sunday.

You disagree, apparently.

I say, given those conditions, "there ought be a rose garden planted on Sunday" is a true statement in the same way that all true statements are. Correspondence to what has happened.

You disagree apparently.

When a sincere speaker says "I promise to plant a rose garden on Sunday", then it follows that there ought be a rose garden planted on Sunday.

You disagree, apparently. — creativesoul

And I do, too. It shows that you do not understand logical validity.

And this exact same example of yours has been previously identified as erroneous by me. Two months ago: I just looked it up.

When a sincere speaker says "I promise to plant a rose garden on Sunday", then it follows that there ought be a rose garden planted on Sunday.

You disagree, apparently. — creativesoul

Of course. How does the statement of one person's subjective intention become an objective requirement on the world at large? Why ought they keep their promise? By what mechanism does their promise impose a requirement on the objective world? It makes no sense. It's basically still making the mistake that is at the heart of this thread, you've made a jump from the subjective intention within someone's mind to an objective state of affairs in the world at large without justifying that step.

When a sincere speaker says "I promise to plant a rose garden on Sunday", then it follows that if that person thinks making a promise confers a duty to satisfy that promise, then they will believe there ought be a rose garden planted on Sunday.

How do you justify removing the bolded sections?

When a sincere speaker says "I promise to plant a rose garden on Sunday", then it follows that there ought be a rose garden planted on Sunday.

You disagree, apparently.

I say, given those conditions, "there ought be a rose garden planted on Sunday" is a true statement in the same way that all true statements are. Correspondence to what has happened.

You disagree apparently. — creativesoul

I disagree, too, if you're saying that the ought is anything like a fact.

If person A promises to plant a rose garden on Sunday, then it follows that there ought be a rose garden the day after, not because one ought keep his/her promise, but rather because that is exactly what the promise means. It means nothing else. — creativesoul

Yes, there ought to be a garden; that is all the consistency between a promise made and an obligation to it, by the same person, means. Whether or not the ever is, or ever was going to be, a garden, is irrelevant with respect to the relationship between a promise and the obligation presupposed by it.

He said that it follows. That is logical terminology. Surely he recognises that and knows that the conclusion doesn't follow from the premise, yet he replies with, "Yes, there ought to be a garden".

Facepalm.

The original claim is a matter of basic logic, specifically logical validity. He presented an argument that is incomplete, and, as presented, is a non sequitur. So no, it doesn't follow. That is the meaning of the Latin phrase, and it means that the argument is invalid.

It simply won't do to apply common sense assumptions about what the promise suggests if that doesn't work as a valid argument. Don't use logical terminology if you can't back it up or don't understand what you're talking about.

If he is capable of putting together a complete and valid argument, then he should stop wasting time and do so, and then we can move forward to discussing soundness.

Yes, all of which I have raised a challenge to, all of which you have ignored.

People absolutely and evidently do not all agree that murder is wrong across all communities.

In Nazi Germany murder of Jews was commonplace and ordinary citizens were entirely complicit. Columbus murder hundreds of natives on arrival in America and that was considered perfectly acceptable. Murdering slaves for most of modern civilisation was seen as merely regrettable.

All wars are murder to those who don't agree with the justification for the war.

Rape was considered a legitimate 'spoil of war' for the best part of 200 years during both the viking and the Mongol expansions.

Torture is used today by one of the world's largest democracies.

The whole fucking third world is exploited to save a few pence on our commodities and no one gives a shit. — Isaac

I was very busy yesterday when I responded briefly to this. Today I have a little more time to read and respond more thoroughly to some points which I think do warrant it.

What I have said is that within and across cultures it is generally agreed that murder, rape, torture etc. of their own people is wrong, and I think, absent any evidence to the contrary, that this is so is justifiably believed. It is a matter of life and death for communities, particularly those which are in conflict with other communities (and that is characteristic of most of human history) to be able to trust the good will of their own members towards one another ("there is honour among thieves").

The fact that marauding tribes wantonly murder and rape those they see as their enemies I don't consider as being relevant, because they do not accord any important human status to those enemies. Often it is a matter of survival; kill you enemies now or be killed later by them, and if you don't see them as human in any important sense, then why not exploit them for your own pleasure before killing them? Now, of course I am not saying that such attitudes are rationally informed.

For sure some German citizens may have been complicit with the Nazi regime in order to acquire Jewish wealth or property, or even simply because they were brainwashed into thinking the Jews were less than human. In any case, the fact that some German citizens were complicit, does not entail that they could not have had to comply regardless of whether they were complicit or not.

I haven't said that every individual thinks for themselves or is capable of freeing themselves from nationalistic or tribalistic ethea. The point is that murder and other extremely violent and violating acts committed by members of a community against others members of the community are generally condemned.

It seems to me that ethea have evolved, and are evolving within the existential constraints of what it takes for communities to survive and thrive. The modern ethos of individualism is really a luxury which has been made possible by the exploitation of fossil fuels and the less developed cultures and their resources.

And it is a mixed blessing, because although it has resulted in unprecedented prosperity for great numbers of people, it destroys the livelihoods and lives of others, and it also promotes a culture of selfishness, hedonism, exploitation of the self and others and the environment for momentary pleasures, and all this it would seem is definitely going to end badly, more particularly for the exploiters, when the shit hits the fan, because they will be so much less capable of coping with the deprivations that are to come than those who are already suffering deprivation are.

Economic exigencies have forced us to be global citizens before we have developed the intellectual and emotional wherewithal to think outside our tribalistic and nationalistic prejudices. And of course once hardship begins to be felt the masses push back against globalization (just look at the phenomena of Trump and Brexit, for example). And yet within our our unprecedentedly prosperous societies all sense of real community has been lost.

The biggest problem I see with the crudest form of moral relativism ( morality relative to individual preference only) is that it is really a symptom of our modern, self-centred, exploitative culture. Is it really sensible to think that everyone should be ruled by their passions? It might be OK for highly emotionally and intellectually cultivated and responsive people to consult their moral feelings, but what of those whose moral feelings are underdeveloped, atrophied or whose feelings are just not moral at all?

It's obviously a huge, complex, nuanced topic (which is a situation that I think moral relativism in it's crudest form that says its all about the individual moral response cannot begin to address) and we're never going to do more than scratch the surface in these forums, but in any case that's all I have time for now; and I'll have to leave responding to others later.

Is it really sensible to think that everyone should be ruled by their passions? — Janus

Questions of what "should be" are not even on the set agenda here. Nor are questions such as whether moral relativism is bad ("exploitative", "selfish", etc.), as opposed to whether it is true. That would be normative ethics, and would be for a different discussion.

I don't understand why people cannot, or choose not to, stick to the original topic. That entire post was either descriptive (e.g. people generally believe such-and-such is wrong) or normative (as indicated above for example). I know that your reply wasn't a reply to me, but rather to Isaac, and maybe the two of you want to discuss something else, but I still find it frustrating that so much time and effort is going into producing lengthy posts about that sort of thing, when it is off topic.

Remember that this discussion is about morality itself, as the title indicates, and that it began with a quoted passage which made a claim about what morality is, namely that it isn't anything other than how people feel, whether they approve or disapprove, etc. of interpersonal behaviour that they consider more significant than etiquette. What people approve or disapprove of in ethics is not at all helpful in this context.

That is an example of what meta-ethics looks like. Take note.

I should have amplified the question to not only ask whether it is sensible to think that people should follow their passions, but also to ask whether it is sensible to believe that they do follow their passions and only their passions.

My view is that meta-ethics is concerned with what ethics consists in. So, the descriptive gives a phenomenological account of how people's moral beliefs and dispositions are mediated by the community and the normative gives an account of why the communal origins of moral beliefs and dispositions are relevant to an individual's moral choices. Ethics just does consist in "what should be"; what else could it consist in?

So. I am not doing ethics, which would be to make specific claims about specific acts or situations; I am doing meta-ethics, making claims about what ethics really consists in. I just don't think the idea that ethics consists in individual's feelings alone is adequate to give a comprehensive account.

The point is, from my perspective, that there is no "how people feel" which is separable from their communal conditioning. The purpose of ethics is to understand how best to live, and to practice in accordance with that understanding. So, the first principle for anyone who wants to live in a community is how best to harmonize with the other members of the community. It seems obvious that dis-valuing them, exploiting them, harming them or even deceiving them cannot be the best ethical strategies.

If you want to participate in a community then you should care, not only about yourself, but about the community; otherwise you are not really participating, but exploiting. If you want to benefit from the community without giving anything in return, without caring about the other members or the welfare of the whole community, then you are basically a disingenuous, even dishonest, individual. This is on account of the fact that you could not be honest about your intentions, because if you were you would be shunned. That might work for you for a while but it cannot but end badly. Also I think it is an ethical truth that if you exploit others you also exploit yourself. This cannot be the best way to live, and if ethics is about how best to live, then it cannot be ethical at all, by any measure.

I also can't understand why you don't acknowledge that there is a third category beyond what is considered to be mere etiquette, and what is considered to be interpersonal behavior that is more morally significant than etiquette. The third category I refer to is interpersonal behavior which involves matter of "life and death".

The whole fucking third world is exploited to save a few pence on our commodities and no one gives a shit. — Isaac

This in particular warrants some more attention. I do agree with you about this exploitation, and I think it is lamentable, but I don't think it is true that we don't, at least in principle, "give a shit". I don't think we are generally ethically advanced enough to genuinely care about those who are strangers to us, but I think most people if asked whether it is ethically right to exploit third world people for our own convenience and prosperity would say "no". But they would probably add that they are better off than is we completely left them alone, and that because their conditions are being improved by us, then they are not really being exploited and so on. So, I think they would not condone exploitation of third world people per se, but would instead rationalize it, make some excuse for it.

The reality is that most of us prosperous first worlders are just too spoiled and indulgent to have the ethical fibre to give up even the smallest part of our precious lifestyles in order to help people who are members of our community but whom we don't know personally, and I'm not even sure how much most of us would give up to help anyone who isn't family or close friend, or for that matter, even how much we would give up for those close to us.

But probably most of us would at least say we should sacrifice our own prosperity and comforts to help others close to us, and even people in general, including those of other communities; the question is whether we actually would make sacrifices when it came down to it, or whether we would instead start making excuses for not doing so.

Meta-ethics is the branch of ethics that seeks to understand the nature of ethical properties, statements, attitudes, and judgments. Meta-ethics is one of the three branches of ethics generally studied by philosophers, the others being normative ethics and applied ethics.

While normative ethics addresses such questions as "What should I do?", evaluating specific practices and principles of action, meta-ethics addresses questions such as "What is goodness?" and "How can we tell what is good from what is bad?", seeking to understand the nature of ethical properties and evaluations.

Some theorists argue that a metaphysical account of morality is necessary for the proper evaluation of actual moral theories and for making practical moral decisions; others reason from opposite premises and suggest that studying moral judgments about proper actions can guide us to a true account of the nature of morality.

According to Richard Garner and Bernard Rosen,[1] there are three kinds of meta-ethical problems, or three general questions:

What is the meaning of moral terms or judgments? (moral semantics)

What is the nature of moral judgments? (moral ontology)

How may moral judgments be supported or defended? (moral epistemology)

A question of the first type might be, "What do the words 'good', 'bad', 'right' and 'wrong' mean?" (see value theory). The second category includes questions of whether moral judgments are universal or relative, of one kind or many kinds, etc. Questions of the third kind ask, for example, how we can know if something is right or wrong, if at all. Garner and Rosen say that answers to the three basic questions "are not unrelated, and sometimes an answer to one will strongly suggest, or perhaps even entail, an answer to another."[1]

A meta-ethical theory, unlike a normative ethical theory, does not attempt to evaluate specific choices as being better, worse, good, bad, or evil; although it may have profound implications as to the validity and meaning of normative ethical claims. An answer to any of the three example questions above would not itself be a normative ethical statement. — Wikipedia

That should clear things up a bit.

I should have amplified the question to not only ask whether it is sensible to think that people should follow their passions, but also to ask whether it is sensible to believe that they do follow their passions and only their passions. — Janus

Only the latter is relevant.

The purpose of ethics is to understand how best to live, and to practice in accordance with that understanding. So, the first principle for anyone who wants to live in a community is how best to harmonize with the other members of the community. — Janus

The question of how best to live is a question in normative ethics, so it should not be addressed here. The primary question which began the discussion was that of what morality is, not what the purpose of ethics is, or should be. The latter was a red herring that was introduced later, and whoever introduced it has earned my scorn, as I am very stern about sticking to the topic and remaining on point, and this really didn't help.

I just don't think the idea that ethics consists in individual's feelings alone is adequate to give a comprehensive account. — Janus

That is the sort of thing that you should confine yourself to talking about.

If you want to participate in a community then you should care, not only about yourself, but about the community; otherwise you are not really participating, but exploiting. If you want to benefit from the community without giving anything in return, without caring about the other members or the welfare of the whole community, then you are basically a disingenuous, even dishonest, individual. This is on account of the fact that you could not be honest about your intentions, because if you were you would be shunned. That might work for you for a while but it cannot but end badly. — Janus

No! That is normative ethics again!

Also I think it is an ethical truth that if you exploit others you also exploit yourself. — Janus

That is moving more in the right direction. Talking about whether there are any moral truths, and if so, in what sense they are moral truths, and how they are known to be so, is meta-ethics. So these are the kind of follow-up questions which you should be addressing.

This cannot be the best way to live, and if ethics is about how best to live, then it cannot be ethical at all, by any measure. — Janus

No! That is basically saying that it is wrong. This isn't simply about what you or I think is wrong. Do you understand that? It is about a deeper philosophical examination. It is a sort of "one step removed" thing, hence the "meta".

All your disagreements here seem to consist in what I see as a misunderstanding. Ethics is about how best to live; that is what it consists in. Obviously though this will be context-based. If you want to live alone, then nothing I have said about participating in community applies to you. (Having said that an argument could be made that a solitary life can never be the best life for a human being, given that we are social creatures).

So, to repeat what I have said in other posts, if you want to participate in community then exploitation is going to be a stumbling block to your aim. Most people do want to participate, so exploitation is ethically wrong for them. If you are a criminal who lives on the fringes, then this will not apply to you, except that if you want to participate in a criminal sub-culture it will apply in that context, but not in the larger context of the whole society.

Ethics and moral philosophy are not really much different except that moral philosophy is usually taken to involve others; whereas ethics does not necessarily by definition do so. There's no point trying to browbeat me into agreeing that I am not doing meta-ethics and that I am thus "off-topic" because that would only be so on your interpretation of a definition, which I don't accept. I see nothing in the wiki article you quoted which is out of accordance with what I am doing here.

To go back to what I have said earlier in this thread; the is/ ought distinction, and Hume';s idea that you cannot get an ought form an is is not the relevant one; it is a kind of category error,as though there could be some empirically observable object which could definitively confirm of diconfirm ethical claims. The relevant distinction is "if/ ought"; 'if I want X, then I ought to do Y". This should be coupled with the realization that there are in fact some things which almost all people do want; which means that there are some things which almost all people ought to do.

If we are social beings, if that is we desire society, then ethics is about how to live the best life harmoniously with the others of our community. It would be absurd to say that it could be about how to live the worst life in conflict with others of our community. Do you not see the difference, and that it has nothing to do with personal preferences except in the first instance of what it is that we really want; to be or not to be social beings?