I think you are conflating the taste of the apple with the tasting of it.

I don't think many realists would argue that the tasting of an apple is present when it is not being tasted. — John

What is the taste of the apple? Is the taste of the apple identical to the chemicals which stimulate the taste receptors? It must if direct realism is to work. But sweetness is very different to molecules. Hence indirect realism.

No, because then the question just repeats for this second experience.

The direct realist is pointing out they are all part of an object. — TheWillowOfDarkness

No, the direct realist argues that the taste and smell and feel of an apple are present even when not being tasted, smelled, and felt.

Taste and smell, like pain and sight, are merely parts of objects which are only experiences at certain points. The direct realist is pointing out they are all part of an object. Else we give-up unperceived objects, as take away the significance of an object when pervade and there is nothing of the object left, and so fall into the incoherence of idealism.

There's nothing incoherent in saying that there's nothing left once experience is taken away. It might be false, but not incoherent. It's no different to the realist saying that if you take away the atoms then there's nothing left.

But is redness identical to electromagnetic radiation at a wavelength of ‎~620–740 nm? It's not. The former is a representation of the latter. That's why indirect realism fares better than direct realism. — Michael

Direct realism has never argued this. Red is, for direct realism, red. It isn't identical to ~620–740 at all.

Electromagnetic radiation at a wavelength of ‎~620–740 may result in many possible experiences of colour. Some people might see red when encountering it. Other people might not (e.g. colourblind people). Other people might not even see a colour at all (blind). The colour red is not representation of 620–740nm electromagnetic radiation. It is representation of the colour red in the world, in instances where it is a showing of an object.

Direct realism has never argued this. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Yes, it has.

Red is, for direct realism, red. It isn't identical to ~620–740 at all.

Electromagnetic radiation at a wavelength of ‎~620–740 may result in many possible experiences of colour. Some people might see red when encountering it. Other people might not (e.g. colourblind people). Other people might not even see a colour at all (blind).

This is indirect realism.

No, the taste of an apple is what it tastes like; some taste sour, some sweet, all taste subtly different.

No, the taste of an apple is what it tastes like; some taste sour, some sweet, all taste subtly different. — John

And it can't taste like something when it's not being tasted.

I've already explained in previous posts, I don't see the point in explaining again unless you say something besides 'nuh uh.' Because after all, you'll just say it again.

Indeed. that's what being "part of the object" means. Same with sight or any other sense.

Parts of the object are, for the direct realist, what experienced when the object is perceived.

This is indirect realism. — Michael

No, it isn't. Under that argument, colours aren't added to the world by experience. They are parts of the world perceived. And they may be when no-one experiencing them.

And they may be when no-one experiencing them. — TheWillowOfDarkness

No, they may not. There is no colour red without any experience. Redness is an experience. It's not a mind-independent feature of the world.

But it doesn't. There is no such question.

I have the experience the dragon can't eat me. There is no doubt present. I understand the dragon to be locked away in the virtual world.

Why? Why must an organism react to stimulation by electromagnetic radiation at a wavelength of ‎~620–740 nm by stimulating the visual experience which we name "red"? — Michael

The receptors (cones) that have the right physical characteristics to be affected by light in the wavelength range you cited (so-called 'red light' ) are the ones that enable seeing red. If the organism, let's say mammal, has these cones (most don't) they will see red; if not, then not

Yes, it can. A sour apple will taste more like another sour apple than it does like a sweet apple; even if they are never tasted. Just as one mountain range will look more like another mountain range than it will look like a valley, even if they are never seen.

I'm not exactly sure where your problem is; but I think you are somehow confusing yourself by reifying words.

The receptors (cones) that have the right physical characteristics to be affected by light in the wavelength range you cited (so-called 'red light' ) are the ones that enable seeing red. If the organism, let's say mammal, has these cones (most don't) they will see red; if not, then not — John

And different animals (or even different persons) might have different receptors that are affected by such light in a different way and so see a different colour. They're no more wrong than we are wrong in not seeing the same colours as a mantis shrimp.

Furthermore, it's not enough to say that seeing red is a necessary consequence of being stimulated by such light; you must say that redness is a mind-independent feature of such light if you are to be a direct realist.

A sour apple will taste more like another sour apple than it does like a sweet apple; even if they are never tasted

That it will taste like X (when tasted) is not that it does taste like X (when not tasted). To maintain direct realism you must say that the apple tastes sour even when not tasted. It's a nonsense position.

I'm not exactly sure where your problem is; but I think you are somehow confusing yourself by reifying words.

The direct realist is the one reifying, treating taste and colour and smell as concrete features that exist independently of the experience.

Yes, there is. That's the whole point of this conversation: that in any case, the direct realist by his own position can be mistaken about whether something is hallucinatory or not. Honestly, I wish people would read the discussion before commenting.

What is the taste of the apple? Is the taste of the apple identical to the chemicals which stimulate the taste receptors? It must if direct realism is to work. But sweetness is very different to molecules. Hence indirect realism. — Michael

The taste of an apple is just the taste of an apple. Apples have certain flavours, no two apples the same flavour, and no apple will taste exactly the same to two people (at least it seems reasonable to think not, even though the very notion of something tasting the same to two people is kind of incoherent to start with).

Sweetness may be a characteristic of molecules, just as heat is the agitation of molecules, but is also from another perspective "very different to" the agitation of molecules.

Yes, there is. That's the whole point of this conversation: that in any case, the direct realist by his own position can be mistaken about whether something is hallucinatory or not. Honestly, I wish people would read the discussion before commenting. — The Great Whatever

But that's not a problem because the direct realist isn't concerned with what is true in any specific instance. The direct realist doesn't have any particular care for an argument that any specific state if real or virtual.

Here you are back to attacking on the grounds that a direct realist doesn't know what is real or virtual, rather than arguing their position is internally inconsistent because there is no difference between the real and virtual.

Indeed, your objection presupposes discintion made by the direct realist here. If the direct realist can be mistake the real world for a virtual one, or a virtual one for a real one, then the distinction of real and virtual means something.

The taste of an apple is just the taste of an apple. Apples have certain flavours, no two apples the same flavour, and no apple will taste exactly the same to two people (at least it seems reasonable to think not, even though the very notion of something tasting the same to two people is kind of incoherent to start with). — John

Again, that they will not taste the same (when tasted) is not that they do not taste the same (when not tasted).

Sweetness may be a characteristic of molecules, just as heat is the agitation of molecules, but is also from another perspective "very different to" the agitation of molecules.

This is conflation, as shown by your use of "from another perspective". The word "heat" can refer either to the type of experience or to the energy. They're not the same thing. The former is a mental representation of the latter and not an objective feature of the fire that is retained even when not being felt.

That's not true. The experience of heat (the hot toast I am juggling) is not a representation of the energy at all. It is heat (what appears in my experience) experienced. The idea of energy doesn't even come-up in the experience of burning oneself on something hot. In that moment, I experience nothing about energy. I have no mental representation of it at all.

The receptors (cones) that have the right physical characteristics to be affected by light in the wavelength range you cited (so-called 'red light' ) are the ones that enable seeing red. If the organism, let's say mammal, has these cones (most don't) they will see red; if not, then not — John


And different animals (or even different persons) might have different receptors that are affected by such light in a different way and so see a different colour. They're no more wrong than we are wrong in not seeing the same colours as a mantis shrimp.

Furthermore, it's not enough to say that seeing red is a necessary consequence of being stimulated by such light; you must say that redness is a mind-independent feature of such light if you are to be a direct realist. — Michael

Sure, but an animal that has a certain kind of receptor will see the 'red wavelength' roughly the same as another animal that has the same kind of receptor. It seems reasonable to think that although there may be different kinds of receptors, no two receptors will be exactly the same. Any animal will see any portion of the spectrum according to the kinds of receptors it possesses. Most mammals do not see colour because their eyes are not equipped with cones (colour receptors) , but only with rods (tonal receptors); they will see only black and white and shades of grey.

Redness is a mind independent feature, but seeing red is not. That seems to make perfect sense to me. What's the problem?

Nothing you have said convinces me that you are not conflating two different things.

A sour apple will taste more like another sour apple than it does like a sweet apple; even if they are never tasted

That it will taste like X (when tasted) is not that it does taste like X (when not tasted). To maintain direct realism you must say that the apple tastes sour even when not tasted. It's a nonsense position.

No it is to say, not that 'it tastes sour' (which is possible only when it is being tasted) but that it has 'a sour taste' independently of its being tasted. The two statements are not the same, and common usage bears this out.

I'm not exactly sure where your problem is; but I think you are somehow confusing yourself by reifying words.

The direct realist is the one reifying, treating taste and colour and smell as concrete features that exist independently of the experience.

As I already said I don't think many realists would believe anything as absurd as that flavours are 'out there' being tasted, colours being seen or odors being smelled, independent of any experiences of tasting, seeing and smelling. I still believe you are conflating different senses of the words.

Common usage says they are concrete features which are independent of being experienced, so if meaning is use, then...

>:O I am not conflating the two senses of heat, as evidenced by my use of the phrase "from another perspective". You are, ironically, accusing me of doing in relation to heat, the very thing, that is running two senses together, which you are doing in relation to colours. smells and tastes.

Redness is a mind independent feature, but seeing red is not. That seems to make perfect sense to me. What's the problem? — John

The problem is that redness isn't a mind-independent feature. Electromagnetic radiation is a mind-independent feature. Redness is the type of experience elicited by the detection of electromagnetic radiation of a certain wavelength.

You are, ironically, accusing me of doing in relation to heat, the very thing, that is running two senses together, which you are doing in relation to colours. smells and tastes. — John

What "two senses" are there to colours, smells, and tastes? There's just the one sense; the types of experience (which are mental representations of their electromagnetic or chemical stimulants).

OK, fine, if you don't want to engage with the argument, then have it your own way.

Then all of common usage that refers to 'smells', tastes', 'colours' in a different sense than 'smelling', 'tasting' and 'seeing colour' and so on, must be wrong then?

It isn't (in the sense you are talking about).

Electromagnetic radiation is no less known through experience than the colour red. And everything thing it does is, how it interacts, what it interacts with, is also only significant in terms of things which may be experienced.

Thread officially dead. Christ.

Are you invoking a resurrection?

Not even Jesus can make some read before answering.

It does seem a shame that direct discussion of the arguments in jamalrob's excellent paper (judging from what I have so far managed to find the time to read of it) has been lost in a degeneration back to the usual kinds of pointless arguments over realism vs anti-realism or idealism. I am guilty of being sucked in too, and I acknowledge that my time would have been better spent studying the paper; and working out responses to it.

So, my apologies to jamalrob for my part in de-railing his thread.