I agree with you, that is another way of saying it.

Direct Realism is correct logically and phenomenological speaking. When I see a tree, I see a tree not a mental representation of a tree. — John

How does the perception of a tree differ from a mental representation of a tree?

In any instance where a person sees a colour in response to an object, an objective colour is shown: it is true that the object in question has the relevant colour. — The Willow Of Darkness

How does a blind person experimentally show that there are objective colours?

Furthermore, "X has property Y when not seen" does not follow from "X sees Y when stimulated by X", so the above doesn't account for objective colour. I might see a chair in response to being poked in the brain by a neuroscientist but it doesn't then follow that the chair continues to exist when I stop seeing it (or even when I am seeing it).

Notice that 1) is impossible if the two are phenomenologically indistinguishable. If for any particular case I cannot tell, then it cannot be that I can tell for the most part (or in other words, there is no way by his own criteria to tell whether or how often I can tell or not). So whether or not jamalrob wants to say this (perhaps he does), he can't. — The Great Whatever

That's not true. The fact it is impossible to tell whether sensation is real or virtual, as phenomenologically speaking, they are identical doesn't prevent us from having other experience which detail whether something is real or virtual. After seeing dragon on the screen, moving towards us, we may then have another experience that the dragon can't get out and shred our body with their death. We have experienced the dragon is "virtual," despite not being able to tell, form the sight of the daring anole, whether it was real or virtual.

I can't see why you think there is such a problematic tension between these two ways of talking about perception; the one from within (phenomenology) and the other from without (science). Why should we be surprised or perplexed that things look different from different angles?

I can't see why you think there is such a problematic tension between these two ways of talking about perception; the one from within (phenomenology) and the other from without (science). Why should we be surprised or perplexed that things look different from different angles? — John

I think his point is that if colours X and Y are phenomenologically indistinguishable then how can one say that they are two colours and not one?

How does the perception of a tree differ from a mental representation of a tree? — Michael

It doesn't. Given that the perception if the tree (a tree experienced) is a mental representation of the tree. They are the same thing: the showing of (part of ) the object of a tree in experience.

The object of the tree, on the other hand, is a bit different. It is what is experienced in this instances perception. But it is also more than is present in the given experience (e.g. different colours, different shapes which aren perceived by the given experience, parts which aren't picked up by the present perceptual system). Crucially, any object (and any part of any object) has it existence defined by itself rather than by whether it is perceived. Perceiving objects doesn't create them or form the existence of an object triggering perception.

From a philosophical perspective I am not a fan of representational theories of perception generally. Hegel, and various philosophers since, have present several viable alternatives, but that is a whole other very complex (and very interesting) story.

Representational models, as diagrammatic heuristics, in science are fine, but are perilous when reified philosophically.

As far as it goes it is OK to say that seeing the tree just is mentally representing it. But, for me, it would be tendentious and philosophically pointless gobbledygook to say that 'we see mental representations'.

Crucially, any object (and any part of any object) has it existence defined by itself rather than by whether it is perceived. — TheWillofDarkness

How things are defined is irrelevant. What matters is whether or not the object's features when seen are also its features when not seen. Can you show that the apple is red and tasty even when I'm not looking at or tasting it? Does it even make sense to say that the apple is tasty when not being tasted?

We are not talking about phenomenal immediacies like colors but about different categories of experience that are well understood and distinguished by all. Not a good analogy, in other words.

But, for me, it would be tendentious and philosophically pointless gobbledygook to say that 'we see mental representations'. — John

I agree, but that's a point of grammar rather than metaphysics. The metaphysical issue is on whether or not the features present in the experience (the shape, the colour, the smell, the taste, the feel, etc.) are present even when the experience ends. The direct realist argues that they are and the indirect realist argues that they're not. The indirect realist argues that shapes and colours and smells and tastes are mental representations of mind-independent causes (in the same way that a footprint is a representation of a foot).

We are not talking about phenomenal immediacies like colors but about different categories of experience that are well understood and distinguished by all. Not a good analogy, in other words. — John

But that's what realism argues: "The realist view is that we perceive objects as they really are. They are composed of matter, occupy space and have properties, such as size, shape, texture, smell, taste and colour, that are usually perceived correctly. Objects obey the laws of physics and retain all their properties whether or not there is anyone to observe them."

Actually it does make perfect sense. Fruiterers often have signs like "Tasty Apples" above their stacks of apples, which are obviously not 'being tasted'.

They're not making a metaphysical claim, though. They're just telling you that you'll like the taste when you eat them (or, rather, they're just trying to convince you to buy them).

And even if they were making a metaphysical claim, that doesn't mean they're right. Are you suggesting that a sweet taste is an objective feature of the apple when not being eaten? Because that's what the direct realist argues. Is that consistent with our scientific understanding of the objective world and perception? I'd argue that it isn't, and that's why indirect realism offers a more plausible account,

How things are defined is irrelevant. What matters is whether or not the object's features when seen are also its features when not seen. Can you show that the apple is red and tasty even when I'm not looking at or tasting it? Does it even make sense to say that the apple is tasty when not being tasted? — Michael

Because it isn't question of showing them. Indeed, the point is about objects when they are no shown: that it doesn't take the showing of a red, tasty and large apple for such a thing to exist. It does make sense to say there is a tasty apple when not being tasted. Objects aren't always perceived. Any if them, an any aspect of them, may or may not be when they are not experienced.

The entire point is that apple-shape, tastiness, red, mass, etc.,etc. are not limited to when an apple is perceived. Any if those qualities, experienced when an apple is perceived, may exist when an object is not perceived. This is how there are unperceived objects.

If we follow your argument, take away all the aspects of a perceived apple (e..g it's shape, mass, redness, tastiness, etc.,etc.), no apple is left. An unperceived apple would be impossible.

So yes, it does make sense to say there is redness, tastiness, a large shape, a mass, etc.,etc. when no-one is experiencing them. That's what an unperceived object IS.

It does make sense to say there is a tasty apple when not being tasted. — TheWillowOfDarkness

It makes no more sense than saying that there is a painful knife when not being used to stab someone. It's only painful once it's experienced a certain way, just as an apple is only tasty or red when experienced a certain way.

You don't think that if you told people that you perceived apples as square, black and white, roughly textured, smelling like rotting fish carcasses, tasting like warthog faeces, as large as houses, that people would think you are insane? Wouldn't they think you are insane because they know that apples are none of these?

Wouldn't such a perception simply be an incorrect perception of an apple?

Apples are tasty, even when not being tasted, in the same sense that the world is visible, even when not being seen.

How does a blind person experimentally show that there are objective colours?

Furthermore, "X has property Y when not seen" does not follow from "X sees Y when stimulated by X", so the above doesn't account for objective colour. I might see a chair in response to being poked in the brain by a neuroscientist but it doesn't then follow that the chair continues to exist when I stop seeing it (or even when I am seeing it). — Michael

Both those objections are incoherent.

Obviously, as the blind person doesn't see them, they do not perceive any of the objective colours of an object and referring to their experience doesn't show any of those colours. Perceiving something about an object requires experience that shows it. The blind person doesn't have this.

There is no X (chair) triggering your experience in the second example. You never perceived an object of a chair which caused your experience of a chair. You are confusing the given experience with the presence of the object.

You don't think that if you told people that you perceived apples as square, black and white, roughly textured, smelling like rotting fish carcasses, tasting like warthog faeces, as large as houses, that people would think you are insane? Wouldn't they think you are insane because they know that apples are none of these?

Wouldn't such a perception simply be an incorrect perception of an apple? — John

Such a perception would only show that your body reacts differently to most people to the same sensory stimulus. In everyday language we might say that you're seeing or smelling or tasting it wrong. But that's hardly indicative of a metaphysical fact.

Is the smell or taste of animal feed pleasant to you? Probably not. Is it pleasant to the animal? Probably. Is one of us wrong (or insane) and the other right? Is it pleasant or not pleasant when not smelled or eaten by either animal or man?

Apples are tasty, even when not being tasted, in the same sense that the world is visible, even when not being seen. — John

By "visible" do you mean "capable of being seen"? If so, I'd agree. So for the analogy to work "tasty" must mean "capable of being considered tasty when tasted". But then what does "tasty" mean in this second sentence? It can't be "capable of being considered tasty when tasted" else you run into a meaningless repetition of "capable of being considered capable of being considered capable of being considered...". So clearly "tasty" in the second sentence means something different. And it's that sense of being tasty that is the matter of discussion, and as it's different in kind to being visible, the analogy fails.

It makes no more sense than saying that there is a painful knife when not being used to stab someone. It's only painful once it's experienced a certain way, just as an apple is only tasty or red when experienced a certain way. — Michael

Given that, you know, does make sense, it doesn't bode well for your argument.

It makes just as much sense as saying an unseen book has pages or that the ball in my bag is spherical. All are nothing more than qualities of an object we experience.

We just tend not describe objects in terms of pain because we usually encounter pain events after perceiving an object some other way. An apple is only rounded to certain experiences too. It only has a certain mass to specific experiences. So it is for any aspect of an object.

Given that, you know, does make sense — TheWillowOfDarkness

No, it doesn't. The knife doesn't contain the property of painfulness when not being used to stab someone. The pain is only ever in the experience. It's painfully obvious.

No, it doesn't. The knife doesn't contain the property of painfulness when not being used to stab someone. It's painfully obvious.

No more or less then the properties of mass, shape, colour, smell tastiness, etc.,etc. All aspects of an object are only encountered during specific interactions between the body and the object. Pain is no different. We only see something when an object it within our field of vision. We only hear something interacts between objects generate a sound our ear picks-up, allowing our body to generate the experience. Pain only occurs when object hit out body in specific ways. Aspects of objects are all alike in this way.

Obviously, as the blind person doesn't see them, they do not perceive any of the objective colours of an object and referring to their experience doesn't show any of those colours. Perceiving something about an object requires experience that shows it. The blind person doesn't have this. — TheWillowOfDarkness

We can experimentally show that certain things exist even though we can't see those things. That's how science works. So if colours are objective then they are the sort of things that a blind person can scientifically determine. I want to know how he can do this. If he can't then the claim that there are objective colours seems to have been falsified.

No more or less then the properties of mass, shape, colour, smell tastiness, etc.,etc. All aspects of an object are only encountered during specific interactions between the body and the object. Pain is no different. We only see something when an object it within our field of vision. We only hear something interacts between objects generate a sound our ear picks-up, allowing our body to generate the experience. Pain only occurs when object hit out body in specific ways. Aspects of objects are all alike in this way. — TheWillowOfDarkness

And the direct realist's claim is that the properties of colour and smell and taste are present even when they're not being experienced. So the above disagrees with direct realism. As usual, your stated position conflicts with your actual claims.

Such a perception would only show that your body reacts differently to most people to the same sensory stimulus. In everyday language we might say that you're seeing or smelling or tasting it wrong. But that's hardly indicative of a metaphysical fact.

Is the smell or taste of animal feed pleasant to you? Probably not. Is it pleasant to the animal? Probably. Is one of us wrong (or insane) and the other right? Is it pleasant or not pleasant when not smelt or eaten by either animal or man? — Michael

Yes, but such a series of perceptions of an apple (if it were indeed possible) would not be correct, in the sense that it would not be within a range that could be considered normal for a human body.

But really, even to say that is too modest; apples are not square, they are not black and white, do not smell like rotting fish carcasses and so on. I think it is arguable that it would not be possible for any sentient being to perceive apples in these ways.

I agree, but that's a point of grammar rather than metaphysics. The metaphysical issue is on whether or not the features present in the experience (the shape, the colour, the smell, the taste, the feel, etc.) are present even when the experience ends. The direct realist argues that they are and the indirect realist argues that they're not. The indirect realist argues that shapes and colours and smells and tastes are mental representations of mind-independent causes (in the same way that a footprint is a representation of a foot). — Michael

I think you are conflating the taste of the apple with the tasting of it.

I don't think many realists would argue that the tasting of an apple is present when it is not being tasted.

Nope.

We can only show something in an experiment provided we have the experience to do so. The blind person doesn't have the experience to show colours. Lacking this experience, the presence of colours is not something the blind person has evidence for. This doesn't mean the colours aren't there.

It is no different to any other instance where someone lacks experience to gather evidence of something. Just because I don't have the system to see bacteria doesn't mean they aren't there. People are always seeing different parts of the world such that they ahem evidence for somethings but not others. The fact someone person lacks evidence for something doesn't mean it is not there.

Yes, but such a series of perceptions of an apple (if it were indeed possible) would not be correct, in the sense that it would not be within a range that could be considered normal for a human body. — John

Sure, but it doesn't then follow that the "normal" taste (for a human) is an inherent feature of the apple when not being tasted.

But really, even to say that is too modest; apples are not square, they are not black and white, do not smell like rotting fish carcasses and so on. I think it is arguable that it would not be possible for any sentient being to perceive apples in these ways.

Why? Why must an organism react to stimulation by electromagnetic radiation at a wavelength of ‎~620–740 nm by stimulating the visual experience which we name "red"? Why must an organism react to stimulation by air-borne chemicals by stimulating the olfactory experience which we name "sweet"? Furthermore, even if they must, it doesn't then follow that the features of these visual or olfactory experiences are features of the apple when not seen or smelled. What would such a thing even mean? So it's not enough to say that we must experience things in this way but also that the things that cause the sweet experience are identical to the sweetness of the experience or that the cause of the red experience is identical to the redness of the experience.

But is redness identical to electromagnetic radiation at a wavelength of ‎~620–740 nm? It's not. The former is a representation of the latter. That's why indirect realism fares better than direct realism.

But it doesn't.

Taste and smell, like pain and sight, are merely parts of objects which are only experiences at certain points. The direct realist is pointing out they are all part of an object. Else we give-up unperceived objects, as take away the significance of an object when pervade and there is nothing of the object left, and so fall into the incoherence of idealism.