Now, let us consider what the logical elements of this situation are in case the religious hypothesis in both its branches be really true. (Of course, we must admit that possibility at the outset. If we are to discuss the question at all, it must involve a living option. If for any of you religion be a hypothesis that cannot, by any living possibility be true, then you need go no farther. I speak to the 'saving remnant' alone.) So proceeding, we see, first that religion offers itself as a momentous option. We are supposed to gain, even now, by our belief, and to lose by our nonbelief, a certain vital good. Secondly, religion is a forced option, so far as that good goes. We cannot escape the issue by remaining sceptical and waiting for more light, because, although we do avoid error in that way if religion be untrue, we lose the good, if it be true, just as certainly as if we positively chose to disbelieve. It is as if a man should hesitate indefinitely to ask a certain woman to marry him because he was not perfectly sure that she would prove an angel after he brought her home. Would he not cut himself off from that particular angel-possibility as decisively as if he went and married some one else? Scepticism, then, is not avoidance of option; it is option of a certain particular kind of risk. Better risk loss of truth than chance of error,-that is your faith-vetoer's exact position. He is actively playing his stake as much as the believer is; he is backing the field against the religious hypothesis, just as the believer is backing the religious hypothesis against the field. To preach scepticism to us as a duty until 'sufficient evidence' for religion be found, is tantamount therefore to telling us, when in presence of the religious hypothesis, that to yield to our fear of its being error is wiser and better than to yield to our hope that it may be true. It is not intellect against all passions, then; it is only intellect with one passion laying down its law. And by what, forsooth, is the supreme wisdom of this passion warranted? Dupery for dupery, what proof is there that dupery through hope is so much worse than dupery through fear ? I, for one, can see no proof; and I simply refuse obedience to the scientist's command to imitate his kind of option, in a case where my own stake is important enough to give me the right to choose my own form of risk. If religion be true and the evidence for it be still insufficient, I do not wish, by putting your extinguisher upon my nature (which feels to me as if it had after all some business in this matter), to forfeit my sole chance in life of getting upon the winning side,--that chance depending, of course, on my willingness to run the risk of acting as if my passional need of taking the world religiously might be prophetic and right.

[...]

I began by a reference to Fitz James Stephen; let me end by a quotation from him. " What do you think of yourself? What do you think of the world? . . . These are questions with which all must deal as it seems good to them. They are riddles of the Sphinx, and in some way or other we must deal with them. . . . In all important transactions of life we have to take a leap in the dark.... If wc decide to leave the riddles unanswered, that is a choice; if we waver in our answer, that, too, is a choice: but whatever choice we make, we make it at our peril. If a man chooses to turn his back altogether on God and the future, no one can prevent him; no one can show beyond reasonable doubt that he is mistaken. If a man thinks otherwise and acts as he thinks, I do not see that any one can prove that he is mistaken. Each must act as he thinks best; and if he is wrong, so much the worse for him. We stand on a mountain pass in the midst of whirling snow and blinding mist through which we get glimpses now and then of paths which may be deceptive. If we stand still we shall be frozen to death. If we take the wrong road we shall be dashed to pieces. We do not certainly know whether there is any right one. What must we do? ' Be strong and of a good courage.' Act for the best, hope for the best, and take what comes. . . . If death ends all, we cannot meet death better." — William James

Non-believer: I would be willing to grant this, except that it would surely be possible for God to have created humans, not to mention angels, without the ability to sin and do evil in the first place.
Believer: Yes, but that would deny them their freedom.
Non-believer: This assumes humans are indeed free! But never mind that for now; freedom is already denied if, in being created by God, humans have no choice in being born. — Thorongil

Anything in the universe is a being in the sense that it has mass, energy, etc. — Jose

In English, the noun 'being' properly only applies to humans — Wayfarer

whenever it is used in a general sense, the referent is 'living beings' — Wayfarer

although in practice, if you speak of 'beings', you're generally referring to humans, are you not? — Wayfarer

God could have simply given us a different limited framework, one in which we do not have the ability or desire to sin/do evil, but where we're free to do all sorts of things that are not sins, that are not evil. — Terrapin Station

In the general sense, conscious organisms are referred to as 'beings'. 'Human' is used to qualify that, although in practice, if you speak of 'beings', you're generally referring to humans, are you not? — Wayfarer

The Christian teaching is, if we were not capable of evil, we would not be capable of good, because we'd simply be robotic. — Wayfarer

I am far more likely to use 'beings' of notional, or less clearly defined groups than of man, mankind, humans, homo sapiens, people (you get my drift!). I talk of extra-terrestrial beings, mythological beings, magical beings, trans-dimensional beings, godlike beings, ineffable beings, unimaginable beings — Barry Etheridge

Being can used generically, like the word thing or object. — Thorongil