Nah. I'm in agreement thus far. It doesn't add anything helpful though, does it?

Of what use is "artificial" here?

Nah. I'm in agreement thus far. It doesn't add anything helpful though, does it? — creativesoul

Seriously? I don't even properly remember the original context in which I was making that point now, and I can't be bothered to go back and check. You just unhelpfully butted in to an exchange I was having with someone else, misrepresented my argument a few times, I then set you straight, and now you have the nerve to tell me that I'm not adding anything helpful? :brow:

It's your point. I showed it adds nothing. Your problem, not mine.

It's actually prone to a reductio...

Naturalism has artificial aspects in the same way.

Now about "concepts"...

:wink:

How do you draw and maintain the distinction between a concept and what is being conceived of?

Conception of "morality" as compared/contrasted to morality?

The same with a rock. Conceptions of "rock" with the rock?

"Rock" is a conception. You earlier charged morality with being 'just a concept'. What were you attempting to argue?

I don't even properly remember... — S

That's a recurring problem.

That's a recurring problem. — creativesoul

It's only really a problem for me for as long as I remember that it's a problem, which isn't very long at all. And other people's problems don't matter. So... wait, what were we talking about again?

You seem to get more enjoyment out of effectively arguing with yourself. So, by all means, don't let me get in the way of that. I hope that you and yourself resolve this problem you seem to be having.

I take it that you cannot distinguish between concepts and that which is being conceived of...

I take it that you cannot distinguish between concepts and that which is being conceived of... — creativesoul

That's a perfect example of what I mean! :rofl:

The oddity arises not from the mistake, but rather from the insistence of telling me that I'm wrong about my own terminological use. — creativesoul

I didn't say anything like that. I don't even believe that word usage can be wrong.

I take it that you cannot distinguish between concepts and that which is being conceived of... — creativesoul

Concepts are abstractions. They don't exist externally. There are external particulars that serve as influences or bases for concepts, but concepts are "of abstractions," they're not "of particulars."

It's not some sort of pure intellectual thing, though. You don't just consider, you feel a certain way about it, and that's very relevant, perhaps more than you realise. — S

Of course it is relevant. Without feeling a certain way, some humans might no longer care for their children. But it is the caring for their children that morality refers to, not the feeling.

You haven't demonstrated that it's necessarily a value to begin with, so saying that it's a value which they forgo does nothing. — S

It's a hypothetico-deductive model and I've defined my terms. So you need to provide a counterexample that contradicts the model. All you've said is that you don't define value that way.

Your point that it works as an explanation is refuted by my point about Ockham's razor. — S

You can't explain moral behavior without appeal to values. But simply defining value as whatever their behavior is makes any explanation useless and devoid of content. Why did Bob drink poison? Because he valued drinking poison. Why did he value drinking poison? Because it was his preference. Why did he prefer drinking poison? ...

If you are interested in getting out of that subjective loop and gaining further insight, then you'll need to look for an explanation for his action in the natural world.

Yeah, that's a bit of a problem. You're not even talking about value, not like the rest of us. You should call that something else to avoid confusion. — S

You just need to pay attention to the context to avoid equivocation. Undervaluing something and perceived value versus actual value are conventional usages. (But perhaps you think that to undervalue something is a semantic contradiction.) As I'm using the term here, what is valuable (or of actual value) is that which satisfies the functional needs of human beings. Such as food and water.

Do it.

I take it that you cannot distinguish between concepts and that which is being conceived of — creativesoul

Concepts are abstractions. They don't exist externally. There are external particulars that serve as influences or bases for concepts, but concepts are "of abstractions," they're not "of particulars." — Terrapin Station

Which is the concept, and which is that which is being conceived of?

If concepts are abstractions, and they are of abstractions, then they are of themselves?

:yikes:

I didn't say anything like that. I don't even believe that word usage can be wrong. — Terrapin Station

If I am pointing at a tree and say "look at the dog", that is wrong word usage, no?

I didn't say anything like that. — Terrapin Station

What you did say was that your use of "feelings" has the same referent as my use of "thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour". That is quite mistaken. For whatever reason, you've focused upon that and left out any of the important bits regarding morality.

Let's move on to the concept notion disagreement.

I say all concepts are existentially dependent upon language. You disagree.

Can we set out our reasoning behind our positions? It is relevant to conceptions of morality.

Of course it is relevant. Without feeling a certain way, some humans might no longer care for their children. But it is the caring for their children that morality refers to, not the feeling. — Andrew M

Yes, but if humans didn't care about how they and others behaved then there wouldn't be morality in the first place. Morality is thus dependent on care, or in other words, on feeling.

Of course it is relevant. Without feeling a certain way, some humans might no longer care for their children. But it is the caring for their children that morality refers to, not the feeling.
— Andrew M

Yes, but if humans didn't care about how they and others behaved then there wouldn't be morality in the first place. Morality is thus dependent on care, or in other words, on feeling. — Janus

I meant care in the sense of, "The provision of what is necessary for the health, welfare, maintenance, and protection of someone or something." (OED)

So if humans didn't provide for and protect their children, there would presumably be no humans, let alone morality. So the feelings bootstrap that behavior. Yet a person can still act morally (e.g., provide for and protect their children) without the attendant feeling.

Yet a person can still act morally (e.g., provide for and protect their children) without the attendant feeling. — Andrew M

That's true, they can. But it is arguable that parents who didn't have any feelings of care for their children would only care for them (in the sense of "provide for and protect") on account of their caring about what others will think, or what actions of others they might be subject to, if they failed to provide such care.

And others would only care to condemn someone who didn't care for their children on account of their own caring about the moral principles that prescribe caring for children, or some other feeling. The point is that moral principles have no "bite' if no one cares about them; so they cannot be merely exercises of reason.

Agreed. And to extend the idea further, suppose the robots take over, suitably programmed with Asimov's three laws. What nudges them back in the right direction if the rules they follow turn out to have unexpected and unwanted consequences for human beings?

I didn't say anything like that. — Terrapin Station

And that's the big, reoccurring problem whenever you engage him in a discussion. He comes with preprepared straw men that he desperately wants you to adopt.

If I am pointing at a tree and say "look at the dog", that is wrong word usage, no? — creativesoul

If I don't believe that word usage can be wrong, then obviously I'd not say that that is wrong. Word usage can be unusual, unconventional, etc., but it can't be wrong. It's not wrong in general to be unusual or unconventional.

Which is the concept, and which is that which is being conceived of?

If concepts are abstractions, and they are of abstractions, then they are of themselves? — creativesoul

Yes, concepts are "of themselves." They're tools we create, out of necessity, really, because it's too difficult to deal with the world as a set of unique particulars.

If I don't believe that word usage can be wrong, then obviously I'd not say that that is wrong. Word usage can be unusual, unconventional, etc., but it can't be wrong. It's not wrong in general to be unusual or unconventional. — Terrapin Station

As with morality, it makes more sense to say that it's wrong relative to a particular standard. Why aren't more people here going with the solution which makes the most sense?

Well, it doesn't follow a particular standard, but why is it wrong to not follow that standard? A lot of people are going to read "wrong" with connotations that I'd want to avoid. If they would read "wrong" so that it just amounts to "is different from x" that would be fine, but people read "wrong" so that it implies something negative, suggests something normative, etc.

Well, it doesn't follow a particular standard, but why is it wrong to not follow that standard. — Terrapin Station

I wouldn't simply say that it's wrong, because then it seems like a generalisation, and I'm not making a generalisation. Creativesoul made that mistake about a hundred million times. He kept taking what I was saying out of a relative context, and treating it as a generalisation.

I would say that it's wrong relative to a particular standard, because it's implicit within a particular standard that one is expected to act accordingly. So if you don't act accordingly, then you're wrong relative to that particular standard. That's just what it means to be wrong.

A lot of people are going to read "wrong" with connotations that I'd want to avoid. If they would read "wrong" so that it just amounts to "is different from x" that would be fine, but people read "wrong" so that it implies something negative, suggests something normative, etc. — Terrapin Station

What's wrong with that, so long as it's suitably qualified in accordance with relativism? Isn't not admitting a right or wrong a sort of nihilism? Are you a nihilist of a sort?

because it's implicit within a particular standard that one is expected to act accordingly. So if you don't act accordingly, then you're wrong — S

I think that's ridiculous though. Just because some people want to do things whatever way, have whatever preferences, why the hell am I expected to act that way or I'm "wrong"? That's basically demanding that I conform to what they want to do or what they like. On what grounds?

Re the question you asked, I'm a nihilist in the sense that I don't believe there is any objective value, meaning, etc.

I think that's ridiculous though. Just because some people want to do things whatever way, have whatever preferences, why the hell am I expected to act that way or I'm "wrong"? That's basically demanding that I conform to what they want to do or what they like. On what grounds? — Terrapin Station

Maybe this is your extreme liberalism getting in the way of good sense. You don't "have" to conform. You are at liberty not to. But by my standard you should do, because by my standard that's what's right. I don't believe that you don't make judgements like this. It's practically impossible not to.

By your standard it's what's right in what sense?

If you're just saying that it's what you prefer, then why should I do what you prefer?