Then I haven't followed your point. Are you agreeing that "good" is indefinable? — Banno

Yeah, I'd agree with that. "fdrake" did a good job of digging into how broad a concept 'good' is.

But the structure of the op suggests that this indefinability somehow segues naturally into :

Moral judgements, like all judgements, are true, or they are false. This follows from their predicate-subject form.

Moral propositions imply an action. That is, one ought act in accord with true moral propositions. — Banno

Whether that's true or not, I can't see how any of it follows from what, in the OP, precedes it.

I'm not sure I would describe "good" indefinable in any real sense. fdrake's many examples seems to imply people know what they are talking about. In any of those cases, people are talking something and how it is significant.

The reason examining "good" is unsatisfactory seems to be a product of it being inseparable from whatever something it is about. If I take away that which is good, I no longer have a good to talk about. I'll always left grasping at nothing because I've actually removed anything that's good and all reason I have for identifying it.

Keeping in mind "good" is about something, I don't think there is much that's controversy to deal with. In talking about "good," we are specifically referencing the value of something. If we say something is "good", we are point out the presence of whatever thing we are talking about is valuable. We have reason to think it out to be there on account of the normative value of its presence.

In this context, Banno's approach doesn't seem the difficult to envision. We can analyse the presence of whether this something is valuable or not in propositional terms of a kind. The OP connects because it's this distinction that ethical significance is of something, but not just the existence of something (which destroys the naturalist claim).

Since good is only itself, just existence of something (e.g. pleasure) does not give us good. The twin "indefinability" of "good," that "good" is never explicable on its own but nothing else amounts to it, is what gives the normative/ethics distinction from other concepts we might have (such as the existence of something).

When I say "It is raining" does that, on your view, mean the very same thing as "I think it is raining"? — Moliere

Yes, with the only exception being when one is unsure.

It seems to me that there's much lost in nearly all philosophical discourse/debate as a result of not drawing and maintaining the distinction between thought and belief and thinking about thought/belief. All conceptions of morality are products of the latter, all discourse about morality and rules and such are as well... yet thinking/believing that something ought and/or ought not be done is not. Our 'sense' of what's acceptable/unacceptable behaviour does not require us to think about it as it's own topic and/or subject matter. Temporally speaking, we had thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour prior to naming it.

So... there's a gap here. I wonder, if like other things that we discover, if there's some 'sense' of morality that exists and/or existed in it's entirety prior to our naming it and/or describing it. If there is/was, then we could get it wrong. The conventional definition certainly does get it wrong, if that is the case.

Not sure if it adds to this thread, or if I could make it seem relevant enough to others here, so I'll leave it here aside from saying this, and then offering a bit of support for it...

Hume's guillotine is a product of thinking about thought/belief, and while it may be true that one cannot derive an ought from an is without presupposing another ought(I'm seriously doubting that that is true), this does not bear upon morality unless one holds that moral claims ought be conclusions, or only specific kinds of utterances of ought count as being a moral claim.

On Friday, speaker A says "I promise to plant you a rose garden on Sunday". Speaker A is speaking sincerely.

On Monday, there ought be a rose garden.

The above statement, an utterance of ought, is true, and it doesn't presuppose another ought. Rather, it follows from what "I promise to plant you a rose garden" means.

Isn't this quite similar to Davidson's(I think) notion that if one knows what it takes for some claim to be true then one knows what it means? Isn't this the case for all 'truth-apt' claims(those capable of being true/false), including but not limited to those called "moral claims"?

Compare to...

Speaker A says "There is a beer in the fridge". Speaker A is being sincere.

It follows by virtue of what the statement means, in addition to having a sincere speaker, that there ought be a beer in the fridge. There is no other ought being presupposed here. The statement of a sincere speaker 'is an is', not an ought. :cool: Speaking sincerely 'is an is' not an ought.

Do these sorts of utterances of ought somehow not qualify/count as being moral utterances? Looks like a negation of Hume's guillotine to me.

From the SEP article linked earlier...

Moore's main argument... ...was what has come to be known as the “open-question argument,” though he actually stated in a couple of slightly different ways. Consider a particular naturalist claim, such as that “x is good” is equivalent to “x is pleasure.” If this claim were true, Moore argued, the judgement “Pleasure is good” would be equivalent to “Pleasure is pleasure,” yet surely someone who asserts the former means to express more than that uninformative tautology. The same argument can be mounted against any other naturalist proposal: even if we have determined that something is what we desire to desire or is more evolved, the question whether it is good remains “open,” in the sense that it is not settled by the meaning of the word “good.”

Doesn't this argument only apply to positions that fail to distinguish between a referent(pleasure, well-being, etc.) and it's evaluation(good)?

It reminds me of justificatory regress...

Insofar as people believe that moral utterances can be true or false they're simply mistaken. They have mistaken beliefs about the ontology of moral utterances.
— Terrapin Station

I would argue that anyone who holds that moral utterances cannot be true or false have mistaken beliefs about thought and belief. — creativesoul

Sure, and then what you'd offer as empirical support would be? — Terrapin Station

This isn't the place, but I guarantee that the empirical support for my position is much stronger than the empirical support for your own claim regarding the ontology of moral utterances.

You could always address the rose garden scenario... No one else seems to want to.

"Is good" is what one says when making a value judgment based upon one's worldview(which includes moral belief).

Does Moore's Open Question Argument apply here?

Being helpful is always good.

I think the line of thinking would be to say that we have conflicting emotions, and moral duty is just another emotion, a sort of pleasure, that some people have. — Moliere

Perhaps, but that would be a strawman to one who has and is thus bound by his/her moral duties, regardless of their own unhappiness about it. Moral duties/obligations may invoke emotion, but they are not equivalent to it any more than any other thing that invokes it. Doing what's good does not always invoke positive feelings.

Using "Boo" and "Hurray" as synonyms for wrong/right renders both meaningless when attempting to take account of those who do what is right in cases when they do not like doing it, or want to.

"Boo to doing what's right" may take proper account of one's feelings while they're doing what's right, but since that is the case, it cannot the case that "Boo" is equivalent to something someone thinks/feels is wrong, and "Hurray" is equivalent to something someone thinks/feels is right.

If "Boo" applies to both, that which someone holds as immoral(like kicking puppies), and something someone holds is moral(like helping those less fortunate even when one doesn't really want to), then we've arrived at an issue of equivocation, false analogy, utter meaninglessness, and/or incoherence.

The historical record shows that our own notions of what counts as moral/immoral evolve along with our understanding and/or knowledge over time. What we hold to be moral/immoral is subject to historical, familial, cultural, and/or societal particulars. There's no denying that much. So, changes in our rules(conventional 'morality') reflect the changes in our moral belief about what's right/wrong as well as our justifications for holding such. Presumably, these changes are not made arbitrarily, but rather as a result of our coming to believe that what we once thought/believed to be moral was not(that we were mistaken).

If what's actually good is determined solely by our own moral belief, then there could be no way for us to be wrong/mistaken about what's good. Thus, our rules would not change. Our moral belief would not evolve; but we are, we have been, they do, they have, and it does.

So, I think the standard position here would be to say that goodness exists in such a way that we 'discover'(scare-quotes intentional) it as compared/contrasted to inventing it and/or defining it. It shows itself to us, so to speak, sometimes despite differences between it and our moral belief about it. We discover what's good or not, in much the same way that we discover what else is true/false about our own worldview.

I wonder if an alien could, just by observing human behavior, understand what we think of as good/bad?

It's said that the golden rule is the most common moral maxim. It seems to be based on suffering and happiness - I like to do things to others, those things that make me happy and I don't do things to others, those things that make me unhappy.

It would be the golden rule that would stand out as common to all cultures.

Morality is basically a guide to create, sustain and promote happiness and stymie, reduce and discourage suffering.

All moral theories can be reduced to a ''game'' of suffering and happiness.

Consequentialism is obvious.

Virtue ethics is about eudaimonia which is happiness in essence.

The golden rule is a Kantian categorical imperative.

Yep. I'm more or less agreeing that it is an odd question - asking for support for their being something "wrong with them" where that's not about the judgement of the person making that judgment... — Banno

Because aren't you arguing that there's something objectively wrong with them? Or are you just saying that you strongly feel that there's something wrong with them?

But, what sort of support does one need to make the judgement that kicking a puppy is wrong? — Banno

If you're saying that it's objectively wrong, then it's the sort of support that if someone says it's not wrong, we can independently check what's the case--with instruments of some sort, for example, and discover which person is correct, just like we can do if we disagree about the composition of rocks from the moon, say.

You can try the sentences in different contexts to see if they're different. — Andrew M

Pretty much an evergreen answer to your responses to my comments:

What does that have to do with what I wrote?

I don't know if you never understand what I write or if you never really want to address it.

Well-being (eudaimonia) is central to Aristotle's (and arguably Plato's) ethics and political philosophy. — Andrew M

So we're assuming Aristotle's ethics or something?

if someone thinks that kicking the pup is fine, then I wouldn't say they have a different preference to me in the way I like vanilla and they like banana. I, and I hope you, would say rather that there was something quite wrong with them — Banno

Your reaction to the idea of a pup being kicked is grounded in, and informed by a context: the society you live, historical experiences, philisophical positions you hold, unconscious associations, etc. There is a whole milieu informing your position towards this hypothetical dog punting.

It is quite easy to imagine an alternate milieu: another society with radically different moral leanings, where kicking a pup would be interpreted differently (perhaps as a non-event for example).

Both contrasting positions would exist within a context. Objectivity attempts to remove context.

Only relativism allows you to judge the dog kicking as 'wrong'. I just happen to agree with you because we grew up in a similar milieu. I don't think there is a universal here.

@Banno

Oh that won't work as far as my definition of moral good getting passed the open argument.

I don't know if you never understand what I write or if you never really want to address it. — Terrapin Station

Alright, I'll try again.

When people comment on pizza, they can be talking about their own subjective preferences or they can be talking about the pizza in an objective sense. If a person says, "Pizza tastes good", they are likely expressing their personal preference. We agree on that. Whereas if they say, "That pizza tastes good", they are likely commenting on the high quality of that particular pizza. So a use can be objective, even when discussing pizza.

If a person says, "Kicking puppies is wrong", then the implication is that they intend that in an objective sense, not merely as an expression of their own subjective preference.

So there are two separate issues. Do people ordinarily intend objectivity when making moral claims? And, if they do, are there moral states of affairs or not?

So we're assuming Aristotle's ethics or something? — Terrapin Station

No. But you seem to find it strange that morality could have anything to do with well-being when there are major philosophical traditions that claim just that. But leaving that claimed connection aside for now, do you think that well-being (and suffering) is something we can make objective claims about? For example, that kicking a puppy causes it suffering?

Whereas if they say, "That pizza tastes good", they are likely commenting on the high quality of that particular pizza. So a use can be objective, even when discussing pizza. — Andrew M

No, it can't. There is no objective quality (in that sense of the word "quality," I'm not saying there are no objective properties.)

No, it can't. There is no objective quality (in that sense of the word "quality," I'm not saying there are no objective properties.) — Terrapin Station

OK, interesting. Before continuing down that path, I'm curious about your answers to the other parts of my post.

Do you think people ordinarily intend objectivity when making moral claims?

Do you think that well-being (and suffering) is something we can make objective claims about?

Do you think people ordinarily intend objectivity when making moral claims? — Andrew M

I have no idea. We'd need to do the empirical research and do pretty extensive polls.

Do you think that well-being (and suffering) is something we can make objective claims about? — Andrew M

Only via saying things like "Joe considers x well-being," "Betty considers y suffering," "Chemical c statistically is correlated to feelings of well-being," "Most people consider z suffering," etc.

The objective/subjective dichotomy is inherently incapable of taking proper account of that which consists in/of both, and as a result... is neither.

Morality is just such a thing.

The objective/subjective dichotomy fails here as well as leading to a reductio(for those who know, you know, for those who don't, it's simple and convincing). In light of all this, continuing to use that dichotomy as standard is to use a false dichotomy.

The subjective/objective dichotomy serves only to add unnecessary confusion to our subsequent thoughts about morality and what's good, in the moral sense of "good". It is proof positive that inherently incapable frameworks are in use.

Do you think people ordinarily intend objectivity when making moral claims?
— Andrew M

I have no idea. We'd need to do the empirical research and do pretty extensive polls. — Terrapin Station

Polls?

:smile:

They either think/believe that something is unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour or they do not. Lots of other folk have room for exceptions. Reasonable folk still think it's wrong in the unexceptional cases.

When someone says "That's immoral/wrong/bad/evil", they take a strong stance against that.

Folk don't learn and know why and/or how they've acquired most of the beliefs that they hold until they carefully consider their own worldview.

Some behaviours are already considered acceptable/unacceptable by a person prior to comparing/contrasting their own worldview with others'. Comparing one's own thoughts/beliefs about the world and/or ourselves to an others' is to think about thought/belief.

Our 'sense' of acceptable/unacceptable thought/belief and/or behaviour is being built long before we begin talking with metacognitive terms. We name that which existed in it's entirety prior to our naming it.

Unfortunately, many folk still draw correlations between some religious deity and/or belief and morality.

By the way, the golden rule leads one to being ok with a sadomasochist treating them they way they want to be treated.

In layman's terms...

The Golden Rule mistakenly presupposes that everyone likes being treated the same way.

It is still yet... a very good 'rule of thumb'... especially when the person using it likes healthy productive and/or good things to be done to them.

A perfect rule if everyone likes good things.

Do you think people ordinarily intend objectivity when making moral claims? — Andrew M

Some may, Some may not. Do most people have a clear idea of 'philosophical' objectivity (whatever that is)?

It seems to me that people use moral language in many different ways and senses. As you pointed out earlier "people use language in more nuanced ways than they're often given credit for"..

They either think/believe that something is unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour or they do not. — creativesoul

Which doesn't tell you anything about whether in their view they're claiming something objective or not.

Whereas if they say, "That pizza tastes good", they are likely commenting on the high quality of that particular pizza. So a use can be objective, even when discussing pizza.
— Andrew M

No, it can't. There is no objective quality (in that sense of the word "quality," I'm not saying there are no objective properties.) — Terrapin Station

A low quality pizza might have old ingredients and be partially cooked (or burnt), whereas a high quality pizza would have fresh ingredients and be properly cooked. Do you reject pizza quality as objective because it depends on facts about humans (e.g., what is edible, healthy, palatable, etc.)?

If so, does that then carry over to other properties as well such as an object's color?

Some may, Some may not. Do most people have a clear idea of 'philosophical' objectivity (whatever that is)? — ChrisH

Maybe not. But we can still analyze people's use of moral terms or ask more concrete questions such as, "Was slavery morally OK in the past when people approved of it?" Compare with, "Was the Earth the center of the universe in the past when people believed that it was?"

It seems to me that people use moral language in many different ways and senses. As you pointed out earlier "people use language in more nuanced ways than they're often given credit for".. — ChrisH

Yes, so it is an empirical question. For one interesting piece of empirical research on what people believe, see https://nationalhumanitiescenter.org/on-the-human/2010/12/objective-moral-truths/ . Also see Brian Leiter's comment which brings up relevant issues.

A low quality pizza might have old ingredients and be partially cooked (or burnt), whereas a high quality pizza would have fresh ingredients and be properly cooked. Do you reject pizza quality as objective because it depends on facts about humans (e.g., what is edible, healthy, palatable, etc.)? — Andrew M

Yes. Quality in this sense, any judgment whatsoever that anything is better or worse than something else, is about persons' preferences. The world outside of minds couldn't care less what the ingredients are, how old the ingredients are, whether the ingredients are going to make us sick or not, it has no "proper" versus "improper," etc.

If so, does that then carry over to other properties as well such as an object's color? — Andrew M

Whatever else someone thinks about it, color is not at all similar to assessments/judgments like good/bad, better/worse, proper/improper, high quality/low quality, etc.

Yes, so it is an empirical question. For one interesting piece of empirical research on what people believe, see https://nationalhumanitiescenter.org/on-the-human/2010/12/objective-moral-truths/ . Also see Brian Leiter's comment which brings up relevant issues. — Andrew M

Thanks. That was interesting.

Tim Maudlin's comment reflected my concerns about this 'experiment':

What the philosophical debate is about is whether moral claims have objective truth conditions. What “the folk” think about the matter is neither here nor there. If one is interested in that sociological question, that’s fine, but presenting this issue as pertinent to the “long and complex philosophical debate” obscures the nature of the research being done. — Tim Maudlin

One good thing about all of these comments from Andrew M lately is that it's clear that he's an objectivist (not in the Randian sense) on ethics, which is connected to it being clear that antinatalism doesn't make much sense from the standpoint of subjectivist ethics.

Yes, so it is an empirical question. For one interesting piece of empirical research on what people believe, see https://nationalhumanitiescenter.org/on-the-human/2010/12/objective-moral-truths/ . Also see Brian Leiter's comment which brings up relevant issues. — Andrew M

Oy vey re that paper. They say, "To get at people’s agreement with moral relativism, they told participants about two characters — John and Fred — who held opposite opinions about whether some given act was morally bad. Participants were then asked whether one of these two characters had to be wrong (the objectivist answer) or whether it could be that neither of them was wrong (the relativist answer)."

You can't determine whether someone is an objectivist or subjectivist by asking them the above. (And the opposite of objectivist can't be relativist--they're mixing up categories; you can think that moral stances are both objective and relative.) The reason you can't make that determination is that "wrong" can be used subjectively (and relatively). People who believe subjectivism don't necessarily refrain from saying "murder is wrong." The vast majority of them still say things like "murder is wrong." The difference is that they realize that they are essentially saying "Boo to murder."

In other words, a subjectivist uses ". . . is wrong" subjectively, which is what they can be doing when they say "John is wrong when he says that 'Murder is morally permissible'."

The only way to determine if someone is an objectivist or subjectivist on ethics is for them to understand the difference and then ask them which one they agree with.