Sorry if I misunderstood you. I don't mean to be rude. I'm happy to try to find common ground if that is possible.

What if you're not an essentialist? (I'm not.) — Terrapin Station

I think you are bound to misunderstand me if you try to zoom in on this or that word and interpret it within this or that narrow system. By 'essence' I mean something like the intelligible structure. If you deny essentialism (which is great), then you are still presenting the intelligible structure of reality to me. 'Essentialism doesn't ascertain reality rationally.' You are telling me what's going on (not just for you but for us), making sense in the 'name of' [synonym for rationality.].

Or rather, in my view, concepts are something that individuals perform--they're abstractions that individuals create, abstractions that range over a number of particulars, because it's easier to deal with the world via these sorts of abstractions. — Terrapin Station

I understand what it tempting about this view, but I think you are missing that language is an intrinsically social phenomenon. Individuals as individuals don't create concepts, though we must allow for occasional individual contributions to the culture. Note that the 'I' is one more word that we learn to use. To convert this dimly understood 'I' into a metaphysical absolute is questionable, in my view. It is one more sign in the system, albeit a central sign for getting around in the world.

To 'be in language' (to make sense of this very sentence and the post you responded to in the first place) is to live in a kind of 'we.' This is not to deny the 'subjective' aspect of experience but rather to make sense of it. Just as the predator makes no sense apart from its prey (or makes only abstract or limited sense), the language user makes no sense apart from the others he shares language and a world of objects with. Are you not otherwise forced to imagine a kind of ghost in the machine?

And then "essential" properties are simply the properties that an individual considers necessary for the concept they've formulated. In a nutshell, they're properties that an individual requires to call some x (some arbitrary particular) an F (some concept term, per that individual's concepts).

So while there are essentials in that sense, it's simply something that individuals make up, a way that individuals think about the world (as are concepts in general). — Terrapin Station

While that theory is a little rigid, I mostly agree, but the protagonist here is mostly the community living 'through' the individual. As children we mostly believe what we are told. We learn a language. We learn what 'one' does, how 'people like us' see things. Only as we become mature do we begin to question what 'one' does, and we still have to do so in terms of the language and values we learned from others. We turn our 'programming' against itself. On the other hand, individuals tend to seek the recognition of the community. They are productive, honorable, reasonable. The 'I' strives to become 'better,' usually in terms of recognizable values. Even Stirner, a radical (anti-)theologian of 'I,' felt the need to publish his book and share his annihilation of every claim (the claim as claim) on the individual Unique. To be clear, I understand the allure of the radically free and self-constructed 'I,' but then that's been one of 'our' values for a long time now.

Enlightenment is man’s release from his self-incurred tutelage. Tutelage is man’s inability to make use of his understanding without direction from another. Self-incurred is this tutelage when its cause lies not in lack of reason but in lack of resolution and courage to use it without direction from another. — Kant

...as a philosopher my goal is to have my signs recognized by others as being objective, as revealing the world-in-common... — sign

Obviously I don't agree with any of that, either. — Terrapin Station

And your signs are here why? Maybe you don't seek recognition from me personally, but these are publicly presented signs. Your ideal community may be listening. 'Mr. Station gets it. He sees through the illusion and/or confusion.' This community can be (has to be?) elitist/exclusive. Indeed, excluding the 'bad' subjectivity is the point, the goal. Your public disagreement is a withholding of recognition from my subjectivity (as you interpret it) as not objective or rational.

. I did not ask what the terms "real," "rational," or "is" mean; I asked for a definition "for present purpose." — tim wood

I am not prepared to discuss either idealism or humanism, — tim wood

Note that the entire gist of my post was about idealism and humanism.

Because I was describing philosophy at a high level of abstraction, the words 'real' and 'rational' must retain their ambiguity here. Roughly the 'real' is what's-going-on. The 'rational' is trickier. Philosophy has been linguistically self-conscious now for a long time. Plato was already a dialectical philosopher. We as philosophers largely try to determine what it is to be rational, and philosophy is something like a permanent identity crisis. New determinations of the rational (the authoritative method for determining reality for 'humanists') lead naturally to different determinations of reality. (All of this is trivial, one might say, but I find it clarifying. I aim for a neutral description of a basic structure.)

I thought I'd sketch what I think is the strongest non-philosophical position. I'll use 'ironism' and 'ironist' but I have a certain kind of skeptic in mind. Such a skeptic would be skeptical about being a skeptic.

The ironist doesn't completely believe in the project of philosophy but loves it anyway. The ironist identity is unstable at the level of speculation (bound of course to everyday life otherwise). The ironist is instead stabilized (if it all) by myth recognized as myth or metaphor recognized as metaphor. There's no particular reason the ironist would have to deny some other questionable faculty for grasping something like 'the absolute.' And maybe 'faculty' is still too rigid.

Hegel's description and successful demolition of the ironist in his Lectures on Fine Art applied only to egoistic ironists. Schlegel may have been in his mind, but:

For Schlegel, a fragment as a particular has a certain unity (“[a] fragment, like a small work of art, has to be entirely isolated from the surrounding world and be complete in itself like a hedgehog,” Athenaeumsfragment 206), but remains nonetheless fragmentary in the perspective it opens up and in its opposition to other fragments. Its “unity” thus reflects Schlegel's view of the whole of things not as a totality but rather as a “chaotic universality” of infinite opposing stances.

If a literary form like the fragment opens up the question of the relation between finite and infinite, so do the literary modes of allegory, wit and irony—allegory as a finite opening toward the infinite (“every allegory means God”), wit as the “fragmentary geniality” or “selective flashing” in which a unity can momentarily be seen, and irony as their synthesis (see Frank 2004, 216). Although impressed with the Socratic notion of irony (playful and serious, frank and deeply hidden, it is the freest of all licenses, since through it one rises above one's own self, Schlegel says in Lyceumfragment 108), Schlegel nonetheless employs it in a way perhaps more reminiscent of the oscillations of Fichtean selfhood. Irony is at once, as he says in Lyceumfragment 37, self-creation, self-limitation, and self-destruction.

“Philosophy is the true home of irony, which might be defined as logical beauty,” Schlegel writes in Lyceumfragment 42: “for wherever men are philosophizing in spoken or written dialogues, and provided they are not entirely systematic, irony ought to be produced and postulated.” — SEP

Are we sure he's not an egoist?

In his essay “On the Limits of the Beautiful” (Über die Grenzen des Schönen, 1794), he argues that love is the highest form of aesthetic enjoyment and can only be realized between free and equal beings (Beiser 1992, 248) — SEP

When I first started talking philosophy online, I already loved this notion of irony. I've examined some amazing systems since then, but I don't think anything has conquered the irony, which can apparently synthesize without synthesizing.

And let's not forget one of the most potent (anti-)formulations of this position:

This faith does not formulate itself—it simply lives, and so guards itself against formulae...It is only on the theory that no word is to be taken literally that this anti-realist is able to speak at all. Set down among Hindus he would have made use of the concepts of Sankhya,[7] and among Chinese he would have employed those of Lao-tse[8]—and in neither case would it have made any difference to him.—He cares nothing for what is established: the word killeth,[10] whatever is established killeth. The idea of “life” as an experience, as he alone conceives it, stands opposed to his mind to every sort of word, formula, law, belief and dogma. He speaks only of inner things: “life” or “truth” or “light” is his word for the innermost—in his sight everything else, the whole of reality, all nature, even language, has significance only as sign, as allegory.
...
If I understand anything at all about this great symbolist, it is this: that he regarded only subjective realities as realities, as “truths” —that he saw everything else, everything natural, temporal, spatial and historical, merely as signs, as materials for parables. The concept of “the Son of God” does not connote a concrete person in history, an isolated and definite individual, but an “eternal” fact, a psychological symbol set free from the concept of time. The same thing is true, and in the highest sense, of the God of this typical symbolist, of the “kingdom of God,” and of the “sonship of God.”...The “kingdom of heaven” is a state of the heart—not something to come “beyond the world” or “after death.” The whole idea of natural death is absent from the Gospels: death is not a bridge, not a passing; it is absent because it belongs to a quite different, a merely apparent world, useful only as a symbol. The “hour of death” is not a Christian idea—“hours,” time, the physical life and its crises have no existence for the bearer of “glad tidings.”... The “kingdom of God” is not something that men wait for: it had no yesterday and no day after tomorrow, it is not going to come at a “millennium”—it is an experience of the heart, it is everywhere and it is nowhere....
— Nietzsche

The passage above is just thing itself IMO. When life down here is just perfect (which doesn't happen too often), I think that passage captures the sense of being beyond all systems, behind all serious words. I think this is the grasp of the absolute that Hegel wasn't satisfied with. He wanted a conceptual elaboration. I suspect that he had this kind of feeling about his system. That system was a poem of the real. It was the truth that could be told for a 'we.'

As spectacular as Hegel is and as much as he gets right, I think 'life' is the master word in all of its anti-systematic ambiguity. The ironist as I conceive him contains Hegel. Does Hegel's system really contain the ironist? It tries. Was Hegel himself also an ironist who nevertheless constructed and presented Hegel's system? I'm guessing that sometimes he was.

This irony, the 'laughter of the gods'...

The gods laugh at man through man. Is this what humanism chases ? flees?

bc im out i dont have time to respond in detail and in a way adequate to this thread : but id want to note that there is a robust philosophical tradition that accepts that which exceeds rationality - and instead sets up camp at the limit. its like catching parts of the stream that are amenable to rationality. sifting for gold. deleuze and the 'plane of immanence' come to mind.

theres no performative paradox in asking that philosophers be rational and also asking that they accept something outside rationalitys limit.

in the same way the fisherman accepts that there is something beyond fish, or methods for catching fish. theres the ocean.

Wasn't it Euclid that proved that not all that is real is rational, by manipulating the square root of two?

Oh hang on, do you mean .......

Never mind. :yikes:

ut id want to note that there is a robust philosophical tradition that accepts that which exceeds rationality - and instead sets up camp at the limit. its like catching parts of the stream that are amenable to rationality. sifting for gold. deleuze and the 'plane of immanence' come to mind. — csalisbury

I guess I'd just exclude these philosophers from the narrow idea of philosophy that I was working with or include them as late philosophers who determine that which determines to be indeterminate--a critique of pure reason or of language on holiday or of the primacy of the theoretical. The key here for me is that [synonym for rationality] is the authority appealed to in order to distinguish philosophy from mere opinion. It's because philosophers don't accept 'well, God told me so' and instead demand an argument or an elaboration that (only) the rational is real. The philosopher I have in mind doesn't believe irrational claims He refuses them as descriptions of reality.

Note that this includes the rejection of claims about the 'thing-in-itself.' So even if philosophy admits its blind-spot, it does so to deny access to this blind spot to others. It 'knows that it does not know' in order to reject 'inhuman' or 'theological' claims of direct access. Kant knows that pre-critical philosophy is wrong precisely by insisting on a kind of absolute ignorance of things in themselves. Absolute knowledge in the Kantian style is knowledge of absolute ignorance or ignorance of the absolute. It's this tangle that Hegel wrestled with, it seems to me. It left humans at an infinite distance from Truth, offending Hegel's intuition that the human mind was divine.

in the same way the fisherman accepts that there is something beyond fish, or methods for catching fish. theres the ocean. — csalisbury

Indeed. And I am more ironist or mystic than philosopher. But to clarify my point, let me ask you a hypothetical question. How would you react if a philosopher insisted that he understood everything? He claims that he is a fisherman who somehow caught the ocean itself on his hook? I expect that you'd be skeptical indeed. My point is that 'that which exceeds rationality' or 'the ocean' plays an important role in the game. It can function as an 'absent' center. 'I know that I don't know --and yet I know that you can't know.' This humble 'not knowing' is itself a 'vision of God' held fixed.

there's no performative paradox in asking that philosophers be rational and also asking that they accept something outside rationality's limit. — csalisbury

Maybe there is. Philosophers accept rationality because it's rational. If you're obliged to accept something and you're irrational, then you're obliged to accept everything. Or, another way, if the rational man accepts reason because it's reason, what reason, what "because" does he have for accepting the non-rational?

I don't know. I have read a lot of Nietzsche. Mostly by accident, really.
If you want to open up that side of things, maybe it deserves its own thread.

I'm tempted. My threads haven't exactly been taking off, though. I'm trying to minimize my annoyance of other people without just saying nothing. I'm surprised by the reception of my OP so far.

And then in some ways it makes perfect sense to discuss post-philosophy or ironism here in order to emphasize the contrast. I'd love to get your opinion on the Nietzsche quote above. It's one of my very favorite passages in all of philosophy.

Maybe there is. Philosophers accept rationality because it's rational. If you're obliged to accept something and you're irrational, then you're obliged to accept everything. Or, another way, if the rational man accepts reason because it's reason, what reason, what "because" does he have for accepting the non-rational? — tim wood

Because it's there.

You're 'obliged' to accept what's there.

You don't really have a choice. You can take any sort of attitude toward those aspects of 'what's there' that you don't like. Still, it's there. And it will keep being there. It will keep lapping at your doorstep. If you want to make it a principled thing of what to accept - rational or irrational - then go ahead. the irrational will keep appearing. So, eventually, for anyone, its a matter of how you deal with it. Maybe you only 'accept' the rational. ok. so how do you deal with the stuff you don't 'accept'? Because it will still be there.

What is 'acceptance?'

Indeed. And I am more ironist or mystic than philosopher. But to clarify my point, let me ask you a hypothetical question. How would you react if a philosopher insisted that he understood everything? He claims that he is a fisherman who somehow caught the ocean itself on his hook? I expect that you'd be skeptical indeed. My point is that 'that which exceeds rationality' or 'the ocean' plays an important role in the game. It can function as an 'absent' center. 'I know that I don't know --and yet I know that you can't know.' This humble 'not knowing' is itself a 'vision of God' held fixed. — sign

why fixed?

I guess I'd just exclude these philosophers from the narrow idea of philosophy that I was working with or include them as late philosophers who determine that which determines to be indeterminate--a critique of pure reason or of language on holiday or of the primacy of the theoretical. The key here for me is that [synonym for rationality] is the authority appealed to in order to distinguish philosophy from mere opinion. It's because philosophers don't accept 'well, God told me so' and instead demand an argument or an elaboration that (only) the rational is real. The philosopher I have in mind doesn't believe irrational claims He refuses them as descriptions of reality.

Note that this includes the rejection of claims about the 'thing-in-itself.' So even if philosophy admits its blind-spot, it does so to deny access to this blind spot to others. It 'knows that it does not know' in order to reject 'inhuman' or 'theological' claims of direct access. Kant knows that pre-critical philosophy is wrong precisely by insisting on a kind of absolute ignorance of things in themselves. Absolute knowledge in the Kantian style is knowledge of absolute ignorance or ignorance of the absolute. It's this tangle that Hegel wrestled with, it seems to me. It left humans at an infinite distance from Truth, offending Hegel's intuition that the human mind was divine. — sign

Yes, I agree with your picture. I think philosophy's wrong to think it knows more about the function of the 'thing-in-itself' than others. A lobsterman knows more about the 'thing-in-itself' than Kant. A fortiori he knows more than Hegel. There are maybe some things Hegel knows more about. But Hegel is still the privileged boy, protected by his position. Every stab at knowledge is limited by its stance. FIshermen are less likely to miss this than philosophers. But its true for both. Its not a matter of knowledge at this point. Its a matter of balancing pride and humility. Its knowing what one knows, and knowing the right stance to take towards what one doesn't know. Philosophy can give the illusion of knowing more than one does.

why fixed? — csalisbury

If I insist that there is a blind-spot for human reason determinable by reason itself, then I have at least one sure result, in the name of this same limited reason. 'I know that you don't know.' I hold fixed not only my own distance from 'God' or 'naked reality' but also yours.

I'm not trying to take sides here (or really I'm the ironist) but trying to point out the tension in a position that seems quite humble. Indeed I think this position can be quite humble. But let's think of those who dismiss everything 'spiritual' or 'metaphysical' in terms of this kind of humility. It can be a will not to know, a dodge. 'Language on holiday' for instance (seemingly anti-metaphysical) is a metaphysics in a phrase. Is this not Anyone's metaphysics?

*I found some old writing where I was griping about Hegel being hard to read, ultimately a rationalization to give up on something that required stretching my mind. I saw this by chance recently after a poster had called Hegel nonsense and I thought 'oh brother, I was basically just like that not so long ago.' I was holding fixed the idea that content was restricted to a particular form.

Its a matter of balancing pride and humility. Its knowing what one knows, and knowing the right stance to take towards what one doesn't know. — csalisbury

I agree.

Because it's there.

You're 'obliged' to accept what's there. — csalisbury

And just what is it (exactly) that is there that I'm obliged to accept?

I'm not sure in your case, everyone has their own.

From your reply I infer you don't know what you're talking about, you don't care to think about it, and you think so little of the rest of us that you make dismissive answers that you hope will get you by. But they won't.

sorry, if I've offended. My answer was not intended to be dismissive. I'm not sure how else to answer your question.

Fair enough. But if I read you right, you hold that I am - anyone is - obliged to accept something that reason fails to discern. If by this you mean merely my personal hallucinations, and each his or her own, that reason could never ferret out, maybe - but why am I obliged to accept them (in any other way than what they are, namely hallucinations). Or if you mean there are questions for which there are no (as of yet) answers, that too. But an unanswered question remains unanswered, until answered. In being obliged to accept that a question is unanswered, I am not thereby obliged to accept anything beyond its status as unanswered.

Or do you mean that unanswered questions are sometimes answered by other means, by "alternative facts"? Indeed some are, but what in those answers obliges me?

the irrational will keep appearing. — csalisbury

In what sense? In what way?

In what sense? In what way? — tim wood

(a month late.)

I meant that real life will keep funneling you challenges, challenges you have no choice but to address, and that exceed any rational, philosophical framework. You have to address these problems in order to even begin to discuss the phil stuff, online. Transcendental conditions of the possibility of posting, if you like.

You have to take care of the details of living before you post.

Everything may be connected and you see a thread in the tangled web that leads from the Church to rationality.

One may ask the question is the transformation recognizable? Do you see the Church in rationality and the latter in the former.

I think the change from Church (faith) to rationality is drastic and the two don't look like each other at all.

I guess you think the Church is an ape and rationality is man. The proper comparison would be the Church is a bacteria and rationality is man.

The difference is just too wide to make a sensible connection. Is this a post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy?

I don't know. Enlighten us.