Kripke talks about properties of objects. What's this about?

In an nutshell, my criticism of Kripke's exposition is that if he is saying that names are not definite descriptions that is trivially true, and if he is saying that names are independent of definite descriptions that is patently false. I wonder if there is a third option, and on the assumption that there might be, I am still waiting for it to be presented and explained.

I'm happy to answer any questions and elaborate further, and am also interested to hear your critique of Kripke's analysis.

It's externalism. — frank

That's an unexpected take; I'd be interested to hear your reasons for saying that.

@Janus, can you highlight your sentiments about Naming and Necessity?

OK, I read the passage from P 91 as suggested, and I think this, which seems to express the substance of how Kripke thinks rigid designation is established, is itself a template for a definite description:

"Someone, let's say, a baby,is born; his parents call him by a certain name. They talk about
him to their friends. Other people meet him. Through various sorts of talk the name is spread from link to link as if by a chain."

So, it would seem that it is on the basis of the accuracy of such a definite description, the most defining definite description of identity, as it were, that we may be thought to be referring or not referring to whomever we think we are referring. When it comes to historical figures we can never be absolutely certain that such a person existed and that we are referring to whomever we think we are.

For example, imagine it is the case that no one called 'Aristotle' authored the philosophical works that are universally attributed to a man named 'Aristotle'; to whom then do we refer when we speak of Aristotle?

As I have said earlier as a work taken to present a positive theory of reference I think it is "much ado about nothing". Taken as a merely critical work, however, I think it does raise some interesting questions.

That's an unexpected take; I'd be interested to hear your reasons for saying that. — Janus

That's a professional assessment. :razz:

That the individual can speak of X without a specific definite description in mind suggests that "meaning ain't in the head."

You are referring to Putnam. Do you take this to be Putnam's argument?

This seems to speak more to reference than meaning. So, reference is not in the head? Maybe off-topic?

To quote Janus, they're all related: meaning, reference, and identity.

As I have said earlier as a work taken to present a positive theory of reference I think it is "much ado about nothing". — Janus

Since he says explicitly that this is not his aim, that's perhaps not surprising.

LOL, did I say that? It's true though I do think they are all related, although being distinguishable from one another.

To return to the thread topic, though: I can refer to all the people I have actually met and whose names I have been told and have remembered without relying on definite descriptions. I can also refer to people whom I know only from seeing them on TV and having been informed of their names without relying on definite descriptions.

But can I refer to an historical figure whom i know only from descriptions of his or her life and actions without relying on definite descriptions? Also, does one have to have a definite description explicitly in mind when referring to someone in order to be said to be relying on definite description?

Since he says explicitly that this is not his aim, that's perhaps not surprising. — Banno

OK, I don't remember where he says that, but if it so then my criticisms have been misplaced.

But can I refer to an historical figure whom i know only from descriptions of his or her life and actions without relying on definite descriptions? — Janus

Counterfactuals and cases of error or ignorance seem to suggest that you don't have to have a definite description in mind.

Also, does one have to have a definite description explicitly in mind when referring to someone in order to be said to be relying on definite description? — Janus

I think just access to some portion of a description.

People are saying things like - how can one possibly imagine a world in which Nixon does not have such and such and did not do such and such???

One want to say: tell me more about this person you can't tell me anything about. — StreetlightX

Hmmm... I don't see anyone taking that stance. It's not about what one can imagine about someone picked out of this world. For me, at least, it's much more about what sorts of imaginings render the object picked out of this world to be basically non-existent. Imagining a world with water but no hydrogen comes to mind as an easy enough example to understand.

As it(possible world semantics) applies to picking out people, I'm not too sure that Kripke is that far off base, if at all. Certainly, there are some situations that are pivotal to making one who one is. Seems that those situations - if removed - would also remove an important part of the person, but I'm not at all certain that I would take a strong stance against anything Kripke has written thus far(regarding where I am).

Certain things other than people, I would... but, Kripke isn't dealing with those... yet(?).

Yes, but the identity is only established by definite descriptions which are in accordance with the actualities of this world; so there is really no Independence of identity from definite description. — Janus

I don't think that Kripke is divorcing identity from description. I think he's using the fact that possible world semantics allow us to stipulate different circumstances without losing identity to show some other things(stuff about a priori/a posteriori, a priori and necessity, perhaps even difference between theories of identity, meaning, and definition). I'm not sure exactly what he's doing, but thus far nothing he has said seems outright wrong...

I'm not too sure that I'll be convinced of much at all simply because we can lose description in positing possible world scenarios, but we'll see.

I personally have a strong aversion to modality(possible world semantics), so... this is tough reading for me anyway. It's like eating a food that is very hard to get down as a result of how badly it smells... you know? Something that the smell alone could make you vomit. I have to accept possible world semantics to understand what Kripke is getting at.

So, this is work for me!

:wink:

As I have said earlier as a work taken to present a positive theory of reference I think it is "much ado about nothing".
— Janus

Since he says explicitly that this is not his aim, that's perhaps not surprising. — Banno

Yes. I recall at least a couple of times that he explicitly denied that he was offering a theory.

Seems that the following is worth posting for reference...

(1) To every name or designating expression 'X', there corresponds a cluster of properties, namely the family of those properties q> such that A believes 'q>X'.
(2) One of the properties, or some conjointly, are be­lieved by A to pick out some individual uniquely.
(3) If most, or a weighted most, of the q> 's are satisfied by one unique object y, then y is the referent of 'x'.
(4) If the vote yields no unique object, 'x' does not refer.
(5) The statement, 'If X exists, then X has most of the q>' s' is known a priori by the speaker.
(6) The statement, 'If X exists, then X has most of the q>' s' expresses a necessary truth (in the idiolect of the speaker).

(Condition for satisfying the above) For any successful theory, the account must not be circular. The properties which are used in the vote must not themselves involve the notion of reference in such a way that it is ultimately impossible to eliminate.

Ok. I take it that the six listed statements above are Kripke's aim. He's using proper nouns in possible world scenarios to place them under suspicion for various reasons.

Ok. I take it that the six listed statements above are Kripke's aim. He's using proper nouns in possible world scenarios to place them under suspicion for various reasons. — creativesoul

Please elaborate?

Uh... no. That's clear enough.

Uh... no. That's clear enough. — creativesoul

So, what is your take on taking an existential quantification property of a counterfactual?

:yikes:

What?

Are you asking me how to count the things being said about a proper noun in a possible world scenario?

:meh:

There is a distinction between counterfactuals and possible world scenarios.

Facts are; events, states of affairs, the way things were/are, reality. Facts consist of what has happened. Counterfactuals are - quite simply - an account of what has not happened. That's what the prefix "counter" must mean, lest the distinction between factual/counterfactual is lost and both terms are rendered utterly meaningless. Continued use of of either term after throwing that distinction out the window amounts to uttering gibberish at worst, and unnecessarily confusing speech at best.

Counterfactuals - by any coherent definition - are counter to fact. Possible world scenarios can be true. That which is counter to fact cannot. Counterfactual scenarios are not equivalent to possible world scenarios.

All counterfactuals and possible world scenarios consist entirely of statements of thought/belief about what has not happened. Counterfactuals must be false. Possible world scenarios can be true.

Counterfactuals are false statements about some thing in this world. The counterfactual statement performs the task of picking out this object from this world and subsequently stipulating a set of imagined circumstances that are counter to this world's circumstances with regard to that thing. They must be false.

The possible world statement performs the task of picking out this object from this world and subsequently stipulating a set of imagined circumstances that are counter to what's believed about this world's circumstances with regard to that thing. They can be true.

My reading of what Wallows was asking is that he wanted to know what you meant by 'using proper nouns in possible world scenarios to place them under suspicion'. I too am curious to know what you meant by that.

I take it that the six listed statements above are Kripke's aim. — creativesoul

You meant target?

Counterfactuals and cases of error or ignorance seem to suggest that you don't have to have a definite description in mind. — frank

So, I don't have to have anything specifically in mind when I refer to, say, Aristotle? What about having something in the back of my mind? Surely I have some idea who Aristotle is, otherwise how would referring to Aristotle be anything different than merely saying the name 'Aristotle'?

And that I must have some such idea seems to be what you are alluding to with this:

I think just access to some portion of a description. — frank

So one cannot be thinking of "anything specific" unless one can present a description of some sort - definite or not.

@Janus; @frank, @Wallows, @creativesoul

Is it the case that there are necessary and sufficient conditions that determine, for every given proper name, if the name has successfully referred to a discreet individual?

that is, must there be universal rules for the use of proper names?

Is that a statement or a question?



Would there not need to be some rule or at least adequate conditions in order to make any distinction between successful and unsuccessful referring coherent?