If... — Terrapin Station

This I don't get. We have just worked our way through ninety-odd pages of close argument. Instead of addressing any of that text, you posit exactly the fraught position the argument set out to refute.

I do find that somewhat frustrating.

So, if Kripke was arguing contra what I just said, then Kripke is wrong.

Why?

Because I'm right.

Not all possible world scenarios are counterfactual. — creativesoul

This strikes me as a deep insight. Would you be able to expand on it?

In the domain of talking about what's going on with possible world semantics; in terms of what we're doing when we pick out this person from this world and posit this unique individual into an alternative set of circumstances; in those very limited situations, I've no issue with what Kripke is claiming.

It quite simply does not follow from anything Kripke says that definitive description is unnecessary for identity in all other circumstances aside from possible world semantics and/or what's going on when we talk about circumstances alternative to what we believe.

The only reason that we can talk about setting definitive descriptions aside is because they have already helped us in establishing which individual we're talking about when we use proper names. We pick out this Nixon, not that one... even when Nixon is not here to point at. There are more than one person named Nixon. There is one Nixon who won the American presidential election. Names are clearly inadequate for identifying this Nixon, in this world. Not all use of "Nixon" picks out this Nixon in this world.

If 'Nixon' was both necessary and sufficient for identifying this person, there could be no other people with the name.

To be perfectly clear...

If it were not for both names and definitive descriptions there could be no such thing as identity across possible world scenarios. Neither is sufficient. Both are necessary for the very ability to use a name to posit someone unique into circumstances other than what made them so.

Not all possible world scenarios are counterfactual.
— creativesoul

This strikes me as a deep insight. Would you be able to expand on it? — Wallows

Deep? I don't know about all that. Simple? Surely.

If everyone believes that Neil Armstrong was the first man to walk on the moon, but he - in fact - was not, then any possible world scenario which stipulated that he was not would not be counter to fact.

Not all possible world scenarios are counterfactual. — creativesoul

Can you list any?

All it takes for a possible world scenario to not be counterfactual is for it to be true. Some possible world scenarios are true.

He just explained one above.

It is really important to keep our terms clear. "Nixon" is not a definite description, it is a name. Nor is it essential that the stipulation used to suggest a counterfactual be a definite description.

So, "What if Nixon had blue eyes?" stipulates a counterfactual without using a definite description. — Banno

It seems to me that where you are confused is in thinking that either names are definite descriptions or that they are completely independent of them.

Of course "What if Nixon had blue eyes" does not "use" a definite description, but it implies one, namely "Nixon does not have blue eyes".

In the domain of talking about what's going on with possible world semantics; in terms of what we're doing when we pick out this person from this world and posit an alternative set of circumstances; in those very limited situations, I've no issue with what Kripke is claiming. — creativesoul

It shows that you don't have to have a particular definite description in mind when you use proper names.

The only reason that we can talk about setting definitive descriptions aside is because they have already helped us in establishing which individual we're talking about when we use proper names. — creativesoul

That's true in the case of counterfactuals. Can't really have a counterfactual with zero knowledge of the facts.

If it were not for both names and definitive descriptions there could be no such thing as identity across possible world scenarios. Neither is sufficient. Both are necessary for the very ability to use a name to posit someone unique into circumstances other than what we already believe while retaining the name. — creativesoul

I agree. But we both see that a definite description is not the same thing as a rigid designator, so I think we're on track.

It seems to me that where you are confused is in thinking that either names are definite descriptions or that they are completely independent of them.

Of course "What if Nixon had blue eyes" does not "use" a definite description, but it implies one, namely "Nixon does not have blue eyes". — Janus

:up:

Philosophy continually makes errors by trying to avoid psychologism or subjectivity.

You can't talk about semantics--meaning, reference, etc.--without talking about how individuals think about language. Whenever you try to say that reference or meaning works in some universal, mind-independent way, you're going to f-- up and say things that are wrong, things that can be very simply falsified merely by noting an individual who thinks about it otherwise.

The only reason that we can talk about setting definitive descriptions aside is because they have already helped us in establishing which individual we're talking about when we use proper names.
— creativesoul

That's true in the case of counterfactuals... — frank

That's true in all cases of talking about setting definitive descriptions aside and positing alternatives. It does not matter whether or not the alternatives are counterfactual. All it takes to be counterfactual is to be false. That which is true cannot be counterfactual. Some possible world scenarios are true. Some possible world scenarios are not counterfactual.

All possible world scenarios are existentially dependent upon definitive descriptions to help fix the referent of the name being used in the scenario.

"Nixon" refers to more than one person. More than one person are named "Nixon". Only one Nixon was president. Therefore, the name alone is insufficient for identifying this Nixon. Once we've already identified this 'Nixon', then and only then can we entertain circumstances that are alternative to the ones which are unique to this man, by virtue of using the name 'Nixon' as a means for retaining the identity.

If it were not for both names and definitive descriptions there could be no such thing as identity across possible world scenarios. Neither is sufficient. Both are necessary for the very ability to use a name to posit someone unique into circumstances other than what we already believe while retaining the name.
— creativesoul

I agree. But we both see that a definite description is not the same thing as a rigid designator, so I think we're on track. — frank

How many different people do you think were the first man to walk on the moon?

We could say that someone other than Neil Armstrong did. Would we be talking about the first man to walk on the moon?

If it were not for both names and definitive descriptions there could be no such thing as identity across possible world scenarios. Neither is sufficient. Both are necessary for the very ability to use a name to posit someone unique into circumstances other than what we already believe while retaining the name. — creativesoul

Which is just what I have been saying all along, but which you, somewhat puzzlingly, seemed to be disagreeing with me about earlier

Some have said that definition requires a description of the object being defined, and that identity is determined by such. Hesperus and Nixon are prima facie examples of cases where that quite simply does not hold up to scrutiny. We can easily posit possible worlds where descriptions of the object are not necessary to identify the object. — creativesoul

Wasn't disagreeing with you in the second quote. Was attempting to summarize Kripke.

I still stand by both quotes.

Of course "What if Nixon had blue eyes" does not "use" a definite description, but it implies one, namely "Nixon does not have blue eyes". — Janus

But "Nixon does not have blue eyes" is not a definite description.

In possible world scenarios shown by Kripke, definite descriptions are not necessary to identify the objects(including people), for they have already been identified in this world by those descriptions.

In possible world scenarios shown by Kripke, definite descriptions are not necessary to identify the objects(people), for they have already been identified in this world by those descriptions. — creativesoul

We can easily posit possible worlds where descriptions of the object are not necessary to identify the object. — creativesoul

To my eye these two statements are contradictory.

But "Nixon does not have blue eyes" is not a definite description. — Banno

Why would it not qualify as a definite description? I think it is a definite description, just as all descriptions are else they would not be descriptions; they are definite insofar as they define the object being described. Of course I also acknowledge that there are degrees of definiteness; just as there is no description that is not definite, there is no absolutely definite description. If I say "Nixon has blue eyes" for example that does not tell me what shade of blue his eyes are (or how large his irises are, what shape his eyes are and so on and on).

In possible world scenarios shown by Kripke, definite descriptions are not necessary to identify the objects(people), for they have already been identified in this world by those descriptions. — creativesoul

This seems silly to me; of course the definitions are used in this world to identify the entities in other world scenarios. Everything is done in this world, so what else could we be talking about?

If it were not for both names and definitive descriptions there could be no such thing as identity across possible world scenarios.
— creativesoul

We can easily posit possible worlds where descriptions of the object are not necessary to identify the object.
— creativesoul

To my eye these two statements are contradictory. — Janus

All possible world scenarios are existentially dependent upon definitive descriptions to help fix the referent of the name being used in the scenario.

"Nixon" refers to more than one person. More than one person are named "Nixon". Only one Nixon was president. Therefore, the name alone is insufficient for identifying this Nixon. Once we've already identified this 'Nixon', then and only then can we entertain circumstances that are alternative to the ones which are unique to this man, by virtue of using the name 'Nixon' as a means for retaining the identity. — creativesoul

Why would it not qualify as a definite description? — Janus

Because it does not pick out a single individual to the exclusion of all others.

Once we've already identified this 'Nixon', then and only then can we entertain circumstances that are alternative to the ones which are unique to this man, by virtue of using the name 'Nixon' as a means for retaining the identity. — creativesoul

But so what? That doesn't mean that the rigid designator is independent of definite descriptions.

Because it does not pick out a single individual to the exclusion of all others. — Banno

But no single description picks out (in the sense of by itself informs someone previously ignorant of the identity of) a single individual to the exclusion of all others; you need a set of descriptions for that; and each description is definite not in the sense that it definitely applies to only one person, (although some of them indeed may) but in the sense that it is part of the definition of what it is to be that unique person.

How many different people do you think were the first man to walk on the moon?

We could say that someone other than Neil Armstrong did. Would we be talking about the first man to walk on the moon? — creativesoul

Consider this statement:

Armstrong was the first man on the moon.

It's not necessarily true because it could have been Aldrin.

Compare this statement:

The actual first man to walk on the moon was Armstrong.

It's necessarily true.

See the difference?

Where is this from?

a noun phrase introduced by the definite article or its equivalent, and denoting a particular entity or phenomenon.

What do you mean? It's from me of course; where else?

Well it is at odds with what I understand - and the definition from Google I cited above - and the discussion provided at the beginning of the text.

In what way is it at odds?

no single description picks out (in the sense of by itself informs someone previously ignorant of the identity of) a single individual to the exclusion of all others; — Janus

Against

"a noun phrase introduced by the definite article or its equivalent and denoting a particular entity or phenomenon."

A bunch of predicates that fit exactly one individual. That's what a Definite description is.