Which would just be another assumption made by someone (Berkeley's word is not the final word) who is being skeptical of others' assumptions. What's new? One unfalsifiable claim is just as good as any other. Where's the evidence, not just of other minds, but of spiritual stuff vs. physical stuff, God, etc.?Solipsism is the risk that Descartes also ran, but Berkeley is firm on their being other minds. — Jamesk
Idealists typically resort to using God as the ultimate source of ideas, so I always thought that it was a consequence of some hope of immortality (death is "physical", or just an "idea"), but I can see how your explanation could be useful too.Sometimes I wonder if it's not kind of a consequence of people who "think too much" in this regard: maybe there are some people who never are simply aware of a tree, say, but instead they always think about it--they think about what it is (including the name "tree"), they think about how they parse the color, the shape, etc. And so on. They never basically have an "empty mind" where they just experience things. If that were the case, then it would make more sense how maybe everything would seem like an idea to those folks, because they can't experience anything without having ideas about it. — Terrapin Station
That would be direct realism - that the tree that is experienced is the one and only tree, it's not a representation of an external tree. Solipsism is a form of direct realism.If you experience things without having any ideas about them, AND you don't buy the realist picture of there being things in the world that are independent of you, with you being a human body situated in that realist world etc., then it wouldn't make any sense to think of the phenomenally appearing tree that it's an idea, something mental, etc. rather than "just being a tree" (not with the term attached (or any terms), etc.--but I have to type it somehow) — Terrapin Station
Okay, so the only difference between "physical" vs. "non-physical" is difference in location - "physical" being outside the mind and "non-physical" being inside the mind?I thought I was making that distinction clear. I think your apparent obfuscation was pretense. — Metaphysician Undercover
I don't see how that answers my question.We've been through this, one is memory, the other anticipation. I remember how my mother was, and I anticipate how she will be. Where's the problem? If you have difficulty distinguishing between your memories of something, and your anticipations concerning that thing, then I think you have some serious issues as a human being. — Metaphysician Undercover
What is "matter"?Yes, there is a constant. But the constant is distinct from the memories, and distinct from the anticipations. It appears to have been created within my mind as a means of relating the memories to the anticipations. I don't really understand the constant, do you? To me, it doesn't seem to be a form at all, it's material. That's how I understand matter, under the Aristotelian conception, it's the constant, the thing which does not change. It's not a form though, it's matter. — Metaphysician Undercover
Then you're a solipsist.Well, I don't think we really agreed. You seem to think that there can be no mind without information. I think that the mind creates information, and can therefore be prior to information, creating its own information. — Metaphysician Undercover
Idealism is no different than direct realism in that idealists believe that they experience things as they actually are - as ideas. — Harry Hindu
(a) I thought we established that the tree is a tree. Why would it be something else?"Experience things as they are" yes, but the difference between realism and idealism is (a) in what each believes the tree is, exactly, and (b) what each believes is the relationship between themselves and the tree. — Terrapin Station
(a) I thought we established that the tree is a tree — Harry Hindu
Hmmm. It sounds like we need to come up with a coherent definition of "experiencing" to make any sense of what you said.No--I wasn't "establishing anyting." I was talking about different ways of experiencing the world and/or parsing that experience.
It's fine to say that both direct realists and idealists think that they're experiencing the tree as it is. That's a similarity between the two.
But there are differences, too. One difference is that idealists think that what they're experiencing is an idea. Realists think that what they're experiencing as it is is an external-to-themselves, physical thing. — Terrapin Station
Which would just be another assumption made by someone (Berkeley's word is not the final word) who is being skeptical of others' assumptions. What's new? One unfalsifiable claim is just as good as any other. Where's the evidence, not just of other minds, but of spiritual stuff vs. physical stuff, God, etc.? — Harry Hindu
Yes! Philosophy is a science.No evidence really just inference from induction which is the same with science. Starting from the first person inquiry can only be justified by saying there really is no better place to start. If there is one thing we can know it is our own minds and thoughts. Not infallible knowledge of of how they work but at least of their existence. — Jamesk
For the idealist and the realist, "experiencing" must mean completely different things. How would they define it?So you're not sure what we're talking about when we talk about experiencing something? That would be interesting, but I'm just curious if it's what you're really saying. — Terrapin Station
I'm simply trying to get at the difference between the two. — Harry Hindu
I don't understand why you can't understand that ideas and external-to-me physical stuff are not identical. — Terrapin Station
Could you explain how, in your view, ideas and external-to-me physical stuff are identical? — Terrapin Station
So far the only difference you seem to imply is location - external vs. internal. Is that the only difference? — Harry Hindu
Which is why you gave up when I asked you to define "awareness" as a idealist would define it. The problem is that "awareness" has no meaning in an idealist "universe" - the same for "experience".Well, personally I think that the idea of nonphysicals is incoherent, so I can't explain that end. — Terrapin Station
Exactly. What is "matter"? What are "ideas"? How do they differ if not just by location (Ideas are in a mind. Matter is everywhere else)?How is it any less coherent than the idea of matter? What is matter? Atoms? Quarks? Higgs-Bosun's? Dark matter? Is light a particle or a wave? What the hell is Quantum theory all about? Hawkins last theory points to a multiverse, is any of that any more coherent than God? — Jamesk
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