Do you want to block my post?

no not you, Terrapin Station is just ruining the thread and trolling the discussion.

Substantial being can't be just matter, or just form. And yet the folk position is that matter just IS substance and form ISN'T substantial. — apokrisis

Isn’t there a sense in which today’s ‘folk metaphysics’ hails back to Cartesian dualism? What I mean is that it was this model which neatly divided everything into extended dumb matter and immaterial mind. But then over the ensuing centuries, the notion of ‘res cogitans’ became unsustainable, mainly because there was no way to show how an immaterial spirit or mind could exert influence over a material body. The net effect of which was the abandonment of ‘the ghost in the machine’ and the subsequent adoption of ‘mechanism’ and ultimately matter alone (as one half of the duality) as the presiding metaphor of early modern science.

And I think the reason Aristotelian philosophy has made something of a comeback, is because the cartesian model, or what became of it, left out so much of obvious importance, that it really required going back and looking at the whole issue again. I think what was found was whilst many notions from Aristotelian physics were well and truly obsolete, the same couldn’t be said for every aspect of Aristotelian metaphysics - particularly the interesting doctrine of ‘hylomorphic dualism’.

The thing is - the bit that actually interests me - is that we can talk very clearly about the formal aspect of substantial being, but it all goes very shifty as we try to drill down into the material aspect of substantial being. — apokrisis

Just if you look at it very superficially. The form of a cloud is very disputable, not even to speak of fog. And there are many things that look circular - but only if you do not measure too exactly...

Particle physics tells us that the electrons and quarks composing the silicon and oxygen atoms are yet again just informed substance — apokrisis

The word "particle physics" as well as the plurals you use seem to indicate a contradiction here. Afaik there are transitions between energy and matter. One could ask the question if this is really the last word on those things though.

So for the materialist, it is turtles all the way down. Yet materialists don't seem to think they have a problem. — apokrisis

I guess the problem is of another nature. Materialists do not seem to start from the smallest particles there are. The reality of the smallest things is often discussed. Maybe they are just theoretical entities, maybe the theories are incomplete. After all qualities have been destroyed there will be only numbers left in the theories. That doesn't mean that matter is numbers.

Did Plato envisage the clouds (dirt, hair, mud) have a Form? It was left an open question but my feeling is that the answer tends towards 'no'.

Did Plato envisage the clouds (dirt, hair, mud) have a Form? It was left an open question but my feeling is that the answer tends towards 'no'. — Wayfarer

Difficult question but I think that he probably did. I think that all objects also have Forms with Plato. I can base this on his banishment of artists in the republic. He does so on the grounds that we do not experience true Forms only copies of them, artists are then engaged in making copies of copies. This process just pushes us deeper into the cave. Well that's my interpretation of it and I remember in lectures talk about the ideal Form of a chair or a table, all chairs and tables are imperfect reflections of their perfect Forms out there in the parallel universe. If regular objects have Forms then it is not that much of a leap for their components to also have them.

Materialism only provides the best explanation of the world without God.

Yes. Dualism arises out of materialism by treating the mind as another kind of substance or stuff. Consciousness would be a property of that substantial being. So the hardening of opinion around the one led to a matching hardening of opinion about the other.

As you know, I would take a process view of both the mind and the matter. So some kind of duality is inevitable. But a hylomorphic one gets so many things right in in fact being triadic. It is about the interaction in which the substantial emerges from formal constraints on material freedoms.

That rather nicely confounds modern folk metaphysics in making the material aspect of things as immaterial as possible - a naked freedom - and the formal aspect of things is then the most substantial in being the structure that puts a limit, and thus gives concrete shape, to those material freedoms.

Well that's my interpretation of it and I remember in lectures talk about the ideal Form of a chair or a table, all chairs and tables are imperfect reflections of their perfect Forms out there in the parallel universe. If regular objects have Forms then it is not that much of a leap for their components to also have them. — Jamesk

It's tangential to this thread, but the question was raised about 'the form of clouds'. I don't think they're the kinds of 'things' - if they are indeed things - that Plato envisaged as implying a Form

Of precisely which sensible things or qualities are there Forms? Socrates is confident that there are Forms of justice, beauty, and goodness; unsure whether there are Forms of man, fire, and water; and confident that there are not Forms of hair, mud, or dirt (Parmenides130b-c.)

Why? The only clue he gives is that in the latter case (hair, mud, and dirt) “the things are just the things we see” (130d).

.

:up:

So you literally have no idea what the difference is between thinking that there can be matter that's not just an idea and thinking that there can be ideas that aren't matter? — Terrapin Station

I'm not talking about thinking what the case is. Thinking what the case is could be wrong.

What I am asking is if materialism or idealism were the case, then what would the actual difference be in the attributes of the primary substance? There should be some difference in how the primary substance actually is or functions if these two substances (matter and mind) are so different to cause this debate to go on for so long.

What I am asking is if materialism or idealism were the case, then what would the actual difference be in the attributes of the primary substance? There should be some difference in how the primary substance actually is or functions if these two substances (matter and mind) are so different to cause this debate to go on for so long. — Harry Hindu

I would say the major difference being that material objects have no causal powers we can know in which case we do not know what causes them.
Ideas also have no causal substance but we do know that they are caused by spirits with the infinite spirit doing most of the causing.

Berkeley does not deny real objects and sees the real world like everyone else, he just denies that it is material.

Right, that's what I've been trying to explain to those people who have been suggesting that we could sense what the chair is made of, matter. We can't do that, we have to take our sensations, and put them into words through the means of ideas. We cannot sense what the chair is made of, be it wood, plastic, matter, or whatever. We sense differences, as you say, not what a thing is made of. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'll tell you what I told Apo, we don't sense just differences. We sense similarities as well. Have you ever held a piece of wood in your hand? Can you not notice the similarity between wood as it exists prior to being assembled into something like a chair, and the assembled product of a wooden chair?

Notice I'm using the term "wood", not "matter". It is the idealists and materialists that insist on using these other terms, "mind" and "matter". All they have done is create these new terms that no one really knows what they mean, and claimed that wood and chairs are either an "idea" or "matter".

Words are simply visual scribbles and sounds - something we access with our senses. So sensing what the chair is composed of is prior to having the goal of communicating what the chair is composed of. What are letters of the alphabet composed of? Would you know a letter of the alphabet without ever seeing one or hearing it's sound?

If we can't sense what the chair is made of, then how can we say that the chair is composed of ideas and not matter?

Is the chair composed of something? Does it matter what term we use to refer to that primary substance? What if we just simply used "primary substance?" If that is the case, then why did we have a debate for 1000s of years over what to call the primary substance (matter or mind)?

Berkeley replaces Locke's material substrata with a spiritual substances - minds. and material objects with ideas supported by minds. — Jamesk

For what purpose? What is a "spiritual" substance? How does a spiritual substance differ from a mental substance? I don't think you're paying attention to what I'm asking.

How do you perceive a thinking object? My mind is the 'thinking end' and you cannot form an idea of a mind. You can develop a notion of minds and of God, but that's not the same as an idea. Berkeley is on sticky ground at this point. Like I said demolishing materialism is easier than supporting immaterialism. — Jamesk

Of course I can form an idea of you mind. Every time you speak or submit a post, I form an idea of what is in your mind. I try to predict people's behavior and in doing so, I form an idea about the contents of their mind. Having ideas about other people's mind is one of the features that separates us from most other species.

I would say the major difference being that material objects have no causal powers we can know in which case we do not know what causes them.
Ideas also have no causal substance but we do know that they are caused by spirits with the infinite spirit doing most of the causing. — Jamesk

That last part there - you lost me.

Isn’t there a sense in which today’s ‘folk metaphysics’ hails back to Cartesian dualism? What I mean is that it was this model which neatly divided everything into extended dumb matter and immaterial mind. But then over the ensuing centuries, the notion of ‘res cogitans’ became unsustainable, mainly because there was no way to show how an immaterial spirit or mind could exert influence over a material body. The net effect of which was the abandonment of ‘the ghost in the machine’ and the subsequent adoption of ‘mechanism’ and ultimately matter alone (as one half of the duality) as the presiding metaphor of early modern science.

And I think the reason Aristotelian philosophy has made something of a comeback, is because the cartesian model, or what became of it, left out so much of obvious importance, that it really required going back and looking at the whole issue again. I think what was found was whilst many notions from Aristotelian physics were well and truly obsolete, the same couldn’t be said for every aspect of Aristotelian metaphysics - particularly the interesting doctrine of ‘hylomorphic dualism’. — Wayfarer

I think it's reasonable to say that one broad stroke of "folk metaphysics" is that it's dualist re mind/matter, but I don't think it's at all reasonable to say that either folk metaphysics wound up adopting eliminative materialism, that there was any folk metaphysics trend back to Aristotelianism, or that Aristotelianism in any way avoids dualism.

Sure. If we redefine matter as idea, I guess problem solved?

What are you talking about? — apokrisis

What would redefining matter (as the materialist defines it) as idea (as the idealist defines it) entail? If it doesn't matter what we call the primary substance, then why the debate for the past 1000 years?

It seems to me that the debate stems from our preliminary assumption of dualism and is solved through the realization of monism.

Dualism arises out of materialism by treating the mind as another kind of substance or stuff. — apokrisis

If we're talking about materialism, the mind is material stuff. That's not "another kind of stuff" in that regard.

As you know, I would take a process view of both the mind and the matter. So some kind of duality is inevitable. — apokrisis

"Both mind and matter are processes" doesn't imply dualism.

But a hylomorphic one gets so many things right in in fact being triadic. It is about the interaction in which the substantial emerges from formal constraints on material freedoms. — apokrisis

I'm not convinced there's any coherent way to make "substance" different than "matter," and matter and form are not separable so that they could "interact."

That rather nicely confounds modern folk metaphysics in making the material aspect of things as immaterial as possible - a naked freedom - and the formal aspect of things is then the most substantial in being the structure that puts a limit, and thus gives concrete shape, to those material freedoms. — apokrisis

Incoherent.

Of precisely which sensible things or qualities are there Forms? Socrates is confident that there are Forms of justice, beauty, and goodness; unsure whether there are Forms of man, fire, and water; and confident that there are not Forms of hair, mud, or dirt (Parmenides130b-c.)

Why? The only clue he gives is that in the latter case (hair, mud, and dirt) “the things are just the things we see” (130d).

Which suggests that the whole idea of Platonic forms is so arbitrary that it's hardly worth bothering with whether Plato would say that clouds have forms. We might as well spend time wondering whether Captain America or Batman would win in a fight.

What I am asking is if materialism or idealism were the case, then what would the actual difference be in the attributes of the primary substance? There should be some difference in how the primary substance actually is or functions if these two substances (matter and mind) are so different to cause this debate to go on for so long. — Harry Hindu

First, we shouldn't assume that there is a "primary substance." Among other things, that (exact term) is linked to ideas that are pretty incoherent a la the Aristotelianism that some folks are seduced by around here.

If we're contrasting idealism with materialism, we're implying that idealism is positing stuff that isn't material. So obviously the difference would be that we're talking about material/physical stuff in the one case, and we're talking about immaterial/nonphysical stuff in the other case.

I've yet to encounter a notion of nonphysical stuff that's coherent, so I can't tell you much about what the properties of nonphysical stuff are supposed to be or how nonphysical stuff is supposed to function, but people who aren't physicalists assure me that they're not (just) positing physical stuff, they're positing something else (in addition if not instead) that's different than physical stuff.

We actually should be better cleaving terms like idealism, materialism, realism, etc., by the way, and specifying the historical contexts we're focusing on, since the conventional connotations of those terms have shifted over the years.

I would say the major difference being that material objects have no causal powers we can know — Jamesk

Are you simply focusing on the Humean comments that amount to us not being able to be certain re causation?

You should make that explicit if so. The folly there is worrying about certainty or linking the idea of knowledge to it.

We know tons of info re causal powers of material objects. For example:

http://www.geo.mtu.edu/UPSeis/why.html

And I think the reason Aristotelian philosophy has made something of a comeback, is because the cartesian model, or what became of it, left out so much of obvious importance, that it really required going back and looking at the whole issue again. I think what was found was whilst many notions from Aristotelian physics were well and truly obsolete, the same couldn’t be said for every aspect of Aristotelian metaphysics - particularly the interesting doctrine of ‘hylomorphic dualism’. — Wayfarer

The reason why Aristotelian dualism is more advanced, and therefore more appealing, than Cartesian dualism is that it divides reality between the more evident categories of actual and potential, active and passive, or being and becoming, rather than mind and matter. In categorizing reality in this way, aspects of each of the two categories, actual and potential, may be present in both mind and matter. This avoids the ever-present problem of Cartesian dualism, which is the issue of how mind interacts with matter.

I'll tell you what I told Apo, we don't sense just differences. We sense similarities as well. Have you ever held a piece of wood in your hand? Can you not notice the similarity between wood as it exists prior to being assembled into something like a chair, and the assembled product of a wooden chair? — Harry Hindu

I notice this, but that's something apprehended by my mind, not my senses. I really don't think I can sense a similarity, because that requires an act of comparison, which is a mental activity. In your example there is a comparison with a prior time, and that requires memory. A difference on the other hand, is a relation between two things, so the difference itself, being a relation, is only one thing, and doesn't require a mental comparison to be perceived.

For what purpose? What is a "spiritual" substance? How does a spiritual substance differ from a mental substance? I don't think you're paying attention to what I'm asking. — Harry Hindu

Spiritual substance and mental substance are the same thing.

Of course I can form an idea of you mind. Every time you speak or submit a post, I form an idea of what is in your mind. I try to predict people's behavior and in doing so, I form an idea about the contents of their mind. Having ideas about other people's mind is one of the features that separates us from most other species. — Harry Hindu

You can form an idea of my body or bodies in general but not of minds. Brains yes but minds no. What does a mind look like? How big is it? what colour is it?

That last part there - you lost me. — Harry Hindu

How does a tree cause you to see a tree? The materialist provides an answer based in physics, light waves, atoms etc. Thinking so, you allow that objects have causal powers in themselves. This is far from proven, as Hume showed all we experience in causation is regularity. The immaterialist knows that God is the only cause of objects existing.

Are you simply focusing on the Humean comments that amount to us not being able to be certain re causation — Terrapin Station

Hume is very certain about causation, it is not necessary connection but it is constant conjunction.The view that all we know about causation is regularity is still today the most widely held opinion among philosophers.

The reason why Aristotelian dualism is more advanced, and therefore more appealing, than Cartesian dualism is that it divides reality between the more evident categories of actual and potential, active and passive, or being and becoming, rather than mind and matter. In categorizing reality in this way, aspects of each of the two categories, actual and potential, may be present in both mind and matter. This avoids the ever-present problem of Cartesian dualism, which is the issue of how mind interacts with matter. — Metaphysician Undercover

That doesn't avoid Cartesian dualism (in folk metaphysics especially), though.

Re an actual/potential distinction somehow solving how mind interacts with matter (where we're assuming Cartesian dualism), that is a good example of the subjectivity of explanations being sufficient. Somehow, to you, an actual/potential distinction helps solve that problem. If I assume Cartesian dualism (as much as I can try to make any sense of it, given that in my view the very idea of nonphysical existents is incoherent), I have no idea how actual/potential would solve the interaction problem, so that wouldn't be a sufficient explanation in my opinion. But what counts as a sufficient explanation is subjective.

A difference on the other hand, is a relation between two things, so the difference itself, being a relation, is only one thing, and doesn't require a mental comparison to be perceived. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't find it plausible that you'd say that differences can be sensed but not similarities. All the same things would go for both. For example, either you're attending to a similarity or difference at the same or at different times (so that you either have to rely on memory or not). They both require comparison, etc.

How would we know with certainty that it's not necessary connection?

We don't know anything with certainty. As empiricists we accept that all of our knowledge comes from sensory experience. We do not experience necessary connection in which case causation is not necessary connection.

We don't know anything with certainty. As empiricists we accept that all of our knowledge comes from sensory experience. We do not experience necessary connection in which case causation is not necessary connection. — Jamesk

Wait, first, "we don't know anything with certainty" doesn't gel well with "Hume is very certain about causation," does it?

Wait, first, "we don't know anything with certainty" doesn't gel well with "Hume is very certain about causation," does it? — Terrapin Station

He is certain that all we know about causation is regularity. I should have said that he is very clear about causation. Surely you can remember and employ the principle of charity when you are discussing philosophy.

If I assume Cartesian dualism (as much as I can try to make any sense of it, given that in my view the very idea of nonphysical existents is incoherent), I have no idea how actual/potential would solve the interaction problem, so that wouldn't be a sufficient explanation in my opinion. But what counts as a sufficient explanation is subjective. — Terrapin Station

First, we've dismissed Cartesian dualism, so there is no premise of "nonphysical existents". We have no division between physical and non-physical in that sense, so there is no division between mind and matter, therefore no interaction problem. Comprehend?

He is certain that all we know about causation is regularity. I should have said that he is very clear about causation. Surely you can remember and employ the principle of charity when you are discussing philosophy. — Jamesk

And knowledge-wise, what prohibits us from knowing necessary connection? A billard ball hits another at a particular velocity, etc., and the struck ball reacts with another particular velocity. The difference between knowing that that is a "regularity" and a "necessary connection" is?

Surely you can remember and employ the principle of charity when you are discussing philosophy. — Jamesk

Sure, are you capable of that when you read and respond to my comments?

Well, we didn't dismiss it in "folk metaphysics,"

If you mean outside of that, who are we talking about, where was the dismissal, what exactly was it, etc.?