I’m still not SURE I agree that a long-term goal is a sign of free will. It is still a choice but a choice that constantly and repeatedly has to be made. I gave my reasons for believing why I think decisions or choices are determined.

As for evolution, the mental exercise of weighing choices is a mechanism nature has chosen that has made humans successful. It is a mischaracterization of what I believe to say that evolution decides which is better, viz. the decision made or the option not taken. The mechanism is what evolution selected for. — Noah Te Stroete

Not that I agree with the following view, but if determinism is the case, then any goal that someone has, any appearance of weighing of choices are not ontologically free but determined. So those things do not work as counterarguments.

What do you mean by “those things do not work as counterarguments” when I am saying that they are indeed not ontologically free.

"So those things do not work as counterarguments" is not argumentative towards you.

Ah. My bad.

Although the argument in the Op fails because of the equivocal use of "responsibility", premise 1 seems true and constitutes a good reason to believe that our choices are not the product of libertarian free will (LFW).

The choices we make are the product of our beliefs, dispositions, and impulses. These seem to be the cause of the choice. Each belief, disposition, and impulse seem to have been caused. Hence, our choices could not have been different.

As a thought experiment: In the actual world, you are presented with a choice between X and Y. You deliberate on the options, weighing pros &cons consistent with your background beliefs and desires, and you ultimately choose X (possibly influenced by some sudden impulse). Is there a possible world with an identical history to this one, so that you have exactly the same background beliefs, desires and impulses at the point at which the choice is presented - but you instead choose Y?

If yes, then your choice is made for no reason.
If no, then your choice has been caused (consistent with determinism).

Consequently, LFW entails making choices for no reason. I don't think it's reasonable to believe we make choices for no reason, which suggests LFW is false.

I've encountered views similar to yours often, but it always strikes me as odd, because I make plenty of choices that seem akin to using a random number generator or rolling dice, and I can also do that so that it's like using a random number generator with biases built in.

I also like to make choices where I literally do use a random number generator.

There is no such thing as a random number generator*. There are pseudo random number generators. Rolls of dice and coin flops are deterministic. You may think you are picking a number randomly, but it could be due to something in the environment triggering it. It is impossible to judge. Statistical tests can be done, just like those used to assess the quality of pseudorandom generators. I've seen some studies, and it doesn't look good for randomness (I'll try to find a paper).

*(It would theoretically be possible to create one based on quantum indeterminacy, but our minds are probably not uncollapsed quantum systems).

I'm referring to phenomenally or epistemically random, not a commitment to whether it's ontologically random, which is what's at issue.

You're completely missing the point of the comment. You don't make any choices that are phenomenally random? (Whether you think they're really (that is, ontologically) random or not)

Sure. Pseudorandom numbers are epistemically random. They're still deterministic. Making choices that seem free is what compatibilism is all about.

Sure. Pseudorandom numbers are epistemically random. They're still deterministic. Making choices that seem free is what compatibilism is all about. — Relativist

So if you make some choices that seem random, this shouldn't be the case:

"The choices we make are the product of our beliefs, dispositions, and impulses. These seem to be the cause of the choice. Each belief, disposition, and impulse seem to have been caused. Hence, our choices could not have been different."

How does one make a “random choice” in practice?

I’m still not SURE I agree that a long-term goal is a sign of free will. It is still a choice but a choice that constantly and repeatedly has to be made. I gave my reasons for believing why I think decisions or choices are determined. — Noah Te Stroete

By itself, a goal is not a sign of free will, but the choice of a goal against a compulsion is a sign that the compulsion is not determining. Consider an alcoholic who habitually goes into every bar he or she passes. One day they commit to being sober. That commitment makes no physical change. Their brain is still wired the same way. Every time they pass a bar, they still start to walk in. So, they remind themselves of their commitment and, by force of will, walk by. Each time they do this, they change their neural connections by a small amount. In time, their new intentionality is incarnated in a new neural pathway. This is the neurophysical reflection of the ancient observation that repeated good behavior leads to habits of right action, aka, virtues.

So, yes, changing your brain wiring is not easy. It does require constant recommitment, and the lack of apparent progress can be discouraging. Still, over time it happens.

As for evolution, the mental exercise of weighing choices is a mechanism nature has chosen that has made humans successful. It is a mischaracterization of what I believe to say that evolution decides which is better, viz. the decision made or the option not taken. The mechanism is what evolution selected for. — Noah Te Stroete

Of course evolution would not be making the individual decisions. Still, we need a mechanism for evolutionary selection of the capacity to represent multiple options -- one that translates into reproductive success -- or evolution does not explain the phenomenon. (Note also that selecting the ability does not explain primary appearence of the capacity, without which it could not be selected.

If evolution does favor the consideration of options, how is this an argument for determinism? Surely, the consideration of options is useless unless we are free to implement the one that we decide is better. It would be very coincidental if the one that we judged to be better mentally were also the only one that was physically realizable. Such a parallel relation reminds me of Leibnitz' monadology and would seem to require a providential God. Isn't it more rational to think that the very fact of commitment to the better option is one of the conditions of physical realization -- just as it is in the above example of the reforming alcoholic? So, if we are free to choose which option we think better, and often free to implement it physically, where does determinism enter?

I believe consciousness is just as real as matter as I am a spiritual person. — Noah Te Stroete

I agree. I am also a spiritual person. We are fairly close in our beliefs, but differ on some details.

Making a seemingly random choice is an impulse.

the choice of a goal against a compulsion is a sign that the compulsion is not determining. Consider an alcoholic who habitually goes into every bar he or she passes. One day they commit to being sober. That commitment makes no physical change. Their brain is still wired the same way. Every time they pass a bar, they still start to walk in. So, they remind themselves of their commitment and, by force of will, walk by — Dfpolis

But this choice is not made in a vacuum. The alcoholic might have learned that he was being "punished" for consuming too much alcohol in the sense that he hit rock bottom and things weren't going well for him. That choice is a completely natural option that fits in with my model. He probably learned from experience (perhaps the accounts of other reformed alcoholics), and he was compelled to make the choice to stop consuming alcohol. It took many bad consequences for him to learn his lesson, but this just reinforces the concept of necessary causes (necessary for his particular case in that his rock bottom may be different from someone else's).

we need a mechanism for evolutionary selection of the capacity to represent multiple options -- one that translates into reproductive success — Dfpolis

Isn't the population of the planet evidence of evolutionary success of our characteristics? How does any characteristic get selected for? It's random at first, but successful characteristics are selected for sometimes as riders of other characteristics, sometimes as the primary characteristic.

Isn't it more rational to think that the very fact of commitment to the better option is one of the conditions of physical realization — Dfpolis

I believe there is a supervenience between the act of commitment and physical realization. But just as the physical realization is deterministic, so are the mental processes.

Now this is not to say that you couldn't still be right about all this, but I still have concerns that need to be addressed.

It would be very coincidental if the one that we judged to be better mentally were also the only one that was physically realizable. Such a parallel relation reminds me of Leibnitz' monadology and would seem to require a providential God. — Dfpolis

I don't know about this. It seems to be only natural, not coincidental, to me. I'm sure that many who died in the Holocaust had doubts about a providential God.

So if you make some choices that seem random, this shouldn't be the case: — Terrapin Station

Would computers have free will in your opinion?

That question doesn't have anything to do with what you're quoting from me, by the way. I'm talking about phenomenal experience and what sorts of decisions Relativist does and doesn't make, from a phenomenal perspective. You're asking an ontological question rather.

At any rate, no, I don't believe that computers have free will a fortiori because I don't believe they have the will requirement. I don't believe that we've produced artificial consciousness.

Making a seemingly random choice is an impulse. — Relativist

I could see calling it that, but you're still describing it as two steps. You said that impulses were among the causes of choices. If we call a seemingly random choice an impulse, the impulse would BE the choice. The impulse wouldn't be a cause where the choice is an effect.

We can still have moral responsibility in the absence of freewill in the Libertarian sense. Strawson's approach is interesting, I haven't read the paper yet but I am interested in what he means by 'truly responsible' and if there is an angle of compatibilism there or not.

We can still have moral responsibility in the absence of freewill in the Libertarian sense. — Jamesk

How? If whatever I do is fully immanent, fully determined, in the state of the world before we are conceived, then our actual existence can play no role in determining how we act. Under what theory/definition of responsibility can a being whose actual existence plays no role in determining an act be responsible for that act?

Of course, being predetermined would allow us a role in our acts. We would be instrumental causes. Thus, your theory would seem to make instruments responsible for what they are used to effect. That being so, are hammers responsible for hammered artifacts?

None of us have freewill. We are 'all in it together' fate believes in equality. We choose to live in societies. Societies need rules to function. Rules need the attachment of responsibility to function. We agree to the rules so we agree to our share of responsibility.

We can still have moral responsibility in the absence of freewill in the Libertarian sense. Strawson's approach is interesting, I haven't read the paper yet but I am interested in what he means by 'truly responsible' and if there is an angle of compatibilism there or not. — Jamesk

Strawson takes the conventional approach of closely linking free will with moral responsibility, so when he attempts to undermine (his) idea of moral responsibility, he also takes it to be an attack on the idea of free will.

What Strawson means by being 'truly responsible' is being the ultimate causal source of your actions. The key move in his argument against moral responsibility is this:

But to be truly responsible for how one is, mentally speaking, in certain respects, one must have brought it about that one is the way one is, mentally speaking, in certain respects. And it is not merely that one must have caused oneself to be the way one is, mentally speaking. One must have consciously and explicitly chosen to be the way one is, mentally speaking, in certain respects, and one must have succeeded in bringing it about that one is that way. — The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility

Where Strawson's position is similar to that of compatibilists is in that for him the question of determinism is irrelevant to the question of moral responsibility/free will - only in his case, he argues that "true" moral responsibility is impossible in any event (but those arguments are quite similar to those that have been used by compatibilists).

Sounds like an outright attack on morality to me.

It's consistent with determinism either way.

" If whatever I do is fully immanent, fully determined, in the state of the world before we are conceived, then our actual existence can play no role in determining how we act. "
If A causes B, and B causes C it is still the case that B's existence caused C. If we did not exist, we could not act.

But this choice is not made in a vacuum. The alcoholic might have learned that he was being "punished" for consuming too much alcohol in the sense that he hit rock bottom and things weren't going well for him. — Noah Te Stroete

A free decision is not an unmotivated decision. If I am seriously weighing two options, which ever I choose can be explained in terms of the factors motivating it. Thus, the fact that we can explain decisions in terms of motivating factors does not show that they are determined.

There is a subtext here, viz. the utilitarian assumption that there is an optimal course of action -- one that results in the greatest happiness, is impelled by the most libido, or has the maximal value of some other utility function. However, if you look at the lead up to decisions, what Aristotle calls proairesis, that is not how we choose. I have never assigned a value to each motivating factor and then calculated which option maximizes the resulting utility. In fact, such a calculation cannot be done, implicitly or explicitly. The reason is simple: motivating factors are not commensurate. No amount of sex will satisfy our need for nutrition, and neither will satisfy our need for understanding. Thus, no trade-off is possible.

H. A. Simmon has written about this at length. Human decisions are made using satisficing rather than maximization. We choose courses of action that satisfy as many of our needs as possible, rather than finding one that maximizes some utility function. As there are many courses of action that can satisfy our needs, satisficing, unlike optimizing, does not constrain us to a single line of action.

Of course, at any point in time, we place more weight on some dome needs/motivating factors than others, but the weight we give each is not predetermined. It is a result of us deciding, implicitly or explicitly, what kind of person we want to be. In your example, even after hitting bottom, the alcoholic still has to decide if they are willing to tolerate the collateral damage alcoholism causes, or if they want to commit to being sober.

Isn't the population of the planet evidence of evolutionary success of our characteristics? — Noah Te Stroete

Perhaps, but it does not tell us that our characteristics are as you imagine them. You think that we can imagine alternatives, but are still pre-determined to one course of action. I think that being able to conceive alternatives that we cannot effect can have no evolutionary value. What I am asking for is an evolutionary argument showing that the ability to conceive unimplementable alternatives is not a waste of time and energy.

I know that you have said that we can remember our previously examined alternatives, and I grant you that. I also grant that as a result, we may decide differently in the future. What I do not see is how deciding differently will increase reproductive success, given that only one option is physically possible in any event.

I believe there is a supervenience between the act of commitment and physical realization. But just as the physical realization is deterministic, so are the mental processes. — Noah Te Stroete

I think supervenience is an irrational distraction -- one invented to avoid discussions of causal ontology.

A set of properties A supervenes upon another set B just in case no two things can differ with respect to A-properties without also differing with respect to their B-properties. In slogan form, “there cannot be an A-difference without a B-difference”. — Supervenience by Brian McLaughlin & Karen Bennett in SEP

There can be no historical events without variations in the positions of the moon and planets, but that does not mean that we should all be studying astrology. The critical issue is what causes what, not what supervenes on what -- which is usually totally irrelevant.

So, to return to the central question, how is it that the intentional process of proaiesis just happens to terminate in the one course of action that is physically predetermined -- especially if there is no causal relation between our intentional commitments and our physical behavior?

Now this is not to say that you couldn't still be right about all this, but I still have concerns that need to be addressed. — Noah Te Stroete

As you can see, I an willing to take the time to address them.

I'm sure that many who died in the Holocaust had doubts about a providential God. — Noah Te Stroete

Of course they did. The problem of evil is real, and I know of no solution that can put our feelings of dismay to rest.

Thanks for taking the time to respond. I need to study what you wrote and think about it for awhile. God bless you.

None of us have freewill. We are 'all in it together' fate believes in equality. We choose to live in societies. Societies need rules to function. Rules need the attachment of responsibility to function. We agree to the rules so we agree to our share of responsibility. — Jamesk

You seem to begin with an unargued faith position, and then immediately contradict it by saying that we choose to live in societies. If we have no free will, we can't choose anything.

Ants have rules, and I have yet to read an account of the social behavior of ants that mentions moral responsibility. Do you have a more detailed argument?

If A causes B, and B causes C it is still the case that B's existence caused C. If we did not exist, we could not act. — Relativist

I addressed that in my second paragraph. Being an instrumental cause does not make one responsible unless one is a willing instrument. Hammers are not responsible for how they are wielded.

Our choice to live in societies is an evolutionary one. Survival is of prime importance and we survive better in groups, it is not a choice made of freewill. Remaining in society however is a choice although very few could consider living outside of it, as Aristotle said, only a God or a beast.
Your comparison of humanity to ants, well ants do not share our level of sentience or consciousness (as far as we can tell at least), ants also live in a very different type of society than we do, I often wonder if Plato studied ants for the Republic.