There is a subtext here, viz. the utilitarian assumption that there is an optimal course of action -- one that results in the greatest happiness, is impelled by the most libido, or has the maximal value of some other utility function. However, if you look at the lead up to decisions, what Aristotle calls proairesis, that is not how we choose. I have never assigned a value to each motivating factor and then calculated which option maximizes the resulting utility. In fact, such a calculation cannot be done, implicitly or explicitly. The reason is simple: motivating factors are not commensurate. No amount of sex will satisfy our need for nutrition, and neither will satisfy our need for understanding. Thus, no trade-off is possible.

H. A. Simmon has written about this at length. Human decisions are made using satisficing rather than maximization. We choose courses of action that satisfy as many of our needs as possible, rather than finding one that maximizes some utility function. As there are many courses of action that can satisfy our needs, satisficing, unlike optimizing, does not constrain us to a single line of action. — Dfpolis

I wasn't implying anything like "optimizing". I believe the alternative of stopping drinking occurred to the alcoholic as an option. Perhaps moderation didn't occur to him as his experience and beliefs didn't necessitate it. Perhaps he has "learned", however wrong-headedly, that all-or-nothing approaches are the only two alternatives. I really don't believe that any of us perform a calculus of optimaization. I believe we are taking shots in the dark essentially. Whatever happens to occur to the alcoholic is predetermined based on his memories, beliefs, experience, mood, and whatever need he feels he needs to satisfy. There is no optimization calculus.

I think supervenience is an irrational distraction -- one invented to avoid discussions of causal ontology. — Dfpolis

Supervenience does not do away with cause and effect. The lower level physical realization is subject to cause and effect as is the higher level mental exercise. It's just that the two levels line up 1:1.

There can be no historical events without variations in the positions of the moon and planets, but that does not mean that we should all be studying astrology. — Dfpolis

I think you're confused here. I wasn't saying that we should do anything like astrology. The physical determination of the planets does not supervene on human behavior. The lower level biology and physiology of the brain supervenes on the higher level mental processes of the mind.

It's subjective how one identifies responsibility. Consider this scenario: a parent raises a child with a lack of discipline, essentially letting the child do whatever she pleases while shielding the child from any negative consequences. The child reaches adulthood and behaves irresponsibly, drinking to excess and driving. One day, the adult child is driving drunk and hits bicyclist; the adult child drives away leaving the bicyclist on the road to die. Is this adult child responsible, or is the parent who failed to teach the child discipline and responsibility? This actually happened in Houston a few years ago. The driver's sister testified that it was their mother's fault for the way she was raised. I'll bet you agree with me that the adult child is responsible.

One can always find someone else to blame, but as a society we hold the actor responsible. By so doing, we impress upon others the need to take responsibility for his actions. Some will learn this and be less likely to behave recklessly. Others won't. Both will be exhibiting behavior that can plausibly considered to have been determined by their beliefs, dispositions, and impulses.

Survival is of prime importance and we survive better in groups, — Jamesk

Yes. We are social animals.

it is not a choice made of freewill. — Jamesk

Then, it is not a choice at all. Unless there is more than one possibility open, there is nothing to choose. Did the moon choose the earth as its orbital partner? Of course not.

If we are social animals, but we can choose to live alone, isn't that evidence that we are not fully determined by our nature?

I agree with much of what you said, but I still see no answer to my basic question. How can a being who is not the radical origin for a line of action be responsible for that line of action?

The drunk driver may have been compelled, but punishment is still necessary to keep dangerous people off the streets and for deterrence.

", it is not a choice at all. Unless there is more than one possibility open, there is nothing to choose. "
People engage in a behavior we call "choosing", this is indisputable. Even if a different choice could not have been made, it is still the case that the choice has been made and it is is a direct result of the choosers deliberation. The choice is in the causal chain.

To my estimation, “choices” are the domain of the privileged. Most people do what they do all day out of necessity. When people do the mental exercise of deciding between or among “choices”, they are just AWARE of options. I believe the final decision is usually determined by subconscious motivations. When it’s not determined by subconscious motivations, the decision is sometimes done after long deliberation. This kind of decision is also usually in the purview of the privileged. When they make this kind of “choice”, it is always ultimately determined by memory, beliefs, biases, mood, and need. The particular factors are always necessary and sufficient causes of the particular “choice”. Always. Across the board.

We may not technically responsible in the sense you are seeking, however our position in the group 'holds' us (and all of the groups members) responsible for their acts. So you are responsible without being responsible and that is fine because we are all the same in this respect. All of us are egalitarian victims of determinism so freedom doesn't really come into it.

Sounds like an outright attack on morality to me. — Jamesk

Well, the title of the paper is kind of a giveaway... But not really. Strawson talks about "ultimate" moral responsibility (he uses half a dozen more such adjectives throughout the discussion). What this has to do with plain-vanilla moral responsibility that we actually live with is questionable. In my opinion, not nearly as much as Strawson implies. And yet the issue of sourcehood is not entirely irrelevant either. But Strawson with his blunt approach does not do a good job of tackling this question.

Supervenience does not do away with cause and effect. The lower level physical realization is subject to cause and effect as is the higher level mental exercise. It's just that the two levels line up 1:1. — Noah Te Stroete

Supervenience is a one-to-many relationship ("No A changes without B changes," but not the other way around).

There are A differences if and only if there are B differences. It goes both ways. Just Google “supervenience”. “If and only if” doesn’t just mean “if”.

If you weren’t already aware “A if and only if B” means “If A then B AND if B then A”. Dfpolis’ definition wasn’t clear on this.

A set of properties A supervenes upon another set B just in case no two things can differ with respect to A-properties without also differing with respect to their B-properties. — Supervenience by Brian McLaughlin & Karen Bennett in SEP

Whatever happens to occur to the alcoholic is predetermined based on his memories, beliefs, experience, mood, and whatever need he feels he needs to satisfy. There is no optimization calculus. — Noah Te Stroete

Okay, we agree that there is no optimization. That being the case, what makes the outcome of proairesis deterministic? It seems that if we find many lines of action satisfactory, no one is predetermined. What we decide is based on the kind of person we intend to become.

Knowledge does enter proairesis both in the options considered, and in our estimation of where each will lead. I do not see that either implies determinism. On the contrary, the more we know, the freer we are. Knowledge removes the constraints imposed by ignorance.

Supervenience does not do away with cause and effect. — Noah Te Stroete

I didn't say supervenience does away with causality. I said it distracts from it. As statisticians remind us, correlation does not mean causality. Co-occurance is irrelevant. What counts is causal dependence. So, what causal relation guaranties that that our intentionally derived decision will be physically realizable? On my theory, the commitment to a line of action can change how we will behave physically. On your theory the relation seems purely coincidental, rather than causal.

The physical determination of the planets does not supervene on human behavior. — Noah Te Stroete

But, it does! Read the definition of supervenience: "A set of properties A supervenes upon another set B just in case no two things can differ with respect to A-properties without also differing with respect to their B-properties." The human states cannot change without there being a difference in the planetary positions. That is exactly why people invented astrology. The problem is that the connection here, though necessary, is not causal in either direction.

I wasn't saying that we should do anything like astrology. — Noah Te Stroete

I did not mean to suggest that you were. I am criticizing the concept of supervenience as a bargain-basement replacement for causality.

The physical determination of the planets does not supervene on human behavior. — Noah Te Stroete

According to the definition, it does. Neural physical processes play a dynamic role in the operation of the mind. Supervenience, while well-defined, provides us with no assurance that the changing properties bear any important relationship to each other.

But, it does! Read the definition of supervenience: — Dfpolis

No, there is no supervenience between us and planets. You need to read more of the supervenience entry:

Supervenience claims do not merely say that it just so happens that there is no A-difference without a B-difference; they say that there cannot be one. A-properties supervene on B-properties if and only if a difference in A-properties requires a difference in B-properties—or, equivalently, if and only if exact similarity with respect to B-properties guarantees exact similarity with respect to A-properties. Supervenience claims thus have modal force. The kind of modal force can vary; different supervenience claims might attribute different kinds of necessity to the connection between B-properties and A-properties (see Section 3.1.) Even when the modality is fixed, however, there are a number of distinct claims that might be expressed by the slogan. A good deal of philosophical work has gone into distinguishing these forms of supervenience, and into examining their pairwise logical relations.

In a nutshell the idea of supervenience is the idea of one set of properties "riding on" another set of properties, but it's that idea where we want to avoid an ontological commitment to saying that the two sets of properties are both part of or aspects of or perspectives of a substantial identity (that's not excluded, its just not committed to with supervenience), and where we want to avoid an ontological commitment to saying that there's a causal relationship (again not excluded, but not committed to).

It seems that we are at an impasse. Not all correlated events supervene on each other. I suggest reading the Wikipedia entry on supervenience. It speaks of higher level and lower level phenomena.

Furthermore, I’m not the one who espouses proairesis. You do. I believe memory, beliefs, mood, and need, etc., are COLLECTIVELY necessary And sufficient causes of our decisions. You keep setting up Straw Men instead of addressing my premises.

Is this adult child responsible, or is the parent who failed to teach the child discipline and responsibility? — Relativist

If there is free will, the parents are responsible for choosing to raise junior without concern for the larger good. Junior is responsible for choosing to drink and drive, and, depending on how mentally competent junior was at the time of the accident, for fleeing the scene. They are each responsible because the possible consequences of their choices were foreseeable, and there were better options available, that they either knew or had a duty to learn.

If there is no free will, the parents had no real choice in how they raised junior, and junior had no choice but to drink, drive and kill. So, there is no more responsibility in the entire scenario than there is in lightening striking and killing the bicyclist. Both would be purely physical events, devoid of moral responsibility.

You seem to be arguing that since responsibility can be distributed, it is entirely subjective. As my first paragraph shows, I reject that. The Germans who chose to do nothing when their Jewish or gay neighbors disappeared in the night bear partial responsibility, as those who continue to support Trump bear partial responsibility for his family separations, condoning political murder, and further degradation of the environment.

I'll bet you agree with me that the adult child is responsible. — Relativist

The adult child has the major share of the blame. That does not make the parents blameless.

I am still wondering how you can blame anyone, if no one has a real choice?

Both will be exhibiting behavior that can plausibly considered to have been determined by their beliefs, dispositions, and impulses. — Relativist

Plausibly. Yet, we choose to commit to our beliefs. I can decide that since God is the author of nature, reading the book of nature may throw light on the book of Genesis. If I'm disposed to drink too much, I can choose to work at being sober. By repeated acts of will, over time I can develop better impulse control. So, while you might plausibly argue that an immediate reaction is determined by beliefs, dispositions, and impulses, that reaction can well be the result of the kind of person we have chosen (or not chosen) to be.

I am still waiting for an account of responsibility that works if we have no free will and all acts are determined.

The drunk driver may have been compelled, but punishment is still necessary to keep dangerous people off the streets and for deterrence. — Noah Te Stroete

I agree, that we may be justified in removing sources of immanent danger from society, even if they did not choose to be as they are. That has nothing to do with the question of moral responsibility.

People engage in a behavior we call "choosing", this is indisputable. Even if a different choice could not have been made, it is still the case that the choice has been made and it is is a direct result of the choosers deliberation. The choice is in the causal chain. — Relativist

I have no argument with any of this, but it does not (1) show that that only one line of action is in our power, or (2) that we are morally responsible for acts fully determined prior to our conception.

We are only morally responsible as a matter of convention. Metaphysically we are not responsible.

You seem to be arguing that since responsibility can be distributed, it is entirely subjective — Dfpolis

If it's not subjective, then it obtains independently of what anyone thinks about it. What would be the evidence of that?

The particular factors are always necessary and sufficient causes of the particular “choice”. Always. Across the board. — Noah Te Stroete

I understand that this is your belief. I do not see an argument supporting your belief.

I do not think that choice belongs only to the privileged. The poor and homeless can act with charity and kindness, or with anger and hostility as easily as the wealthy and powerful.

It is clear that the cause of anything must be sufficient to effect it. There is no reason to think that the cause of everything must necessitate it as opposed to some other effect it is sufficient to cause. To make your case, you need to establish the necessity you claim.

I do not believe that mental phenomena cause changes in the brain as you do. If mental phenomena were causally efficacious, then wouldn’t it be possible for telekinesis to occur? It is much more likely that mental phenomena supervenes on the physical brain. This is knowable a fortiori. It is consistent and coherent with neuroscience. Your claim is not.

We may not technically responsible in the sense you are seeking, however our position in the group 'holds' us (and all of the groups members) responsible for their acts. So you are responsible without being responsible and that is fine because we are all the same in this respect. All of us are egalitarian victims of determinism so freedom doesn't really come into it. — Jamesk

This is why I brought up ants. They and bees have social roles and follow rules of contingent behavior, but because they have no choice of role or contingent behavior, they have no need for the concept of responsibility. It is only because we can choose new roles and violate the social expectations (an intentional concept) by the exercise of free will that the concept of moral responsibility arises. In other words, being social animals does not necessitate the dynamic of responsibility. So, being free agents explains the need for the concept of responsibility, while being fully determined social animals does not.

Thus, the two weaknesses of your position are: (1) you have provided no reason to believe that we are determined, and (2) you have provided no reason for the existence of the responsibility dynamic you admit exists.

Supervenience claims do not merely say that it just so happens that there is no A-difference without a B-difference; they say that there cannot be one. — Terrapin Station

Yes, I see the modal "can." Our biological existence depends on living in the kind of universe that we do. If the laws of nature, the physical constants and the initial state of the universe were different (so that the planets were not as they are) we would not be here to act as we do. Thus, there is a necessary link between human behavioral changes and the planetary movements, but not a causal relation. That is why supervenience is a philosophical distraction, and a poor substitute for causality.

Of course one can read "can" more narrowly, as having something to do with causality, but the definition does not require it, and, in my opinion, the whole point of supervenience is to avoid discussing causality. Consider:

Supervenience is a central notion in analytic philosophy. It has been invoked in almost every corner of the field. For example, it has been claimed that aesthetic, moral, and mental properties supervene upon physical properties. — Supervenience by Brian McLaughlin & Karen Bennett in SEP

The implication would seem to be that since these non-physical properties supervene on physical properties, that there must be an (unknown) dynamic by which the non-physical are manifestations of the physical. As I have shown by my astrological example, logically there is no such implication. Of course, the philosophers pointing out this supervenience would say that no such implication was ever asserted, only supervenience. That is certainly true, but the question is what motivates a discussion of the supervenience of the non-physical on the physical if not the hope/desire/implication of a dynamic connection? Yet, without a dynamical connection all there really is, is a distraction, for almost everything supervenes on almost everything else.

if and only if exact similarity with respect to B-properties guarantees exact similarity with respect to A-properties. — Terrapin Station

Yes. Let's look at history again. Go back to 0437 GMT 1835. Whatever the historical state of the world then, it cannot be that state without the planets having the exact state they had. If we look at the actual changes that happened between then and 0438 GMT, those historical changes cannot have occurred without corresponding changes in orbital positions. Such is the nature of supervenience.

A good deal of philosophical work has gone into distinguishing these forms of supervenience, and into examining their pairwise logical relations. — Terrapin Station

It is certainly true that there are different kinds of modality, but the differences in kinds of modality do not depend on supervenience, but on the underlying dynamics of the case.

There are A differences if and only if there are B differences. It goes both ways. Just Google “supervenience”. “If and only if” doesn’t just mean “if”. — Noah Te Stroete

You are misreading the definition that, I assume, you got from Google:

X is said to supervene on Y if and only if some difference in Y is necessary for any difference in X to be possible. — Supervenience - Wikipedia

Note the placement of IFF in the wiki definition.

Yes, I see the modal "can." Our biological existence depends on living in the kind of universe that we do. If the laws of nature, the physical constants and the initial state of the universe were different (so that the planets were not as they are) we would not be here to act as we do. Thus, there is a necessary link between human behavioral changes and the planetary movements, but not a causal relation — Dfpolis

No, you're not getting the idea. If there's a supervenience relation, one can't obtain without the other. Planets could still exist if we didn't.

The implication would seem to be that since these non-physical properties supervene on physical properties, — Dfpolis

I would say that mental, aesthetic, etc. properties supervene on physical properties, but in that I am not saying that mental, aesthetic etc. properties are non-physical. A supervenience relation there doesn't exclude either the notion that mental, aesthetic properties are physical or nonphysical.

Furthermore, I’m not the one who espouses proairesis. You do. I believe memory, beliefs, mood, and need, etc., are necessary And sufficient causes of our decisions. You keep setting up Straw Men instead of addressing my premises. — Noah Te Stroete

Proairesis merely names the process leading to a decision. It literally beans "before choice." So, there is nothing to espouse with regard to its existence unless you believe that there is no thought leading to a decision, which would seem to ignore the relevant phenomenology.

What Aristotle noted about proariesis is that it is an iterative process. One begins with a goal to be effected, then finds means of effecting that goal, then finds means of effecting those means and so on. These observations are compatible with both deterministic and libertarian views of choice, and they certainly do not rule out a role for memory, beliefs, mood, need, etc.

I have no problem with the causes of a decision being both necessary and sufficient. That is a very different matter than the choice being necessitated. Necessarily, these factors are in involved, and the factors effecting a decision are sufficient to the actual decision does not mean that the decision is necessary. For example, necessarily I need skills sufficient to house building to build this house does not mean that having those necessary and sufficient skills compels me to build this house rather than that.

If you still feel we are at an impasse, then my best to you.

Hive society animals have a completely different form than our own so I feel your comparison is unfair. You use hive insects as the example for all social animals and that is a mistake, at the very best we could be compared to other primates but not insects.

Unless you think that morals are a natural feature of the world, which i do not, I also don't think comparing us to other species is helpful either,

My claim is that mental phenomena supervene on the physical brain. Some difference in the brain is necessary for a change in the mental processes. Also the brain supervenes on mental processes. Any change in mental processes necessitate changes in the brain. Hence, my assertion that there is supervenience BETWEEN mental processes and the brain.

We are only morally responsible as a matter of convention. Metaphysically we are not responsible. — Noah Te Stroete

I don't think this quite cuts it. If responsibility were an arbitrary convention, how can it play a dynamic role in our personal and social life? Again, what would motivate anyone to give an arbitrary convention a central role in social interaction? Wouldn't such centrality be completely irrational and long-since recognized as such?