Also believe there is a regression here. The “what we are” is a result of a series of actions of ourselves and others, which in turn are the result of actions of others, and so on.

So the argument really is not if an individual act is determined, but if the entire series of acts is determined, which than leads to logical question what or who determined the first act in this series

Actions have consequences, some of those consequences may impact the actions of others.

[1] "When we act, we do what we do because of the way we are, all things considered."

[2} "So, to be truly responsible for what we do when we act, we need to be truly responsible for how we are."

[3] "But, we cannot be ultimately responsible for the way we are."

[4] "So, we cannot be free." — Galen Strawson

Frankly I find it embarrassing when philosophers forward arguments like this. It's embarrassing to have any association with philosophy if anyone is going to assume that we think such crap arguments are worth anything at all.

He has undefined garbage phrases in there like "truly responsible" and "ultimately responsible."

So aside from lame No True Scotsman moves he might make, (3) doesn't seem at all obviously the case.

Aside from that, it's not clear what sort of free will he's even talking about, and he seems to be conflating what's supposed to be an argument against freedom with comments that are primarily focused on whether we can be considered culpable for our actions. Those are two different ideas.

It is true that we do what we do because we have the power to do it, but to say that "the way we are" prior to our choice predetermines that choice is to assume determinism. — Dfpolis

Is he even talking about making choices per se? That wasn't clear to me, which is why I said that "it's not clear what sort of free will he's even talking about." I got the impression that maybe he was referring to free will in more of a murky Dennettian sense, but I wasn't sure. (Dennett is a compatibilist. In my opinion, compatibilism can't be made coherent.)

By the way, if we're talking about free will in the sense of simply making choices, the first premise, "When we act, we do what we do because of the way we are, all things considered," is consistent with, "The action in question was making a choice between a turkey and a tuna sandwich. I acted to make that choice because of the way I am--I like both turkey and tuna equally," etc.

And then re the other premises, we can say, "I am the way I am--that is, I like both turkey and tuna equally, because of the way I chose to acclimate myself to turkey and tuna over the years. I didn't use to like either. But I was able to influence my tastes enough that now I like both equally."

As I noted, with the way he set up the argument he could just lamely "No True Scotsman" his way out of it ("you weren't 'truly responsible' for acclimating yourself to both tuna and turkey blah blah blah"), but that would of course be a fallacy.

But again, he might be addressing something different. something like a Dennettian account of free will, which doesn't have anything to do with choosing between turkey and tuna in a manner akin to rolling dice (even weighted dice).

As Strawson admits before giving his argument, experience tells us that being a free agent is part of "the way we are." To be a free agent is to be the radical source of new lines of action, where "radical source" means that the new line of action is not fully immanent (pre-determined) before the agent chooses. — Dfpolis

Putting your two sentences together, we get the assertion: experience tells us that being the source of new lines of action that are not fully pre-determined before we choose is part of "the way we are".

This isn't true. All that experience tells us is that:
a) approaching a choice, we are aware of more than one new line of action (let's call these lines L1 and L2)
(b) it seems to us that we are free to choose either L1 or L2
(c) after we have chosen (say) L1, it seems to us that we could have chosen L2 instead.

If we lay this out as a logical argument intended to prove that we could in fact have chosen another line of action, it fails:
Premise 1: Approaching the choice, we are aware of L1 and L2.
Premise 2: Approaching the choice, it seems to us that are free to choose between L1 and L2.
Premise 3: After choosing L1, it seems to us that we could have chosen L2 instead.
Conclusion: Therefore the choice between L1 and L2 was not pre-determined, and we could have chosen L2.

Clearly the conclusion does not follow from the premisses. So in fact experience does not tell us what is stated in the conclusion, and therefore experience does not tell us that being a free agent is part of the way we are; it only tells us that seeming to ourselves to be a free agent is part of the way we are.

Yesterday on a different forum, I was referred to a video in which Galen Strawson purportedly proved that free will is impossible. — Dfpolis

Instead of relying on someone's summary of a Youtube video, you should read some of Strawson's papers, such as The impossibility of moral responsibility (1994)

(I am not on Strawson's side, BTW)

Reading the full argument prompts me to observe that responsibility as something that we practice every day has less to do with "making one the way one is, mentally speaking" and more to do with trying to influence other people, events, and the condition of things. Our influence can change outcomes in that regards but usually not in a way that we can own as coming only from our will. As Taoism observes, it can be the result of disowning events.

So the argument really is not if an individual act is determined, but if the entire series of acts is determined, which than leads to logical question what or who determined the first act in this series — Rank Amateur

I think it is both the individual act and the series that is in question. So, you raise an interesting point.

he seems to be conflating what's supposed to be an argument against freedom with comments that are primarily focused on whether we can be considered culpable for our actions. Those are two different ideas. — Terrapin Station

Yes, he does seem to be conflating a number of ideas, making his use of "responsible" even more equivocal than I said.

Is he even talking about making choices per se? That wasn't clear to me, which is why I said that "it's not clear what sort of free will he's even talking about." I got the impression that maybe he was referring to free will in more of a murky Dennettian sense, but I wasn't sure. (Dennett is a compatibilist. In my opinion, compatibilism can't be made coherent.) — Terrapin Station

His argument might work vs. Dennett's position, but I think Dennett is fooling himself in thinking that deterministic avoidance can warrant personal responsibility. Strawson's argument surely does not work vs. the capacity to choose one of a number of equally possible options.

This isn't true. All that experience tells us is that:
a) approaching a choice, we are aware of more than one new line of action (let's call these lines L1 and L2)
(b) it seems to us that we are free to choose either L1 or L2
(c) after we have chosen (say) L1, it seems to us that we could have chosen L2 instead. — Herg

I experience tells us more than this. It additionally tells us, in many cases, that L1 and L2 are equally in our power. It is equally in my power, for example, to go to the store to buy an ingredient for dinner or to stay home a while longer to discuss philosophy. I know both are equally in my power on the basis of my past experience. This awareness of alternatives being equally in my power, and not "I could have chosen otherwise," is what I mean by free will. Of course, the fact that the alternatives were equally in my power means that I could have chosen otherwise, but that is derivative, and not the critical act of awareness.

There is a further experiential point worthy of reflection. Purely physical systems (as opposed to physical systems with intellect and will) have only one immanent line of action -- that determined by its present state and the laws of nature. Intentional systems, such as humans, are essentially different in that we can have multiple lines of actions immanent before we commit to one. The difference in the number of immanent lines of action is critical, for it means that we differ from purely physical systems. So any analogy to their deterministic nature fails.

If we lay this out as a logical argument intended to prove that we could in fact have chosen another line of action, it fails:
Premise 1: Approaching the choice, we are aware of L1 and L2.
Premise 2: Approaching the choice, it seems to us that are free to choose between L1 and L2.
Premise 3: After choosing L1, it seems to us that we could have chosen L2 instead.
Conclusion: Therefore the choice between L1 and L2 was not pre-determined, and we could have chosen L2.

Clearly the conclusion does not follow from the premisses. — Herg

Agreed. The argument is unsound, so that is not an argument I would use. My argument is:

1. Approaching the choice, we are aware that incompatible lines of action, L1, L2, ..., are equally in our power.
2. To have free will means that we have incompatible lines of action equally in our power.
3. Therefore, we have free will.

You could deny premise 1, but only dogmatically. First, I know what is and what is not in my power from my experience as a human in the world. It is in my power to walk to the store it is not in my power to walk to the moon. Second, being in my power is a real state, with well-defined truth conditions. Staying home ceases to be in my power once I am on my way to the store.

Instead of relying on someone's summary of a Youtube video, you should read some of Strawson's papers, such as The impossibility of moral responsibility (1994) — SophistiCat

The video is Strawson presenting his own argument, not a third party summary. Before I posted, I did a brief search for text in which Strawson presented the same argument, but did not find it.

Were I to take up the task of writing a book on free will again, I would read opposing views extensively, as I did for my book on naturalism. Until I do take up that task, Strawson is not likely to be on my reading list.

2. To have free will means that we have incompatible lines of action equally in our power. — Dfpolis

I could just deny your second premise. I believe we are compelled to make the choices we make, and the availability of choices is just a mental exercise. What we choose is what we really want most of all, so is there really a choice? I mean you could've gone out or you could've stayed on this forum typing your post. That is true in the sense that the options occurred to you. However, you really wanted to stay and post more than you wanted to go out, so you were really compelled by your emotions to choose what you chose. It's all in the limbic system.

(Now, I know you won't agree with my assessment as philosophers rarely agree on anything, but I welcome your response.)

Reading the full argument prompts me to observe that responsibility as something that we practice every day has less to do with "making one the way one is, mentally speaking" and more to do with trying to influence other people, events, and the condition of things. — Valentinus

I don't think that is quite right either. I am actually more in agreement with what Strawson Strawson's dad wrote in his earlier essay Freedom and Resentment (your utilitarian attitude here could be identified with that of the "optimist" in Strawson's essay).

Edit: Andrewk corrected my blunder.

Were I to take up the task of writing a book on free will again, I would read opposing views extensively, as I did for my book on naturalism. Until I do take up that task, Strawson is not likely to be on my reading list. — Dfpolis

Suit yourself. Only why would I bother to read what you have to say, whether in a book or in a forum post, given that you don't know what you are talking about?

with what Strawson wrote in his earlier essay Freedom and Resentment — SophistiCat

That was the other Strawson philosopher - Galen's Dad, Peter. :smile:

Oops! That explains the striking change of attitude. Thanks for the correction :)

2. To have free will means that we have incompatible lines of action equally in our power. — Dfpolis

I could just deny your second premise. — Noah Te Stroete

You could, but as it is a definition, that would buy you little. It would merely mean that we use words in different ways.

I believe we are compelled to make the choices we make, and the availability of choices is just a mental exercise. — Noah Te Stroete

You can believe what you will. The question is how do you justify such a belief? I have offered a justification for my position, and all you have objected to is how I use the term "free will."

What we choose is what we really want most of all, so is there really a choice? — Noah Te Stroete

This is merely a tautology. The question is, is what we want most predetermined? If it is not, but it is ultimately we who give weigh our incommensurate needs and desires, then we are free. As different people assign different weights to different motives, it is clear that the assignment of weights depends on the agent.

The key here is incommensurability. As each desire is satisfied by different desiderata, there is no predetermined, automatic trade off between different motives. In other words there is no single utility, measure of happiness, or of libido, to be maximized. It is the agent who gives more or less weight to charity, honesty, prestige, power, various physical desires, etc. -- thus valuing one option above another.

Only why would I bother to read what you have to say, whether in a book or in a forum post, given that you don't know what you are talking about? — SophistiCat

Because if you read what I write, you can decide if I know what I am talking about. You certainly can't rationally decide a priori. I do not need to know everything Galen Strawson and his father ever wrote to know his argument is fallacious.

I believe we are compelled to make the choices we make, and the availability of choices is just a mental exercise.
— Noah Te Stroete

You can believe what you will. The question is how do you justify such a belief? I have offered a justification for my position, and all you have objected to is how I use the term "free will." — Dfpolis

I justify it by the fact that the limbic system has been shown by neuroscience to be the driver of our frontal lobe's decision making process.

What we choose is what we really want most of all, so is there really a choice?
— Noah Te Stroete

This is merely a tautology. The question is, is what we want most predetermined? If it is not, but it is ultimately we who give weigh our incommensurate needs and desires, then we are free. As different people assign different weights to different motives, it is clear that the assignment of weights depends on the agent. — Dfpolis

It is not a tautology because you seem to be claiming that we could've chosen something that we didn't want most of all. It is predetermined by the limbic system which drives the frontal lobe (the "thinking" or "weighing" part which I said is just like "going through a mental exercise").

Conclusion: Therefore the choice between L1 and L2 was not pre-determined, and we could have chosen L2. — Herg

I don't think he was saying this conclusion. "Experience tells us" is another way of saying "per experience," or "phenomenally, if we're to go by experience," etc.

Your conclusion is written from a perspective outside of experience per se. But the sentence is "experience tells us," The sentence isn't presented as a perspective from outside of experience.

I justify it by the fact that the limbic system has been shown by neuroscience to be the driver of our frontal lobe's decision making process. — Noah Te Stroete

Really? I've studied the question of brain modelling, and discuss in the last chapter of my book. Given our present state of knowledge, such modeling is an impossible task. Our brain has approximately 100,000,000,000 neurons with perhaps 100 times that many connections, and we have 10 times that many glia. We have little idea of how glial cells contribute to data processing, but we know that they do. Depending on how you count, there are 30-100 neurotransmitters, and the function of the majority is unknown.

We know that neurons respond nonlinearly to excitatory and inhibiting inputs, and that their response depends on their long and short term history. Chaos theory tells us that any minor change in the assumed inputs of a nonlinear system can result in completely different outputs. I show in the first chapter of my book that any attempt to determine our actual brain state (needed for input by any predictive brain model) would both fry our brain and require a data processing time much greater than the age of the universe.

We do know that the limbic system (composed mainly of the amygdala, hippocampus, thalamus, hypothalamus, basal ganglia, and cingulate gyrus) is involved in memory, emotion and arousal or stimulation. We do not know, and, in light of the aforementioned data acquisition and modeling difficulties, cannot know, that its outputs determine our brain's neuromotor outputs. Thus, hypotheses of the sort you are advancing are unfalsifiable, and so unscientific.

So, I ask again, why do you think that the limbic system determines, as opposed to influencing, our decisions?

What we choose is what we really want most of all, so is there really a choice?
— Noah Te Stroete

This is merely a tautology. The question is, is what we want most predetermined? If it is not, but it is ultimately we who give weigh our incommensurate needs and desires, then we are free. As different people assign different weights to different motives, it is clear that the assignment of weights depends on the agent. — Dfpolis

It is not a tautology because you seem to be claiming that we could've chosen something that we didn't want most of all. — Noah Te Stroete

I made no such claim. Let's think about this. How do we know what a person most wants? By observing what they choose. This is true whether or not that choice is predetermined. So, it is a tautology to say that "What we choose is what we really want most of all." Of course we do.

Volitional determinists believe that all human acts are fully immanent in the state of the universe prior to the existence of the human agent. Proponents of free will think that this is false, and that new lines of action have their radical origin in human agents. That is the question that needs to be discussed with regard to the existence of free will, and it is a question that cannot be evaded by compatibilist redefinitions of "free will."

It is predetermined by the limbic system which drives the frontal lobe (the "thinking" or "weighing" part which I said is just like "going through a mental exercise"). — Noah Te Stroete

This makes no evolutionary sense. Why waste time and energy on a process that is merely for show? Who is nature trying to fool and why?

hypotheses of the sort you are advancing are unfalsifiable, and so unscientific. — Dfpolis

Proponents of free will think that this is false, and that new lines of action have their radical origin in human agents. — Dfpolis

And this isn't unfalsifiable?

Edit: I believe it is a better explanatory model to say that the limbic system drives our decisions, then to simply assert that we are free agents.

So, it is a tautology to say that "What we choose is what we really want most of all." Of course we do. — Dfpolis

Then we choose. But what is your evidence that it isn't pre-determined? How do you reconcile free will with everything that we know about the natural world?

hypotheses of the sort you are advancing are unfalsifiable, and so unscientific. — Dfpolis

Proponents of free will think that this is false, and that new lines of action have their radical origin in human agents. — Dfpolis

And this isn't unfalsifiable? — Noah Te Stroete

Falsifiability is a criterion applicable only to the hypothetico-deductive or scientific method. One cannot apply that method to a hypothesis that is unfalsifiable. It does not apply to either experiential observation or to deduction, which are reliable or not on their own grounds. You presented what, on its face, appears to be a scientific hypothesis. I presented a deductive, experienced-based argument for my position. If you have and experiential/deductive argument for determinism, please advance it.

Falsifiability is a criterion applicable only to the hypothetico-deductive or scientific method. One cannot apply that method to a hypothesis that is unfalsifiable. It does not apply to either experiential observation or to deduction, which are reliable or not on their own grounds. You presented what, on its face, appears to be a scientific hypothesis. I presented a deductive, experienced-based argument for my position. If you have and experiential/deductive argument for determinism, please advance it. — Dfpolis

All natural phenomena have sufficient and necessary causes.
Choices are natural phenomena.
Choices have sufficient and necessary causes.

Approaching the choice, we are aware that incompatible lines of action, L1, L2, ..., are equally in our power. — Dfpolis

Are we aware of this? I don't know that this is true.

Approaching the choice, we are aware that incompatible lines of action, L1, L2, ..., are equally in our power. — Dfpolis

If you really have free will, then refrain from posting further. EDIT :Or, give up philosophy altogether. Or do you feel compelled to be a philosopher?

[1] "When we act, we do what we do because of the way we are, all things considered." — Galen Strawson

There is a category mistake inherent within this premise. The "way we are" is a passive state, expressed as a static description. It cannot account for an action, as an action requires an active cause. So if someone asked me why I acted in a particular way, at a particular time, to say "I acted that way because that's the way I am", would be a meaningless category mistake, because it doesn't say why I acted that way. What it is, is an avoidance of the question, which appears like a possible answer to the question, when it's really a category mistake.

To explain an action requires reference to other actions, as cause. So when someone asks why I acted in a particular way, at a particular time, I cannot refer to "the way I am" (as this is a category mistake). I must refer to other activities which were happening or happened at that time, or things which I desired to make happen in the future. To explain an action requires reference to an action, it cannot be explained through reference to a state.

There is a further experiential point worthy of reflection. Purely physical systems (as opposed to physical systems with intellect and will) have only one immanent line of action -- that determined by its present state and the laws of nature. Intentional systems, such as humans, are essentially different in that we can have multiple lines of actions immanent before we commit to one. The difference in the number of immanent lines of action is critical, for it means that we differ from purely physical systems. So any analogy to their deterministic nature fails. — Dfpolis

So the point to consider here is that the activity of a physical system cannot be explained through reference to its "present state". That would be to make the same category mistake. To explain the activity of a physical system requires reference to the temporal extension of that system, and this means something beyond the "present state".

But what is your evidence that it isn't pre-determined? How do you reconcile free will with everything that we know about the natural world? — Noah Te Stroete

I provided a positive case for my position. I am prepared to rebut any counter argument. (I have reviewed all that I could find.) That is the best I can do.

I dispute your claim that free will is in any way incompatible "with everything that we know about the natural world." Surely humans are part of nature and our our experiences of ourselves as agents are as natural as our experiences of physical objects. What it is incompatible with is physical determinism.

I have argued previously that although all knowing is a subject-object relation, natural science begins with a fundamental abstraction that focuses on physical objects to the exclusion of the knowing subject. Consequently, the natural sciences are bereft of data on subjective agents, and has, therefore, no means of connecting what it has learned of the physical world with the intentional operations of subject-agents. That means that any attempt to apply purely physical concepts to such agency is an instance of Whitehead's Fallacy of Misplace Concreteness (applying abstractions to situations in which the abstracted context is relevant).

All natural phenomena have sufficient and necessary causes.
Choices are natural phenomena.
Choices have sufficient and necessary causes. — Noah Te Stroete

Agreed. Still, while it is necessary that every effect have an adequate cause, it is not necessary that the cause that informs the effect be predetermined to a particular effect. The problem with this sort of argument is that modern philosophy has forgotten the distinction between accidental and essential causes.

Accidental causes (which are all most moderns think about) are the time-sequence by rule that occupied the minds of Hume and Kant. They connect two temporally disjoint events, and as the separation allows for intervention, this kind of causality is not necessary -- a point famously made by Hume, but also known to Aristotle, ibn Sina and Aquinas. That is why time-sequenced causality is called "accidental." Since accidental causality is not necessary, it cannot justify determinism.

Essential or concurrent causality is quite different. Aristotle's paradigm case is the builder building the house. The builder building the house is identically the house being built by the builder. Because of this identity and the fact that only a single event is involved, essential causality has an intrinsic necessity that accidental causality lacks. Every happening is a doing, and every doing is a happening. For example, the law of conservation of mass-energy conserving this system's mass-energy is identically this system's mass-energy being conserved by the law of conservation of mass-energy. If the law were not operative here and now, mass-energy would not be conserved here and now -- and vice versa.

Human will acts concurrently. As long as I continue to will my goal, I continue to work toward that goal. Thus, a free will can be the necessary sufficient cause you argue for if it is sufficient to commit to the line of action (say L1) that it in fact commits to. That it is sufficient to commit to L1 does not preclude it from also being sufficient to commit to L2, which it did not commit to.

Approaching the choice, we are aware that incompatible lines of action, L1, L2, ..., are equally in our power. — Dfpolis

Are we aware of this? I don't know that this is true. — Noah Te Stroete

Even though I choose to stay home, I am aware that I have the power to walk to the store while I do not have the power to walk to the moon. How could you not know this?

If you really have free will, then refrain from posting further. — Noah Te Stroete

How would following your dictate prove anything?

So the point to consider here is that the activity of a physical system cannot be explained through reference to its "present state". That would be to make the same category mistake. To explain the activity of a physical system requires reference to the temporal extension of that system, and this means something beyond the "present state". — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes. Intentionality is revealed by time-development -- whether that intentionality be human or merely physical.

Human will acts concurrently. As long as I continue to will my goal, I continue to work toward that goal. Thus, a free will can be the necessary sufficient cause you argue for if it is sufficient to commit to the line of action (say L1) that it in fact commits to. That it is sufficient to commit to L1 does not preclude it from also being sufficient to commit to L2, which it did not commit to. — Dfpolis

"As long as I continue to will my goal, I continue to work toward that goal."

Of course! This is a tautology. It's like saying, "As long as I continue to will my goal, I continue to will my goal." So what is will?

"it is sufficient to commit to the line of action (say L1) that it in fact commits to. That it is sufficient to commit to L1 does not preclude it from also being sufficient to commit to L2, which it did not commit to."

So the will is uncaused. How did you refute Strawson again? I'm genuinely confused here. Could you clarify how the will is not accidentally necessarily and sufficiently caused?

If you really have free will, then refrain from posting further.
— Noah Te Stroete

How would following your dictate prove anything? — Dfpolis

Because you felt compelled to put me in my place.

if it is sufficient to commit to the line of action (say L1) that it in fact commits to. That it is sufficient to commit to L1 does not preclude it from also being sufficient to commit to L2, which it did not commit to. — Dfpolis

I'm saying it's necessary AND sufficient. Not just sufficient. Where am I going wrong? I'm confused.

I have argued previously that although all knowing is a subject-object relation, natural science begins with a fundamental abstraction that focuses on physical objects to the exclusion of the knowing subject. — Dfpolis

You are putting it to the point. You are different from the physical object observed, so... why should anyone assume you got something to do with it?

If I had a frontal lobotomy (which I'm considering after this exchange), then I couldn't speak coherently no matter how much I willed it. So, is not the will dependent on the physical-natural brain which operates according to necessary AND sufficient causes?