I have long been convinced of the pointlessness of the question 'Is perception 'really' direct or indirect?'; whether perception is thought to be direct or indirect is just a matter of perspective, or different ways of talking about the same thing, isn't it? As far as I have been able to see there is no "one way it 'really' is".

Well, it depends on what's meant by awareness. A computer program could be said to be aware of its inputs. A simulation of perceptual awareness could be built into a robot.

That's different from having a conscious perception. — Marchesk

As far as I see, you differentiate between conscious perception and the state of consciousness.
Could you define both rigorously?

I have long been convinced of the pointlessness of the question 'Is perception 'really' direct or indirect?'; whether perception is thought to be direct or indirect is just a matter of perspective, or different ways of talking about the same thing, isn't it? — Janus

No, I don't think so. Consider a brain in a vat, or Neo in the Matrix. Now regardless of whether we think such a scenario is feasible (whether the vat or Matrix could actually be built), we can conclude that BIVs and Neo inside the Matrix are not perceiving objects directly. Rather, their brain is being stimulated as if they were perceiving objects via their physical organs.

Now the indirect realist is saying something similar about actual perception. Which is that the brain being stimulated via the senses results in a Matrix/BIV-like experience in that it is brain activity that creates consciousness. As such, we're aware of a mentally simulated world.

The direct realist denies this. For one thing, it has skeptical connotations about how we can really know there's a world out there, or even that we're not BIVs with no actual bodies. It also makes idealism an attractive alternative.

And direct realists have their own reasons for thinking representations or ideas are faulty concepts.

But I can't get away from the fact that it's brain activity which results in colors, sounds and what not. The fact that BIV, Matrix or Boltzmann brain scenarios sound plausible (to an extent anyway) and that we have dreams, hallucinations, imagination, inner dialog and what not strongly suggests that all experience is brain generated, and that's what we're aware of. So why would perception be different?

When I'm dreaming, I experience seeing stuff, hearing stuff, my body moving around as if it were actual perception. That's why dream skepticism exists at all, and how sometimes I can be temporarily confused upon waking up as to what's real. I just don't see how the experience is somehow different (setting aside the ridiculous structure of dreams). Only the origin of the experience.

Firstly, I don't think BIV or Matrix scenarios are worthy of serious consideration; apart from their implausibility they just push the real world back one step, leaving all the questions unanswered.

Secondly, I don't think it is right to say that it is brain activity which creates consciousness. The brain is a part of the whole process to be sure, but there could be no (ordinary, at least) consciousness without the things we are conscious of. I don't believe the world is "mentally simulated", mental activity is just a part of the activity of the world, as far as we can tell.

So, I don't think it's right, or at least complete, to say that brains "result in colours and sounds...". If perception were of mere simulations and were not veridical, then the belief that there is a brain at all is thrown into question.

Dreams are distinguishable from waking life insofar as we usually wake from them; they generally have no continuity from night to night, and our waking life is coherently shared with others. Dreams, or my dreams at least, do not manifest these characteristics.

It's the experience of dreams that's relevant, because it demonstrates that it's possible to have a perceptual-like experience where the content is clearly mental. A dream tree is an idea in my mind (or however one would prefer to state that).

The brain is central to experience because it's the one component of the organism which is necessary for experience. Remove your eyes and you can still have color experiences. Remove your visual cortex and this becomes impossible.

The BIV and Matrix scenarios are plausible in the sense that we can already stimulate the brain to have experiences that seem real, but which aren't veridical perceptions. This can be done with drugs, meditative states, imagination, dreaming, electrodes in the brain, etc.

The brain is central to experience because it's the one component of the organism which is necessary for experience. — Marchesk

The body is necessary for experience; it's as obvious that you can't have experience without a body as it is that you cannot have experience without a brain. It's also obvious that you can't have an experiencing body without an environment.

I remain unconvinced by your reasoning that the BIV and Matrix scenarios are plausible; they are merely logical possibilities, insofar as they don't involve any logical contradiction.

You haven't tried to address my point that our knowledge of the brain would be altogether bankrupt if perception were not veridical, and I think that is the most telling point against what you have been proposing.

You haven't tried to address my point that our knowledge of the brain would be altogether bankrupt if perception were not veridical, — Janus

I didn't say perception wasn't veridical. I said it's not direct when we're conscious of a perception.

Looks like the OP is chock full of reference/ground that is highly questionable.

When perception is said to be informed by language... the result is a conflation of complex thought/belief and but one element therein. Perception is necessary but insufficient for thinking about a computer as a computer.

I didn't say perception wasn't veridical. I said it's not direct when we're conscious of a perception. — Marchesk

What would it mean to say that perception is veridical according to you? I mean it obviously wouldn't be veridical under the BIV or Matrix scenarios. Also to say that it is not (thought to be?) direct when we are conscious of (the 'machinery' of) perception (you say of "a perception" but this is not what I took you to mean) is just the same as to say that it is thought to be direct or indirect depending on how we think about it, isn't it?

I mean it obviously wouldn't be veridical under the BIV or Matrix scenarios. — Janus

Those scenarios were just meant to illustrate what an indirect realist means by being aware of a mental image instead of the physical object itself. And to lend credibility to the idea that it's the brain generated experience that we're aware of when having a conscious perception. Because the senses are performing the same roles as a vat in that they're stimulating the regions of the brain to have those experiences.

What would it mean to say that perception is veridical according to you? — Janus

Empirically verifiable, unless we start out knowing what is the case, such as with BIVs and Matrices.

is just the same as to say that it is thought to be direct or indirect depending on how we think about it, isn't it? — Janus

Depending on one's philosophical interpretation of perception.

But we don't consciously perceive the world as it is. From science we know that it's not true. — Marchesk

This is simply because effects are not the same as their causes. This would be the case for any being with senses. The effects: conscious experiences, will never be the things they are experiencing. It is nonsensical to even think that could be the case, and to even ask the question: "How can we see things as they really are?" It seems to me that the only way to observe how something truly is, is to BE that thing. You are your mind and you experience your mind as it truly is. I can only infer what is in your mind through your behavior. But this is simply because of how vision works. Our visual systems make models of how things are. We see things as objects when everything is process and information.

While we don't see things as they really are, we can know things as they truly are. Is there an advantage of seeing things as they truly are as opposed to knowing things as they truly are? What would it be like to see the ripeness of an apple as opposed to "just" the redness of the apple? What advantage would one have over the other?

The effects: conscious experiences, will never be the things they are experiencing. It is nonsensical to even think that could be the case, and to even ask the question: "How can we see things as they really are?" — Harry Hindu

Yes indeed.

215. Here we see that the idea of 'agreement with reality' does not have any clear application. — Wittgenstein, On Certainty

If we can't perceive things as they really are, then direct realism is impossible, since realism is concerned with things as they are, not as they appear to us. But I take it you're an indirect realist.

Those scenarios were just meant to illustrate what an indirect realist means by being aware of a mental image instead of the physical object itself. And to lend credibility to the idea that it's the brain generated experience that we're aware of when having a conscious perception. Because the senses are performing the same roles as a vat in that they're stimulating the regions of the brain to have those experiences. — Marchesk

Do you genuinely believe that when you perceive a tree you are perceiving a "mental image"? The very notion of a "mental image" is based on a scientific explanation which assumes a series of real processes both external and internal to the brain. How can you you justify using such an assumption to undermine itself?

Appealing to the BIV scenario doesn't help, because it assumes the independent existence of brains and vats, i.e. it assumes the existence of an extra-mental world.

What would it mean to say that perception is veridical according to you? — Janus


Empirically verifiable, unless we start out knowing what is the case, such as with BIVs and Matrices. — Marchesk

But that is not what your argument seems to be wanting to address. Empirical verifiability is just accordance with intersubjective experience; it says nothing about whether direct or indirect realism is the case. The idea of veridicality of perception, though, is the idea that what we perceive reflects (at least some) real qualities of mind-independent things. According to the direct realist view, when I see a tree, I see an actual tree that exists external to my body. The colour of the tree is a function of real processes; light, the surfaces of the leaves and bark of the tree reflecting the light, and the constitution of my eyes, optic nerves and visual cortex, the position of my body in relation to the tree and so on and on. All these processes are extra-mental; the seeing itself is the mental thing.

Of course none of this says anything about what the "ultimate reality" of the tree (or of my body) 'really is"; in a way such questions are senseless because they cannot be answered. The fact that they cannot be answered doesn't seem to have anything to do with whether things are directly or indirectly real, though (leaving aside so-called "naive realism'). We can look at what seems to be going on and declare it to be either directly or indirectly real depending on whether we choose to consider the question from one perspective or another, but I think the only cogent notion of reality, in the context of which directness or indirectness are irrelevant, is gained in contrast to the idea of the imaginary.

Appealing to the BIV scenario doesn't help, because it assumes the independent existence of brains and vats, i.e. it assumes the existence of an extra-mental world. — Janus

The indirect realist accepts the existence of an extra-mental world so he can appeal to the BIV scenario to explain his point, which is that although our experiences are causally covariant with external world stimulation the qualities of our experiences (the look, the feel, the taste, etc.) are not properties of these external world stimuli but properties of the mental phenomena itself.

The external world object has the property of reflecting light at a certain wavelength which isn’t the same as being red or green or whatever. That most people tend to have the same kind of colour experience when stimulated by light of this wavelength isn’t that the colour is a property of the external world object. That’s the naive view of perception that doesn’t stand up to scrutiny.

That's a sort of Wittgensteinian or pragmatic position to take, but it's not realism, since realism is concerned with things as they are, not as they appear to us.

If we can't perceive things as they really are, then direct realism is impossible, since realism is concerned with things as they are, not as they appear to us. But I take it you're an indirect realist. — Marchesk

I tried to make another point there in my post, but I think you missed it.

Not only is "direct realism" impossible, it doesn't even make sense to make a distinction between direct and indirect in how we "see" things and how we know things. Seeing is a form of knowledge. You acquire knowledge of real-time events. Observation is a key part of the scientific method. The fact that we can reproduce and predict so many external events must mean that we see/know some things as they really are. It doesn't seem to matter enough to make a distinction between indirect vs direct.

I also pointed out that you have a direct experience of your own mind and your mind is part of reality. Our minds are affected by external events and can be causes of external events. Your mind is external, or separate from mine - and mine to yours. We each have direct access to something in this reality. You could say that you have a direct perception of what it is like for Marchesk to experience reading a post on a Philosophy Forum. It seems to me that we have both direct and indirect access to reality, so it makes no sense to make the distinction between direct and indirect. I find the term, "space/time" more useful in referring to the separation of causes from their subsequent events, and I guess I'm just a realist.

That's a sort of Wittgensteinian or pragmatic position to take, but it's not realism, since realism is concerned with things as they are, not as they appear to us. — Marchesk

The contents of your mind is part of how things are. Psychology and neurology are scientific fields attempting to get at those parts of how things are.

Well, it depends on what's meant by awareness. A computer program could be said to be aware of its inputs. A simulation of perceptual awareness could be built into a robot.

That's different from having a conscious perception. — Marchesk

Is it? What is a conscious perception and how exactly does it differ from a robot's perceptions within it's own "brain"? All you see is a brain when you look at a human being. How do you know that mass of tissue contains conscious perceptions?

Isn't it that that mass of tissue or silicon is just a model of what is actually there? Hasn't your argument been that it is naive to think that what you see is actually the way things are?