Pyrrhonism

tim wood

A book about Pyrrhonism was mentioned in a thread a while ago,Pyrrhonism, How the Ancient Greeks Reinvented Buddhism, Adrian Kuzminski, 2008. Got and read, and it turns out that Pyrrhonism is pretty interesting. Attributed to Pyrrhon of Elis, c. 340 BC, pursued and developed by folks various through Sextus Empiricus, c. 190 AD.

Pyrrhonism is not skepticism. Skeptics doubt. Pyrrhonists believe. But what did they believe, and as well what did they not believe? From the book, "These philosophers were unique in the West in consciously not developing belief about nonevident matters, pro or con. Such beliefs, they maintained, being about things nonevident, could not be substantiated, and so remained unstable and open to challenge from competing beliefs.... Beliefs about things nonevident therefore were to be avoided, they recommended, and their philosophy addressed how this was to be achieved" (1).

Nonevident matters bad; evident matters good, apparently. Evident matters are described as "the testimony of what is evident, that is, the immediate, involuntary experiences we have of sensation and thoughts, ..., that are found convincing in everyday life" (1). This encompasses concepts of pathos and suffering, those things that happen to us. (Suffering in just that sense; that, e.g., we can suffer pleasure). I read this as believing in what we encounter, whether in thought or sense.

A distinction that matters is that for Pyrrhonists, "appearances are not abstractions, as they are... for most [of] Western philosophy" (71). They "take appearances at face value [and] assert that appearances indeed do have a face value, that is,.. reliably distinguishing character immediately and directly manifest to consciousness.... there is no reason to assume that appearances have to be explained; instead they themselves can become the principles of explanation. This is the 'Copernican revolution' of Pyrrhonism with regard to mainstream Western Philosophy" (71-72). That is, no form-matter synthesis. As I read it, what is, just is.

Appearances are just the involuntary objects of consciousness, objects "not as abstract concepts, such as substances, forms, matter, etc., but rather as distinct pathai, like the sight of a tree, the taste of a lemon, or the dread that follows rejection" (75).

"Appearances constitute a reality;.. they resist, under the questioning of Pyrrhonists,.. resolution into any other reality.... Indeed, appearance appears as its own reality, provided we accept it just as the peculiar reality that it is.... But if we seek to explain appearance as a function of some... synthesis, or anything else, then it becomes... a secondary function of more basic factors, of other criteria, which are themselves beyond appearances as such, and so necessarily nonevident" (75).

On the evident, (from Against the Logicians, Sextus): there are four distinct classes of objects [pragmata, or facts]... 1) things manifestly evident, 2) things absolutely nonevident, 3) things naturally nonevident, and 4) things temporarily nonevident.

1) Things manifest are just the appearances themselves, sensations and thoughts
2) Things absolutely nonevident are "the things never to be presented to human apprehension"
3) Naturally nonevident things are those incapable of clear presentation to perception. "The soul, for instance, is one of the things naturally nonevident; for such is its nature that it never presents itself to our clear perception"
4) Temporarily nonevident are just those things but for circumstance are not manifestly evident, like the books in the library when you're in the kitchen (93-94).

------

I've resorted to quoting from the book as a way not to neglect some of the subtleties of Pyrrhonism, and it should be clear that there are subtleties. Further, I take the philosophy of a critical acceptance of appearances not as a created obscure revelatory "psychology" of that time, but rather as a kind of majority report - or at least a large plurality. That is, an account of what most folks did, with an attempt to give the account some rigour. And if this is what most folks did (and no doubt what many folks still do), i.e., believe that in appearances there is a kind of certitude - maybe the only certitude, then I find therein a very plausible accounting for the behaviours of much of humanity: that they operate on immediate belief in appearances.

But the Pyrrhonist retains for himself a safeguard in that he does not also believe, eo ipso, that the appearance is true beyond what is apparent. "I might eat a mushroom and watch the trees in the forest dance. There is no mistaking the dancing trees I see. The mistake is to take them for the trees in the forest I saw earlier, that is, for linking them together in term of some continuous , eternal substance underlying both" (81). More generally, the distinction is between the appearance, and what is said about the appearance.

The author makes the point that echos of Pyrrhonism are heard in Berkeley, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and others.
‍♂️

schopenhauer1

↪tim wood

So they don't believe in universals? Also, if people have slightly different appearances and experiences, does that mean there are as many realities as people's experiences?

tim wood

↪schopenhauer1

That is in fact the tension between scholastic realism and nominalism - leading to the division and distinction between a perfect god and an omnipotent god. As such, no part of this discussion except perhaps derivatively or tangentially. Two further points: in as much as universals are not appearances, my guess is that they would not have included them in what they believed - universals being "naturally nonevident," and, I'm inclined to not speak about what they did not believe, so much as that they simply suspended belief about that thing. I..e., in addition to what could be said for it, were all the things that could be said against it, without coming to a stand. Whereas, to "not believe" is to come to a stand.

As to multiple realities, yes and no. You have your perception - appearance; I have mine. But these are "appearances" and understood to be such. But neither the Pyrronhist nor you and I would hold ourselves apart from "comparing notes" to determine that the appearance was of an underlying reality. You see a snake; I see a snake. No doubt our respective perceptions and thoughts differ. but equally certainly, we can compare and quickly satisfy ourselves that there is a snake.

Wayfarer

Thanks for the interesting review. I read a long excerpt from that book when enrolled in Buddhist Studies, but it's not in the university library so have not read it in entirety, although I'm reasonably familiar with the overall idea.

the distinction is between the appearance, and what is said about the appearance. — tim wood

This is where the Buddhist influence can be spelled out a bit better. One of the fundamental principles of Buddhism is the teaching of 'emptiness', which sounds extremely mysterious, but to quote a Buddhist scholar:

Emptiness is [simply] a mode of perception, a way of looking at experience. It adds nothing to and takes nothing away from the raw data of physical and mental events. You look at events in the mind and the senses with no thought of whether there's anything lying behind them.

This mode is called 'emptiness' because it's empty of the presuppositions we usually add to experience to make sense of it: the stories and world-views we fashion to explain who we are and the world we live in. Although these stories and views have their uses, the Buddha found that some of the more abstract questions they raise — of our true identity and the reality of the world outside — pull attention away from a direct experience of how events influence one another in the immediate present. Thus they get in the way when we try to understand and solve the problem of suffering.

This is connected to the idea of 'conceptual proliferation'(prapañca) which is, if you like, what it is that emptiness sets out to negate. This analysis shows how deeply we are are affected by conditioned responses and attachments - 'what can be said about appearances'. And that can be extended to highly complex and sophisticated forms of thought - even to philosophy! - as well as to any or all of our day-to-day activities and attitudes. How many arguments are based on the meanings we generally attribute to things? Like and dislike, mine and not-mine, and the many judgements that then flow from this. And I think this is nearer in meaning to the 'suspension of judgement' (epoche) which is associated with Pyrrhonism.

(See also Epoche and Śūnyatā: Skepticism East and West, Jay Garfield.)

tim wood

↪Wayfarer

Agreed, much nearer.

I see the hazard as lying in the reification of not-believing. I read Pyrrhonists (and apparently Buddhists) as avoiding that pitfall. Do you think we might call it considered/informed indifference?

Wayfarer

↪tim wood

The 'reification of not-believing' is a bit of an awkward phrase, but it's definitely on target. It manifests in secular culture as rejection of ideas that are associated with religion; there are kinds of taboos or cultural boundaries which are often implicit that are based on this rejection. (I know as one who frequently crosses them ;-) )

One of the things that occured to me when I started studying Buddhism is that it's sceptical - but also religious, in some ways. So from our point of view, that's a contradiction in terms; religion is all about 'belief', right? And more so - 'belief without evidence'. And there certainly is that strain of thought in Western religion - believing in spite of, or even in defiance of, evidence to the contrary. But that, in turn, is because of the role 'belief' plays in the way 'religion' has been construed in our culture.

See Metaphysical mistake: should we believe in belief?, Karen Armstrong

and also:

Belief and Truth - Katja Vogt (who also authored the SEP article on 'Ancient Scepticism'.)

eodnhoj7

↪tim wood

Interesting post...so effectively "The All" of what is perceived is evidence and should be taken at face value?

tim wood

↪eodnhoj7

I think you've got it, if "perceived" is taken as very broadly inclusive, and "face value" just is face value. As I read it, it isn't so much a philosophy as a practice of which one aspect is opposition to dogmatists. Beyond that I hesitate to characterize, because this is thinking originating a few centuries BC, and apparently from Buddhist roots. It includes perceptions and sensations, thoughts and feelings, anything evident, as opposed to things non-evident. I reckon the trick is in keeping track of what things are and especially what they are not. An example is the oar that's straight, but "bent" in water. Apparently the Pyrrhonist does not have a problem with this: what he might question is what is said about it, and why it's said. It's also pretty clear that these were essentially reasonable folks who weren't interested, as so many of us are, in proving the impossible true and the true impossible.

Sextus Empiricus is on my list. Caveat: the author of the book referenced above makes it very clear that nearly everyone ties Pyrronhism into a Prucrustean bed of Skepticism, implicitly - explicitly, actually - disqualifying nearly all commentary as thereby wrong-headed.

eodnhoj7

↪tim wood

Upon first glance, I am both personally and objectively sympathetic to pyrrhonist perspective as it gives premise to appearances or symbols as directing us to truth under a simple premise of existence "as is". In simpler terms existence is movement as appearance dictates this to us.

The problem occurs in the respect The pyrrhonist perspective and it's opposition towards any form of dogma is in itself a dogma with the base rules and triadic means to reach these rules (upon further reading) are also dogma as a framework of reasoning.

And yet their position of appearance paradoxically is also true as this statement itself is appearance. So it appears that all appearance is composed of, composes and is maintained through limits which give the foundation of appearance.

tim wood

And yet their position of appearance paradoxically is also true — eodnhoj7

Clever folks, them Greeks (and Buddhists).

eodnhoj7

↪tim wood

Brilliant in all truth, considering there emphasis on understanding the subjective human psychology effectively lead them to question the nature of what objective limit really "is".

ONE lesson I learned from eastern philosophy is that true objectivity leads to compassion and unity, for if one is to look as the divisive nature of cruelty it stems from a form of attachment with attachment causing change as an absence of order hence being its own problem.

This self reflective nature of all being effectively makes the truest form of cruelty being one of complete objectivity where cruelty is observe coldly and negates itself in a compassionate unity, with unity being the foundation of all structure, existence and even objectivity.

True objectivity leads to compassion as detachment.

eodnhoj7

↪tim wood

The problem occurs as this appearance neccessitates dogma and in these respects the pyrhonnists contradict themselves.

tim wood

The problem occurs as this appearance necessitates dogma and in these respects the pyrhonnists contradict themselves. — eodnhoj7

Perhaps, but the author noted that and made clear that Pyrrhonists don't worry about it. It's appearances they choose to believe in. With respect to what is said about the appearances, they're apparently capable of agnosticism. Hmm. Agnosticism implies a stand, a conclusion. Near as I can tell, Pyrronhists free themselves from the burden of insupportable conclusions. The author makes clear that it's not a philosophy, but a practice, with to-be-sure, therapeutic benefits.

eodnhoj7

So if the practice of pyrhonism is rooted in contradiction, the pyrhonists practice contradiction as a form of opposition between opposing extremes (ie no dogma is dogma). In these respects, this opposition as a foundation of multiplicity through its dualistic nature, gives premise to the pyrhonnist philosophy as one of acceptance of appearance as change being acceptance of change itself.

Under these terms the pyrhonnist philosophy of acceptance of continual change through appearance, is in itself a constant and there is still a contradiction (oppostion). That is unless change and no change are accepted as connected, but if connected as one.

Do you see where I am heading?

tim wood

So if the practice of pyrhonism is rooted in contradiction, — eodnhoj7

I don't qualify as an apologist for Pyrrhonism; I only have some notions about it got from one book. But I am pretty sure that contradiction is actually nothing to them. How could it be? How would an appearance (again, broadly inclusive) be a contradiction. Observe I did not say grounds for a contradiction; that would be a different application. But a contradiction in itself? Above in the OP is the example of "the dancing trees." A contradiction only if the respective appearances are confused one for the other.

What you're looking for is an argument based in non-evident considerations (so I argue). The Pyrrhonist, so I gather, simply distinguishes between what he calls the evident and the non-evident, and as a practice avoids cross-contamination of the two. In this it's good to recall the Buddhist roots of the thing. Pyrrhon apparently traveled with Alexander the Great to Asia where he encountered forms of Buddhism.

(And to argue no-dogma is dogma makes some subtle assumptions that I believe are unsupportable - or at least arguable. I.e., that dogma/not-dogma constitute complimentary sets, and that in combination are exhaustive of all possibilities. If that's what you're claiming, I'll leave it to you to make the case that not-dogma is dogma. I'll concede at the outset that it's an attractively persuasive conclusion. But I suspect it's an error and the Pyrronhist approach is evidence of the error.)

eodnhoj7

If the contradiction is nothing to them, and appearances are rooted in contradiction then appearances are nothing to them and the philosophy effectively is nothing.

On the other hand if contradiction, as opposition, is something then what they are observing is a connective quality between difference, effectively leading to the paramenidian conception of all is one. This necessitates a degree of change as to what appearance is considering oneness is viewed approximately through multiplicity and appearance is dependent upon a change in observation where observation at space time locality x is different than the one at space time locality y.

Observation of x and y would have to be observed and the question of appearance becomes one of the self.

On a separate note:

The negation of a positive, in this case dogma, necessitates a positive to be negated where negation is strictly a means of relative gradation hence appearance as dogma is rooted in an idolization of relativism if left unobserved.

I will stop here to keep the post short.

tim wood

and appearances are rooted in contradiction — eodnhoj7

Who said this? They didn't. You're confusing things. A contradiction arises in the confrontation of two (or more) thing otherwise related. There's no contradiction in appearances. This appears, that appears and that's it. Hard to get your head around, but worth the effort.

If two thing seem contradictory, then the point is to look and see exactly in what the contradiction inheres. It would seem that contradiction occurs in the (a) non-evident substrate. The which, I think, the Pyrrhonist would confront on its own terms - maybe a a third appearance of thought.

The negation of a positive, in this case dogma, necessitates a positive to be negated where negation is strictly a means of relative gradation hence appearance as dogma is rooted in an idolization of relativism if left unobserved. — eodnhoj7

Negation a term of relative gradation? Appearance as dogma? negation is negation; nothing relative about it: it is, or it isn't. And appearance is appearance. These are your axioms.

eodnhoj7

↪tim wood

Actually that is the problem, what they may have said and what they appear to have said is relative to the observer as the observer still appears under a mantle of selfhood. This dualism between the perceived (As an appearance) and the appearance necessitates that appearance can invert or change eachother from one state to another; hence is void of structure and acts as a means of inversion.

The rest of the thread is long, so you can skip the rest and just focus on the above ststement.

Actually there is a contradiction.

Writing out a negation of dogma, in itself appears as a dogma if one is to look up the definition of dogma. The question of interpretation of appearance in itself is an appearance, hence what we understand of appearance is not just a reflective nature (where specific limits repeated resulting in a symmetry) but observes a relativistic disconnect from one appearance and another.

This disconnect, or void, is the premise of much appearance itself.

The nature of appearance cannot be limited to empiricism alone, but must also extend to reason and intuition considering the emliricists doctrine is not strictly interpreted by the 5 senses alone. In this manner appearance must be relegated to reason and intuition. This gives premise to all appearance, effectively occurring from point space or void.

Hence, as you observed the third dimension to appearance (relative to the dualism of contradiction resulting in a third form of the thing itself) is dependent upon a form of synthesis with this synthesis itself not entirely perceptible due to its possibilities nature.

In regards to a negative as relative gradation:

ALL positives observe a premise of existence as unity or unity (locality as a whole existing through other wholes). Considering there is no nothing, what we observe as absence is merely a relation of parts.

Color may be absent in this sentence, but as absent we localize color as a part which relates to further parts. So while this sentence my be deficient in yellow or green we under the absence of yellow and green as a negative boundary, we observe that the color of yellow and green are separate from this sentence and in doing so localize them into separate parts (ie the sentence and the colors green and yellow).

Hence as lacking in certain qualities the above sentence observes grades of quality (color, yellow, green) with a grade, or "gradation", being a form of atomization with the definition of "grade" being subject to its own nature as multiple definitions.

In regards to appearance as dogma. The pyrhonnist localize specific negative traits to reality leading to an axiom of appearance being the resting point of there philosophy. The problem is that these negative boundaries to appearance, still act as a dogma (or set of rule and regulations) in the respect they observe grades of appearance through negation.

For example, one may not be able to make a full judgement due to change, but this absence of judgement points to judgement as separate hence existing as a grade of appearance. The pyrhonnist have the appearance of dogma, but claim dogma is not possible or correct, hence appearance effectively is void in these respects as it is absent of limits or boundaries from which to give it structure.

If these are "my axioms" as I perceive them, and the pyrhonnist perspective is true, then the axioms exist and the pyrhonnist perspective is just a localized aspect of truth and cannot exist on its own terms except as a part of truth. I agree with the pyrhonnist argument, if it is viewed for what it is as a part of truth.

eodnhoj7

↪tim wood

Actually you can reference the "all axioms act as points of inversion; hence are non-axiomatic" thread in the first page of the metaphysics section... it would summarize a lot considering "axiom" (self evidence) and "appearance" can be observed as connected.

Ying

So, according to Sextus Empiricus, this is what sceptics, well, did:

"Scepticism is an ability, or mental attitude, which opposes appearances to judgements in any way whatsoever, with the result that, owing to the equipollence of the objects and reasons thus opposed, we are brought firstly to a state of mental suspense and next to a state of "unperturbedness" or quietude. Now we call it an "ability" not in any subtle sense, but simply in respect of its "being able." By "appearances" we now mean the objects of sense-perception, whence we contrast them with the objects of thought or "judgements." The phrase "in any way whatsoever" can be connected either with the word "ability," to make us take the word "ability," as we said, in its simple sense, or with the phrase "opposing appearances to judgements"; for inasmuch as we oppose these in a variety of ways – appearances to appearances, or judgements to judgements, or alternando appearances to judgements, -- in order to ensure the inclusion of all these antitheses we employ the phrase "in any way whatsoever." Or, again, we join "in any way whatsoever" to "appearances and judgements" in order that we may not have to inquire how the appearances appear or how the thought-objects are judged, but may take these terms in the simple sense. The phrase "opposed judgements" we do not employ in the sense of negations and affirmations only but simply as equivalent to "conflicting judgements." "Equipollence" we use of equality in respect of probability and improbability, to indicate that no one of the conflicting judgements takes precedence of any other as being more probable. "Suspense" is a state of mental rest owing to which we neither deny nor affirm anything. "Quietude" is an untroubled and tranquil condition of soul. And how quietude enters the soul along with suspension of judgement we shall explain in our chapter (XII.) "Concerning the End.""
-Sextus Empiricus, "Outlines of Pyrrhonism" book 1, ch. 4.

"Our next subject will be the end of the Sceptic system. Now an "end" is "that for which all actions or reasonings are undertaken, while it exists for the sake of none"; or, otherwise, "the ultimate object of appentency." We assert still that the Sceptic's End is quietude in respect of matters of opinion and moderate feeling in respect of things unavoidable. For the skeptic, having set out to philosophize with the object of passing judgment on the sense impressions and ascertaining which of them are true and which false, so as to attain quietude thereby, found himself involved in contradictions of equal weight, and being unable to decide between them suspended judgment; and as he was thus in suspense there followed, as it happened, the state of quietude in respect of matters of opinion. For the man who opines that anything is by nature good or bad is for ever being disquieted: when he is without the things which he deems good he believes himself to be tormented by things naturally bad and he pursues after the things which are, as he thinks, good; which when he has obtained he keeps falling into still more perturbations because of his irrational and immoderate elation, and in his dread of a change of fortune he uses every endeavor to avoid losing the things which he deems good. On the other hand, the man who determines nothing as to what is naturally good or bad neither shuns nor pursues anything eagerly; and, in consequence, he is unperturbed.
The Sceptic, in fact, had the same experience which is said to have befallen the painter Apelles. Once, they say, when he was painting a horse and wished to represent in the painting the horse's foam, he was so unsuccessful that he gave up the attempt and flung at the picture the sponge on which he used to wipe the paints off his brush, and the mark of the sponge produced the effect of a horse's foam. So, too, the Sceptics were in hopes of gaining quietude by means of a decision regarding the disparity of the objects of sense and of thought, and being unable to effect this they suspended judgment; and they found that quietude, as if by chance, followed upon their suspense, even as a shadow follows its substance. We do not, however, suppose that the Sceptic is wholly untroubled; but we say that he is troubled by things unavoidable; for we grant that he is cold at times and thirsty, and suffers various affections of that kind. But even in these cases, whereas ordinary people are afflicted by two circumstances, -- namely, by the affections themselves and, in no less a degree, by the belief that these conditions are evil by nature, --the Sceptic, by his rejection of the added belief in the natural badness of all these conditions, escapes here too with less discomfort. Hence we say that, while in regard to matters of opinion the Sceptic's End is quietude, in regard to things unavoidable it is "moderate affection." But some notable Sceptics have added the further definition "suspension of judgment in investigations.""
-Ibid. ch. 12.

... Right. Sextus Empiricus then notes, in ch. 33 of book 1:

"Arcesilaus, however, who was, as we said, the president and founder of the Middle Academy, certainly seems to me to have shared the doctrines of Pyrrho, so that his way of thought is almost identical with ours. For we do not find him making any assertion about the reality or unreality of anything, nor does he prefer any one thing to another in point of probability or improbability, but suspends judgment about all. He also says that the End is suspension -- which is accompanied, as we have said, by "quietude." He declares, too, that suspension regarding particular objects is good, but assent regarding particulars bad. Only one might say that whereas we make these statements not positively but in accordance with what appears to us, he makes them as statements of real facts, so that he asserts that suspension in itself really is good and assent bad. And if one ought to credit also what is said about him, he appeared at the first glance, they say, to be a Pyrrhonean, but in reality he was a dogmatist; and because he used to test his companions by means of dubitation to see if they were fitted by nature for the reception of the Platonic dogmas, he was thought to be a dubitive philosopher, but he actually passed on to such of his companions as were naturally gifted the dogmas of Plato. And this was why Ariston described him as "Plato the head of him, Pyrrho the tail, in the midst Diodorus"; because he employed the dialectic of Diodorus, although he was actually a Platonist."

tim wood

And how is it that your own system as here represented escapes self-criticism?

what they may have said and what they appear to have said is relative to the observer as the observer still appears under a mantle of selfhood. — eodnhoj7

I think you're close to it, here. The observer takes the appearance (in this case what was said) just as appearance, as evident (as an appearance). To suppose that it is other than it appears appeals to some non-evident criteria. You, apparently thinking in binary terms, imply a non-evident contradiction that you then suppose them to deny. But if you do not acknowledge any contradiction, then there is no denial - no acknowledgment of the non-evident as evident.

It's as if someone likes vanilla ice cream and you suppose thereby that they dislike chocolate, or, if they don't want vanilla, then they must want chocolate. Maybe they want neither, or maybe strawberry. in other words, they, Pyrrhonists, apparently were at pains to avoid skepticism, in favour of belief, and they figured out a way to do it. If that doesn't work for you, that's ok. But I think you still have a ways to go in understanding before your critique can have merit.

If these are "my axioms" as I perceive them, and the pyrhonnist perspective is true, — eodnhoj7

I do not think "truth" is a meaningful criteria for evaluating Pyrrhonism, except perhaps trivially. At the very first, you would have to define "truth" somehow, and that's it own problem.

eodnhoj7

↪Ying

The problem of a strict suspension of judgement is it still necessitates a form of judgement as a process of negation in necessititated. This negatation requires a positive act of focus, for the most part, where a thesis is supplied to act as a negative.

This may sound contradictory at first glance, using a positive as a negative, but here is one example:

A cat keeps meowing, so I bring in a dog to chase the cat away. The dog keeps barking, so I feed it and pet it to keep it quiet.

In these examples a positive localized phenomena is brought into negate another positive localized phenemona...effectively to contain it. The cat is contained through the dog, the dog is contained through good behavior towards it. The problem, effectively as some perceived absence of order, is negated by providing some limit in which to contain it.

The same occurs for the munchaussen trillema, which is solvable, where it acts as a negative set of boundaries that form positive boundaries of "still psyche" by encapsulating or giving form to perceived chaos as an absence of order.

In these respects all movements have simultaneous positive and negative qualities and dogma is unavoidable. The question is rather less one of dogma or no dogma, but the most centered dogma which gives freedom through self structuring, in these respects we are left with basic reflection as the repitition of forms which give structure and direction to action.

It appears the best approach is a direct center approach, a middle path, of both dogma and no dogma where we perceive phenomena strictly for what they are limits.

Ying

The problem of a strict suspension of judgement is it still necessitates a form of judgement as a process of negation in necessititated. This negatation requires a positive act of focus, for the most part, where a thesis is supplied to act as a negative. — eodnhoj7

No, see, the problem is, I don't feel like playing the role of sounding board, here. I'd go look for someone else if I where you.

eodnhoj7

↪tim wood

System? I am assuming the Prime directives? You will have to elaborate before I answer and make a post longer than it needs to be.

The problem is that appearance takes on a form of evidence of existence where evidence is strictly just a structure of appearance...under the limits of continuity. One appearance is directed towards another and this directive quality gives existence to the appearance itself. In these respects all appearance, at minimum through time, is defined through the basic limits of the line and we are left with a foundation axiom and dogma of directed movement being the foundation of existence. This cannot be negated without effectively multiply this same limit into multiple one of the same structure.

ONE example is that while I may negate a phenomena as an appearance this still breaks it into further appearances. This progression continues and we are left with the question of what is appearance? The same negative qualities of separation, as in projecting one one phenomena away from another, require positive movment as limit in itself.

Under these terms we are left with the connection or separation of appearance, effectively being rooted in movement. The question occurs is appearance movment or vice versa. Either way a process of direction takes hold and we are stuck in the same cycle, but this cycle alomg with the projective linear nature of separation are universal forms.

And we are left with a reflection of platonic forms in one respect, while these limits exist as the change of heracltius. Change is form, with all form giving a prerequisite to a necessary dogma.

eodnhoj7

↪Ying

This is a debate....and from a pyrhonnist perspective this argument appears therefore it exists. ALL the statement can be reverse to "I will not be a sounding board for your ideas". It works both ways.

I will summate may point in shorter terms:

The pyrrhonist premise of appearance necessitates forms of negation. The forms of negation give form and function to a stable and structured mind. As positively forming a sound mind, the negative qualities of pyrhonnist philosophy has a dual positive structure and exists as dogma.

Ying

This is a debate... — eodnhoj7

Maybe it is, maybe it isn't. But you can't force me to be an active interlocutor in this discussion.

I will summate may point in shorter terms:

The pyrrhonist premise of appearance necessitates forms of negation. The forms of negation give form and function to a stable and structured mind. As positively forming a sound mind, the negative qualities of pyrhonnist philosophy has a dual positive structure and exists as dogma.

Yeah. I don't care. Sorry. See? I'm no fun.

eodnhoj7

↪Ying

Its up to you, just observing the inverse position of pyrhonism consider the thread is about it. Best to look at both sides of the coin considering they do not "appear" at the same time.

What pyrhonism "is", "is not" and the "origin" of both.

tim wood

The problem is that appearance takes on a form of evidence of existence — eodnhoj7

You keep making claims without support. Stop it and take the time to understand what you're trying to critique.

eodnhoj7

Okay...what is it I do not understand and what claims am I making that are unsupported?

If the logic does not work the logic does not work. The pyrhonist school has a dogma. The pyrhonist school claims there can be no dogma. Only appearance is truth. Appearance becomes is own constant law of change. Constant change is a limit and is a structure as this is One Law. Pyrhonism is not wrong, if viewed as a part of other systems of thought. It is only contradictory when viewed solely as self existing and rationally maintained by its own form and function.

We have evidence of this in geometry, much of which is premised in Platonic forms, Pythagorean Monad(s), Thales, the the presocratic atomist schools, Parmenides and Plotinus arguing of "The One" (which in effect exists as a law of limit), etc.

I am presenting nothing other than a Hegelian Synthesis of these schools. Constant change, as one appearance existing through another, in accorded with time, necessitates appearance existing as a necessary 1d Lineat Limit, at minimum.

This is a foundation for reason as it is a foundation of measurement; hence there can be a rational dogma which does not contradict any degree of truth considering this dogma, as a means of existence, is self sustaining and exists as the foundation of all appearance as definition while not being limited to appearance.

tim wood

The pyrhonist school claims there can be no dogma. — eodnhoj7

Who said that? I only read that they're opposed to dogmatism.

Only appearance is truth. — eodnhoj7

Who said that? I only read that Pyrrhonists choose to place their beliefs in appearances, as opposed to believing in things that are non-evident.

Appearance becomes is own constant law of change. — eodnhoj7

incoherent, irrelevant.

Constant change is a limit and is a structure as this is One Law. — eodnhoj7

Just incoherent.

Pyrhonism is not wrong — eodnhoj7

Near as I can tell, it's neither right nor wrong; it is a system for mediating perceptions and sensations to "see" them as they are.

It is only contradictory when viewed solely as self existing and rationally maintained by its own form and function — eodnhoj7

It's contradictory when rational?

You've said a lot about Pyrronhism. Now tell us your sources of information about it. It seems to me so far you know nothing about it and are not interested in it, except to try out your own opaque ideas on it.

eodnhoj7

↪tim wood

What is the difference between being opposed to dogmatism and saying their is no dogma?

If they choose to place there beliefs only in appearance, then that which does not appear may also be true?

Actually "constant change is a limit and is a structure as this is one law" is not incoherent. If what we observe is change, and this change is constant through time, then change exists as a limit through the projective nature of time. Time is the limit, and one law, through which change occurs. Considering time is linear, at minimum, this boundary of change can be observed as linear.

Pyrhonism as "neither/nor" rather than "both/and" may be neutral, but it is a negative neutral where "both/and" would be positive neutral. I'm arguing, if you would have actually read the statement, pyrhonism is both right and wrong. Right when viewed as a relative part, wrong when viewed as self sustaining.

Pyrhonism as a system, which appears as dogma as appearance is subjective, opposes itself as it opposes dogma. Opposition is contadiction, with contradiction being deficiency through this opposition.

As to the last statement "it is contradictory when"

Being rational and self maintaining is not contradictory. It is contradictory when the system "solely" (as in the system alone, existing alone) is determined true when it's form and function are not comgru ent.

You have said a lot about pyrhonism, admitted to not being an expert, how do you no if you are right or wrong? I am working with the information provided here, along with Stanford,wiki, random sources. The premises are not self sustaining for the school, but does not necessitate it having no truth...just deficient in truth.

Agnositicism, except in appearance, does not give a complete foundation for truth as if it appears, then it must be true. Hence inevitably we are left to a premise of a universal "the all" and the "I am".

Pyrrhonism

Welcome to The Philosophy Forum!

Categories