I wouldn't impose any criteria on which groups objectively exist because every restrictive criterion would be arbitrary to some extent - the more restrictive, the more arbitrary; the less restrictive, the less arbitrary (more universal/general).

I disagree because your position disqualifies any talk about the objective existence of anything.

We are a part of nature, which means that our experience and understanding is also a part of nature, so why should we not think that our understanding and experience reflects something of objective nature?

It's all about what it is reasonable for us to think, not about knowing anything with absolute certainty. If you want to demand absolute certainty and then reject any and all criteria because none of them can offer that, it's up to you; to me that seems patently unreasonable.

I disagree because your position disqualifies any talk about the objective existence of anything. — Janus

First, objective existence doesn't depend on whether anybody talks about it. Second, even if we accept that everything exists we can still talk about the ways in which this or that object exists.

We are a part of nature, which means that our experience and understanding is also a part of nature, so why should we not think that our understanding and experience reflects something of objective nature? — Janus

I didn't say that.

First, objective existence doesn't depend on whether anybody talks about it. Second, even if we accept that everything exists we can still talk about the ways in which this or that object exists. — litewave

Yes, and a good example of that is the realization that arbitrary collections exist only in thought.

I didn't say that. — litewave

Then I don't know what you are saying or how it differs from what I have been saying.

Yes, and a good example of that is the realization that arbitrary collections exist only in thought. — Janus

Why would they only exist in thought? A collection is constituted by the objects it is a collection of. If Sun, Earth and Moon exist outside our thoughts why should the collection they constitute exist inside our thoughts?

Then I don't know what you are saying or how it differs from what I have been saying. — Janus

I am not denying that our understanding and experience reflect something of objective nature. I am talking from my understanding and experience too.

why should the collection they constitute exist inside our thoughts? — litewave

Because we can arbitrarily think of any old selection of objects as a collection. Do we really need to go over this again?

I am not denying that our understanding and experience reflect something of objective nature. I am talking from my understanding and experience too. — litewave

The fact that our understanding can reflect nature does not entail that all our understandings do reflect nature, or that they all reflect nature equally well.

Because we can arbitrarily think of any old selection of objects as a collection. Do we really need to go over this again? — Janus

Just because we can think of something doesn't mean it only exists in our thoughts.

If we can think about something we know that it at least exists in our thoughts. If we want to impute additional existence to it beyond that we need some reason for doing so. Observed physical connection is such a reason. I cannot see any reason to impute extra-mental existence to arbitrary collections of objects whether those objects are themselves real or merely imagined.

But the magnitude determines the order of natural numbers from smallest to biggest. — litewave

No. the magnitude does not determine the order. There is nothing inherent within magnitude which says that 100 is before or after 200, or 50, or whatever. Whichever arbitrary ordering that you choose could be completely random. That one is of a larger magnitude than another does not necessitate any order. It is a size, not an order. To produce an order of different magnitudes would require a stipulation, that the bigger are prior to the smaller, or vise versa, but then this would be the order, not the magnitudes themselves It is only when we assume a first, a second, third, etc., that there is a convention of order inherent within the numbering.

A line is defined as the set of points whose coordinates satisfy a linear equation. All the points are already there, in the space in which the circle is contained, and their geometrical relations are already there. All lines and all other possible curves in that space are defined. A human just selects those he finds useful for a particular purpose and may give them names. — litewave

You're being ridiculous again, claiming "all lines and all other possible curves in that space are defined", without the existence of any definitions. Come on litewave, think about what you are saying.

Irrational numbers are not contradictory. A perfect circle exists in an infinitesimally grained space, which may or may not be the physical space we live in. Anyway, you don't need a circle to define angles; an angle is a relation between two lines. — litewave

The point is that these circles are conceptual only, they can't exist in any space at all. This is proven by the irrational nature of the ratio between circumference and diameter. The perfect circle cannot exist in space.

Correlations, connections, and associations, are drawn completely within the creature itself. The being does this completely internally. Therefore sensation of things exterior to the creature is not necessary for such activity, nor is it necessary for meaning, consequently. — Metaphysician Undercover

What are the contents of this purported correlation? What things are being connected, correlated, and/or associated with each other?

Do you have an example?

There are things such as organisms, planets, stars, land forms, rocks and so on which can be made up of other things. These are not arbitrary groupings of objects. — Janus

I'm just curious... you and litewave are talking about a subject that underwrote our discussion as well...

What's the difference between arbitrary and not? What's the criterion?

In this context arbitrariness could be understood to be inversely proportional to physical connection as i already explained.

So, the animal body is not an arbitrary collection of parts but a dynamic organic unity. On the other hand, a collection consisting of a table, a mountain,, a drawing of Mickey Mouse and the Pacific Ocean is arbitrary because there is no special physical relationship between them.

Thanks.

And a worldview(a collection of one's own thought and belief about themselves and the world)?

Doesn't seem very arbitrary to me.

Clearly there are different accepted usages for the term "arbitrary", and not all place adequate value upon our own thought and belief.

It's instead saying that a photon can have an indefinite causal history. — Andrew M

And so it is not always possible to know the cause.

If the principle of causation is that every event has a cause, then the experiment is perhaps not so philosophically interesting, since what it shows is not that there are events with no cause, but that it is sometimes not possible to know the causal sequence.

So what the experiment does, is to place a limit on our knowledge such that it is not always possible for us to know the causal sequence of some set of events.

Right, the conceptions of time and space utilized by physicists are inadequate, such that they cannot distinguish the temporal order of such events. Physicist have no standard principles whereby they can get beyond the deficiencies of special relativity, which sees simultaneity as reference dependent. It appears like some physicists might take Einstein's relativity theories as the be all and end all to understanding the relationship between space and time. — Metaphysician Undercover

Nuh, again. It's your expectation that physics ought be able to distinguish the temporal order of events that is inadequate. Again, you have it backwards.

Interesting.

What follows from the experiment is that there is no reason to suppose that the big bang, a quantum event, has some particular place in a given causal sequence.

An argument, for instance, that held a cause to be essential, and in the absence of a physical cause invoked a supernatural cause, would be fraught.

So far we know that the universe is deterministic, — Christoffer

No, we don't.

Causality is defined in terms of cause preceding effect in time. Anyway that's the definition I'm familiar with. — TheMadFool

Then the experiment breaks that definition, at least in that we do not know which event is cause, and which is effect.

No. the magnitude does not determine the order. There is nothing inherent within magnitude which says that 100 is before or after 200, or 50, or whatever. — Metaphysician Undercover

The magnitude says that 100 is smaller than 200 and thus orders the numbers from smaller to bigger.

You're being ridiculous again, claiming "all lines and all other possible curves in that space are defined", without the existence of any definitions. — Metaphysician Undercover

All points in space exist and thus they constitute all possible groups of points, that is, all possible lines and curves in that space.

I cannot see any reason to impute extra-mental existence to arbitrary collections of objects whether those objects are themselves real or merely imagined. — Janus

But that's what you are doing. You are imputing extra-mental existence to collections of objects based on arbitrary criteria.

No, you're not paying attention; the criterion is physical connection.

Sorry, I'm not clear what the question is.

And so it is not always possible to know the cause.

If the principle of causation is that every event has a cause, then the experiment is perhaps not so philosophically interesting, since what it shows is not that there are events with no cause, but that it is sometimes not possible to know the causal sequence.

So what the experiment does, is to place a limit on our knowledge such that it is not always possible for us to know the causal sequence of some set of events. — Banno

Actually not knowing the causal sequence is not the issue in this experiment. What "indefinite" means here is not "unknown causal sequence" but "no singular causal sequence".

In a classical model, the photon would travel either the first path of the interferometer (where transformation A is applied to the photon followed by transformation B) or the second path (where transformation B is applied to the photon followed by transformation A). Thus there would be a single causal sequence, whether known or unknown.

But that's not what happens. Instead the measured state of the photon shows that it must have traveled both paths in superposition (i.e., the interference pattern can't be reproduced with a single causal sequence). Thus the photon has both causal sequences in its history. For an illustration of this experiment, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5hGw5jjdHO0.

It's analogous to the double-slit experiment where the interference pattern can't be reproduced classically. The photon has both slit paths in its history.

No, you're not paying attention; the criterion is physical connection. — Janus

A physical connection of arbitrary kind and to arbitrary degree. Everything in the universe is physically connected in some way. And Sun, Earth and Moon are gravitationally connected, yet you deny that they constitute a group.

An accurate correction, it seems. So should I have said:

If the principle of causation is that every event has a cause, then the experiment is perhaps not so philosophically interesting, since what it shows is not that there are events with no cause, but that there is sometimes no definite causal sequence.

So what the experiment does, is to place a limit such that it is not always possible to identify the causal sequence of some set of events. — Banno

Yes. There need not be a single ("the") causal sequence of some set of events - sometimes there are multiple causal sequences.

I think it's philosophically interesting from a language perspective. Thinking about the mathematical description of the experiment (and QM generally) and translating it into intuitive language.

So everything is equally arbitrary and 'arbitrary' loses its meaning? Great!

With respect to collections, I don't see how you can restrict their objective existence in any way. Whether they are "tightly connected" or "loosely connected", they are out there. You can talk about how tightly or loosely they are connected but you can't deny they are out there.

I don't deny the objects are "out there". I can, and do, deny the collectedness (read "connectedness") of things which are "loosely (read "arbitrarily") connected". For example, there is no special or significant connection whatsoever between your nose and my arse, unless you happen to be sniffing it. :razz: :rofl:

Reality does not care what we find special or significant. It just is.