I don't know what it could mean to say that truth is objective. The idea of truth seems to be the idea of something really being the case; the idea of an objective state of affairs or actuality. So, truth is the idea of the objective, it is of the objective, but is not itself objective, it is of actuality, but is not itself actual.

Sounds right to me.

Are there different sorts of truth? Is "objective truth" meaningful? — Mongrel

You really are missing Banno! But anyway, my starting point would be that arriving at truth would have to be the result of a process - an epistemic process. So that would normally imply already that "subjectivity" lurks in there somewhere.

And then for "objective" to be meaningful as a qualifier, that would have to be so in the usual fashion of being held up against its intelligible opposite, its "other", which again is usually regarded as "subjective".

And if subjective means fundamentally epistemic, then objective implies in contrary fashion that something is fundamentally ontic.

From there, we can talk at cross-purposes forever. To talk of objective truth is naive realism if it ignores its own epistemic conditions by which it came to be - the process that was followed such that it might be held separable from the ontically subjective!

8-)

my starting point would be that arriving at truth would have to be the result of a process - an epistemic process — apokrisis

So you see truth as a destination, as opposed to a property of statements?

Objectivity as a criterion of truth is very much associated with the rise of modern philosophy; it was never much considered by the medievals. I recall reading that the awareness of objectivity came out of criticism of Kant by his successors. But I regard objective truth as pertaining to statements that are made regarding empirical objects and forces. In other words, an objective statement ought to be corroborated with reference to the measurement of something existent. Whereas mathematical proofs are not objective in that sense, even though to all intents they are regarded as objective statements.

Agree with @John that truth is just "what is the case". In my opinion, objectivity has to do with justification, and not with truth per se.

Yeh it's one of those things that can make reading Kant in English misleading. Alison makes the point that there are 2 seperate German words for objective, one for the gods-eye-view meaning and one for the to-do-with-objects meaning.

There are different uses of "truth." Maybe the unit of meaning is not the sentence or the paragraph but all of human history. Maybe zooming in on individual words as if they are legos can only take us so far (not worthless, but not enough). In life as we live it, we deal with personalities as a whole. To mock objective truth is just humility about our own beliefs in one scenario and irresponsibility in another. We want to know if we can count on someone. We want them to know that they can count on us. Take language out of the context of meaningful action, and it becomes fuzzy.

Could you say more about that? It's interesting to me because I usually think of objective as a kind of narrative. It confuses me a little when it's used in other ways.

Maybe the unit of meaning is not the sentence or the paragraph but all of human history. Maybe zooming in on individual words as if they are legos can only take us so far (not worthless, but not enough). — Hoo

You're talking about meaning holism. I see it's advantages, but I think it also has its weaknesses. Maybe meaning partakes of both holism and atomism (I don't mean molecularism... I don't see that working.)

Yes, meaning holism and a shift toward worldly context. I'm not saying concept clarification is never worthwhile. I like analyzing "explanation," for instance. But there's also the issue of meaning-by-fiat. No matter what consensus philosophers achieve (which probably won't be much), we all have to get out and the world in the jungle of varying uses and mostly live there. Moreover, it's unlikely that philosophers are going to tame this varying use with their expertly determined 'correct' use. So to me there's a certain futility in the enterprise.

No matter what consensus philosophers achieve (which probably won't be much), we all have to get out and the world in the jungle of varying uses and mostly live there. Moreover, it's unlikely that philosophers are going to tame this varying use with their expertly determined 'correct' use. So to me there's a certain futility in the enterprise — Hoo

How do you see this tying into issues to do with truth? What is your theory of truth, btw?

Do you think it is objectively true that the sun rises and sets each day, we experience it that way, but then when we ask what does it mean to say the sun rises/sets the explanation suggests that we are in apparent error and the truth is that the earth revolves around the sun... that what we experience is an appearance and not the truth, but then if all we experience are appearances, what does that mean for the truth of the things we experience.

Couldn't it be that it's just a matter of different frames of reference which translate one to the other? Standing on earth, we see the sun rise. From a spot high up, we'd see that the earth spins. The same event is being witnessed, so there's only one truth.

Hanover did his Banno impression. That was mine. :)

How do you see this tying into issues to do with truth? What is your theory of truth, btw? — Mongrel

I guess I'd try to paraphrase any statement by looking at it in as large a context as is reasonable. I think it's safe to assume that assertions are offered (in a polite conversation) as potentially valuable strings of marks and noises.
I don't know I have what would be called a theory of truth. I like to emphasize strings of marks and noises as tools in the hand of beings with "irrational" purposes. So my criterion is a generalized utility. I think the correspondence theory of truth is great for less abstract propositions. On this less, truth and utility are just about the same. I don't want to deny common sense objective reality or ordinary language. But I think we drag the correspondence theory's massive utility away from its strong intersection with utility into the abstract realm (along with PSR and LEM). But for me this abstract realm is ambiguous. It's hard to make PSR and LEM look necessary. That's when we look at strings and marks of noises in the context of the entire personality. How do they live? Are they happy? What do they deduce from ambiguous/abstract beliefs in terms of actions and less ambiguous propositions?

Make sure I understand what you are suggesting.

Truth corresponds to experience, and the translation of that correspondence is based on the perspective of some observer?

Doesn't that make truth relative to the observer, unless we assume that all observers must share some specific perspectives in order to claim to know the truth. We all share the perspective of the apparent, and we can all reason our way from what is apparent to what it conceals by reason, so reason is necessarily one of our shared perspectives.

On this less, truth and utility are just about the same — Hoo

My diagnosis is borderline truth skepticism. Particularly suitable for LSD excursions... but it's probably multi-functional.

But I think we drag the correspondence theory's massive utility away from its strong intersection with utility into the abstract realm (along with PSR and LEM) — Hoo

Frege demolished correspondence theory. That's what a fair amount of 20th Century AP is about... trying to come up with a response. I see it being tied to some fairly seismic issues related to disintegration of religion and the rise of materialism. It's not about philosophers trying to take over the role of the dictionary.

so reason is necessarily our shared perspectives. — Cavacava

Yes. Reason is the bones of objectivity.

One wonders what kind of conceptual work the qualifier 'objective' in 'objective truth' does. Assuming that any other kind of 'truth' simply would not be truth, why not just... truth?

So you see truth as a destination, as opposed to a property of statements? — Mongrel

A statement has to be interpreted. It doesn't understand itself. So yes. True or false are semantic judgments. A proposition is merely a sign awaiting interpretation.

One wonders what kind of conceptual work the qualifier 'objective' in 'objective truth' does. — StreetlightX

It implies publicly demonstrable. So a collective subjective agreement. ;)

Would truth that is not open to public demonstration be truth?

How could you know? Or rather, how could you tell someone else about it?

'One fine bright Sunday morning, a Catholic priest decided to sneak out and hit a few rounds of golf between services. St Peter happened to notice this, and called God over to see. 'Look, God. That wicked priest, instead of tending to his flock on the Sabbath, is out there playing golf! He surely deserves punishment for that!'

Just then the priest teed off. The ball sailed hundreds of meters through the air, bounced once, and then dropped neatly in the hole.

St Peter was gobsmacked. 'I said, "punish him". But you've given him a hole-in-one'.

'Yes', said God, sauntering off. 'But who can he tell?'

:)

Would truth that is not open to public demonstration be truth? — StreetlightX

Did you have an example in mind? Aesthetics for instance? And would it be a problem for you if that were contrastingly qualified as subjective truth?

Or if you meant Platonic or rational truth, or even deductive logical truth, then that becomes another discussion again.

So truth may have many modalities or multiple methods of inquiry. Truth really just describes our willingness to ascribe a state of certainty due to an act of interpretation properly carried out.

It is in the end is a state of mind, even when that state of mind is collective, as I said.

No, you're missing the point. I asked what kind of conceptual work the qualifier 'objective' in 'objective truth' does, and you replied that it means that it must be open to public demonstration. But if that criteria is baked-in to the very idea of truth, then it seems to me you haven't answered my question, and the qualifier 'objective' still doesn't do anything.

Frege demolished correspondence theory. That's what a fair amount of 20th Century AP is about... trying to come up with a response. I see it being tied to some fairly seismic issues related to disintegration of religion and the rise of materialism. It's not about philosophers trying to take over the role of the dictionary. — Mongrel

Sure, the correspondence theory falls apart as the air gets thin. But in the ordinary world of ordinary objects, that's how we talk and live. We're only philosophers part-time. I agree that at high altitudes it is largely about religion, materialism, and various 'concept religions' clashing, most of them assuming that they are representing something accurately. Also, sometimes as philosophers we are just working out our own worldviews with a purpose. We think in terms of the claims that deserve and do not deserve our respect. We refine our positions according to some image of wisdom and style.
For me it was quite a head change to abandon the notion that truth was singular. We inherit a physical world that we mostly agree on (beds, food, cars, faces) and then construct a layer on top of this world that is under-determined by practical life. It's OK to believe in God or pure reason or not, as long as one stops at red nights, pays taxes, doesn't commit murder. In a pluralistic culture that largely assumes the singularity of abstract truth (someone must be right and others wrong), we're smacked constantly with incompatible claims about unseen entities, including gods, quarks, sin, duties, etc. This is not exactly innocent, since it's largely about justifying and attaining power. We can look at such belief systems (for belief is largely systematic) as individual adaptations --largely used for solidarity. To abandon the notion of the "correct" system of abstract thought for the notion of continual improvement in terms of pain/pleasure (high and low) rather than accuracy is to welcome the partial assimilation of otherwise opposed belief systems. Rather than "X is true," we have "you might find a use for X."
I still think that (on forums at least) there is a fair share of writing the 'official' dictionary.

For me it was quite a head change to abandon the notion that truth was singular. We inherit a physical world that we mostly agree on (beds, food, cars, faces) and then construct a layer on top of this world that is under-determined by practical life. — Hoo

I get that. I was reading some Jung a while back and he was going on and on about some crap. As I read, it occurred to me that he was a product of his times. And then somewhat abruptly, Jung dropped out of his philosophizing and basically stated that he was a product of his times. Holy shit. He knew.

My fascination with culture and history is related to that... wanting to see myself by seeing how I'm a product of my time. Maybe you and I are fundamentally doing the same thing, just in different ways.

What's a "red night"? Sounds intriguing...or wicked...
>:)