An immoral belief is immoral. — Sapientia

So what factors determine whether or not a belief is immoral?

A false moral belief isn't necessarily immoral, just false.

So how have you determined that the belief "racism is acceptable" is immoral and not just false?

So what factors determine whether or not a belief is immoral? — Michael

The same factors which determine whether we should or shouldn't believe something (in an ethical context). For example, we shouldn't believe that racism is acceptable for a number of reasons: because people of other races shouldn't be devalued on that basis, and because of the detrimental consequences it would likely bring about, and because it would be indicative of vice, and because we wouldn't want to be considered in that way...

So how have you determined that the belief "racism is acceptable" is immoral and not just false? — Michael

See the above.

The same factors which determine whether we should or shouldn't believe something. For example, we shouldn't believe that racism is acceptable for a number of reasons: because people of other races shouldn't be devalued on that basis, and because of the detrimental consequences it would likely bring about, and because it would be indicative of vice, and because we wouldn't want to be considered in that way. — Sapientia

This just seems like you're saying that the belief is immoral because it's false. The belief that racism is acceptable is immoral because racism isn't acceptable.

This just seems like you're saying that the belief is immoral because it's false. — Michael

It might seem like that to you. It doesn't seem like that to me. That clearly isn't what I said.

Well, let's break it down:

The [factors which determine whether or not a belief is immoral are the] same factors which determine whether we should or shouldn't believe something.

...

We shouldn't believe that racism is acceptable ... because people of other races shouldn't be devalued on [the basis of their race]

Surely "people of other races shouldn't be devalued on [the basis of their race]" just means "racism isn't acceptable". Therefore, we shouldn't believe that racism is acceptable because racism isn't acceptable. And given that this is the same factor which determines whether or not a belief is immoral, the belief that racism is acceptable is immoral because racism isn't acceptable. Therefore, the belief is immoral because it's false.

Hitler had strong convictions.

Surely "people of other races shouldn't be devalued on [the basis of their race]" just means "racism isn't acceptable". — Michael

No, they don't mean the same thing, although the latter follows from the former.

Therefore, we shouldn't believe that racism is acceptable because racism isn't acceptable. — Michael

No, because they don't mean the same thing.

And given that this is the same factor which determines whether or not a belief is immoral, the belief that racism is acceptable is immoral is because racism isn't acceptable. Therefore, the belief is immoral because it's false. — Michael

The belief is immoral because it's false in addition to other reasons I've mentioned, which you've hardly addressed. You've addressed a single reason, and failed to conflate or reduce it to mere falsity.

Hitler had strong convictions. — Wayfarer

What's your point?

No, they don't mean the same thing, although the latter follows from the former. — Sapientia

Then what does "people of other races shouldn't be devalued on the basis of their race" mean if not "it is unacceptable to devalue people of other races on the basis of their race"?

The belief is immoral because it's false in addition to other reasons I've mentioned, which you've hardly addressed. You've addressed a single reason, and failed to conflate or reduce it to mere falsity.

OK, so let's look at the others:

1)

... because of the detrimental consequences it would likely bring about

A false moral belief is immoral if it is likely to bring about detrimental consequences?

2)

... because it would be indicative of vice.

A false moral belief is immoral if it would be indicative of vice?

3)

... because we wouldn't want to be considered in that way.

A false moral belief is immoral if we wouldn't want to be considered in that way?

This one doesn't make much sense, so I assume it's supposed to be part of 2), giving

4)

... because it would be indicative of vice and because we wouldn't want to be considered in that way

A false moral belief is immoral if it indicates a vice that we don't want to be considered as having?

Okay. So, does that mean that you believe that matter-of-fact beliefs can't be morally right or wrong? So, for example, if one believes that, as a matter of fact, rape is okay, or even good, then that isn't morally wrong? If so, that requires an explanation. — Sapientia

That's not what I think is a matter-of-fact belief.

I'll make it clear for you. In my view (using race as the example because that was the original one):

• Belief that a certain race has a certain 'superior aspect' or 'advantage' = matter-of-fact (even if it is not, in fact, fact) and cannot be morally right or wrong.
  
  
• Belief that a certain race is not worth as much as another = attitude and is wrong to say and probably to believe also.

I'm sorry if it wasn't clear enough in the beginning.

That's not what I think is a matter-of-fact belief.

I'll make it clear for you. In my view (using race as the example because that was the original one):

Belief that a certain race has a certain 'superior aspect' or 'advantage' = matter-of-fact (even if it is not, in fact, fact) and cannot be morally right or wrong.

Belief that a certain race is not worth as much as another = attitude and is wrong to say and probably to believe also.

I'm sorry if it wasn't clear enough in the beginning. — Ovaloid

But the first sort of belief would include belief in offensive racial stereotypes, which is morally wrong.

I didn't answer the poll, because there's not an option that really fits my views.

First, it might be worth saying what I think morality/ethics is. So here's my ethics in a nutshell, quoting myself:

I'm a subjectivist/emotivist on ethics. In other words, I believe that ethical judgments are essentially "yaying" or "booing" interpersonal behavior--interpersonal behavior that one considers more socially significant than matters of etiquette or manners. (Also note that "interpersonal" can be behavior towards oneself.)

It's not just arbitrarily yaying or booing behavior. It's yaying or booing based on "deep"/gut feelings or "intuitions" and instincts, many of which are evolutionarily biased.

"Subjective" as I use it, by the way, merely denotes that it's a mental phenomenon, or a brain phenomenon. It doesn't imply anything about whether people are likely to disagree or agree with each other. Every single person could agree, but ethics are still subjectively determined, because those judgments about behavior are brain phenomena. That's all I'm saying by that term (although an upshot is that someone can't be factually incorrect in their judgment, even if they're the only one who makes that particular judgment and 7 billion other people make a different judgment; people can't be factually correct either, rather people are reporting and acting in accordance with how they feel about interpersonal behavior and its upshots).

Re my view above, I'm not saying "that's how I choose to approach ethics," I'm saying that I believe that that's what ethics is for everyone, even if they believe that they're doing something else instead, even if they believe in a God who issues ethical decrees or whatever. What folks are really doing is yaying or booing interpersonal behavior.

So while I personally do not morally judge any mere beliefs or speech acts, I wouldn't say that no one does, or that the people who do are committing a category error. Something I do judge is people morally judging mere beliefs or speech acts, although I wouldn't say that I morally judge them. What I do rather is make judgments about what I take to be an uncomfortableness with difference, a desire to control others in detail, and so on, depending on the situation.

Regarding offense. I do not see being offended as a moral issue. And I always think that people who are offended are the people with a problem that needs to be worked on rather than the person who they took to be offensive. There are a number of reasons for this, including that the idea of offense doesn't make a whole lot of sense to me in the first place. I look at it this way: what someone says one either agrees with--they either feel the same way or they also believe that it's true, or one disagrees and doesn't feel the same way/doesn't believe that what the person said is true. There's no need to be offended in any of those cases. Obviously, it would be odd to be offended if one agrees. If one disagrees, if it's a matter of feeling and not a factual claim, it's important to be able to be comfortable with different people feeling different ways. If it's a factual claim, then why be upset that someone simply has an incorrect belief about a factual matter? Maybe you can lead them to a correct belief, maybe they're at least temporarily not intellectually capable of coming to a correct belief about that matter. Whatever the case, there's no need to be upset about it.

If one is bothered instead by the fact that someone doesn't like oneself, that someone has malicious feelings towards oneself, etc., one needs to learn to cope with that. No matter what you do, it's going to be the case that not everyone likes you. You can't have anxiety or whatever just in case not everyone likes you. You have to get used to that fact, because it's going to be unavoidable. Some personalities are just going to clash. The thing to do is to try to be as laissez-faire about that as one can be (especially when we're just talking about beliefs and speech acts, which is what we're doing).

I'm never offended by any beliefs or any speech/expression, and I'm a free speech absolutist. For example, I'm not offended by the fact that you said, "We've all been offended at one time or another . . . " which is an incorrect belief about a factual matter. It wouldn't make any sense to me to be offended by you having an incorrect belief about a factual matter. Maybe I can lead you to a correct belief. Maybe, at least at the moment, you're not capable of coming to a correct belief about it. If anything, perhaps I should be concerned if you're not capable of coming to a correct belief about it, but sometimes there isn't anything one can do to help others in that regard. One has to be able to just let it go. There's no need to introduce more stress into one's life just because not everyone can be helped in some ideal way.

You ask, "Can anyone, without being intellectually dishonest, claim to find no belief (or statement of belief) right or wrong?" Yes. I'd be intellectually dishonest, rather, if I were to say that I find some beliefs or any expression morally right or wrong. "Would you pass the test if this were put to practice, in a real life situation, if you were caught off-guard?" Yes, certainly.

Belief that a certain race has a certain 'superior aspect' or 'advantage' = matter-of-fact (even if it is not, in fact, fact) and cannot be morally right or wrong. — Ovaloid

It's not morally wrong to think that Asians are good at math. It's a stereotype that will be confirmed by some Asians you meet and disconfirmed by others. To the extent that you demonstrate to Asians in your environment that you see them through a lens of stereotype, you broadcast: "I don't see you, I just see a cartoon version of you."

My experience with Asian-Asians is that even if they're put off by that, they won't say anything. American-Asians are pretty much guaranteed to put it out there that you're being racist. I think most of them do that because they think its funny.

If, on the other hand, you point out that most top-level basketball players are black, most people in your environment are going to wonder what your point is. That there are differences between blacks and whites is a pretty radioactive topic in my culture. That's because we all sit on a giant wound in varying stages of healing. At some point in the future when it's finally healed, we'll be able to address that kind of thing.

The issue in this discussion is whether or not it is correct to categorise or judge beliefs, or the expression thereof, as right or wrong - whether that even makes sense, or is a category error. — Sapientia

What I believe is a category error is whether it's correct to morally judge beliefs or expression.

Some people do morally judge beliefs or expression. There are no facts whether one should judge beliefs or expression. So there is no correct or incorrect stance on this.

To the extent that you demonstrate to Asians in your environment that you see them through a lens of stereotype, you broadcast: "I don't see you, I just see a cartoon version of you." — Mongrel

I think people tend to see "cartoon versions" of everyone/everything. We tend to see simplified caricatures, and part of that is a factor of simple categorization, simple abstraction. Taking in every detail, every nuance, is too much for our brains to handle. We simplify, we merge things together as types, we focus on fewer features and that focus amounts to exaggeration, etc.

and because of the detrimental consequences it would likely bring about, — Sapientia

If we're talking about consequences that are "brought about," we're no longer talking about mere beliefs or speech. We're talking about actions. Definitely I morally judge some actions.

I think people tend to see "cartoon versions" of everyone/everything. We tend to see simplified caricatures, and part of that is a factor of simple categorization, simple abstraction. Taking in every detail, every nuance, is too much for our brains to handle. We simplify, we merge things together as types, we focus on fewer features and that focus amounts to exaggeration, etc. — Terrapin Station

I think people vary in that. It's not really a matter of taking in more data to see the person behind the face, skin-color, religion, gender, etc. I've wondered over the years what exactly it is. It's something you can shift in and out of... seeing the living, breathing, being that animates the form versus seeing mainly the form.

So it's immoral for an adult with full mental capacity to have a false moral belief? — Michael

It's rather not possible to have either a true or false moral view.

seeing the living, breathing, being that animates the form versus seeing mainly the form. — Mongrel

I don't agree with your metaphysics there (which we should know from the wax discussion). The living, breathing, being is identical to the form in my view.

1. I don't think that it makes any sense whatsoever to refrain from judging any belief or statement solely on the basis that it is a belief or a statement. The content matters, and it can be appropriate and right to judge it, and we're free to do so.

2. Judgment and belief are linked. That you morally judge others for judging beliefs indicates to me that you believe it to be morally objectionable, despite your denial of the moral implications and insistence of amorality. This in turn implies that you judge others for an alleged fault of which you yourself are guilty.

3. Offence is, by it's very nature, a moral issue. It implies, or consists of, moral objection. So, how can it not be? Your point about placing the blame on the person being offended - in some cases, the victim - is shallow and one-sided, and only applies to some, but not all, cases. Often, it is the person being offensive, or judged to be offensive, who is at least partially to blame. It's silly and inconsiderate to say that there's no need to get upset about it, when you should know full well that we don't have full control over our emotions.

4. I don't for a second believe that you're never offended by any beliefs or any speech/expression.

5. It is indeed a correct belief that, as a matter of fact, we've all been offended at one time or another, and it would be ludicrous to deny, except to point out trivial exceptions like those who didn't survive for long enough after birth, but that obviously isn't what I was getting at.

6. Regarding the tests I referred to: I think that you'd definitely, at some point, fail the second one about practising what you preach. However, you might pass, or have already passed, the first test about intellectual honestly, but honest and intelligent people can still be mistaken, and mistaken without realising it, and in this case, in the relevant respect, I think that you are one such person.

It's not morally wrong to think that Asians are good at math. It's a stereotype that will be confirmed by some Asians you meet and disconfirmed by others. To the extent that you demonstrate to Asians in your environment that you see them through a lens of stereotype, you broadcast: "I don't see you, I just see a cartoon version of you."

My experience with Asian-Asians is that even if they're put off by that, they won't say anything. American-Asians are pretty much guaranteed to put it out there that you're being racist. I think most of them do that because they think its funny. — Mongrel

That you rightly qualify with "some" and "most" and "in my experience" and "I think" is telling, and flies in the face of your first sentence. It can, in some situations, be morally wrong.

1. I don't think that it makes any sense whatsoever to refrain from judging any belief or statement solely on the basis that it is a belief or a statement. — Sapientia

I don't refrain from morally judging beliefs or statements BECAUSE they're beliefs or statements. I refrain from morally judging them because I don't feel that mere beliefs or expressions have anything to do with morality/ethics. Others feel differently obviously.

The content matters, and it can be appropriate and right to judge it, and we're free to do so.

You're free to do so, obviously (metaphysically, and legally per expression in most places, too). Re it being "right" to do so, if you mean "correct," or something like "It is true that one should morally judge beliefs," that is what would be a category error, as I pointed out in another post above.

2. Judgment and belief are linked.

Obviously, yeah.

That you morally judge others for judging beliefs

Actually, I explicitly pointed out that I do not morally judge others for judging beliefs. I judge them in other ways--I make judgments about character, for example, about whether that person is comfortable with difference and so on.

Offence is, by it's very nature, a moral issue.

I couldn't disagree more with the metaphysics of that. Meaning is subjective first off. "X (term) is an F issue" is a semantic statement (it's a statement about the meaning of x). Well, that simply depends on how someone thinks about x. There aren't right or wrong ways to think about it.

It implies, or consists of, moral objection.

If you think about it that way. I do not.

Your point about placing the blame on the person being offended - in some cases, the victim - is shallow and one-sided

However you characterize it, I think it's the offended who has a problem that needs to be worked on, for the reasons I explained, not the offended. You characterizing it one way or another wouldn't affect my feelings on that.

Often, it is the person being offensive, or judged to be offensive, who is at least partially to blame.

Certainly some people feel that way. I do not.

It's silly and inconsiderate to say that there's no need to get upset about it, when you should know full well that we don't have full control over our emotions.

Sure, people do not have "full control" over their emotions. But one can work on oneself so that one is no longer offended. That's worth doing in my opinion. If you prefer to be offendable, and you are offendable, then don't work on yourself in that way.

4. I don't for a second believe that you're never offended by any beliefs or any speech/expression.

Right. So at least temporarily, you're incapable of getting the facts right on this issue. I'd not suppose that there's anything I can do about that. I can accept that you're likely to continue to have an incorrect belief in this regard.

5. It is indeed a correct belief that, as a matter of fact, we've all been offended at one time or another,

Right. I'm aware that you believe that. You're wrong. And surely, based on your comments so far, you'll continue to be wrong about this indefinitely.

5. Regarding the tests I referred to: I think that you'd definitely, at some point, fail the second one about practising what you preach.

Sure. It would be inconsistent given your other comments for you to not believe that. So yay for consistency at least, I suppose.

What I believe is a category error is whether it's correct to morally judge beliefs or expression. — Terrapin Station

That doesn't make sense, since whether it's correct to morally judge beliefs or expression is not a statement, but the issue under discussion. You can say that it's a category error to morally judge beliefs or expression, but I think that you'd be the one making the error.

Some people do morally judge beliefs or expression. — Terrapin Station

Yes, they do.

There are no facts [about] whether one should judge beliefs or expression. — Terrapin Station

Even if not, I don't think that that makes the debate redundant or refutes my position.

So there is no correct or incorrect stance on this. — Terrapin Station

That only follows if facts about whether one should judge beliefs or expression are the only valid means of determining correctness or incorrectness, which is arguable, and which I dispute.

Although I agree that actions can correctly be categorised as moral or immoral — Sapientia

By this do you mean you endorse some form of objective morality, where actions,beliefs,etc can be "correctly categorised" in a manner independent of the person doing the categorising?

That doesn't make sense, since whether it's correct to morally judge beliefs or expression is not a statement, but the issue under discussion. You can say that it's a category error to morally judge beliefs or expression, but I think that you'd be the one making the error. — Sapientia

It doesn't make any sense to say it doesn't make any sense. "It's correct to morally judge beliefs or expression" IS a statement (what the heck else would it be?) But it's not correct or incorrect to morally judge beliefs. That's because there are no facts to that effect. Hence, it's a category error. You're assuming that it's a factual matter when it is not. It's simply a matter of whether you're yaying judging beliefs and expression.

I don't think that that makes the debate redundant or refutes my position. — Sapientia

It would only refute "It is correct to morally judge beliefs and/or expression." Maybe you're simply saying that you're using "correct" in a looser sense, so that all you're doing by using "correct" is "yaying"? In that case, then right, that there are no facts regarding whether one should morally judge beliefs and/or expression wouldn't refute your yaying, but in my opinion that would be a confusing way to use the term "correct," and I'd bet a lot of other people would wind up thinking that you're claiming that it's a fact, too.

That only follows if facts about whether one should judge beliefs or expression are the only valid means of determining correctness or incorrectness, which is arguable, and which I dispute. — Sapientia

So how could something be correct or incorrect in your view aside from matching or failing to match facts? P is correct just in case _____? (And then fill in the blank.)

By this do you mean you endorse some form of objective morality, where actions,beliefs,etc can be "correctly categorised" in a manner independent of the person doing the categorising? — hunterkf5732

Not objective morality, but objective or inter-subjective categorisation regarding morality. Just as you'd be mistaken to categorise, say, a wardrobe, as the sort of thing that can be moral or immoral, you could be mistaken about whether beliefs are the sort of thing that can correctly or appropriately be categorised as moral or immoral. Even if you personally exclude beliefs as inapplicable, it still makes sense to question why, and test whether that coheres or fits in well with how we think, and judge, and what we know and observe, and how we speak, and how we feel, and whether it's counterintuitive, or whether we're missing something important or useful or essential. You can be wrong in that sense at the very least.

In other words, you're forwarding an argumentum ad populum. That's a fallacy. Things aren't correct just because a bunch of people agree or do something a particular way. That only makes that thing conventional. But it's not incorrect to be unconventional.

Then what does "people of other races shouldn't be devalued on the basis of their race" mean if not "it is unacceptable to devalue people of other races on the basis of their race"? — Michael

It means what it says. It's prescriptive, a bit like an instruction, whereas the latter is descriptive. It's not redundant or viciously circular to say, for example, "You shouldn't do that here because it's unacceptable".

OK, so let's look at the others:

1)
... because of the detrimental consequences it would likely bring about

A false moral belief is immoral if it is likely to bring about detrimental consequences?

2)
... because it would be indicative of vice.

A false moral belief is immoral if it would be indicative of vice?

3)
... because we wouldn't want to be considered in that way.

A false moral belief is immoral if we wouldn't want to be considered in that way? — Michael

When you said "let's look at the others", to be honest, I expected a bit more than just a repetition of what I said with a question mark attached.

This one doesn't make much sense, so I assume it's supposed to be part of 2) — Michael

It does, and it wasn't part of 2). It was a reference to the Golden Rule, or a variation of it, which I thought you'd pick up on.

It's prescriptive, a bit like an instruction, whereas the latter is descriptive. — Sapientia

So "people of other races shouldn't be devalued on that basis" means "don't devalue people of other races on that basis"?

Then when you say "we shouldn't believe that racism is acceptable ... because people of other races shouldn't be devalued on that basis" you're saying "we shouldn't believe that racism is acceptable ... because don't devalue people of other races on that basis", which doesn't make sense.

When you said "let's look at the others", to be honest, I expected a bit more than just a repetition of what I said with a question mark attached.

I'm double-checking that I've interpreted you correctly.

It does, and it wasn't part of 2). It was a reference to the Golden rule which I thought you'd pick up on.

I see, so you're saying that a false moral belief is immoral if we wouldn't want others to have this same false moral belief about us?

I don't agree with your metaphysics there (which we should know from the wax discussion). The living, breathing, being is identical to the form in my view. — Terrapin Station

I've spent as little time as possible working in my region's intensive care burn unit, but just enough to be able to assert pretty confidently that skin color isn't what a person is.

There is some metaphysics to how the same person can take a number of different forms. I'm into Leibniz's views these days.

My own view has something to do with how I understand love. Love isn't friendly. It's not a matter of wanting to make somebody happy. Love is how you see the person behind the face. Love conquers racism. There are two viewpoints which would contradict me on that... the view that a person is their skin color and self-anti-realism. It never ceases to crack me up when a self-anti-realist proposes to teach other people about racism. Jesus...