Suppose the universe just happened to have beings of type x, but these beings would not exist had some set of historical facts (F) not occurred. Does this imply F was designed to produce x?

The constants in physics are artifacts of our knowledge. — Moliere

no, these constants exist - with or without our knowledge of them. They existed long before we were aware of them and had the tools to quantity or express them in ways we understand them.

The constants are constant, so there's no need to think of them as if they landed precisely where they needed to in order for life to flourish. They didn't land at all. They're just the number they happen to be. — Moliere

You are in disagreement with established science who believe they need to be, in many cases, almost exactly what they are for life to flourish. And again, as above, the conditions were there, and existed long before we developed the ability to quantify them, or establish them as constants. Science didn't invent the constants, they explained the existing phenomenon.

Could they be different? Possibly. But it is also possible that they could not be different. — Moliere

The FTA is applying different hypothesis to "what is". You can't change the "what is" as an argument against. FTA starts with facts, we exist, these criteria for our existence, exist. the collective probability of all the criteria existing is incredibly incredibly incredibly unlikely. All FTA does is ask how probable we view different hypothesis for how this collection of facts could occur.

Why are there exactly 52 cards? Couldn't there be 60 cards? — Moliere

No it would not, yet again you want to change the factual perception of what is. The only thing you can change and stay within the FTA argument is the "why" not the what.

Let's take this:

It has been mathematically calculated that, back at one second, the universe's expansion energy and the opposing gravitational energy must have differed by less than one part in 10 to the power 15 (one part in a million billion). If it was different at all (in either direction) then there would be no galaxies, no stars, and so no planets. — Antony Latham

So it could have differed in one direction or another direction, hypothetically speaking. But it didn't. Why didn't it?


One explanation is that there was a designer who intervened in the formation of the universe to ensure that life could arise within it.

Another is that it didn't differ, and there's nothing terribly controversial about accepting a fact as a fact -- it just happened that way.

Another is that there's a multiplicity of universes being spit out by some universe-engine, and so given infinite time we would eventually pop out of it.

Another might be that there's some reason for the specific ratio that we haven't discovered. Perhaps gravity acts in a particular way because of [x].


**
The fact is the ratio between expansion and gravitational energy. The prediction is that with a difference then there would be no galaxies, no stars, and no planets. But the latter is not a fact -- we simply do not know what would have happened had it been otherwise. We'd have to run an experiment.

It's something that follows ceteris peribus. -- given such and such set of propositions, this is what would happen. It's reasonable enough to speculate, but we'd only know the fact of the prediction if we generated a universe with a different ratio.

We don't know what would happen if things were different than they were. There is no fact to the matter. We can make guesses and evaluate said guesses in terms of what seems right, sure. And I'd contend that's exactly what we're doing in positing the above 4 possible explanations of the fact.

So it could have differed in one direction or another direction, hypothetically speaking. But it didn't. Why didn't it? — Moliere

yet again - you are trying to change the "what is" That is not an argument against FTA. You are in effects saying "ok lets just say the facts were different" Changing, the facts is not an argument.

or - if all you are doing is saying there could have been other combinations of differing criteria and who knows what would have been. That just seems like a long way around to saying the best hypothesis is randomness. Which brings me back to my deck of cards. In any example I can think of almost no one would assign randomness to set of criteria like this. It is only the prospect of some acknowledgment of the designer that makes it unpalatable in the case of FTA.

Again all arguments against FTA at their heart begins with the assumption the probability of a designer is near zero, no matter how good the logic is, because there can't be a designer, because.

yet again - you are trying to change the "what is" That is not an argument against FTA. You are in effects saying "ok lets just say the facts were different" Changing, the facts is not an argument. — Rank Amateur

Hrm? I'm granting the facts. What you're quoting is a rephrasing of the argument. So we have the facts from the SEP article:

The strength of gravity
The strength of the strong nuclear force
The difference between the masses of the two lightest quarks
The strength of the weak force
The cosmological constant
The global cosmic energy density is close to ro sub c.
The relative amplitude Q of density fluctuations
The initial entropy of the universe


I'm not changing these.

The argument goes -- at least if I'm reading any of this right -- that these are really specific values that could have been different, but weren't. The values that they are support life -- and there are very few such values that would support life. So the best explanation for these specific values is that there is a designer who chose them.

I'm giving alternate explanations. One is that there simply isn't one -- that constants are facts, and there isn't anything special about them. Adding a designer is just messy. You might as well add a designer to explain why the spring constant of a spring is just so. Or you could just accept that the spring constant is exactly as it is, and there's nothing special about it (even though only a very specific spring constant would support this particular mechanism)

Another is the multiverse theory. And another would be something more fundamental, that things ended up just and so because of some physical reason that is hitherto unknown.

I'm not sure what the bubble machine metaphor is attempting to assert. I take it the bubbles are akin to universes that evolve the right paremeters over time.

Thing is that bubble machines and factories are designed by intelligences. So the evolutionary bubble process has it's start with intelligent design and intentional decision making to setup a filter process for longer lasting bubble.

The argument goes -- at least if I'm reading any of this right -- that these are really specific values that could have been different, but weren't. The values that they are support life -- and there are very few such values that would support life. So the best explanation for these specific values is that there is a designer who chose them. — Moliere

My understanding of the argument goes:
1. sentient, moral agent beings like us exist.
2. in order for beings like us to exist those values, along with other criteria have to be
near exactly what they are - if any were changed appreciably - we would not exist.
3. the probability of all possible combinations of events needed for all of this criteria to
exist is incredibly unlikely - on the order of 52! or more.

Which hypothesis for these facts is most probable.

1. This system was designed as such to support 1. therefor there is in some way a designer
2. As improbable as it is these were all just random events that allowed 1.
3. There are an infinite number of universes or conditions that are in existence, making the odds that one like ours exist highly probable.

Now this has to be explained.
— Antony Latham

SophisitiCat you answered: "Why? Can you explain your reasoning? This is one of the things I would like to clear up in this discussion. Is this fine-tuning surprising? Is it unexpected? If so, what are your expectations and what are they based on?"

It is obvious why this needs explanation. We are talking about an amalgamation of absolutely essential physical conditions needed for galaxies, planets and life (of any sort) to exist. Someone like Martin Rees, who knows the maths, can calculate the odds against such conditions occurring by chance. It turns out that chance, to get this right, would require far more opportunities to come up with these conditions than there are particles in the universe.

William Dembski calls this specified complexity. A pile of scrabble pieces lying randomly on the floor is complex and that arrangement is very unlikely but not specified. A bunch of scrabble pieces which are on the floor spelling out something like "Don't be late home. Dinner is at 7pm and remember we have invited Mrs Bloggs" is specified and needs a design origin. The fine tuning specifies planets and life.

Now if you have an a priori belief that there is nothing beyond the physical (naturalism), then you will baulk at this and have to come up with something like a multiverse theory to deal with the odds. But you will need to admit, while doing this that it is for non-scientific reasons - a particular world view or belief system you have which out-rules any non-physical agent.


Occam's razor leads me more to the more parsimonious solution - design.
— Antony Latham

SophisitCat you answered: "How do you figure?"

The idea that there is some limitless number of universes and we just happen to have struck lucky, is adding a completely new and totally unverified dimension to reality - beyond what we already know. What we already know is that the situation looks very much like design. That is the simplest and most parsimonious solution. That this goes against the prevailing naturalism/physicalism of our times is neither here nor there.

I am finding it hard to understand why you don’t see the issue here. The customary post-Enlightenment attitude to this matter has always been that as the Universe was not ‘God’s handiwork’ [i.e. the consequence of intentional creation], then the only alternative was that life arose by chance. — Wayfarer

You are equivocating on two meanings of "chance"; depending on the meaning, the "chance/design" dichotomy is either obviously true or obviously false, but in no case is it profound or relevant to our topic.

If "chance" means unintentional, accidental, then it translates into "The universe and everything in it is either the consequence of intentional creation or it is not" - a truism. If "chance" means random, lacking any pattern, then it is obviously false, since most people before, during and after the Enlightenment had at least some idea of the universe as a fairly orderly place. As such, it is to be expected that the universe was always constituted in such a way that life would be possible in it at least at some time and in some places. This is in no way a novel, unexpected finding. Neither is the idea that the universe could conceivably have been constituted otherwise.

None of this has much to do with the notion of fine-tuning, which specifically has to do with sensitive dependence of life on certain "parameters" of physical models.

My understanding of the argument goes:
1. sentient, moral agent beings like us exist.
2. in order for beings like us to exist those values, along with other criteria have to be
near exactly what they are - if any were changed appreciably - we would not exist.
3. the probability of all possible combinations of events needed for all of this criteria to
exist is incredibly unlikely - on the order of 52! or more. — Rank Amateur

Heh. Well, we had a different understanding then.

I'd say that your 2 is at least uncertain, and is what I was speaking to before. If the values were just constants then they wouldn't change. There isn't a physical possibility that they differ.

And I'd say that your paper tries to address 3 by talking about epistemic probability. But I'd just say that such probability caches out as plausibility. We can evaluate whether something is likely or not, but the likelihood we'll come up with depends on our priors.

Which hypothesis for these facts is most probable.

1. This system was designed as such to support 1. therefor there is in some way a designer
2. As improbable as it is these were all just random events that allowed 1.
3. There are an infinite number of universes or conditions that are in existence, making the odds that one like ours exist highly probable.

I don't think there's a reasonable way to evaluate them. Not really, anyways. One can sound good to someone and so they'll adopt it. We can make some argument -- about the probability space, for instance -- that makes it seem like we are really, really, really certain of a probability.

But all three are congruent with the facts, at present. So it's not on an evidential basis that we could decide such a probability. We may make arguments, but these would in turn just appeal to our intuitions. Those intuitions would already play a part in what way we believe in the first place, hence my thinking that it just depends upon what we believe.

There's no reason to close inquiry to any of the three, as far as I'm concerned.

I have a bubble blowing machine — fdrake

Here’s where your analogy fails. Why? Because it begs the question. In the situation at hand what you really have is nothing whatever. If you have a machine already, then your argument begs the question.

I may not have communicated it well, but done properly 2and3 are facts as supported and believed as true by current science.

If "chance" means unintentional, accidental, then it translates into "The universe and everything in it is either the consequence of intentional creation or it is not" - a truism. If "chance" means random, lacking any pattern, then it is obviously false, since most people before, during and after the Enlightenment had at least some idea of the universe as a fairly orderly place. — SophistiCat

That is the philosophical crux as far as I'm concerned. I quoted from Bertrand Russell's 'Free Man's Worship' which depicts man as 'the accidental collocation of atoms', and also from Jacques Monod, who says the same. The whole thrust of 20th century mechanistic atheism was that whatever order does exist in the universe, is also the consequence of chance, of happenstance, of material necessity. So if you don't see that as central to the argument, then it explains why you find the whole question meaningless - because you're not seeing what it means.

I think what is almost universally lost in this argument, is the fact that science doesn't explain 'the order of the Universe'. Sure, if you watch Brian Cox then you would be forgiven for thinking so, because this is what he and his ilk gloat over almost continuously. (Isn't science marvellous?!?') But science doesn't explain 'why things are the way they are' in the grand meta-narrative sense that our culture seems to assume it does. It starts by 'bracketing out' the very question which is here under consideration and then - surprise! - declaring there's 'absolutely no evidence' for it. Only the appearance of evidence, which in reality can be 'explained' on the basis of (physical) chance and necessity. As Dennett, another of the uber-atheists, insists (referring here to organic molecules):

An impersonal, unreflective, robotic, mindless little scrap of molecular machinery is the ultimate basis of all the agency, and hence meaning, and hence consciousness, in the universe.

Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), 202-3.

2. in order for beings like us to exist those values, along with other criteria have to be
near exactly what they are - if any were changed appreciably - we would not exist.
3. the probability of all possible combinations of events needed for all of this criteria to
exist is incredibly unlikely - on the order of 52! or more — Rank Amateur

What is factual about them?

In order for us to know 2 we'd have to run an experiment. So we'd start a universe with different values and see what came up (if that were possible to do). 2 follows if we accept all of current scientific statements as true, and then decide to treat some constants as variables to see what might happen in a universe that is remarkably similar to ours, but with a few changes.

But it's just a prediction, not a fact. We'd have to actually see that happening to say "This is fact"


And 3 depends upon treating those same constants as variables, too. But if they don't vary then there isn't a range of possible values for the constants to be. It's kind of hokey, from my viewpoint. I mean, shoot, the number line is infinite, so we might as well say that the probability of a constant is 0 (giving the event an infinitely great improbability, sans someone putting it there), given that it's just a single point on an infinite line.

Yes, I am aware of Robin Collins's argument. Maybe we'll get to him, but I was rather hoping to engage proponents of FTA directly. I could talk about Collins's argument (I'll need a refresher), but I wouldn't want to just talk to myself. I don't think his argument works, but he is one of the few to take up the defense of the FTA seriously, and if he is wrong, his failure is instructive.

jeeprs... go thumb your dog-eared collection of quotes and moan about the evils of atheistic materialism somewhere else. You don't seem to understand what we are talking about.

I don't argue facts. And I don't argue faith, both a waste of time.

↪Rank Amateur Yes, I am aware of Robin Collins's argument. Maybe we'll get to him, but I was rather hoping to engage proponents of FTA directly. I could talk about Collins's argument (I'll need a refresher), but I wouldn't want to just talk to myself. I don't think his argument works, but he is one of the few to take up the defense of the FTA seriously, and if he is wrong, his failure is instructive. — SophistiCat

It was all the response your snide post required. Ditto for this one.

You don't seem to understand what we are talking about. — SophistiCat

Which apparently is nothing of any significance.

:D

I'd say that neither is any more a waste of time than arguing itself.

Plus science is all about arguing over facts. It's not like it's all just settled. There are arguments, not doctrines.

This even applies to ranges rather than just single points.

If W is the width of the range of parameter p within which life is possible, then no matter how large W is (eg anywhere between 10^(-googol) and 10^(+googol), which is an inconceivably wide range ), we can show that the probability of the constant falling within that range is less than any given tiny number epsilon, no matter how small, simply by hypothesising that p has a uniform distribution on the interval [0, 2W/epsilon].

So no matter how wide the range of life-permitting values, somebody that wants to argue that they are fine-tuned is able to do that.

And therein lies a problem: there is no uniform probability distribution on an infinitely wide interval. But if not uniform, then what? If a uniform distribution of epistemic probability could be justified by the principle of indifference (sort of - there's a lot of controversy over the principle of indifference, and over epistemic probability for that matter), there surely cannot be any justification for a non-uniform distribution.

Robin Collins attempts to address the problem with so-called "epistemically illuminated regions," if I remember correctly. That is, he suggests that instead of taking the largest conceivable range as the total probability space, which would be infinite for many of the fine-tuned parameters, we should only look at finite ranges that we have actually examined for life fitness ("epistemically illuminated.") The problem here is that for at least some of these parameters we have no trouble examining the entire infinite range. We could (and probably should) vary all so-called parameters simultaneously and thus end up not with a single range but with a multidimensional parameter space. However, even though it might be analytically and technically difficult, nothing in principle prevents us from theoretically examining this entire infinite space for life fitness. If we do, and it turns out that the life-supporting regions in this space have a combined measure of zero, that would undermine Collins's probabilistic analysis. It seems unsatisfactory to bet your entire analysis on such a contingency.

If we then allow the laws themselves to vary (and there is no metaphysical reason why we should consider the laws to be fixed while relaxing constants and boundary conditions), we run into an even more severe problem: the "collection" of all possible laws is too big to even form a set (since it will be as "big" as the set of all sets - a paradoxical concept, as Russell famously demonstrated), and so no measure theory - and thus no probability - could possibly be applied here.

But why stop there? Who said that there have to be laws? They are not a metaphysical necessity. So, as long as we allow constants, boundary conditions, and then laws to vary, we should also consider possible universes in which laws do not operate, or operate inconsistently. That broadens the space (which is not a space!) inconceivably.

Is this a fatal blow to the FTA? Well, it is to Collins's Bayesian argument, but frankly, I think there are better reasons than that to reject Collins's argument.

there is no metaphysical reason why we should consider the laws to be fixed — SophistiCat

Isn’t there an empirical reason, namely, that they always are? Could it ever be F=MA^{(most of the time)}?

I agree.

I followed the link that Rank Amateur gave to the Robin Collins argument but it fell at the first hurdle, comparing the FTA to our finding a high-tech domed structure on Mars. That demonstrates he's missing the point so badly that I could not read any further.

We have seen a large number of examples of uninhabited landscapes - in deserts and under oceans on Earth, on the Moon, on Mars where the Rovers have been, and on other planets and their moons through telescopes on passing spacecraft. That experience gives us strong empirical evidence that sophisticated domed structures do not arise without being constructed by intelligent beings.

Compare that to the FTA and our spacetime. Our sample size is one! And in every element in our sample, intelligent life has arisen. So if we want to throw observation-based probabilistic arguments about (which I would not!) the observationally-supported hypothesis is that there is a 100% probability that a spacetime will contain intelligent life.

The argument is just a re-heated version of Paley's 'watch on the heath' argument. All that's been changed is that the heath becomes a planet and the watch becomes a dome. Has Collins never even bothered to read any of the critiques of Paley's argument? Does he really think that just giving the two key objects different names will somehow resurrect a dead argument?

From that abominable start, does it get any better? Are there any pages that are less naive and worth reading?

@SophistiCat, @andrewk, yeah, the fine-tuning arguments seem kind of fine-tuned (to an end) themselves.
An assessment would perhaps have to include something like modal realism, which isn't really feasible.
In a very large probability space, the probability of any observed particulars (in our universe) becomes very small, whether involving us, or life, or the rocky moons in our Solar system, or whatever.
Also, how would we assess the chances of a hypothetical über-designer intentionally coming up with our universe (without begging the question)?
And maybe we're just a side-effect of an über-designer studying micro-chaos versus macro-constraints or whatever?
How would we differentiate?
Looks to me like the Texas sharpshooter fallacy applies.

It seem to me, maybe incorrectly, from many of the responses that some are not clear on the form of the FTA. It is not a proof of anything. It is just an observation on some verifiable truths.

1. embodied sentient beings like us exist.
2. There is a significant number of physical criteria necessary for 1 to exist
many of these criteria need to be within small tolerances for 1 to exist
3. In the realm of possible options, there is an incredibly low probability
all of these conditions will exist.

(I may not have done a good job on those, but when stated correctly they are all scientifically verifiable facts)

All FTA does is as for a probability guess on how such a condition can come into existence. FTA pro ports that it is by design. The only other hypotheses i have seen on this is either it was random, or the multi- universe statement.

Again - when stated correctly - you can not dispute 1, 2, 3 without leaving established science.

the discussion in on the explanation, and all 3 hypotheses are reasonable ( meaning not in conflict with fact ) - just a judgement on which one is more probable than another.

let me try a different though experiment to highlight it.

You are taking a hike in the mountains.
You come to fork in the trail,
at the fork you see 10 flat rocks, one stacked upon the other largest on the bottom
smallest on the top, making a pyramid.

you are given 3 options for how these rock came to be there:
1. someone found them an stacked them that way
2. they randomly fell from the mountains and landed that way
3. there are an infinite number of you, in an infinite number of universes, in this infinite
set one with such a stack exists

I'd pick 1.

It is just an observation on some verifiable truths.

1. embodied sentient beings like us exist.
2. There is a significant number of physical criteria necessary for 1 to exist
many of these criteria need to be within small tolerances for 1 to exist
3. In the realm of possible options, there is an incredibly low probability
all of these conditions will exist. — Rank Amateur

No. Item 1 is an observation.
For the sake of argument let's provisionally agree that the claim in 2 is justifiable.
But 3 is a claim about probability, with no support at all. As has been shown above, we can put whatever probability we like on the conditions obtaining, and each probability has as much support as any other, which is none at all.

More generally, statements about probabilities are never observable facts. They are based on a model, and models are interpretations, not facts.

But 3 is a claim about probability, with no support at all. As has been shown above, we can put whatever probability we like on the conditions obtaining, and each probability has as much support as any other, which is none at all. — andrewk

In reverse order

I propose the probability of rolling a 1 on a fair 6 sided dice is one chance in 6 is a true statement.

But 3 is a claim about probability, with no support at all. As has been shown above, we can put whatever probability we like on the conditions obtaining, and each probability has as much support as any other, which is none at all. — andrewk

That is a fair point, even if I could understand the physics behind this, which I probably can't, not sure many others could either. And I am sue it would take up a few pages of posts to provide the support you ask for. As I said on my post, I will freely admit I may not have stated perfectly. But when the argument is made professionally, this point is supported and its basis is completely consistent with current scientific knowledge. If you can't accept that, google is your friend.

More generally, statements about probabilities are never observable facts. They are based on a model, and models are interpretations, not facts. — andrewk

Sorry, my comment about the factual nature of statements about probability was supposed to go with this.