So let's just stick with unenlightened's notion of commitment. — Moliere

I've already argued for why commitment alone is inadequate.

I am fine with your notion of lying. So lying, rather than merely being mistaken, is when you deliberately misrepresent your own belief to yourself. Merely being mistaken is holding a false belief. Since falsity isn't in the notion of lying the two don't even have to relate. — Moliere

This is incorrect. Truth/falsity is in the notion of lying. It's just that the lie(what's being said as opposed/compared to what's believed) can be either. On the face of it even it's more than obvious that being mistaken and lying are related. They both require belief.

We may deliberately misrepresent some true or false belief to ourselves, just depending upon what we believe.

That's what I'm rejecting, and have argued for without subsequent refutation. On my view, just saying it isn't enough. Can you argue for this?

By removing truth, in fact, there is a lot more wiggle room here -- the beliefs need not even have a factual component (EDIT: Or even be truth-apt). They merely need to be misrepresented to ourselves.

Removing truth from the notion of thought and belief? Cannot be done. All thought and belief presupposes it's own truth somewhere along the line. The notion of being "truth-apt" is misleading at best. All thought and belief can be either. It's only as a result of their being inadequately represented in speech that makes it seem like some are not.

I am committed to some belief. I come to believe something that is in conflict with this other belief. Here I can be honest with myself, realize that these two beliefs are not compatible, and try and think through that conflict and resolve it in some way. Or I can be dishonest with myself, act out of fear, and tell myself that the beliefs are not in conflict. — Moliere

If you know that they are in conflict, then you cannot believe that they are not.

However I might accomplish this -- it seems that this dishonesty is really what lying to yourself is all about. You aren't coming to terms with a conflict in beliefs, but rather accepting both beliefs in spite of having the niggling realization that they are in conflict. So you misrepresent your beliefs -- or meta-beliefs? -- by saying they can get along fine. Your commitment and your new belief that said commitment is somehow erroneous (not necessarily false) and your belief that they are not in conflict are all somehow simultaneously preserved. It seems a mental feat which would result in conflict of the self, and indeed I'd say that this is the case -- which really only makes sense if different parts of the self can actually be in conflict, which is easily understood if the mind is divided.

The mind is divided. However, it is still one mind. It is divided in terms of having/holding conflicting beliefs. Your example is one of cognitive dissonance being ignored. Very common practice hereabouts and everywhere I've ever been.

Lying is dishonest/insincerity. Being insincere is precisely what one is doing when being dishonest(when lying). Both point towards what's going on when one is deliberately misrepresenting one's own thought and belief. So, there's no difference on my view between 'being dishonest with oneself' and 'lying to oneself'. Both are poor uses of language stemming from misconceptions. They hamper understanding.

One cannot be tricked into believing something if they know both how they're being tricked, and that they're being tricked.

One who is performing the trickery knows both how and that they're doing it.

One cannot know how and that one is tricking him/herself and not know how and that one is tricking oneself(how and that it's being done).

The same applies to deliberately misrepresenting one's own thought and belief to oneself. It's just plain common sense. It's not at all difficult to grasp. — creativesoul

If you know that they are in conflict, then you cannot believe that they are not. — creativesoul

The mind is divided. However, it is still one mind. It is divided in terms of having/holding conflicting beliefs. Your example is one of cognitive dissonance being ignored. Very common practice hereabouts and everywhere I've ever been. — creativesoul

So if we can have or hold conflicting beliefs -- ignore cognitive dissonance, as you put it -- then we can both know that two beliefs are in conflict, and believe they are not in conflict. Because both of those beliefs, too, are in conflict, yet we can hold conflicting beliefs, so.... what's the problem?

It goes against common sense. But here it seems you're admitting that common sense is wrong?

Removing truth from the notion of thought and belief? Cannot be done. — creativesoul

I feel that's irritating.

"I feel that's irritating" is true. But is the feeling of irritation true? No. But it is a part of the mind. So if the entire mind is belief, then surely there are non-cognitive beliefs.

So if we can have or hold conflicting beliefs -- ignore cognitive dissonance, as you put it -- then we can both know that two beliefs are in conflict, and believe they are not in conflict. Because both of those beliefs, too, are in conflict, yet we can hold conflicting beliefs, so.... what's the problem?

It goes against common sense. But here it seems you're admitting that common sense is wrong? — Moliere

Ignoring the self-contradiction is not believing there is none. It's neglecting to address it, or believing it's unimportant.

But if we can be in self-contradiction, then we can also be in self-contradiction about our beliefs. So we might just ignore it, which is something like what I believe @jkg20 is saying. But we can also form a further belief, a belief that the two are not in self-contradiction. So we can believe that "A and B do not contradict" as well as believe that "A and B do contradict" -- since we can believe contradictory things.

I feel that's irritating.

"I feel that's irritating" is true. But is the feeling of irritation true? No. But it is a part of the mind. So if the entire mind is belief, then surely there are non-cognitive beliefs. — Moliere

All thought and belief consist of correlations drawn between 'objects' of physiological sensory perception and/or oneself. The 'feeling' of irritation is no different. The statement sets out the connection to oneself(the irritation) and the 'object'(that).

But if we can be in self-contradiction, then we can also be in self-contradiction about our beliefs. So we might just ignore it, which is something like what I believe jkg20 is saying. But we can also form a further belief, a belief that the two are not in self-contradiction. So we can believe that "A and B do not contradict" as well as believe that "A and B do contradict" -- since we can believe contradictory things. — Moliere

We can believe contradictory things. We cannot acknowledge that they are and believe that they are not in the same breath.

Sure. I can go with that. That's why I thought a dimension of time was necessary, as well as some way of explaining how we shift from one part of the mind to another -- like having an awareness that shifts.

That's normal. If one holds contradictory belief, they usually do not face one another in one's thought. That usually takes an other. Always actually, but that would get into how thinking about thought and belief requires language.

Why call this lying to oneself if it shares nothing with lying to another? If you're going with my notion of what counts as lying, it just doesn't work...

One's beliefs change over time. This can certainly result in having contradictory beliefs that weren't there before. We don't think about all our beliefs at the same time. It(maintaining coherency) takes a lot of work when one begins to look at the world differently...

Let's consider the philosopher's friend, phantom limb pain. I seems I cannot be deceived or mistaken about my own pain, because it is experiential. But then I find that the leg I do not have hurts. Real pain, phantom leg. So neurobabbblle tells us that it is due to activity in a region of the brain that has a 'body-image' to which sensations are referred and the leg image goes a bit mad from sensory deprivation. ( They don't say that, I'm paraphrasing).

There seems to be a certain sleight of leg going on - one might say that I am deceived by my nervous system into thinking I have a hurty leg, when I do not have a hurty leg. But then I have separated me, my body and my nervous system, and allowed one to deceive another, albeit unintentionally.

Or consider an anorexic, who considers herself grossly overweight as she is dying of starvation.

Or the poor philosopher, who reasons thus:

Men like football.
I am a man.
Therefore I like football.

Which is an example of conforming to an image. Is it impossible to convince oneself that one likes football, or gurls, or shaving, or fighting, because one more desperately wants to conform than to be 'true to oneself'? Surely, it happens all the time?

Because you can intentionally tell yourself a lie, and then become unaware of said action. I'd say I agree with @unenlightened's examples above -- we can have an image we want to conform to, realize we are not like the image, and then tell ourselves "But really, deep down inside, I am like that image" and then have our awareness flip such that we are no longer aware that we intentionally deceived ourselves.

lie to your self ...we do it all the time , we compromise ethics , we convince ourselves it's their fault , you assume they don't like you .... all forms of lying to your self


now ... can you lie to YOU .... no .... deep down if the mind quiets there is never a single doubt as to action needed , so to pretend we do not know something that is internal is a lie in itself .....


the answer to your question depends which you we are speaking about , the self image/ego .... or the consciousness capable of observing thought without judgment .... one yes , the other one no

Which is an example of conforming to an image. Is it impossible to convince oneself that one likes football, or gurls, or shaving, or fighting, because one more desperately wants to conform than to be 'true to oneself'? Surely, it happens all the time? — unenlightened

Surely. I'm confident that neither 'self-deception' nor 'lying to oneself' is the best way to describe these situations though. I mentioned one earlier... the homosexual. We all adopt our initial worldview, and that includes much, if not most, of our own original 'self' image.

Here we see the inherent problem with the notion of self. I'm certain we all agree here. The self is largely delineated by others.

Because you can intentionally tell yourself a lie, and then become unaware of said action. I'd say I agree with unenlightened's examples above -- we can have an image we want to conform to, realize we are not like the image, and then tell ourselves "But really, deep down inside, I am like that image" and then have our awareness flip such that we are no longer aware that we intentionally deceived ourselves. — Moliere

This is presupposing exactly what needs argued for. Care to address the arguments I've given for how and why one cannot deceive oneself and one cannot lie to oneself? I think I've directly addressed all you've said here. I certainly intended to.

Being wrong is not equivalent to lying. Being wrong about oneself is not equivalent to lying to oneself.

The notion of 'self'-deception is nonsense. I've already adequately argued for that without subsequent valid criticism.

Your argument appears to be:
1: Self-deception only makes sense if it makes sense for one person A to act deceitfully towards a person B, where A and B are the same person.
2: It does not make sense for one person A to act deceitfully towards person B, where A and B are the same person.
3: Therefore, modus tollens, self-deception does not make sense.

To support (2), the model of A being deceitful towards B regarding some proposition P, goes along the following lines
a) A knowingly believes that not-P.
b) B's own interests are best served by knowingly believing that not-P.
c) A knowingly believes that his (A's) intentions/wishes are best served by having B knowingly believe that P.
c) A acts intentionally in order that B should knowingly believe that P.

So we end up, if the deceitful behaviour is successful, with A knowingly believing that not-P and B knowingly believing that P at one and the same time. This is not possible where A and B are one and the same person.
(Note that we are talking about A being deceitful to B, not A merely deceiving B.)

That seems right, and so (2) is a true premise.
But this leaves conditional (1) undefended and @Srap Tasmaner and I have been suggesting that self-deception should not be modelled on one person being deceitful to another. That part of the argument you have not yet established. As far as I recall, it came down to intuitions about what you/I/Srap would or would not call cases of self-deception.

Being wrong is not equivalent to lying. Being wrong about oneself is not equivalent to lying to oneself.

The notion of 'self'-deception is nonsense. I've already adequately argued for that without subsequent valid criticism. — creativesoul

Have you? It seems to me that you've just declared it nonsense. (EDIT: I should note here I believe you're sincere, I'm just telling you my impression is all) You do so on the basis of saying that we can classify any intentional act of misrepresenting belief to oneself as something other than lying, because we haven't given the necessary and sufficient conditions that are up to your standard.

But is that an argument? We have given criteria that marks simple error from self-deception. You've just said "OK, sure that's necessary, but not good enough" -- but then we do in fact have a means for distinguishing the two, and so what exactly is nonsensical here?

we can have an image we want to conform to, realize we are not like the image, and then tell ourselves "But really, deep down inside, I am like that image" and then have our awareness flip such that we are no longer aware that we intentionally deceived ourselves. — Moliere

I don't think it works quite like that, in most cases. One needs a bit of psychology here.There is 'what I am', and there is 'what I think I am' (my self image), and the latter is an aspect of the former. But inevitably, I think that what I am is what I think I am. So self- preservation becomes a matter of preserving the image.

Suppose I look at myself from a position of ignorance. It comes naturally, from this realisation that I am not who I think I am. Then I see there is the self-image I have, but I give it less importance, because it is incomplete at best. So I am ready to discover myself anew. Perhaps, after all I am not the wise philosopher I think I am; perhaps I am not the nice balanced social being I think I am. I will find out as I go - I will learn about myself in my relationship to the world, but it will always be learning, never knowing. This is too frightening for me as long as I still think I am what I think I am, and it seems that to change my image is to die.

I'm confident that neither 'self-deception' nor 'lying to oneself' is the best way to describe these situations though. I mentioned one earlier... the homosexual. We all adopt our initial worldview, and that includes much, if not most, of our own original 'self' image.

Here we see the inherent problem with the notion of self. I'm certain we all agree here. The self is largely delineated by others. — creativesoul

Well I'm not committed to a particular way of describing things, but when people use these terms, I think I know what is meant.

"You are naughty! Be a good boy for Mummy!"

On the one hand one discovers oneself in relationship, one is learning, and on the other, one is told what one is and what one must be. One must be good because one is naughty. And Santa will know which you are. Most people are naughty and being good, taught to live a lie in negation of the lie they have been taught.

I don't think it works quite like that, in most cases. One needs a bit of psychology here.There is 'what I am', and there is 'what I think I am' (my self image), and the latter is an aspect of the former. But inevitably, I think that what I am is what I think I am. So self- preservation becomes a matter of preserving the image. — unenlightened

That's fair. I can get along with that -- I haven't really been thinking in terms of plausibility, psychology, or facts as much as just getting a basic and easy to recognize theory of lying-to-oneself across to @creativesoul

Suppose I look at myself from a position of ignorance. It comes naturally, from this realisation that I am not who I think I am. Then I see there is the self-image I have, but I give it less importance, because it is incomplete at best. So I am ready to discover myself anew. Perhaps, after all I am not the wise philosopher I think I am; perhaps I am not the nice balanced social being I think I am. I will find out as I go - I will learn about myself in my relationship to the world, but it will always be learning, never knowing. This is too frightening for me as long as I still think I am what I think I am, and it seems that to change my image is to die.

So for yourself 'lying to yourself' is much more subtle, really. It's almost like an approach to the world and the self -- whereas in one case we must be something we are not, or we believe we are this exact thing and it's a hill to die on, and in the other case we recognize that we are not this set of beliefs about ourself and are open to learning more -- it is exciting to change the image in the face of new information, rather than a death-threat.

it is exciting to change the image in the face of new information, rather than a death-threat. — Moliere

Yes, exactly, learning without accumulation, one could say.

Learning through experience is one thing – it is the accumulation of conditioning – and learning all the time, not only about objective things but also about oneself, is something quite different. There is the accumulation which brings about conditioning – this we know – and there is the learning which we speak about. This learning is observation – to observe without accumulation, to observe in freedom. This observation is not directed from the past. Let us keep those two things clear. — J.Krishnamurti

https://www.jkrishnamurti.org/content/‘learning’/learning%20without%20accumulation

So my image is from the past, and the image does not observe; I observe in the present, unidentified with the image.

On the one hand one discovers oneself in relationship, one is learning, and on the other, one is told what one is and what one must be. One must be good because one is naughty. And Santa will know which you are. Most people are naughty and being good, taught to live a lie in negation of the lie they have been taught. — unenlightened

Here we go ...the divided self. Can you describe or explain how the divided self, divided in this way, between what I want to do, and what I ought to do (mummy tells me so), relates to your description of that other division between "what I am" and "what I think I am"?

I would assume that what I am relates to what I want to do, and what I think I am relates to what I ought to do. But you say that what I think I am is an aspect of what I am, so how would what I ought to do become an aspect of what I am when it's only related to what I think I am, and separate from it? See, I'm divided because I perceive what I ought to do as an aspect of others, "mummy told me not to do this", and not really an aspect of myself at all. Maybe it's a third person perspective. But then it's impossible that what I ought to do can be an aspect of what I think I am, unless others are somehow controlling my thoughts. How would "what I ought to do" become a real aspect of "what I think I am"? It would seem like it could only be an aspect of "what I am".

Would you say that "what I am" is itself a deception, that there is only what I think I am, and what others think I am? There really is no self, only an image. If not, then what supports the assumption that there is such a thing as what I am? Is it necessary to assume a "what I am", in order to produce a divided self, to expose the possibility of self-deception, which is really an attribute of the one undivided "what I think I am?

Attempting to find out what would be a bit more congenial to your taste's @creativesoul --

I think awareness through time is doing most of the work in making the concept of lying to oneself coherent, for me. Just as I can flip my awareness in a moment from the thoughts I am having to my fingers, to my memories, to my feelings it seems to me that a flip in awareness could happen from two halves of myself. So where I do agree with you is that the part of myself that is lying could not misrepresent their own thoughts and trick themselves -- there is a need for some kind of a division for trickery to be successful on this model, because you have to be aware of the trick if you're setting out to trick someone. Like a three card monte player knows how to replace a card without someone observing, they couldn't do so to themselves.

So I'm tracking with you on that. For me the flip in awareness is what's important -- so at one point we are aware of the trick, and at the other point we are not. For something like three card monte, where we have concrete points of reference in our literal hands this would be pretty extreme, though maybe possible. But for something a bit more abstract, like knowledge of myself, it doesn't seem so extreme to me because we aren't perfectly transparent to ourselves.

Since we aren't perfectly transparent to ourselves it actually becomes rather easy to lie to ourselves because the trick lies in what is actually a very plausible belief: "I am not transparent to myself" -- so if I come across something that I'd term inconvenient for myself, all I need do is remind myself that I am not transparent to myself and suddenly what was inconvenient becomes questionable.


That's why it makes sense for me, at least. Where in this line of reasoning does something just balk as unnacceptable to you? My guess is you'd just say this is not lying. But if I both believe P and ~P -- because I did, after all, come across something inconvenient -- then that seems to fit perfectly with the notion of lying, or tricking myself. In fact it seems like in order for me to intentional trick myself I would have to believe both, since to be intentional about the lie I'd have to believe P and want myself to believe ~P, then convince myself of ~P -- without changing the original belief.

Whereas to be mistaken would just be to believe something that is false, or to believe something that is true but for bad reasons.

Would you say that "what I am" is itself a deception, that there is only what I think I am, and what others think I am? There really is no self, only an image. If not, then what supports the assumption that there is such a thing as what I am? Is it necessary to assume a "what I am", in order to produce a divided self, to expose the possibility of self-deception, which is really an attribute of the one undivided "what I think I am? — Metaphysician Undercover

Well I'm only talking, and only even talking about thought. Physically, there is no division, obviously. So there is a division in thought, and a mental conflict. Or perhaps there isn't in your case, it's for you to say.

'What I am' is writing a response - this one - (dasein?). This is real enough, I don't have to assume anything. And then you want a response that explains and justifies the writer in some way, and that is the image I am conveying in the writing that is not the writer, but an image of him. I don't see why you want to problematise this?

'What I am' is writing a response - this one - (dasein?). This is real enough, I don't have to assume anything. And then you want a response that explains and justifies the writer in some way, and that is the image I am conveying in the writing that is not the writer, but an image of him. I don't see why you want to problematise this? — unenlightened

What I was asking is how do you relate this to the division between what I want to do, and what I ought to do. It's all thought, as you say, but suppose I am writing this response because I want to, but I am thinking that I ought not to be, because I have other responsibilities which I should be taking care of right now, instead of wasting my time doing this.

So in your response, you indicate that "what I am" is writing this response, despite the fact that I ought not to be writing this response. How do I get to the point where I can produce consistency between what I want to do, and what I ought to do, such that what I am is the same as what I ought to be, because I would be doing what I ought to be doing? Otherwise I see no reason to do what I ought to do, because it's simply not me.

How do I get to the point where I can produce consistency between what I want to do, and what I ought to do, such that what I am is the same as what I ought to be, because I would be doing what I ought to be doing? — Metaphysician Undercover

You'll have to ask Jesus about that one, dude. All I can point out is that 'what I want' and 'what I ought' are images that often conflict, and 'what I am' is what happens as a matter of fact.

You'll have to ask Jesus about that one, dude. — unenlightened

Got his phone number?

Your argument appears to be:
1: Self-deception only makes sense if it makes sense for one person A to act deceitfully towards a person B, where A and B are the same person.
2: It does not make sense for one person A to act deceitfully towards person B, where A and B are the same person.
3: Therefore, modus tollens, self-deception does not make sense.

To support (2), the model of A being deceitful towards B regarding some proposition P, goes along the following lines
a) A knowingly believes that not-P.
b) B's own interests are best served by knowingly believing that not-P.
c) A knowingly believes that his (A's) intentions/wishes are best served by having B knowingly believe that P.
c) A acts intentionally in order that B should knowingly believe that P.

So we end up, if the deceitful behaviour is successful, with A knowingly believing that not-P and B knowingly believing that P at one and the same time. This is not possible where A and B are one and the same person.
(Note that we are talking about A being deceitful to B, not A merely deceiving B.)

That seems right, and so (2) is a true premise.
But this leaves conditional (1) undefended and Srap Tasmaner and I have been suggesting that self-deception should not be modelled on one person being deceitful to another. That part of the argument you have not yet established. As far as I recall, it came down to intuitions about what you/I/Srap would or would not call cases of self-deception. — jkg20

That's close, but not quite the argument...

Lying to another is deliberately misrepresenting one's own thought and belief to another. Lying to oneself would be deliberately misrepresenting one's own thought and belief to oneself. One always knows if s/he believes something, doesn't believe something, or are uncertain whether or not s/he believes something. Thus, one cannot deliberately misrepresent one's own thought and belief to oneself.

Strictly speaking, I shouldn't say 'nonsense' if I mean incoherent, unintelligible, or self-contradictory. Whether or not something is sensible(in this context) isn't determined by being coherent. It's determined by common use. The notion of self-deception and lying to oneself is often used in common talk.

Attempting to find out what would be a bit more congenial to your taste's creativesoul --

I think awareness through time is doing most of the work in making the concept of lying to oneself coherent, for me. Just as I can flip my awareness in a moment from the thoughts I am having to my fingers, to my memories, to my feelings it seems to me that a flip in awareness could happen from two halves of myself. So where I do agree with you is that the part of myself that is lying could not misrepresent their own thoughts and trick themselves -- there is a need for some kind of a division for trickery to be successful on this model, because you have to be aware of the trick if you're setting out to trick someone. Like a three card monte player knows how to replace a card without someone observing, they couldn't do so to themselves.

So I'm tracking with you on that. For me the flip in awareness is what's important -- so at one point we are aware of the trick, and at the other point we are not. For something like three card monte, where we have concrete points of reference in our literal hands this would be pretty extreme, though maybe possible. But for something a bit more abstract, like knowledge of myself, it doesn't seem so extreme to me because we aren't perfectly transparent to ourselves.

Since we aren't perfectly transparent to ourselves it actually becomes rather easy to lie to ourselves because the trick lies in what is actually a very plausible belief: "I am not transparent to myself" -- so if I come across something that I'd term inconvenient for myself, all I need do is remind myself that I am not transparent to myself and suddenly what was inconvenient becomes questionable.


That's why it makes sense for me, at least. Where in this line of reasoning does something just balk as unnacceptable to you? My guess is you'd just say this is not lying. But if I both believe P and ~P -- because I did, after all, come across something inconvenient -- then that seems to fit perfectly with the notion of lying, or tricking myself. In fact it seems like in order for me to intentional trick myself I would have to believe both, since to be intentional about the lie I'd have to believe P and want myself to believe ~P, then convince myself of ~P -- without changing the original belief.

Whereas to be mistaken would just be to believe something that is false, or to believe something that is true but for bad reasons. — Moliere

It seems that this hinges upon the notion of being transparent to ourselves.

On my view, one always knows whether or not they believe what they say. That is, one always know whether they believe it, do not believe it, or are uncertain.

Seems to me that you've offered an account of one developing contradictory beliefs.

There's this idea of 'wearing a different hat'...

So, it's basically the idea that the same person acts differently in different situations. This revolves around ethics. That is to say that how one acts in some situation or other, assuming the person has some notion of appropriate behaviour, ought be situation specific. We decide what counts as acceptable/unacceptable behaviour in different situations, and we hold others to that standard. I mean, we all know that some of what we do in our own homes, we would not do in public. In school, there are codes of conduct. At work, at the movies, in the theatre, in a restaurant, etc; all these places have slightly different codes of acceptable/unacceptable behaviour. So, we have different criteria and thus differing expectations for behaviour depending upon the situation we're in...

That's the groundwork. I want to tie this into the conversation here...

If it is the case that someone strongly believes that they must consciously alter their behavior as a means to conform to what they believe is expected, this could set up a situation that fulfills - I think - some of the notions expressed in this thread regarding a case of lying to oneself, and/or deceiving oneself.

When one acts in ways that satisfy what one thinks that others expect, and they do this intentionally and deliberately, then they think that that's how they ought act. If those ways include saying things that they do not believe, but rather they say them because they think that it's the best thing to say at the time because of the situation they're in, then we have everything needed for one to lose sight of what they actually believe...

Now, I am not saying that this must be the case or always is the case when one 'wears different hats', but rather that it has what it takes for one to lose sight of oneself, over a significant enough period of time.