Can you give an example of how you'd analyze a typical knowledge claim? Anything about that analysis that makes you uncomfortable?

Sure. At the present moment, (I know that) I'm sitting at my PC writing this sentence.

I adhere to correspondence theory re truth claims, so in this example, I am judging the truth value "true" to correspond to my experience in the present moment sitting at my PC.

I adhere to internalist theories of justification (and meaning wholesale), so in this example, my justification appeals to my believing/knowing that Realism is true and believing that direct realism is true; and that having this experience qua this experience cannot be reasonably refuted, even if what my experience is of cannot be known absolutely known (that is, even though I can be certain I am having an experience, it's possible that the content of my experience is false, e.g. I could be dreaming, hallucinating, etc. in the vein of "brain-in-a-vat" type scenarios).

That's a (strong) foundationalist position.

So far, I don't feel "uncomfortable" about that analysis.

But I become ambivalent when I consider that I have other beliefs that appeal to weak foundationalism as a "starting point"/foundational belief. For example, the (weak foundationalist) empirical claim that the sun will "rise" in the morning. And then I wonder whether it makes sense to say that strong foundationalism is compatible with weak foundationalism. Can there be different types of foundational beliefs within a system, for instance? I think so, but not totally sold yet.

On other hand, I do think it makes sense to believe that coherentism is compatible with foundationlism, since I believe that all thoughts are ultimately circular in nature like a "web/network of thoughts/beliefs." I am aware that coherentism says that there are no foundational beliefs, which I disagree with. So the way I conceive it, I have a variation of foundational beliefs that are organised in a network of other beliefs (a la coherentism).

having this experience qua this experience cannot be reasonably refuted, even if what my experience is of cannot be known absolutely known (that is, even though I can be certain I am having an experience, it's possible that the content of my experience is false — numberjohnny5

Your experience has a quality and a content: the quality you know ("know"?) infallibly, but the content -- maybe not infallibly? Maybe not at all? Are you sure there's a foundation for knowledge here?

Yes, the quality I know infallibly, and the content I know fallibly, although I believe I have very good reasons to know the content (99.99999....% knowledge). I'd say that's a very strong foundation for knowledge.

Are the quality of an experience and its content related?

Sure. At the present moment, (I know that) I'm sitting at my PC writing this sentence. — numberjohnny5

My position is that you "don't know that you're sitting at the PC writing," i.e., that proposition is a foundational belief. What I mean by foundational is that the belief doesn't fall within any epistemological construct, i.e., it doesn't make sense that it would need justification, and it doesn't make sense that it can or could be doubted (at least generally). There are many foundational beliefs that fall into this category, for example, "This is my hand," or "I live on the Earth;" I would call these beliefs bedrock, basic, or foundational. One can identify these foundational beliefs when we consider whether or not it makes sense in particular contexts to doubt the statement/proposition, which is why it's not a matter of knowing that you're sitting at the PC. It's simply a very basic belief that falls outside any epistemic consideration, which is to say that it doesn't need to be justified. Justification comes to an end with these kinds of statements.

My position is that you "don't know that you're sitting at the PC writing," i.e., that proposition is a foundational belief. What I mean by foundational is that the belief doesn't fall within any epistemological construct, i.e., it doesn't make sense that it would need justification, and it doesn't make sense that it can or could be doubted (at least generally). — Sam26

I am doubting the claim "I am sitting at my pc" due to it's unreality. It is a belief rather than real, I contend (although, in reality, there is merely the experience of a "contend" thought).

The reality is that there is an experience of "sitting at my pc".

Are the quality of an experience and its content related? — Srap Tasmaner

Well, now that I think about it, even the content of an experience is qualitative. How can any experience not be qualitative? So to answer your question, yes, they are related in that they are identical. You cannot separate qualia from content, in other words (if you buy qualia, that is).

The quality/content may be an illusion, but even the illusion would be qualitative. The problem here is that we cannot refute solipsism or "veil of perception"-type problems, but that impossibility is not a good enough reason to reject the idea that an experience of phenomena might be illusory. It's still an experience--one can be absolutely certain about that.

I see, thanks for explaining that.

With regards to your "position", I'd rather say that "I don't know that my experience of sitting at my PC writing is not an illusion, but I know that I am currently having an experience of some kind." That's a foundational belief for me.

If you want your qualitative experience to be the foundation of your knowledge, then I think you need to be able to say something like this eventually:

(F) Because I have experience of A, I have knowledge of B.

The question is how to fill in A and B, and whether one determines the other, so that (F) -- is true? must be true? If is the latter, what's the nature of that necessity?

I am doubting the claim "I am sitting at my pc" due to it's unreality. It is a belief rather than real, I contend (although, in reality, there is merely the experience of a "contend" thought).

The reality is that there is an experience of "sitting at my pc". — raza

My point is that to doubt something means that one has good reasons to doubt, or has good evidence to doubt. In my epistemology one doesn't just need a justification for knowledge, but one needs a good justification for doubt, the two go hand-in-hand. So I'm not sure what it would mean to doubt that you're sitting at your pc. I'm sure that you might be able to construct a scenario in which it would make sense to doubt it, but what would it mean to doubt it in normal everyday circumstances. Do we normally doubt such things?

With regards to your "position", I'd rather say that "I don't know that my experience of sitting at my PC writing is not an illusion, but I know that I am currently having an experience of some kind." That's a foundational belief for me. — numberjohnny5

I would say that normally we do know that it's not an illusion. However, I maybe using the word know differently from you. What I mean, is that we are reasonably sure that such-and-such is the case. I don't have to know with absolute certainty to make the claim that "I know..." Furthermore, if you don't know that you're sitting at your computer doing X, viz., having that experience, then how would you know that you're having any experience? We can be reasonably sure that our sensory experiences generally don't mislead us, if this wasn't the case, then we couldn't be sure of much.

My point is that to doubt something means that one has good reasons to doubt, or has good evidence to doubt. In my epistemology one doesn't just need a justification for knowledge, but one needs a good justification for doubt, the two go hand-in-hand. So I'm not sure what it would mean to doubt that you're sitting at your pc. I'm sure that you might be able to construct a scenario in which it would make sense to doubt it, but what would it mean to doubt it in normal everyday circumstances. Do we normally doubt such things? — Sam26

I have good evidence that during the experience conveniently described as “I am sitting at my pc” this is not in fact what is occurring.


What is occurring is the experience of sitting at “my” pc.


I (me) can only logically and fundamentally be the entire experience (the room, the chair, sounds, sensations of all kinds). “I am sitting at my pc” is merely a description for sake of convenient transmission during an experience of a conversation about the previous “pc” event.

"I don't know that my experience of sitting at my PC writing is not an illusion, but I know that I am currently having an experience of some kind."

I question that you're really being honest with yourself here. I bet you really do believe that you are actually sitting at your PC writing, and that is not an illusion. Your issue is that you can't prove it, so you feel as if you ought to be skeptical of that. Please consider this.

It is not at all irrational to believe that the world of experience is actually a reflection of the actual world. I suggest that this is actually a properly basic belief because it is innate (no one had to convince you of this through argumentation), self-evident, consistent with a rational world view, and the presence of such beliefs is consistent with everything else we believe about the world (e.g. it's consistent with natural selection). It would be irrational to abandon this belief solely because of of the conceptual possibility that it is false. You should not abandon a belief just because there is an epistemic possibility of it being false; rather - a belief should only be abandoned if it is rationally defeated - i.e. you acquire a new belief that contradicts this innate belief, and you have more reasons to believe the new belief true.

I have good evidence that during the experience conveniently described as “I am sitting at my pc” this is not in fact what is occurring.

What is occurring is the experience of sitting at “my” pc.

I (me) can only logically and fundamentally be the entire experience (the room, the chair, sounds, sensations of all kinds). “I am sitting at my pc” is merely a description for sake of convenient transmission during an experience of a conversation about the previous “pc” event. — raza

I would submit that your just playing word games. "I am sitting at my pc," is the experience of sitting at my pc, what else could it mean? What else would we be talking about when we say, "I am sitting at my pc," besides the experience itself? When you talk about it, you're merely describing the event, or describing the experience. We use the words to convey the experience to others.

When you talk about it, you're merely describing the event, or describing the experience. We use the words to convey the experience to others — Sam26

In the most shorthand form we find. The issue is we tend to think our shorthand, our therefore merely convenient form of description, is itself what reality is.

I am not doing word games but words are all we have in order to do the conversation on these matters.

"I am sitting at my pc" is not what is occurring. It describes a picture that even we ourselves do not see in the moment of that particular experience.

So what is it, then, that is ACTUALLY occurring in that moment?

You do not see a you at the pc, correct?

A "you at your pc" is imagined. Then there is the conversation with another about that experience.

That conversation, then, merely describes to this other what you had imagined (and not what was actually occurring).

So back to what was actually occurring: In the experience described (imaginatively), "I am at my pc", was the entire experience of a room, a chair, perhaps breathing, perhaps a watery mouth, perhaps pain from some injury in an elbow, the temperature of the room, the sensation of touching the keypad, etc, etc, etc.

All those sensations above, the entire space within which all sensations arose, have to, by necessity, been "you".

There was never a "you" in a room, at a pc.

There was only ONE thing occurring, not a whole lot of separate things (with apparently merely one of those things being "you").

This ONE thing occurring is the entire experience. The entire experience IS "you".

"You" cannot, and does not, exist outside of or inside of any experience that is arising. "You" are never separate from experience. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE! (if we are to talk of reality and not illusion).

The only phenomena which gives rise to the idea that "I am sitting at my pc" is merely THE IDEA itself.

THE IDEA (of "I am sitting at my pc") is the picture imagined. The picture is imagined for use merely as a description.

Let's face it. We do not even have to resort to imagine such a picture in order for the actual experience to occur.

The picture is just for data storage purposes, and therefore data for conversation beyond the actual experience.

So it is not word games, BUT, to define more accurately what is actually occurring requires a far greater amount of words (if asked to define, essentially).

So therefore we shorthand the experience into a convenient description.

The issue is JUST BECAUSE we use shorthand DOES NOT MAKE the shorthand what it actually was.

It is not reality, it is a version or shorthand conveniently imagined version of reality.

perhaps pain from some injury in an elbow — raza

Where should be the fundamental difference between pain as the content of consciousness and your pc?

In the most shorthand form we find. The issue is we tend to think our shorthand, our therefore merely convenient form of description, is itself what reality is. — raza

I understand that our language is just a description of reality, and thus how we talk about reality. It doesn't follow from that that our description is reality.

"I am sitting at my pc" is not what is occurring. It describes a picture that even we ourselves do not see in the moment of that particular experience.

So what is it, then, that is ACTUALLY occurring in that moment?

You do not see a you at the pc, correct? — raza

You seem to want to talk about simple everyday explanations in a metaphysical way. If we spoke to each other in the way you seem to want too, we would never get anywhere with our talk. Obviously we can analyze our experiences in ways that we don't normally do in our everyday speech. If what you're saying is the case, then we wouldn't know what we were talking about when we told each other, "I am presently sitting at my computer typing." The fact is that we do understand. If you talked with people in your everyday life like you're talking right now, they would think you were crazy. Unless of course there was a specific context that dictated a more accurate picture (however, I don't think the way your talking is more accurate) of what it means to experience these kinds of experiences. In my case I'm talking about everyday speech acts.

Raza, I can't make any sense out of your contention. It might make for interesting philosophical discussions, and that's a stretch, but other than that, I don't find some of it plausible.

Where should be the fundamental difference between pain as the content of consciousness and your pc? — Heiko

In terms of what or who you are during the experience within which the pc is a part, there is not a difference.

Any difference noticed is gradated accordingly based on attention. Attention shifts about. One's fundamental identity is all that which arises in any moment. All that which arises in consciousness, therefore, is "you".

The commonly and habitually presumed identity, one's apparent body, say, within a room, is merely an aspect of "you". The body commonly and habitually presumed to be "you" is one of many aspects within consciousness.

Consciousness, seen in this light, is essentially the entire space within which everything arises.

I understand that our language is just a description of reality, and thus how we talk about reality. It doesn't follow from that that our description is reality. — Sam26

I agree it doesn't necessarily follow and nor do I recommend it does or should

You seem to want to talk about simple everyday explanations in a metaphysical way. If we spoke to each other in the way you seem to want too, we would never get anywhere with our talk — Sam26

I don't recommend at all we talk in this "metaphysical" way. This is a particular subject, however, we are talking about here.

This way of talking is merely for understanding sake. It is to, more or less, realize as, say, fundamental, and then forget. Once it is understood fundamentally it becomes like something running in the background.

In particular moments it can be brought back to attention as a form of realignment. It can be a way to address the ego-sensation - put the ego-sensation in it's proper subservient place (as not one's essential identity).

I don't find some of it plausible — Sam26

What I find implausible is the commonly presumed separate body-ego as one's essential identity.

The main reason, meaning perhaps the easiest reason to define, is that one's skin encapsulated body (the merely presumed "you") CANNOT exist separate from any experience that is said to be occurring OUTSIDE of this form (or inside this body-form, if it is an ache or a heartbeat, for example). .

The commonly and habitually presumed identity, one's apparent body, say, within a room, is merely an aspect of "you". — raza

The body is what I am. This being involves consciousness but the relation between me an my being is not that the being could be substracted and then one would be left with the real me.
I think therefor I am.

It might make for interesting philosophical discussions — Sam26

It is rational rather than philosophical.

Disputing it is like imagining one exists separate from the world or universe.

Just as it is irrational the concept which says, of these bodies, "we came into this world". Compared to a far more rational concept which says, of these bodies, "we came out of this world (as a leaf comes out from it's branch)".

So how we talk matters because it informs (the mind). Though it is not important to talk this way all the time but I think is important to understand.

but the relation between me an my being — Heiko

Are you presuming the existence of two things AS you?

If so, why complicate it so?

No, this just really appears that way because the consciousness of me being myself is often assumed to be something different from me being myself.

No, this just really appears that way because the consciousness of me being myself is often assumed to be something different from me being myself — Heiko

Assumed by you OF you? Or are you assuming others assumptions of you?

The latter, ironically. It was often pointed out that the transcendental ego cannot be thought of like something being present at hand that is set in opposition to a world.

The latter, ironically. It was often pointed out that the transcendental ego cannot be thought of like something being present at hand that is set in opposition to a world. — Heiko

I can't grasp a concept of "transcendental ego". I see "ego" as a circular thought experience which also generates sensations which essentially causes contraction.

It's therefore a type of tension. "Ego" is a tension (or IS tension). This is why I refer to it as "ego-sensation". It is effectively a "sensation" we create ("we", meaning, our pattern of thinking).

This "ego-sensation" that is created by a habitual "pattern of thinking" creates contraction.

"Contraction" is like anti-relationship, in essence. It is a retreat from relationship. A form of defense or cowering, or a form of attack (as a consequence of feelings of defensiveness).

But overall is a contraction, as opposed to expansiveness (openness, perhaps).

The latter, ironically — Heiko

By the way, I think that is part of the comparison game. Ultimately futile, in my opinion.

Certainly not necessary in the human relationship sense. The “comparison game” would be a cause of contraction rather than expansiveness.

Following Kant the transcendental ego is the noumenal determination of that, which thinks. If there is thought, which we ought to know for sure, there must be something thinking. That's crystal clear. If it rains there must be something raining.

I am an Aristotelian.

1. I reject the correspondence view of truth.
a. While it works in many cases, it is flawed. Nothing corresponds to universal ideas or negations. There is no one-to-one mapping between what we think and reality. Reality is much more coomplex than our limited experience and abstractions reveal.
b. The definition of Isaac ben Israel, adopted by Aquinas is much better: Truth is the adequacy of intellect and reality. Adequacy is a relative concept. What is adequate to one requirement need not be adequate to another. It is not lying to teach Newtonian physics to civil engineers, even though it is woefully inadequate in quantum and relativistic contexts. This means that truth is an analogous concept -- partly the same and partly different depending on context. What is adequate for physics may be inadequate for metaphysics.

2. I think knowledge is not a species of belief.
a. I define knowledge as awareness of present reality. Reality is present by acting on us, My knowledge of my keyboard is due to it acting on my sensory system, and my awareness of some of the effects it has wrought. Things can be cognitively present directly (by acting on me) or indirectly (by having acted on others, who act on me).
b. A belief is completely different. It does not require awareness of the presence of the object of belief. Instead it is a commitment to the truth of a proposition which is the object of belief. So, while knowing is an act of intellect (our capacity to be aware), believing, as a commitment, is an act of will. So, while Descartes knew he was in his chamber (because it acted on him via his senses), he chose (for methodological reasons) not to believe he was in his chamber. This act of will (Cartesian doubt) was completely orthogonal to his knowledge, and so, no reason to question what he knew.

3. As Aristotle pointed out, not all propositions can be proven. Some must be accepted without proof, i.e., as fundamental.
a. Fundamental propositions are knowable. Although we cannot prove them, we can know them experientially. For example "This apple is red." We know from experience that the phantasm (bound contents) that evokes the concept <this apple> is the identical phantasm that evokes the concept <red>. As the proposition's truth is based on identity of origin, the copula "is" denotes identity -- not of concepts, but of foundation in reality.
b. Once we have a population of fundamental, experiential propositions, we begin a constructive movement we can call "modeling." It adds to our experienced content new notes of intelligibility to "fill in the gaps." These constructive elements or gap fillers, are not known, but are believed. That does not make them unimportant, or even unreliable, as we test them in daily living. E.g., we expect objects to persist, even when we don't experience them. Many of these gap-filling beliefs are so reliable, that we are willing to say we "know" them -- even though we can't derive them from experience.
c. Considering Eddington's two tables, for example, we think of the table of everyday experience as continuous and not atomic because the construct of continuity is adequate to our everyday needs. Our dishes, knives and forks do not fall through it, onto the floor. We don't think it's continuous as a result of direct experience of its microstructure. So, while the notion of macroscopic continuity is experiential, adequate to our usual needs, and so true; that of microscopic continuity is a gap filler, and unreliable when consider the table's microstructure.

4. If our knowledge were merely a self-consistent set of beliefs, we would have no reason to think they would be applicable to reality. Why?
a. In order to apply our knowledge to reality, we need to recognize that we're dealing with an instance of something we know. For example, to apply "Coral snakes are dangerous," we must recognize that we are facing a coral snake. If the animal before us could not evoke the concept <coral snake>, we could never recognize it as one. But if sensing it can evoke the concept, then our knowledge is not merely a self-consistent web, but linked to reality.
b. Again, if our knowledge were merely a self-consistent web, experimental data could never change our knowledge. First, we would not know the results, because that requires experiential input, and second, what was self-consistent before would not become inconsistent. The only inconsistency is between what we used to think and the new, experiential data.