Certainly not necessary in the human relationship sense. — raza

I'm not quite sure why I wouldn't - without restriction - call a discussion on an internet-forum a human relationship. Look at this post - I'm not responding to you but to a statement.

Following Kant the transcendental ego is the noumenal determination of that, which thinks. If there is thought, which we ought to know for sure, there must be something thinking. That's crystal clear. If it rains there must be something raining. — Heiko

You say that it is Chrystal clear and then attempt to qualify that with the rain analogy.

So, therefore, what is it that rains?

Another way to put it: What is the “it” in the sentence “it is raining”?

I'm not quite sure why I wouldn't - without restriction - call a discussion on an internet-forum a human relationship. Look at this post - I'm not responding to you but to a statement. — Heiko

I don’t know what this reply is responding to. The last response I made to you where I used the term “relationship” was in regard to yourself comparing yourself with another with mere assumptions about what an other could be assuming about you. I then called that out as playing a comparison game which I referred to as a futile game.

It is futile because it is circular, it creates unnecessary tension in your own mind, at it is a fabrication (assumptions) rather than actual, which all lends itself to a you which suffers contraction.

The last response I made to you where I used the term “relationship” was in regard to yourself comparing yourself with another with mere assumptions about what an other could be assuming about you. — raza

Whatever - I guess I understand pretty well if somebody tries to tell me something. It is not that I'd have to speculate much to understand it that way.

Another way to put it: What is the “it” in the sentence “it is raining”? — raza

I think you will tell me. As far as I understand, at least.

You said that “there must be something thinking” and stated this is “crystal clear” as backed up by the Rain analogy.

So, are you able to therefore clearly crystalize for me what it is that rains?

I don’t know the answer. I don’t claim to know the answer. You, however, appear to know the answer and that it is Chrystal clear.

I can only know what isn’t with regard to this subject.

Indeed, I don't see how non-qualitative experience (whatever that is?--seems incoherent to me) can be the foundation of knowledge, since experience is necessarily qualitative, and knowledge is (ontologically) mental phenomena based upon experience.

Experience is the only starting point/foundation of knowledge whatsoever. No experience, no knowledge.

I would say that normally we do know that it's not an illusion. However, I maybe using the word know differently from you. What I mean, is that we are reasonably sure that such-and-such is the case. I don't have to know with absolute certainty to make the claim that "I know..." Furthermore, if you don't know that you're sitting at your computer doing X, viz., having that experience, then how would you know that you're having any experience? We can be reasonably sure that our sensory experiences generally don't mislead us, if this wasn't the case, then we couldn't be sure of much. — Sam26

I use the conventional definition of "knowledge" per analytic philosophy (justified true belief).

In my view, some knowledge claims can be absolutely certain and some can't. The latter feature in the class of empirical claims, which cannot be proved (i.e. cannot be certain) and only provisionally verified. Since we cannot absolutely know some things ("brain-in-a-vat" type arguments and solipsism, etc.), all we can do is provide good reasons to believe one possibility over others. Since I can't absolutely know that my experience at my pc is an illusion or not, the best I can do is have good enough reasons to support my belief that I am sitting at my pc, and that that experience is not illusory. That's good enough to me, and I'm generally someone who has a commonsensical view on stuff like this, but I'm also aware of the logical and empirical impossibilities/barriers to making claims on absolute certainy.

Furthermore, if you don't know that you're sitting at your computer doing X, viz., having that experience, then how would you know that you're having any experience? We can be reasonably sure that our sensory experiences generally don't mislead us, if this wasn't the case, then we couldn't be sure of much. — Sam26

Because experiencing an illusion is still an experience. I don't think it is an illusion at all, but I can't be absolutely certain. But I also don't need to be absolutely certain to claim that I know that I am sitting at my pc. As you say, I can be reasonably sure about the general veracity of my sensorial experiences.

"I don't know that my experience of sitting at my PC writing is not an illusion, but I know that I am currently having an experience of some kind."

I question that you're really being honest with yourself here. I bet you really do believe that you are actually sitting at your PC writing, and that is not an illusion. Your issue is that you can't prove it, so you feel as if you ought to be skeptical of that. Please consider this. — Relativist

I am being honest. As I mentioned to another poster, I don't believe that my experience of sitting at my pc is an illusion, even if I can't know that with absolute certainty. But I don't need to know that with absolute certainty. I think it's reasonable to believe the experience is accurate. Hence why I think my present phenomenal experiences are foundational (classical/strong foundationalism), but whether those experiences are illusory or not (e.g whether I am actually a brain in a vat seemingly experiencing sitting at my pc) are foundational in a weak sense (modern/weak foundationalism).

It is not at all irrational to believe that the world of experience is actually a reflection of the actual world. I suggest that this is actually a properly basic belief because it is innate (no one had to convince you of this through argumentation), self-evident, consistent with a rational world view, and the presence of such beliefs is consistent with everything else we believe about the world (e.g. it's consistent with natural selection). It would be irrational to abandon this belief solely because of of the conceptual possibility that it is false. You should not abandon a belief just because there is an epistemic possibility of it being false; rather - a belief should only be abandoned if it is rationally defeated - i.e. you acquire a new belief that contradicts this innate belief, and you have more reasons to believe the new belief true. — Relativist

I generally agree with that.

Following Kant the transcendental ego is the noumenal determination of that, which thinks. If there is thought, which we ought to know for sure, there must be something thinking. That's crystal clear. If it rains there must be something raining. — Heiko

I will throw this out there, however.

The way I see what is "it" that rains.

Rain is part of the living process of this planet's life of which we, of course, experience. Thought is also part of this living process.

Both thought and rain arise in consciousness (consciousness being space within which all experience arises).

Rain is a result of cause and effect so nothing rains (or no thing rains).

All we can say is rain rains. It makes little sense to say water rains. Rain is rain. Water is water.

Does water river when we try to describe a river?

Why, when we see a river, do we not say a river is rivering?

Thoughts also arise within consciousness as a result, it would appear, of cause and effect.

I don't think. I experience thoughts which arise.

So I am not the thinker of thought. Thought just does it's thing just as rain just does it's thing.

When there is rain I experience it........but I didn't do anything to make it occur.

Same with a thought. A thought arises. Cause and effect means that the thought that arose will generate another thought.

A thought will sometimes also generate an act. And then an act will often generate a thought.

knowledge is (ontologically) mental phenomena based upon experience — numberjohnny5

But a super special kind of mental phenomena. If you want to pick out some of your beliefs and call them "knowledge", you do that by saying something about the connection between those beliefs, the mental phenomena, and the content of those beliefs, what the beliefs are about, and what the beliefs are about is not (necessarily) mental.

I am being honest. As I mentioned to another poster, I don't believe that my experience of sitting at my pc is an illusion, even if I can't know that with absolute certainty. But I don't need to know that with absolute certainty. I think it's reasonable to believe the experience is accurate — numberjohnny5

I say the language is accurate “I am sitting at my pc” because it is accepted as the appropriate form of sentence structure for disseminating that information.

Just because it is accurate in that way does not mean that is what actually occurred.

It leaves behind the question as to who “I” is or “you” are during the “at the pc” experience.


I therefore state that what “you” are during the “at the pc” experience is the entire experience thus it’s content.


You cannot be a content separate from every other content within the experience.

The “brain” engaged with the pc is, in effect, being also the pc. The pc is, during that experience, imbedded in the “brain” (for context, “brain” as awareness).

It is not particularly different to the sentence structure “the rising sun” while no actual event such as that is occurring.

But a super special kind of mental phenomena. — Srap Tasmaner

I'm not sure I'd put it like that. We can value "knowledge" as "super" or "special" qua mental phenomena, but that's only a subjective assessment. There's no objective value to that assessment. Although I'm not sure whether you meant it like that.

If you want to pick out some of your beliefs and call them "knowledge", you do that by saying something about the connection between those beliefs, the mental phenomena, and the content of those beliefs, what the beliefs are about, and what the beliefs are about is not (necessarily) mental. — Srap Tasmaner

I'm not sure what you're getting at there.

I say the language is accurate “I am sitting at my pc” because it is accepted as the appropriate form of sentence structure for disseminating that information.

Just because it is accurate in that way does not mean that is what actually occurred. — raza

You mean the "map-is-not-the-territory"-type thing? I agree: descriptions or propositions about stuff are not identical to the stuff that those descriptions/propositions are about.

I therefore state that what “you” are during the “at the pc” experience is the entire experience thus it’s content. — raza

Firstly, I don't know what you mean by "content". Secondly, in my view, "experience" is mental only. The boundaries of experiences are within the brain (in connection with the body). We experience stuff internally and externally though.

The “brain” engaged with the pc is, in effect, being also the pc. The pc is, during that experience, imbedded in the “brain” (for context, “brain” as awareness). — raza

I disagree, and I think thinking about things like that leads to confusion and incoherency. Being aware of the pc is not being the pc, but maybe you're being poetic or something.

Firstly, I don't know what you mean by "content". Secondly, in my view, "experience" is mental only. The boundaries of experiences are within the brain (in connection with the body). We experience stuff internally and externally though. — numberjohnny5

Content = objects identified within an experience, usually named.

“Experience” is mental only? What is therefore beyond the “mental”?

“Experience”, in my view, is electrical. Some call it “chemical”.

But I do not see where a boundary lies where “mental” is on one side and something else on the other.

So what is the “something else” which apparently isn’t “mental”?

I disagree, and I think thinking about things like that leads to confusion and incoherency. Being aware of the pc is not being the pc, but maybe you're being poetic or something — numberjohnny5

I’m not suffering confusion from the understanding I have put forth.

“Being aware of the pc is not being the pc“

What is it that is being aware of the pc? A “mental” something?

“Experience” is mental only? What is therefore beyond the “mental”? — raza

Every thing (or all things) that is not mental is "beyond the mental."

“Experience”, in my view, is electrical. Some call it “chemical”. — raza

Yes, mental phenomena is electro-chemical, and experience is mental phenomena.

But I do not see where a boundary lies where “mental” is on one side and something else on the other. — raza

The boundary is the boundary of the brain.

So what is the “something else” which apparently isn’t “mental”? — raza

The "something else" is the stuff that the mental experiences.

What is it that is being aware of the pc? A “mental” something? — raza

Yes, a mind.

Mind and brain, however, is an idea. A mental construct.

They cannot be distinct from each other in any scientific way.

> “Every thing (or all things) that is not mental is "beyond the mental.”<
>“mental phenomena is electro-chemical, and experience is mental phenomena”<

Hence the contradiction above.

The term “mental” is utilised to define every phenomena along with the observer. As you put it: The “mental” that “experiences”.

As in your statement below.

>The "something else" is the stuff that the mental experiences<

Mind and brain, however, is an idea. A mental construct. — raza

You're conflating the idea of "mind and brain" with a real/actual mind and brain. There are actual organs that we call "minds/brains"--they're not just ideas, unless you're an idealist.

They cannot be distinct from each other in any scientific way. — raza

Wrong. They are distinct in that minds are a type of brain state, i.e. minds are conscious states (as opposed to non-conscious brain states). There is a ton of evidence to demonstrate this.

Hence the contradiction above. — raza

Can you point out the contradiction?

They are distinct in that minds are a type of brain state, i.e. minds are conscious states (as opposed to non-conscious brain states). There is a ton of evidence to demonstrate this. — numberjohnny5

A non conscious brain state? You mean a dead mind or brain?

. There are actual organs that we call "minds/brains"--they're not just ideas, unless you're an idealist — numberjohnny5

Yes. One phenomena. Brain and mind, not brain and then, over there, a mind.

Just as a living body is essentially a body-mind.

> “Every thing (or all things) that is not mental is "beyond the mental.”<
>“mental phenomena is electro-chemical, and experience is mental phenomena<

Can you point out the contradiction? — numberjohnny5

A thing (as in “every thing”) does not exist unless it arises within the mental.

This point is also made with your statement, >The "something else" is the stuff that the mental experiences<

The “something else” (or the “every thing”) does not exist unless it arises in the mental.

You, however, appear to know the answer and that it is Chrystal clear...
...
I will throw this out there, however... — raza

What is clear is the form of the conclusion. It rains, so there is rain and rain is defined by raining. The most to-the-spot explanation of metaphysics is: Do not explain something, that exists, by something else, that exists.
Or in more Heideggerian terms: The problem is not to explain beings by other beings but to say what the being is as being. "To be" can not be substituted with "being experienced" - I tried to point at the falseness of the whole metaphysical apparatus built on the dichotomy of subject and object.
You understand that reality is more or less defined by not being dependent on particular beings. That is how you tried to point out that sitting at your computer was not sitting at your computer - which is self-contradictory. If you weren't, you weren't. The possibility of the statement not being true affirms that the fact is a fact: one can only understand falsity by a reference to what things actually are. Again this is not to be understood as a reference to some eternal truth, which would be just as fictional. More modern approaches to the problem leave that notion behind.
We are beings in a world. I can see myself typing sentences. Why couldn't I be something else? Because I am myself. Psychologism is ridiculous.

Presumably you can define what a pc is. Presumably you can define what a chair is you use to sit on while at the pc. However, what is the “I” or the “you” is that apparently sits at the pc?

Is this “I” or “you” that is sitting at the pc one object of the three listed in this sentence: “I” am sitting on a “chair” at my “pc”?

Is a severed human arm still an arm or is it a piece of human meat?

Is this “I” or “you” that is sitting at the pc one object of the three listed in this sentence: “I” am sitting on a “chair” at my “pc”? — raza

Dunno - are you?

Dunno - are you? — Heiko

No, it is impossible.

Consider what "chair" really stands for. It is a word used, essentially, to describe a sensation (in a particular way when coupled with the word "sit").

The sensation of sitting on a flat raised surface will feel much the same as that on a "chair".

The arse on a chair, or other surface, contributes equally the sensation value of the "sitting on chair" experience.

No arse on chair means no chair in that experience. The "chair" sensation is not existing unless arse is equally involved.

So is that sensation you, while sitting on the chair, or just the sensation of "sitting on a chair" given that the chair has to exist equally in that moment when your arse is on it?


So I argue that in that "sitting" moment or experience your arse is as much "you" as the chair is "you".

A non conscious brain state? You mean a dead mind or brain? — raza

No. Nonconscious brain states are involuntary brain processes that involve regulating breathing, hear rate, balance, sensory and motor functions, etc.

Yes. One phenomena. Brain and mind, not brain and then, over there, a mind.

Just as a living body is essentially a body-mind. — raza

I'm not sure whether we're on the same page, but I'll just say that brain and mind are identical. They share the same location.

A thing (as in “every thing”) does not exist unless it arises within the mental. — raza

You're conflating epistemology with ontology there, unless you're an idealist. Are you an idealist?

Is a severed human arm still an arm or is it a piece of human meat? — raza

A human arm can be attached or detached from the rest of the human body. The arm itself hasn't changed.

Consider what "chair" really stands for. — raza

A "chair" is a product of human work, manufactured for optimal comfort and/or low price in sweatshops for fat a**e* to be placed on.

So I argue that in that "sitting" moment or experience your arse is as much "you" as the chair is "you". — raza

No... my fat ass is my own work.

No. Nonconscious brain states are involuntary brain processes that involve regulating breathing, hear rate, balance, sensory and motor functions, etc. — numberjohnny5

Are you therefore saying "mind" refers to will?

I'm not sure whether we're on the same page, but I'll just say that brain and mind are identical. They share the same location. — numberjohnny5

The entire body is in the same "location" to exist. Remove the head the body also dies and vice versa.