Anyone can piece together a few premises and draw a conclusion. — Sapientia

Please do.

No. I'm not kidding. Valid refutation is required. — creativesoul

No, you don't seem to understand. There's nothing to refute. Hitchen's razor applies. You've just kicked the can a little further down the road by swapping "introspection" with "metacognition" and reasserting that it requires language.

Introspection is thinking about one's own mental ongoings(one's own thought and belief). In order to even be able to think about one's own thought and belief, thought and belief must be prior to thinking about it, and there must be a means of identifying, isolating, and further assessing it. That means is language. We use the terms "mental ongoings", "thought", "belief", etc.

With me yet? — creativesoul

I understand the above, but it just won't do. "That means is language" won't do. What you're describing is some kind of mental process, not language. That makes me think that you don't know what language is, and are confused. This is language. Feel free to try again, but I haven't got all day. I was expecting more from you. Was that expectation misplaced?

Please do. — creativesoul

No, I don't need to do so at this stage, as the burden of proof lies with you. And, in case you missed the point, that was a criticism of the argument that you presented. I was pointing out that it' easy to do, and that it's pointless if your premises are false or questionable and you're unable to substantiate them. More than mere validity is required for an argument to succeed.

All belief is meaningful. All meaning is attributed. All attribution of meaning requires something to become symbol, something to become symbolized, and a creature capable of connecting the two. All belief requires something to become symbol, something to become symbolized, and a creature capable of connecting the two. The connecting of the symbol to what's symbolized is the attribution of meaning and constitutes being meaningful thought and/or belief formation itself. At conception there is no mental faculty capable of attributing meaning.

At conception there is neither thought nor belief. — creativesoul

What is all of this? Was this directed at me? Can you please just explain, clearly and adequately, (what you've said so far has been severly lacking in this regard) why you think that introspection or metacognition requires language and others? And in what way does it require others? What did you mean by that? That could mean a number of things.

Please answer along the lines of, "Introspection requires language because...", or "Instrospection requires others, in the sense of.... because...". And it would probably help if you defined key terms which you might be using unconventionally. Do you think you can manage that?

If you can't do this, but can instead do little more than repeat your original assertions, then you have no substantive argument, and any argument which asserts the contrary is just as good or valid.

Thus, the literature reviewed in this section can be interpreted as suggesting that the causes of our behavior are not, after all, the sorts of things to which we have introspective access.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/introspection/#EmpEviAccInt

https://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-sze/introspection-research_b_7306546.html

What do you mean? Holding a belief is simply holding a belief: being convinced of something. Of course, we'd expect people to act in a certain way as a result of their beliefs. But that's not what holding a belief is. Did you mean the former or the latter? I have no problem with the former, although that differs from what you actually said, which seems plain wrong, as Michael's reaction attests. — Sapientia

Seems what little progress we made has here been rescinded. "Holding a belief is simply holding a belief" says nothing, does nothing, gets us nowhere. Denying the empirical data leaves this line of enquiry with no place to go. Saying "No" over and over is not doing philosophy.

Seems what little progress we made has here been rescinded. "Holding a belief is simply holding a belief" says nothing, does nothing, gets us nowhere. Denying the empirical data leaves this line of enquiry with no place to go. Saying "No" over and over is not doing philosophy. — Banno

Obviously I said more than just that, and you've addressed that quote out of its context. If I had said just that with nothing else to add, then you might've had an objection worth raising. That was indeed part of my reply, and I said it for emphasis. It doesn't do nothing, else it wouldn't be a commonly used rhetorical device.

Now, what empirical data are you suggesting that I'm denying? Nevermind, I've just seen the links above. I take it that that's what you're referring to.

Now, what empirical data are you suggesting that I'm denying? — Sapientia

Well, I've presented quite a few links to tertiary sources. LEt's go with this:

Thus, the literature reviewed in this section can be interpreted as suggesting that the causes of our behavior are not, after all, the sorts of things to which we have introspective access.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/introspection/#EmpEviAccInt — Banno

And oppose it to this:

Beliefs explain but do not determine actions
Beliefs are used to explain actions. Further, such explanations are causal and sufficient. So if we have appropriate desires and a beliefs we can explain an action.

So, given that John is hungry, and that John believes eating a sandwich will remove his hunger, we have a sufficient causal explanation for why John ate the sandwich.

One may act in ways that are contrary to one's beliefs. A dissident may comply in order to protect herself and her family.

So given that John is hungry, and has a sandwich at hand, it does not follow that John will eat the sandwich. — Banno

It is apparent that the analysis in the OP is insufficient in that it just takes it for granted that John 's belief that he is hungry is infallible.

Is it? Do you have a definite opinion on this, or are you, like me, looking for some way to reconcile an apparent contrast?

It is apparent that the analysis in the OP is insufficient in that it just takes it for granted that John 's belief that he is hungry is infallible.

Is it? Do you have a definite opinion on this, or are you, like me, looking for some way to reconcile an apparent contrast? — Banno

Well, how often have you mistakenly believed that you were hungry? If not infallible, it's at least very unusual. There are multiple times each day when I know that I'm hungry, and where I know that I'm not mistaken, and where my subsequent actions attest to the fact. Genuine exceptions would seem rare. Maybe as a result of some sort of medical condition or disorder. It's not an unusual trait for a young child to say that he's hungry or to ask for food, but then not eat what he's given, but that's not quite the same. Adults can do a similar thing, but again, this seems different, less genuine.

Well, how often have you mistakenly believed that you were hungry? — Sapientia

Are you hungry, or thirsty? Or a bit depressed and looking for solace in a bite? Or really just wishing not to offend your host? That's the upshot of the psychology; we are not as good at judging as we like to think we are.

That's the empirical evidence.

Thus, the literature reviewed in this section can be interpreted as suggesting that the causes of our behavior are not, after all, the sorts of things to which we have introspective access.

Access is not always guaranteed, but to say that we don't have any access is surely mistaken. There are times when I know why I behaved a certain way. There's a level of explanation that I'm perfectly capable of acquiring and sharing with others. So, if that contradicts this review, then so be it. I know what I know.

Are you hungry, or thirsty? Or a bit depressed and looking for solace in a bite? Or really just wishing not to offend your host? That's the upshot of the psychology; we are not as good at judging as we like to think we are.

That's the empirical evidence. — Banno

I'm hungry right now, without a doubt. That's direct evidence, though it's not publicly accessible. You may not know, but I do. This evidence is stronger than anything that you have to offer. I haven't eaten much all day, and I last had something to eat when I had an egg and cress sandwich at what is now yesterday afternoon. I had nothing for dinner. The time on my clock presently reads 1:43am. That's plenty of evidence. It's frankly silly to try to cast doubt on this belief by questioning whether I might just be a bit depressed or looking to please someone or whatever. That's just counterfactual speculation.

Access is not always guaranteed, but to say that we don't have any access is surely mistaken. — Sapientia

Access to what, exactly? The really, truly, true belief?

There are times when I know why I behaved a certain way. — Sapientia

Sure. And when you do this, are you introducing some belief to explain your behaviour?

I'm hungry right now, without a doubt. That's direct evidence, and it's stronger than anything that you have to offer. I haven't eaten since I had a sandwich at what is now yesterday afternoon. I had nothing for dinner. The time on my clock presently reads 1:43am. That's plenty of evidence. — Sapientia

Notice how much more than just the sensation of hunger is at play here? All that other stuff about how you relate to the world. Is your belief just one part of this? Or is all of this part of your belief?

The conclusion seems to me to be that some mental state, called a belief, is in itself inadequate to explain what we do.

Access to what, exactly? The really, truly, true belief? — Banno

Yes. Or just "the belief" for short.

Sure. And when you do this, are you introducing some belief to explain your behaviour? — Banno

I would probably appeal to some belief to explain my behaviour, yes. If, by using the word "introduce", you mean to suggest something along the lines that this belief would be an invention or a useful fiction, then I reject that suggestion.

Notice how much more than just the sensation of hunger is at play here? All that other stuff about how you relate to the world. Is your belief just one part of this? Or is all of this part of your belief? — Banno

I haven't denied that worldly stuff relates and factors in to what I believe. But this is part of a cause and effect relationship with belief, not what belief is comprised of ontologically, which is how I interpreted your earlier talk of what belief consists in.

The conclusion seems to me to be that some mental state, called a belief, is in itself inadequate to explain what we do. — Banno

Well, that would depend on what exactly you're trying to explain and what kind of explanation you're looking for, would it not? I can think of situations where it would be adequate enough, all else being equal. Obviously, there's always additional background assumptions which relate to other connected beliefs. Talk of my door key makes sense in relation to me, my body, my key, my door, my house, the world...

Talk of my door key makes sense in relation to me, my body, my key, my door, my house, the world... — Sapientia

But a belief is something apart from just talk, isn't it?

What is it? Not an invention or useful fiction - although the empirical evidence shows that it can be such a rationalisation...

We push each other to the extremes of our positions. What do we agree on?

Which of these are you happy with?

• A belief can form part of the explanation for a behaviour
• Our introspections of our beliefs are not infallible; we may be mistaken as to why we did something
• Given a specific action there are innumerable possible beliefs that might explain it
• We are not as good at judging our beliefs as we think we are
• Beliefs cannot stand alone - they must be understood in terms of one's other beliefs
• One can doubt what one believes
• Access to our beliefs is not always guaranteed
• We can be mistaken as to why we acted in some particular way.

@Sapientia

What sort of thing is a belief?

Can you please just explain, clearly and adequately... ...why you think that introspection or metacognition requires language and others? — Sapientia

I have... numerous times over.

Sapientia is evidently hung up on the idea that he can think about his own thought, belief, and 'feelings' when no one else is around, and dubiously concludes that others aren't required for introspection.

What he doesn't seem to understand is that the only reason that he can do that is because he already speaks language. That is... because of others.

"Believing one is hungry" is an odd way to talk. One eats for any number of reasons. All of which are belief-based.

Beliefs are not mental states Banno.

Fear is a mental state. Being excited is a mental state. Being confused is a mental state. Being content, relaxed, having peace of mind, etc.

Beliefs are not mental states Banno. — creativesoul

Put simply, that's not how most philosophers talk.

I've put of breakfast, too, until lunch time. I don't believe I am hungry. I am just hungry. In the sandwich example above, it's not the hunger that is believed, it's the solution - John believes that eating the sandwich will fix his hunger.

Much more care is needed here. My apologies if i've misdirected anyone. In my case the pie is in the oven, and I believe it will be hot enough to eat in about twenty minutes. Pie for brunch. Hm.

But a belief is something apart from just talk, isn't it? — Banno

Yes, of course, and there are beliefs relating to what I mentioned, which, it should have been quite clear, was what I was getting at, taking into consideration the context.

What is it? Not an invention or useful fiction - although the empirical evidence shows that it can be such a rationalisation... — Banno

No, not an invention or useful fiction, and yes, it can be used in that way. But so can virtually anything. So does that really matter? Do you want to discuss belief or false explanations?

You shouldn't have to ask what a belief is. You should already know. I think that you do already know. And that seems to me to be the problem. What has caused you to doubt yourself? Do you truly doubt, or is this more of an excercise? You do have beliefs, do you not? You understand the meaning of the word? Of course you do. Are you really telling me that you don't know what these things we call beliefs are? Isn't there something about that scenario that strikes you as absurd? Only in philosophy do we seem to think it appropriate to question such things. In philosophy, things get special treatment. But is it right?

What do beliefs have in common? What are their characteristics? I've given my own definition, and it's good enough for me.

We push each other to the extremes of our positions. What do we agree on?

Which of these are you happy with?
A belief can form part of the explanation for a behaviour
Our introspections of our beliefs are not infallible; we may be mistaken as to why we did something
Given a specific action there are innumerable possible beliefs that might explain it
We are not as good at judging our beliefs as we think we are
Beliefs cannot stand alone - they must be understood in terms of one's other beliefs
One can doubt what one believes
Access to our beliefs is not always guaranteed
We can be mistaken as to why we acted in some particular way. — Banno

I would accept all of those, although some of them with added qualifications.

It might be true that we aren't generally as good at judging our beliefs as we think we are, yet nevertheless sometimes we get it spot on. It wouldn't even be inconsistent for it also to be true that we get it right much of the time, with the thrust of the explanation having more to do with our tendency to overestimate our powers of judgement.

Although we might be able to doubt to some extent our beliefs, some beliefs can be so strong as to set aside any serious doubt.

Given a specific action there are innumerable possible beliefs that might explain it, though these innumerable possible explanations can typically be whittled down to just a handful, and sometimes just one: the best explanation. Countless of them can easily be rejected as remote, implausible, unworkable, and not worthy of serious consideration.

We can be mistaken as to why we acted in some particular way, but we can also be correct. As with many, many, other things. This in itself tells us little of significance.

So, I would say that these statements that you've collected together appear to lean more towards one side, outcome, conclusion or position, but under scrutiny, this is found to be misleading.

p1 Introspection requires language.
p2 Language is social.
C1 Introspection requires that which is social.(from p1 and p2)
p3 Being social requires others(by definition)
C2 Introspection requires others(from C1 and p3)

p1 in the above argument was questioned by Sapientia. The following argument was offered as support for p1 above.

p1 Introspection is metacognitive(by definition)
p2 Metacognition requires language(by existential dependency as offered below)
c1 Introspection requires language(from p1 and p2)

Introspection is thinking about one's own mental ongoings(one's own thought and belief). In order to even be able to think about one's own belief, there must be some pre-existing belief to be thinking about. This is just plain common sense. Prior to thinking about one's own mental ongoings, one must first have mental ongoings(belief) and the capability to identify, isolate, and subsequently talk about them. That capability requires a means. That means is language. We use the terms "mental ongoings", "thought", "belief", etc.

This is all just plain common sense. It's not that difficult to understand.

Beliefs are not mental states Banno.
— creativesoul

Put simply, that's not how most philosophers talk. — Banno

Yes. I am painfully aware of that fact.

:wink:

That's not my problem though. Rather, my problem is showing how that kind of talk is (a big part of)the problem...

The chickens, ducks, and all the other animals see me, and if they are hungry they come...

Why?

Because they believe that they will be fed. They do not understand this explanation, so it would be wrong to equate my account/report of their belief with their belief. Rather, they've just drawn mental correlations, connection, and/or associations between me and what happens(more often than not) after they walk themselves over to me. I am meaningful(significant if you prefer) to those animals in a way that other people are not necessarily, although most of the animals tend to attribute the same meaning to anyone else who looks enough like me... most other humans...

:lol:

It's rudimentary... but it's there.

Sapientia is evidently hung up on the idea that he can think about his own thought and belief when no one else is around, and dubiously concludes that others aren't required for introspection.

What he doesn't seem to understand is that the only reason that he can do that is because he already speaks language. That is... because of others. — creativesoul

I did ask you to clarify your meaning, not once, but multiple times, though to little avail. I have had to press you. Don't you think that it's a bit of a piss take for you to take me to task over one possible interpretation I raised, out of a number of possible interpretations, the existence of which I have acknowledged? Do you know how problems like this can be avoided? They can be avoided if you express yourself clearly from the start, or at least do so as soon you're made aware that the ambiguity of your original wording is problematic. You shouldn't leave the hardwork of figuring out what the heck you mean down to others.

I'm just about done trying to make sense of you. It's tiring. And you can be very repetitive too, needlessly so. But please, let this be a lesson.

...please, let this be a lesson — Sapientia

Mirror, mirror...

Your approach here leaves me little reason to continue with you Sap... I still love ya...

:halo:

Mirror, mirror... — creativesoul

Where in our recent discussion have I come out with ridiculously vague and easy to misinterpret statements such as those of yours which I've called attention to, if that is what you're suggesting?

The mods should delete that as spam. It's just a pointless copy-paste job that doesn't add anything helpful. You've adding nothing new of any significance, and the problems with it are still problems with it, but you obviously have no interest in addressing them properly, otherwise you wouldn't reply in this way. I see the addition of a few ill-judged remarks about it being "plain common sense" and "easily understood", as well as mention of my name, but that's about it. In short, a waste of time.

There's a post above you where all your concerns are adequately explained. Care to address it?

:wink: