What's interesting, is the sense in which biochemistry is considered a solution to the philosophical issue at hand. In addition to the biochemistry, there is also, as you say, a semiotic factor. In Pattee's paper, Physics and Metaphysics of Biosemiosis, page 2, he states that he has not solved the problem of how the 'epistemic cut' which seems fundamental to the establishment of the distinction between the symbolic and physical orders originated. Do you think this admits of a purely physical solution? That the epistemic cut, or the distinction between the semantic and the physical, will be erased in due course?

Do you think this admits of a purely physical solution? — Wayfarer

Or it could be that Pattee is adopting a useful rhetorical position in which the glass is half-empty rather than half-full.

It is definitely part of his character that he pushes the expected scientific attitude of: "Well, we don't really know yet. And we may never actually know the answer on abiogenesis because we haven't got a time machine to go back and see what may have been some of the accidental steps along some actual sequence of events."

Pattee set himself apart from his mostly far more easy-going theoretical biology colleagues on this score. There are always plenty happy to believe they have the answer - RNA world, or whatever. And Pattee's chosen role was to be the one bringing clarity to the actual question to be answered. So he was always saying, hold up, not yet. You will have to go deeper than that to count as a final theory.

So what you are hearing is the kind of rigour that makes science a metaphysically-responsible exercise worth doing.

It is certainly not any kind of semi-religious wavering - the thought that the causes of life and mind might not have a naturalistic explanation. I never heard Pattee make the faintest nod in that direction. And the subject did come up as others in his circle, like Robert Ulanowicz, were openly theistic.

Pattee would be the most hard-nosed of materialists and so resisted Peircean metaphysics and semiotics pretty strongly - until he was converted and came out with his late flood of papers arguing the case elegantly.

That the epistemic cut, or the distinction between the semantic and the physical, will be erased in due course? — Wayfarer

But the cut exists. The abiogenetic issue is how could it have evolved as it seems there is a significant gap to leap.

And now - in just the past decade - that gap has shrunk dramatically, as Nick Lane and Peter Hoffman can tell you from their frontline position in experimental biology.

With Hoffman, the gap is pretty much literally not there. At the quasi-quantum nanoscale, where the entropic costs of converting thermal gradients to negentropic work falls effectively to zero, life is left with no choice but to get started.

The epistemic cut simply is lying there on the floor ready to be picked up. It doesn't need to be created anymore. You couldn't avoid stumbling into its grip if you are some passing biochemical process. The likelihood of life not breaking out falls to some improbably tiny number that we might as well call zero.

I find it a little embarrassing for you that you deny that lipids can spontaneously from in the right conditions — Read Parfit

If it's true, then where is the evidence? Where are all these lipids which are spontaneously forming in the right conditions? Or is it simply the case that "the right conditions" just don't exist and therefore lipids just aren't spontaneously forming? And, "the right conditions" is a convenient fiction which substitutes for "magic".

Of course the only way to judge the reasonableness of such speculation - which ran ahead of the experiments now being done by Lane and others - would be to actually read his book. — apokrisis

As I explained to Read Parfit, both the evidence and the logic indicate that the correct direction for speculation is into the nature of the non-physical, and how the non-physical "soul" brings about the existence of living physical bodies. That's why I consider reading books with speculations in an opposing direction to be a waste of time.

I find it a little embarrassing for you that you deny that lipids can spontaneously from in the right conditions— Read Parfit

If it's true, then where is the evidence? Where are all these lipids which are spontaneously forming in the right conditions? Or is it simply the case that "the right conditions" just don't exist and therefore lipids just aren't spontaneously forming? And, "the right conditions" is a convenient fiction which substitutes for "magic". — Metaphysician Undercover

If you want evidence of lipids spontaneously forming in the right conditions, just check out the gut of the average American :).

When you ask something like, “where is the evidence?” in hydrothermal vents, or other places, it turns out that your question is very hard answer since Earth is not a sterile lab at this point. Lipids are in about every living organism, and when you find them in these places, it is pretty much impossible to tell if they were assembled from their component elements, or the byproduct of existing life. They have been produced in the lab, but that only gets the science so far. This is just one aspect that makes the science hard, and it is something that scientists will have to sort out, but this difficulty has nothing whatsoever to do with magic.

I find your regularly invoking the term “magic” for any unanswered aspect of a scientific theory both disrespectful and unhelpful. It is disrespectful because science is the opposite of magic, and you must know it gets under the skin of anyone that respects the process of science to be accused of relying on it. I think there is a good argument that your repeated accusations of my relying on magic are a form of taunting.

But past that, it is simply unhelpful in discourse. You use the term as a substitute for making a constructive counter argument. In my view it took way too many exchanges for you to finally say that what you meant by “magic” is that the right conditions do not exist.

As I explained to Read Parfit, both the evidence and the logic indicate that the correct direction for speculation is into the nature of the non-physical, and how the non-physical "soul" brings about the existence of living physical bodies. — Metaphysician Undercover

So do lipids have eternal souls that bring about their existence in nature? Tell us more.

You don't seem to understand the scientific version of hylomorphism - the kind where global organisation can form "spontaneously" to meet some finality. The word spontaneous is used here to denote that there is no particular local material/efficient cause that produces the global organisation. Instead there is some generalised finality being served which does the trick.

In the case of lipids forming micelles, the finality is the usual one of entropy minimisation. The lipid molecules have no choice but to find the configuration which is the least energy-demanding possible. And any kind of nudge or fluctuation at all is going to be enough of a local material push to set that chain of dominoes falling to its inevitable conclusion - a micelle arrangement with all the hydrophobic tails tuck up inside, safely far from any surrounding water.

So for a modern biological Aristotelian, we have our notions of final/formal cause that make measurable sense. We have a second law of thermodynamics. We can apply it universally in a way that explains micelles and vesicles as spontaneous necessities. They are forms of material organisation that can't not happen as even the most "non-physical" nudge - the faintest possible accidental fluctuation - is going to tumble everything in that direction. The outcome is almost Platonically pre-destined.

But what is the story for your scholastic Aristotelianism? What about nature does it manage to explain in a way that has any pragmatic use these days?

What does the Bible say about the origin of lipids, and hence micelles and vesicles? Point us to the relevant chapter and verse.

You don't seem to understand the scientific version of hylomorphism - the kind where global organisation can form "spontaneously" to meet some finality. The word spontaneous is used here to denote that there is no particular local material/efficient cause that produces the global organisation. Instead there is some generalised finality being served which does the trick. — apokrisis

You don't seem to understand final cause. Final cause requires intention, the non-physical. So to say that global organisation occurs "spontaneously" to meet some finality, is to say that intention, the non-physical is involved in this process, expressed by being directed to meet some finality.

In the case of lipids forming micelles, the finality is the usual one of entropy minimisation. The lipid molecules have no choice but to find the configuration which is the least energy-demanding possible. And any kind of nudge or fluctuation at all is going to be enough of a local material push to set that chain of dominoes falling to its inevitable conclusion - a micelle arrangement with all the hydrophobic tails tuck up inside, safely far from any surrounding water. — apokrisis

But lipids don't form spontaneously, their existence is caused. And that causation is directed toward some purpose. That they have a standard, non-random behaviour is what makes them useful.

So for a modern biological Aristotelian, we have our notions of final/formal cause that make measurable sense. — apokrisis

Actually your notion of final cause does not make sense. You claim that organisation occurs "to meet finality" which implies necessarily, "purpose", but then you deny the non-physical, "intent" which is implied by purpose. No physical existent is ever directed to meet some finality without intent. If you remove that non-physical aspect, intent, you do not have a case of a physical existent being directed toward some finality. Intent is the essence of being directed to meet some finality. By removing that non-physical aspect, intent, from finality, you are left with nonsense.

But lipids don't form spontaneously — Metaphysician Undercover

They form membranes spontaneously. You forgot, or never understood, what was said.

By removing that non-physical aspect, intent, from finality, you are left with nonsense. — Metaphysician Undercover

Godless nonsense I’m sure. :grin:

Final cause requires intention, the non-physical. — Metaphysician Undercover

Can purpose refer to function or reason instead of intent, and thereby to a strictly physical (as opposed to mental, or non-physical) process?

For example:
1) The purpose (function) of the heart is to pump blood.
2) The purpose of (reason for) photosynthesis is to convert light into chemical energy.

Did Aristotle define telos in terms of reason or intent?

They form membranes spontaneously. You forgot, or never understood, what was said. — apokrisis

I suppose we need to define "spontaneously" then. Does this mean "without a cause", or does it mean "voluntarily"? If the former, then finality is excluded, as final cause is a cause. If the latter, then we're talking about a non-physical cause.

Can purpose refer to function or reason instead of intent, and thereby to a strictly physical (as opposed to mental, or non-physical) process?

For example:
1) The purpose (function) of the heart is to pump blood.
2) The purpose of (reason for) photosynthesis is to convert light into chemical energy. — Galuchat

If something acts with purpose, there is necessarily intent involved, that's how "intent" is defined. To act with purpose is to act with intent There appears to be a trend in modern scientific thinking to limit the meaning of "intent" to conscious intent. But conscious intent is just one form of intent, as there is still intent in habits and subconscious acts. Limiting "intent" in this way, to conscious intent, would leave all the instances of purpose, such as those in your examples, left ungrounded. When we say "purpose" we imply "for the sake of something". And "for the sake of which" implies the reason for the act. The act is carried out for this reason, for this purpose. So if the act was carried out for this reason, the act was caused to occur for that reason, and that's the purpose of the act. That's what's known as intent, when an act is caused to occur, for a purpose.

So both of your examples, by referring to "purpose", imply intent. If you say that the purpose of the heart is to pump blood, then you imply that the actions of the heart are caused to occur by the intent to pump blood. And if the purpose of photosynthesis is to convert light energy into chemical energy, then you imply that the activity of photosynthesis is caused to occur by the intent to convert energy. That's why it's common for materialists, and physicalists to deny purpose from these acts, saying that they just come about by chance, "spontaneously", without cause. But It's very difficult to deny purpose from the acts of living things because the evidence is overwhelming. We know that there is purpose (intent) behind birds building their nests, and beavers building damns, and all the various activities which we observe of the living creatures.

Did Aristotle define telos in terms of reason or intent? — Galuchat

I don't think "intent" was a word in Aristotle's Greece. I believe it comes from Latin. In his "Physics" he defined final cause as "that for the sake of which". The example he gave is that if a man walks for his health, then health is the cause of the man walking, in the sense of final cause. The man has an idea, a goal, "health", and this is the cause of him walking. This is commonly called, by us, intent.

"Reason" is a much more vague and ambiguous term. It can be used as "the act of reasoning", or "the reason for". But even as "the reason for", it is very ambiguous, lending itself to all the different types of causation. The cause of something (final, efficient, whatever) is the reason for it. So it's better not to interpret final cause in terms of "reason". And I think if one did interpret it in this way, very strict limitations would need to be put on the definition of "reason".

I suppose we need to define "spontaneously" then. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah. I did. The spontaneous part of "spontaneous symmetry-breaking" refers to the fact that any old material nudge is going to tip everything in some collective symmetry-breaking direction. So it says, yes, you need some kind of material/efficient cause to get things going. But the very least imaginable fluctuation is going to do that.

It doesn't have to be a fluctuation of any particular formed kind. It doesn't have to be a fluctuation with any degree of intention. It is the very opposite of any kind of voluntary act. It is a pure accident. Whatever happened, it would have resulted in the same effect.

A classic example of this is a ball balanced on top of a dome. It is going to roll off one way or another of its own accord. Well, it will need a nudge to get going. But there is always going to be some vibration or other that tips the balance.

So in the physics of symmetry-breaking and self-organisation, the notion of "spontaneous" in regards to material/efficient cause is very well defined.

And likewise, the final/formal cause is well understood. If there is a state of organisation that can lower a system's entropy - like a ball rolling of a dome - then finality will drive that to happen. It so wants to happen, that is the reason any old nudge is going to get you started.

It is the usual reciprocal or dichotomous story. The more powerful the entropic urge, the less material push it takes to get things going. Hence you have this sharp contrast between tiny pushes and outlandish effects.

In his "Physics" he defined final cause as "that for the sake of which". The example he gave is that if a man walks for his health, then health is the cause of the man walking, in the sense of final cause. The man has an idea, a goal, "health", and this is the cause of him walking. This is commonly called, by us, intent. — Metaphysician Undercover

Continuing with the SEP article (2. The Four Causes):

"Moreover, a teleological explanation of the type sketched above does not crucially depend upon the application of psychological concepts such as desires, beliefs and intentions. This is important because artistic production provides Aristotle with a teleological model for the study of natural processes, whose explanation does not involve beliefs, desires, intentions or anything of this sort. Some have contended that Aristotle explains natural process on the basis of an inappropriately psychological teleological model; that is to say, a teleological model that involves a purposive agent who is somehow sensitive to the end. This objection can be met if the artistic model is understood in non-psychological terms. In other words, Aristotle does not psychologize nature because his study of the natural world is based on a teleological model that is consciously free from psychological factors."

Yeah. I did. The spontaneous part of "spontaneous symmetry-breaking" refers to the fact that any old material nudge is going to tip everything in some collective symmetry-breaking direction. So it says, yes, you need some kind of material/efficient cause to get things going. But the very least imaginable fluctuation is going to do that. — apokrisis

Well that's not really "spontaneous" then. That little nudge is the cause. And so it's just as I say. the lipid's tendency to behave in this way, upon being "nudged" is the reason why they are useful, and are produced.

It is a pure accident. Whatever happened, it would have resulted in the same effect. — apokrisis

It's not pure accident, the lipids have a physical constitution which makes them tend to behave this way. Other things don't behave in this way, this behaviour is proper to, and essential to these lipids. So it really can't be said to be accidental.

A classic example of this is a ball balanced on top of a dome. It is going to roll off one way or another of its own accord. Well, it will need a nudge to get going. But there is always going to be some vibration or other that tips the balance. — apokrisis

Have you ever tried to balance a ball on a dome? That very nudge (vibration or whatever) which you say will get the ball going, will prevent the ball from being balanced. So the direction the ball rolls depends on how you place it, because it's never going to be balanced. It's a false example. If you do happen to get something balanced in this way, then it will take a cause to unbalance it, and it will move in some direction or another depending on that cause.


That's right, the model doesn't have to be, and should not be taken as "psychological", that's what I explained. Those who restrict "intent", to conscious intent (psychological), necessitate a psychological model of final cause. This will lead to panpsychism when we try to explain all the purpose (intent) in the world in other living things which are not conscious. That's why we must look to something other than the mind as the source of purposeful, or intentional activity. If you read Aristotle's biology you will see that he attributes this immaterial source of purposeful, or intentional activity (which manifests as conscious intent), to "the soul", which all living things have in common. The intellect is a potency of the soul, just like things such as self-nutrition, self-movement, and sensation. All of these being activities produced by final causation (intent), as they are purposeful activities.

That's why we must look to something other than the mind as the source of purposeful, or intentional activity. If you read Aristotle's biology you will see that he attributes this immaterial source of purposeful, or intentional activity (which manifests as conscious intent), to "the soul", which all living things have in common. — Metaphysician Undercover

As previously noted here:
The intellect (mind) and soul (form of the living body) of the human being are united as one (according to Aquinas, not Aristotle).

So, how is the human soul (mind+form) the source of intentional activity if "...we must look to something other than the mind as the source of purposeful, or intentional activity." (as above)?

Also, if Aristotle's final cause applies to all of nature, it may help if you could explain what the final cause of an inorganic object or process (e.g., a volcano or volcanic eruption) would be.

The intellect (mind) and soul (form of the living body) of the human being are united as one (according to Aquinas, not Aristotle). — Galuchat

United as one, does not deny identifiable parts. It means that the two named things exist within one united being. Different attributes are united as one, in one being, but that does not mean that the attributes are not identifiable as distinct.

So, how is the human soul (mind+form) the source of intentional activity if "...we must look to something other than the mind as the source of purposeful, or intentional activity." (as above)? — Galuchat

I think that this question indicates that you misunderstand the meaning of "united as one". When two things are united as one, each part has a different relation to the one united thing. So "soul" could refer to the source of intentional activity, and "mind" could have a different relation to intentional activity, while the two are united as one in the human being.

Also, if Aristotle's final cause applies to all of nature, it may help if you could explain what the final cause of an inorganic object or process (e.g., a volcano or volcanic eruption) would be. — Galuchat

I don't think I said anything to imply that final cause is evident in inanimate things.

When two things are united as one, each part has a different relation to the one united thing. So "soul" could refer to the source of intentional activity, and "mind" could have a different relation to intentional activity, while the two are united as one in the human being. — Metaphysician Undercover

If the soul (mind+form of the body) is the source of intentional activity, and we must look to something other than the mind as the source of intentional activity, then is it more accurate to say that the form of the body (and not the soul) is the source of intentional activity?

If so, is physiology an example of nonconscious intentional activity produced by the form of the body independent of the mind?

Do mind and form of the body interact? If so, how?

I don't think I said anything to imply that final cause is evident in inanimate things.
Metaphysician Undercover

You didn't, but if final cause applies to all of nature, and not just living organisms, we should be able to describe it using the same terms (e.g., "nonconscious intent") with reference to inorganic objects and processes.

I'm just trying to determine whether (given Aristotle's avoidance of psychological terms such as "intent") the use of even "nonconscious intent" to describe final cause should be avoided in favour of another, such as "end" (telos). It seems to me that using "intent" with reference to final cause is equivocal, possibly serving an unnecessary theological (as opposed to strictly scientific) end (read: Thomist viewpoint superseding Aristotelian viewpoint).

Continuing with the SEP article (3. The Four Causes in the Science of Nature):

"In the Physics, Aristotle builds on his general account of the four causes by developing explanatory principles that are specific to the study of nature. Here Aristotle insists that all four causes are involved in the explanation of natural phenomena, and that the job of “the student of nature is to bring the why-question back to them all in the way appropriate to the science of nature” (Phys. 198 a 21–23)."

If the soul (mind+form of the body) is the source of intentional activity, and we must look to something other than the mind as the source of intentional activity, then is it more accurate to say that the form of the body (and not the soul) is the source of intentional activity? — Galuchat

As I understand, the soul is not the form of the body. It is an immaterial form, prior to the body. This is where dualism comes into play, and where the Neo-Platonists, consequently Aquinas, differ from Aristotle,. There are material forms, which are forms of bodies, and also separate immaterial forms.

I'm just trying to determine whether (given Aristotle's avoidance of psychological terms such as "intent") the use of even "nonconscious intent" to describe final cause should be avoided in favour of another, such as "end" (telos). It seems to me that using "intent" with reference to final cause is equivocal, possibly serving an unnecessary theological (as opposed to strictly scientific) end (read: Thomist viewpoint superseding Aristotelian viewpoint). — Galuchat

I don't see this equivocation. "Intent" and "end" are both applicable terms, one is of the general, the other particular. "End" refers to the particular, best understood as "the good", that which is desired, the particular thing which one is trying to bring about in an intentional act. I'm not sure what "telos" is supposed to mean "Intent" refers to the general, what lies behind the recognition of particular goods. but sometimes "intent" will be used to refer to the particular, as in "what was your intent?". So long as we avoid confusing the particular with the general in terms of usage, there is no equivocation

In the Physics, Aristotle builds on his general account of the four causes by developing explanatory principles that are specific to the study of nature. Here Aristotle insists that all four causes are involved in the explanation of natural phenomena, and that the job of “the student of nature is to bring the why-question back to them all in the way appropriate to the science of nature” (Phys. 198 a 21–23)." — Galuchat

Sure, we need to refer to all four causes to understand all aspects of nature, but he clearly indicates that some phenomena do not require application of all four causes in order to understand them. If some phenomena can be understood without applying final cause, then so be it. Aristotle's intent, in defining the four distinct ways in which "cause" is used, was to avoid ambiguity, because "cause" at that time had all these different meanings. So he insists that the appropriate meaning be applied in each situation of usage, "in the way appropriate to the science of nature", to avoid equivocation.

From here:

The soul was always understood as separable from the body, even following Aristotle's definition, designating it as the form of the body... — Metaphysician Undercover

To here:

As I understand, the soul is not the form of the body. — Metaphysician Undercover

If your understanding is not contradictory, your explanations certainly are.

Given Aristotle's avoidance of psychological terms...It seems to me that using "intent" with reference to final cause is equivocal, possibly serving an unnecessary theological (as opposed to strictly scientific) end (read: Thomist viewpoint superseding Aristotelian viewpoint). — Galuchat

I don't see this equivocation. "Intent" and "end" are both applicable terms, one is of the general, the other particular. "End" refers to the particular, best understood as "the good", that which is desired, the particular thing which one is trying to bring about in an intentional act. — Metaphysician Undercover

And to @apokrisis here:

You claim that organisation occurs "to meet finality" which implies necessarily, "purpose", but then you deny the non-physical, "intent" which is implied by purpose. — Metaphysician Undercover

In my opinion, you have been presenting a view of Final Cause which Aristotle would not have endorsed. So, our discussion ends here.

In my opinion, you have been presenting a view of Final Cause which Aristotle would not have endorsed. — Galuchat

Have you never read Aristotle? Final cause is clearly defined in his Physics as "that for the sake of which" 194b. Walking is for the sake of health, so health is the cause of walking, in the sense of "final cause". If you doubt me, look it up.

In his Nicomachean Ethics, "that for the sake of which" is called "the end". Human activities are carried out for a purpose, this is the end. The activity is the means to the end. The problem he addresses is that usually even the end itself is for the sake of something else, a further end. This produces a chain of causation (in the sense of final cause); this is desired for the sake of that, which is desired for something further, etc.. He seeks to put an end to this causal chain, and posits happiness as the ultimate end, what all other ends are sought for the sake of.

I really don't understand what your problem is. What do you think is meant by "final cause"? What makes you think "final cause" ought to be disassociated with intent? You really don't explain yourself very well. Why don't you try?

If your understanding is not contradictory, your explanations certainly are. — Galuchat

I've thought about this issue, and I've come to realize that the problem here is not with ambiguity in the word "intent", or "final cause", or the word "end",we're beating around the bush here. Our difficulty in communication stems from ambiguity in the word "form".

This word, "form" has taken on many different meanings from Plato, Aristotle, Neo-Platonists, Christian theologians, through to modern usage. I started with a strictly Aristotelian use of "form" in the definition of "soul", and you responded with a Thomistic understanding of "soul". The point being that the meaning of the word "form" had already gone through a Neo-Platonist transformation between Aristotle and Aquinas, providing the ontology which allows for the independent existence of Forms.

That seems to be where we have disagreement, on the existence of independent Forms. Aristotle did not explicitly develop any ontology of the independent existence of forms, but his metaphysics leaves open the possibility of this, by providing the basic principles which act as a foundation. The ontology of independent Forms was then developed by Neo-Platonists through application of Aristotelian principles and reference to Plato's Timaeus. This ontology was accepted in principle into Christian theology. You seem to hold some atheist prejudice whereby you will not approach these Neo-Platonic principles, which are completely consistent with Aristotelian metaphysics, claiming that these principles are strictly "theological", as if this means unphilosophical.

So, Aquinas changed the meaning of "soul" from "form" to "mind" and separated it from "body" for theological reasons. — Galuchat

The principles of separation of the "One", the "Soul", and the "Intellect", from the material body, were already produced by the Neo-Platonists, who were more "mystical" than "theological", and these principles were received into Christian theology by Augustine and later theologians. The principles were not produced for "theological reasons".

From here:

The soul was always understood as separable from the body, even following Aristotle's definition, designating it as the form of the body... — Metaphysician Undercover


To here:

As I understand, the soul is not the form of the body. — Metaphysician Undercover


If your understanding is not contradictory, your explanations certainly are. — Galuchat

In the first quote, it is someone else's ideas that are being described. The second quote is a declaration of personal belief. In this case the two of them contradict, as you say. Because they are the views (beliefs) of different people; people who disagree. :wink:

Thanks Pattern-chaser, but Galuchat seems to have given up.

For example, prior to the work of Maxwell and Hertz, electromagnetic radiation was non-physical, but became physical as a result of the knowledge that they generated. — johnpetrovic

The problem with that comment is that "electromagnetic radiation" was never non-physical, it was merely discovered to be physical. Unknown entities/processes do not entail non-physical entities/processes. You're conflating epistemological issues with ontological issues there.

The soul comes down to our memories. Our memories make us unique and make who we are and/or who we will become. An eternal soul persists apart from the body. It is like a DVD of data that is removable. If you remember lost loved ones, their soul persists in your memories.

The modern "cloud" for data storage, if maintained forever, would perpetuate your memories, through these writings. It is type of external soul. The DNA is also type of soul, since it is a type of memory storage that is unique to each of us. The DNA was inferred through the concept of reincarnation, where the genes memories of the past, can reappear in the present.

In tradition the soul is static. It is the spirit that animates the soul. The soul is like data on a DVD. You need to use a reader to make it come to life. There are natural spirits, such as instinctive needs and sensory input that animate our memories. There is also the divine spirits, which is more of an internal trigger, connected to choice and will power, which is part of the creative process. Choice and will power, in tradition, made humans like gods; divine spirit.

Relative to the DNA, our DNA by itself cannot assemble a cell or an entire human from a beaker of molecular parts. It is static like the soul. It needs a spirit, such as the organized proteins of a mother cell to feed and shape it. Or in the lab, we may need to add chemical and enzymatic spirits to animate the DNA so it can replicate. By itself it is static like the soul.

The ancient people, who created these concepts, did not have extroverted modern science. Their science was more based on introspection and unconscious projection. Now that we have modern external science, one can use the insight of the past to advance extroverted science. The ancients knew the software side, while modern science is more geared to the hardware. One can infer one from the other, if you know both. Metaphysics complements physics if you know how to translate between the two systems. Philosophy is sort of the bridge.

Metaphysics complements physics if you know how to translate between the two systems. — wellwisher

I rather think metaphysics is what its etymology suggests, something upon which physics is founded or based. In the case of physics as we understand it today, in Western technological society, it is based on subject-object metaphysics. The two topics are certainly complementary, in the sense that they are compatible, and don't really intersect at all. But you can't translate from one to the other, I don't think, simply because they are, as you say, complementary. Not sharing the same intellectual space, but existing alongside one another.

An eternal soul persists apart from the body. It is like a DVD of data that is removable. — wellwisher

I'm not at all keen on the computer analogy, but if we are to use it, I think we must consider the soul DVD to contain data and programs, or even executable data.

A good analogy for the contrast between physics and metaphysics and how they relate, is connected to the complementary relationship between software and hardware, but to game software in particular.

In game software, the laws of physics do not necessarily apply. In the game landscape we can have infinite lives or we can levitate as part of the game action. The metaphysical aspect of the game occurs in the imaginary world of software. It is generated, in part, by the brain hardware, but it is also separate from the brain, in terms of the laws of physics. Only the brain has to obey all the laws of physics while the imagination can depart.

Back in ancient times, the physical world was ruled by the metaphysical world of the gods and spirits. The physical world was differentiated by means of the more open structure of meta-reality coming in contact with the practical limits of physical reality. I can hit a 600 foot home run in the game but if I try this in reality the result will be different.

For example, an architect can design a large bridge, made of glass, on paper. It looks fine and beautiful in terms of its structure on paper. The engineers who are commissioned to build the bridge are constrained by the physical limitations of glass. It may not be possible in reality. It may only be possible in the game landscape.

Going from the imagination to reality does not always work. Reality helps to set physicals limits on the output of the imagination. While the imagination creates game scenarios that places one in contact with hard reality, so we can differentiate hard reality, by means of the needs of meta-reality and the results in hard reality. The glass bridge may only work in the realm of the gods; software dreamscape or imagination. In physical reality we may need to change materials from glass and use carbon fiber and epoxy. From that we learn to differentiate reality.

I'm sorry. I thought you meant metaphysical in a philosophical sense. It seems you mean something closer to the everyday, something along the lines of abstract, figurative, mystical and maybe even magical. I don't really disagree with what you say, I just misunderstood your intended meaning. :up:

I'm sorry. I thought you meant metaphysical in a philosophical sense. It seems you mean something closer to the everyday, something along the lines of abstract, figurative, mystical and maybe even magical. I don't really disagree with what you say, I just misunderstood your intended meaning. :up:
6 hours ago — Pattern-chaser

These two concepts are the same thing. Big Foot, for example, is within the realm of possibility. Big foot is not overly magical or overly metaphysically gifted to be written off as purely imaginary. If he/she could fly or pulled trees from the ground, this distinction would be easier. Yet he/she has not been scientifically confirmed in terms of physical reality. This metaphysical projection from the imagination, is close enough to possible physical reality, for big foot to appear real, even if not confirmed as real.

If you ever read historical fiction, a historical time is properly characterized; War and Peace, in terms of historical events. The main fictional characters are given a relatable human side, that is reasonable and interesting. Even though this is fiction, there is sufficient overlap in terms of the imaginary/metaphysical and the physical, for some people to believe it is real. This technique is being used in the Trump mythology, to create a reasonable fictional/metaphysical and reality overlap scenario.

This closeness is what the ancients saw in terms of their mythologies of gods, super heroes, and super villains. They lacked our modern scientific foundation, therefore, what they knew of physical reality was very limited by modern standards. This made these metaphysical systems appear within the realm of possibility, even if not confirmed on demand.

Through the process of seeking to confirm the metaphysical; meet the gods, a distinction gradually appears between the two realms of meta/imagination and matter. Science starts to appear. Natural projection factors from the collective unconscious mind, were driving the metaphysical inductions of the imagination, to create an overlap and contrast for the conscious mind; test things. From these ancient systems and other induced data one can reverse engineer and map out the software side of the brain.

Dark matter and dark energy is a metaphysical system that is within the realm of physical possibility, but like big foot, it has yet to be confirmed in the lab. Even scientists are not immune. They lack knowledge of the software side of the brain to make this distinction.

Trump mythologies are different from dark energy. Unlike ark energy, Trump mythology is not driven by internal factors, but by external factors. It is not natural to the brain, and is causing a problem for many people in terms of unconscious backlash; fear and paranoia. Dark energy is motivating people to explore and seek truth through physical evidence. Trump mythologies is about avoiding physical reality so the induced metaphysical overlap becomes their reality.

Dark matter and dark energy is a metaphysical system — wellwisher

No, they are part of a hypothetical physical (as in 'physics') system. Metaphysics, as I understand it, is not what you think.

Metaphysics, in philosophy, deals with the underlying principles behind reality. The logical question is how do these underlying things come into original awareness, when many of these things can't be easily seen with the eyes? If they were easy to see there would be no need for philosophy.

They start in the imagination, which has a connection to the natural brain firmware. We imagine, and then overlap our imagination with reality, and attempt to build a bridge between the two. This is how we prove or narrow the correlation.

When you read about these things, instead of invent them, the creative process is a little different. The imagination is induced from outside oneself, by the writings. The original starts on the inside. The writings induce it from the outside. The philosophy student will attempt to overlap the external imagination induction with reality, to see if it fits.

Philosophy that perpetuates over time, begins in the imagination of the creator; Plato. This is connected to collective human firmware common to the human species. These are within each of us connected to human DNA. The writings help to induce the same firmware that created it, allowing the same firmware to resonate through time. It is natural output product of the human brain, that can be induced anew in each generation by the original writings. Religions use this affect. Of God means the entire process is natural.

The unconscious mind, where the firmware dwell, is the main frame part of the brain. It can absorb much more data in a subliminal way. The ego may direct the sensory systems, but the firmware is much better at collecting data. It can also integrate and process the higher data density to reach deeper or new conclusions. However, there is a gap between the unconscious mind and conscious awareness, which the unconscious attempts to bridge via the imagination. It uses a different type of language that is more spatial; symbolism. The ego has to help build the bridge from the other side. Plato was a natural bridge builder.

Some philosophy gets very esoteric because translating the 3-D language of the brain, into 2-D; cause and affect, requires a bit of finesse. The esoteric tries to simulate the third dimension.