The interesting thing is that any two conflicting stances are reasoned positions. — TheMadFool
Therefore the difference between thesis and antithesis must lie with the axioms of the arguments offered in support of them. — TheMadFool
Differences in choice of axioms must originate with our preferences (likes and dislikes). — TheMadFool
Surely you don’t mean that? The flat earther is not holding a reasoned position. — MindForged
Well I don't know about that. The project of picking axioms is intended to be done rationally, not "I like that assumption". So theory choice models come into play. — MindForged
Axioms, by definition, have no supporting reasons. So, can't be rational. — TheMadFool
If you apply a model of theory choice we very well get supporting reasons. If the axioms taken on result in a theory which introduces a bunch of ad hoc elements, isn't fruitful, is too inconsistent relative to another theory with the same results but sans-those defects, the latter theory is more rational.
Axioms can be supported with reason, just check out Penelope Maddy's "Believing the Axioms". — MindForged
You're saying that the respective axioms must cohere with each other and that counts as reasons supporting the entire collection of axioms. — TheMadFool
It, being the first, doesn't have the luxury of such a support structure because no other theories exist alongside it. — TheMadFool
metaphysics is a region of space which is filled with contradictory philosophies and there is no actual process by which we may verify or disconfirm theories in it. Such a place is journeyed through only per choice; no rationale. — TheMadFool
Differences in choice of axioms must originate with our preferences (likes and dislikes). — TheMadFool
Even logically, axioms shouldn't lead to contradictions. — TheMadFool
In such cases isn't it personal preference, not rationale, that swings our vote? — TheMadFool
everyone from logicians to sociologists essentially makes reference to such theories being made better or worse on these grounds — MindForged
the only difference being how highly respective parties rate particular theoretical virtues and how they conceive of them. — MindForged
No, metaphysical theories rest on logical theories (for various reasons) and both metaphysical theories and logical theories have the worth assessed via how virtuous their theories are. — MindForged
I believe reason also informs our emotions. — TheMadFool
I don't know what model of theory choice you might be referring to, but I can't think of a single exposition to which "everyone" refers. There are perfectly well respected critics of pretty much every version from Popper to Becker. Its just wishful thinking to suggest we have some universally approved means of judging the value of theories (prior to formal proofs). — Pseudonym
the only difference being how highly respective parties rate particular theoretical virtues and how they conceive of them. — Me
The specific value given to each weight probably doesn't matter, all you need is to be able to give them different weights (of we have to get deep down, primitive recursive arithmetic is more or less never doubted). I already said people disagree on the particulars of this.And even if the above were the case (which I'm certain it isn't) then the weight to give to each factor would itself be axiomatic and so subject to rational choice theory, and so on.
So the popularity of theological-based metaphysics just about the time when most people were religious, and it's subsequent waning as atheism grows is just a coincidence?
(...)
you're still trying to claim that philosophical theories are largely accepted or rejected on their virtues? — Pseudonym
I wouldn't deny that *in general* preferences guide what we believe.I was just saying axioms in particular are not, necessarily, simply picked arbitrarily on grounds of preference.
I made no claim about this playing out historically exactly according to any particular model (much more complicated). — MindForged
metaphysics is a region of space which is filled with contradictory philosophies and there is no actual process by which we may verify or disconfirm theories in it. Such a place is journeyed through only per choice; no rationale. — TheMadFool
No, metaphysical theories rest on logical theories (for various reasons) and both metaphysical theories and logical theories have the worth assessed via how virtuous their theories are. — MindForged
my point was that arguing based on theory choice is used in all fields, — MindForged
The specific value given to each weight probably doesn't matter, — MindForged
It's a very convoluted interpretation that has this exchange saying what you claim. Not only do you specifically make the claim that "both metaphysical theories and logical theories have the worth assessed via how virtuous their theories are." — Pseudonym
I wouldn't deny that *in general* preferences guide what we believe.I was just saying axioms in particular are not, necessarily, simply picked arbitrarily on grounds of preference. — MindForged
The arguments people use to justify their theories and the reason they chose them are not the same thing. — Pseudonym
If, however, you're claiming that regardless of how theories are actually chosen, they are defended using rational theory choice models, then your argument is a non sequitur, the OP is about how theories are chosen, not how they're defended. I very much doubt the OP was confused into thinking that philosophers actually admitted to his claim. — Pseudonym
Differences in choice of axioms must originate with our preferences (likes and dislikes).
Therefore, philosophy is not so much about rationality as it is about our personal preferences. — TheMadFool
Yet your claim is that it is responsible for selecting one set of axioms over another. I can't think of very much that matters more in explaining the differences in fundamental philosophical lines of thought, which is what the thread is about. — Pseudonym
How is that convoluted — MindForged
You actually said "No" in answer to the proposition that metaphysics is journeyed through by personal choice (as opposed to rational necessity) — Pseudonym
I wouldn't deny that *in general* preferences guide what we believe.I was just saying axioms in particularare not, necessarily, simply picked arbitrarily on grounds of preference. — MindForged
I stopped reading the moment you said this — MindForged
no matter how much you insist that, I can go up and quote what I said — MindForged
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