I can see no issue with defining as physical, everything that is subject to the laws of physics. And no, that isn't circular, because we know what the laws of physics are, to very high accuracy.

What are counted as the laws of physics have changed and continue to undergo development, so you are okay that what counts as physical changes? Also, what about other special sciences such as chemistry, biology and so on - are they studies of non-physical things? Or did you mean by "laws of physics" "laws of science", in which case, why don't you class mathematics and logic as sciences and (therefore, by the new definition) their objects as physical?

So far Uber's idea of linking the physical to energy conservation constraints seems the most promising.

I could make things very metaphysically lean by saying something like this: physical things are just finite states of motion

By tying down the physical to motion, don't we tie it down to the spatiotemporal at the same time? I was under the impression that you were trying to avoid that particular criterion for the reason that spacetime might be emergent.
But perhaps I haven't understood what you mean by motion.

What are counted as the laws of physics have changed and continue to undergo development, so you are okay that what counts as physical changes? — MetaphysicsNow

Remind me, when was the last time the Schrödinger equation changed?

Also, what about other special sciences such as chemistry, biology and so on - are they studies of non-physical things? — MetaphysicsNow

You think chemicals don't obey the laws of physics?

why don't you class mathematics and logic as sciences — MetaphysicsNow

Because they aren't.

So far Uber's idea of linking the physical to energy conservation constraints seems the most promising. — MetaphysicsNow

How do you check for energy conservation?

Remind me, when was the last time the Schrödinger equation changed?

Irrelevant. The point is that if you tie "laws of physics" to "current laws of physics" you rule out any further development. If you just mean "whatever becomes a law of physics" your original claim is vacuous because who knows what will be subsumed under future laws of physics in that sense.

You think chemicals don't obey the laws of physics?

I think the laws of that cover chemical reactions do not reduce to the laws of physics - if by laws of physics you are specifically talking about the laws covering the so-called four fundamental forces. Certainly nobody has ever reduced them - the claim that they are so reducible is just that, a claim, and a pretty empty one at that. So, by your definition of physical, that would rule out chemical reactions as being physical. Unless, of course, you extend the scope of "physical law" to include laws of chemistry, and then I refer you to my previous post.

why don't you class mathematics and logic as sciences — MetaphysicsNow


Because they aren't.

So tom says that P entails that P?

How do you check for energy conservation?

I imagine it would depend on the circumstances - why, what's your point?

I think that the use of "phenomena" in the question entails its physical -despite incomplete- modeling. That is, we can experience the phenomena because it is modeled within a existing theory. New theories permit us to observe new phenomena, which sometimes require another new theories (or extensions) to be more extensively accounted. But even when the physical account to a phenomena (such as black holes) is not complete, the knowledge of the existence of the phenomena it is possible only if there is a preexisting physical theory (about electromagnetic radiation, gravity, etc. that permit us at least to confirm its existence). A "non-physical" phenomena is in my view a contradiction in terms.
In my opinion, the non-physical refers to the knowledge that is not obtained by physics methods.That is, the referred to logic and mathematics, together the worlds of fantasy (mythology, films, literature, etc.). The non-physical is only a product of our imagination.
Then, the physical entails the non-physical only in a specific sense: physics uses mathematics objects to modeling reality.

Irrelevant. The point is that if you tie "laws of physics" to "current laws of physics" you rule out any further development. If you just mean "whatever becomes a law of physics" your original claim is vacuous because who knows what will be subsumed under future laws of physics in that sense. — MetaphysicsNow

What we have discovered about reality cannot be undone by future knowledge. Quantum mechanics will always work as well as it does, and nothing it has revealed to us about reality can be forgotten.

I think the laws of that cover chemical reactions do not reduce to the laws of physics - if by laws of physics you are specifically talking about the laws covering the so-called four fundamental forces. Certainly nobody has ever reduced them - the claim that they are so reducible is just that, a claim, and a pretty empty one at that. — MetaphysicsNow

You're not joking are you? I hope you are because the alternative is quite worrying.

I imagine it would depend on the circumstances - why, what's your point? — MetaphysicsNow

How do you use the principle of conservation of energy, to check for the conservation of energy? Give it a try.

Quantum mechanics will always work as well as it does, and nothing it has revealed to us about reality can be forgotten.

Show a little philosophical sophistication please, this is a philosophy forum after all. The fact that QM is useful and always will be does not entail it tells us anything about reality.

Show a little philosophical sophistication please, this is a philosophy forum after all. The fact that QM is useful and always will be does not entail it tells us anything about reality. — MetaphysicsNow

Your:

I think the laws of that cover chemical reactions do not reduce to the laws of physics - if by laws of physics you are specifically talking about the laws covering the so-called four fundamental forces. Certainly nobody has ever reduced them - the claim that they are so reducible is just that, a claim, and a pretty empty one at that. — MetaphysicsNow

Is a keeper though, you know whenever I want a laugh.

Oh, and by the way, QM has told us a great deal about the structure of reality, but I don't think I'll bother going into that right now.

And you keep ducking the conservation of energy question, why?

You're not joking are you? I hope you are because the alternative is quite worrying.

Take the chemical laws of catalysis. Point me to the theoretical work that has reduced those to the laws of physics. If you are tempted to say "the laws of chemical analsys are laws of physics" then once again your argument that "the physical is what is the subject matter of physical laws" becomes "the physical is the subject matter of scientific laws", and then the question "Why aren't maths and logic sciences" remains one you have not addressed (other than to simply pronounce that they are not).

You don't use the principle of conservation of energy to check for the conservation of energy. You check for conservation of energy by measuring energy. I still don't see the point of this particular line of thought of yours. Uber's idea is that we identify something as physical because it is a process or object or whatnot the behaviour of which is bound by the laws of conservation of energy.

And you keep ducking the conservation of energy question, why?

Says the master of the technique of going silent when proved wrong.

Monism doesn't preclude the possibility of a spiritual realm. — Galuchat

I would have thought any monism would preclude the possibility of separate realms. — Wayfarer

Yes, monism precludes the possibility of separate realms, but not the possibility of different realms (or domains).

For example, temperament (those aspects of personality considered to be innate, as opposed to learned) may be the result of differences in the natural frequencies and damping ratios of thalamocortical circuits. Robinson, D. L. (December 2008). Brain Function, Emotional Experience and Personality. Netherlands Journal of Psychology, Volume 64, Issue 4, pp.152–167).

Temperament (a mental condition) and thalamocortical circuit function (a neurophysiological process) are two different types of actualities (empirical data accessed at different levels of abstraction) which are inextricably linked. Yet, temperament behaviour is a unity.

So, isn't it possible that spirit (a different domain) is somehow part of the mind-body equation which determines the behaviour of a human organism (a neutral monist substance)?

Take the chemical laws of catalysis. Point me to the theoretical work that has reduced those to the laws of physics. — MetaphysicsNow

OMFG!

Given the economic importance of chemical processes involving catalysis, do you not think that a great deal of time, effort and money has been put into understanding the various processes at a fundamental level. There are literally sections of libraries devoted to this.

You really should use google, but perhaps you have no idea even what to search for. Anyway, if you ever try to educate yourself on chemical reactions, stability of atoms, blah, blah, you will discover, underneath it all, is the Schrödinger equation. Only under rare circumstances are you forced into relativistic equations for the bulk of chemistry.

"Why aren't maths and logic sciences" remains one you have not addressed (other than to simply pronounce that they are not). — MetaphysicsNow

Have you heard of the Criterion of Demarcation? Look it up.

You don't use the principle of conservation of energy to check for the conservation of energy. You check for conservation of energy by measuring energy. — MetaphysicsNow

How do you measure energy to check that the Principle of Conservation of Energy holds?

Says the master of the technique of going silent when proved wrong. — MetaphysicsNow

Be a man of your word, and tell us how to measure energy.

All great points. I identified some of these problems myself when I asked where do constraints come from and mentioned how in many cases we don't know. In some cases, certain constraints can be explained in terms of other constraints. For example, a limited version of the conservation of energy can be derived from Newton's third law. More general versions in classical physics can be derived through Noether's theorem, which relates continuous symmetries to conservation laws. But I admit that the idea needs more work and would be happy if you offered some suggestions to improve it. — Uber

Do you recognize the difference between a thing and the description of that thing? Laws such as the conservation of energy, and Newton's third law are descriptions, produced from inductive principles. If these laws refer to constraints, they are descriptions of constraints, not the constraints themselves.

In a general sense, I guess what I'm trying to do is put motion front and center, and then explain that things in the world can't just exist in any state of motion they like. The very concept is a bit tough for me to put into words. When I talk about actual constraints in physics, I can easily express them as equations or something to that effect. But I would want to avoid saying something like physical things are subject to equations that constrain energy, for the reasons you highlighted. — Uber

But you are doing exactly that, what you say you are trying to avoid. You are talking about these laws, which are descriptions produced by human minds, and saying that they are constraints on the physical. This is no different from saying that physical things are subject to human equations, as if the human equations are somehow controlling "constraining" the physical things. We see this quite commonly in discussions of quantum mechanics when people reify fields and wave functions, as if these mathematical objects were interacting with the physical world rather than just representing, or describing it.

You seem to see the importance of keeping a clear separation between the world and the representation of it, so why does it appear like you are intentionally blurring this boundary, actually dissolving it into vagueness, when you speak about constraints?

I could make things very metaphysically lean by saying something like this: physical things are just finite states of motion (ie. basically finite energy). And then when asked to explain what this means in the context of physics, I could delve into equations of constraint and things like that. Thoughts? — Uber

I really don't think this would work. Do you not see that "motion" is itself a description? If there is motion, there is necessarily something which is moving. "Motion" is a descriptive term, refrring to the properties of a moving thing. Do you agree? "Motion" is a description of a thing which is moving, it is attributed to the thing, as a property of it.

In the old days, physicists talked about bodies, moving bodies, and "physical" was defined as "of the body". Motion is "of the body", so motion is physical, but it is not a physical "thing", it is a property of a physical thing. Attributes, properties, such as colour, size, motion, etc., when understood as things themselves, are non-physical things, they are things of the mind, concepts. The "physical thing" is the assumed body which is moving. Notice I say "assumed", because the existence of physical things, bodies, is a metaphysical assumption. We make this assumption to make sense of "change". If there is change, then something is changing, and we assume a physical body as the thing which is changing.

By the way, I am still waiting for the dualists to address the epistemological problem. The silence is deafening. — Uber

I tend to employ dualist principles, so you might call me dualist. But I haven't seen your expression of this "epistemological problem". The silence is us dualists waiting with bated breath for something to address.

Good point about motion. Now I never really said what I meant by motion, which is probably why you don't know what I meant! I suppose I wanted the "chain of explanation" to end somewhere, fully aware that any end will leave open certain questions, but also comfortable with that incomplete state of affairs as long as the idea has broad power, generality, and does not lead to absurd implications. Like I said I don't think there will be a perfect solution to this.

On to your very good question: how can motion not be a part of spacetime? Intuitively the very suggestion is ridiculous, I understand. We think of motion as being in space and time. And normally I would have no problem with this, but in the event that some of the quantum people are right, we have to think about motion in other ways too. We have to think about entangled states of motion that give rise to spacetime itself. These states of motion are also "constrained," which I know is not our favorite word right now. My way of thinking about things was meant to cover this scenario too, regardless of whether it's actually true. But on balance I am hoping that motion is such an intuitive thing, whether it's a car going down the street or a quantum field fluctuating, that it can cover many cases without inviting too much speculation about its "ultimate nature."

Like you I share the skepticism of saying that physical things are those things covered by the laws of physics. The measurement problem is the "classic" issue with this type of thinking. Is the wavefunction real or is it a useful mathematical construct in the Schrodinger equation? The SE itself cannot tell us what the answer is, but the implication of tom's view is that it is physical by virtue of being in the equation. So it trivially assumes as physical something that is very much controversial and contested in physics, where the Copenhagen interpretation is slowly dying out in favor of alternatives. But you don't need to be hung up on wavefunctions to see other flaws. For example are vectors physical? Some laws of classical mechanics (Newtonian mechanics) use them, but others prefer a scalar formalism, as in Lagrangian mechanics. There are a million other problems as well, some of which you and others have pointed out.

@tom@MetaphysicsNow Ladies and gentlemen, place your bets for round 4 of tom v MetaphysicsNow. MN has a clear 3-0 lead (two knock outs in the so-called Free Will Theorem debates, and a points victory awarded by referee Uber in the implications of time-invariance) but I might take a risk on the underdog for this one.

Firstly, on the "reduction" of chemical laws to physical laws, there has been a lot of research into looking into the quantum mechanical basis of catalytic behaviour. That's certainly true, and MN should take a look at it. However, although I admit not being right up to date with the latest research, my understanding is that there had been no straightforward mapping of a law such as the Bronsted Law of Catalysis to the Schrodinger Wave Equation. So in that sense of reduction (one-one mapping of laws from one domain to laws in another) there remain laws of chemistry which have not been reduced to laws of physics. That being so, there is certainly a sense of "laws of physics" whereby the chemical reactions of the type which are the subject of the Bronsted Law are not the subject of laws of physics, which would - under the proposed definition of physical - mean that those reactions are not physical. Of course,tom might have another conception of a law of physics, but if so he would need to make that clear (and obviously do so with just saying that they are laws that treat of physical things, because then we really are in a very unillumintaing circle if our search is for some criterion of what is to count as physical).

Secondly, although I have not come across the "Criterion of Demarcation" before, just looking it up very quickly shows that it is a disputable and disputed philosophical criterion for making a dividing line between the scientific and the non-scientific. I don't think any philosophical dispute is going to be settled by appealing to a disputed philosophical criterion.

Thirdly, this notion of measuring energy. We don't directly measure energy, it is calculated. For instance, you measure the mass of an object and its velocity - given a frame of reference of course - and you can calculate its kinetic energy relative to that frame. But in one sense of "measure" that would be enough to measure the kinetic energy of the object. After all, we talk about measuring the calorific energy content of a peanut, but to do so we set the peanut alight and measure the temperature by which that lighted peanut raises a known amount of water. But if by "measurement" tom means "direct measurement" then perhaps we never measure energy. On the other hand, if we push the notion of directness, perhaps we never directly measure any physical quantity.

Firstly, on the "reduction" of chemical laws to physical laws, there has been a lot of research into looking into the quantum mechanical basis of catalytic behaviour. That's certainly true, and MN should take a look at it. However, although I admit not being right up to date with the latest research, my understanding is that there had been no straightforward mapping of a law such as the Bronsted Law of Catalysis to the Schrodinger Wave Equation. — jkg20

Are you claiming that what is happening in a catalytic reaction does not obey quantum mechanics?

Secondly, although I have not come across the "Criterion of Demarcation" before, just looking it up very quickly shows that it is a disputable and disputed philosophical criterion for making a dividing line between the scientific and the non-scientific. I don't think any philosophical dispute is going to be settled by appealing to a disputed philosophical criterion. — jkg20

It's not a philosophical criterion, it's a methodological criterion, pertaining to the Scientific Method. Don't upset mathematicians or logicians by claiming what they do is science, or that they employ the scientific method.

Thirdly, this notion of measuring energy. We don't directly measure energy, it is calculated. For instance, you measure the mass of an object and its velocity - given a frame of reference of course - and you can calculate its kinetic energy relative to that frame. But in one sense of "measure" that would be enough to measure the kinetic energy of the object. — jkg20

Right, we can't calculate the amount of energy using the Principle of conservation of energy, because it does not tell us how to do this.

We need to employ the laws of physics to calculate the energy.

Are you claiming that what is happening in a catalytic reaction does not obey quantum mechanics?

No, I'm suggesting that the phenomena modelled by the equations of a law such as the Bronsted Law of Catalysis have no currently settled quantum model. That's the way things were a few years ago anyway, perhaps there's been a break through that I'm not aware of. I know that the advances in the availability of computing power have been pushing things along, but there was still a way to go last time I looked. But don't get hung up on the chemistry angle, the same point MN is making could be made for other special sciences: there is no quantum mechanical model for natural selection of species for instance, but it's at least tempting to think that natural selection is a theory which concerns physical things and events.

We need to employ the laws of physics to calculate the energy.

Well, calculating the energy of a system is part and parcel of doing physics, for sure, but I don't see why that vitiates Uber's point that we can demarcate the physical from the non-physical in terms of constraints such as the conservation of energy. I think the point is that we are trying to find some stable principle to allow a dermacation of the phyiscal from the non-physical. Sure, the conservation of energy isa guiding principle of physics, but its a guiding principle of chemistry and biology as well - it is a fixed point across all sciences.

the Scientific Method.

The definite article? You seriously believe that what scientific method is is not a philosophical issue? You learnt your philosophy in a physics lab perhaps?

To M Undercover:

I mentioned the epistemological problem in an earlier post in this thread. It is an argument against Platonic realism by Paul Benacerraf. Here it is in the SEP. The problem is famous in the philosophy of mathematics, and it pretty much single-handedly led to the turn away from Platonic realism and towards structuralism at the end of the 20th century. It boils down to a simple question, which can be asked in different ways: how can universals communicate their properties to the human mind if not through physical causation? And if they do so through the latter, how are they not physical? It's a variation of the same question Princess Elisabeth asked Descartes: how can an immaterial soul guide a material brain? It's a problem that comes up in different guises across several philosophical fields, including theism as well, as Quentin Smith comprehensively demonstrated in his attacks against the ontological and cosmological arguments. There is no successful refutation of this problem by dualists.

You seem to be obsessed with the ontological nature of constraints. But I have already acknowledged that I don't really know where they come from or "what they are like." To echo Newton, I feign no hypothesis. Maybe God set them there. Maybe they are eternal and fundamental conditions of reality. Perhaps the most basic ones did not come from anywhere; they are just the default states of reality. I am perfectly content not knowing their "ultimate nature," to the extent that a concept like this makes any sense. To me what matters most, although it's not the only thing that matters, is that these constraints are validated through rigorous empirical observations.

Obviously I do not actually believe that mathematical equations have any causal powers. It's not like the uncertainty principle in the form of an equation is doing any kind of constraining. I believe that equations can describe important empirical relations. I believe that the uncertainty principle describes something fundamental about how states of motion evolve (ie. in certain ways and not others). But as to what ultimately explains it, I don't know. I just know that it's true.

It boils down to a simple question, which can be asked in different ways: how can universals communicate their properties to the human mind if not through physical causation? — Uber

Platonic forms, necessary truths, laws of nature. None of them communicate with us. We gain knowledge of these things in the same way - conjecture and criticism, though our conjectures regarding the laws of nature are amenable to a particularly powerful method of criticism.

Cool but that automatically deflates the canonical versions of Platonism, including the fairy tale varieties on offer from Wayfarer, where universal reason just magically "permeates" (his accepted terminology) the mind first, and then conjencture and criticism come later.

This is precisely why philosophers of math abandoned Platonic realism in droves after Benacerraf.

Cool but that automatically deflates the canonical versions of Platonism, including the fairy tale varieties on offer from Wayfarer, where reason just magically permeates the mind first, and then conjencture and criticism come later.

This is precisely why philosophers of math abandoned Platonic realism in droves after Benacerraf. — Uber

There is still a bit of "magic", we have no theory of the psychology of conjecture.

Putting that to one side, we have a fully developed method for dealing with conjectures, and this theory cannot work under postmodernism, deconstructionism, or structuralism, which claimthat theories are essentially arbitrary.

Contrast these ideas with falibilism - you can't be a fallible postmodernist or structuralist!

I suppose we can live with "a bit" of magic.

There are structuralists who believe in some kind of modified Platonism (you actually sound like one), but other intellectual varieties also exist. In general, structuralism does maintain that mathematical statements or objects can have objective truth values, and hence are definitely not arbitrary, when analyzed in relation to their larger structures and systems.

isn't it possible that spirit (a different domain) is somehow part of the mind-body equation which determines the behaviour of a human organism (a neutral monist substance)? — Galuchat

A big question in its own right. There are many possible responses, but the Mahāyāna Buddhist analysis is instructive in this regard. Nāgārjuna says there is but one domain, and that therefore 'Saṃsāra and Nirvāṇa are not different' (i.e. non-dual, advaya). (For the traditional schools, this was regarded as heretical, although for Mahāyāna Buddhism it has become canonical.) But the rationale is that 'the world' is 'Saṃsāra' (i.e. the endless round of birth and death) for those who cling to it, but that same world is Nirvāṇa for those who have renounced it. 'Saṃsāra is Nirvāṇa grasped, Nirvāṇa is Saṃsāra released' is an economical way of expressing it.

Cool but that automatically deflates the canonical versions of Platonism, including the fairy tale varieties on offer from Wayfarer, where universal reason just magically "permeates" (his accepted terminology) the mind first, and then conjecture and criticism come later. — Uber

Permeates the rational operations of mind. Recall this is one of the key distinctions between h. sapiens and other hominids (and indeed species.)

Under the correspondence theory, logical statements are said to capture something intrinsic about material reality, and that's what makes them true. — Uber

According to correspondence theory, 'truth' consists in the agreement of our thought with reality. This view seems to conform closely to our ordinary common sense usage when we speak of truth. The flaws in the definition arise when we ask what is meant by "agreement" or "correspondence" of ideas and objects, beliefs and facts, thought and reality. In order to test the truth of an idea or belief we must presumably compare it with the reality in some sense.

But in order to make the comparison, we must know what it is that we are comparing, namely, the belief on the one hand and the reality on the other. But if we already know the reality, why do we need to make a comparison? And if we don't know the reality, how can we make a comparison?

Furthermore the making of the comparison is itself a fact about which we have a belief. We have to believe that the belief about the comparison is true. How do we know that our belief in this agreement is "true"? This leads to an infinite regress, leaving us with no assurance of true belief.

So you will need to have at least something that is self-evident or apodictic on which to anchor 'correspondence' - which is, for instance, exactly what Descartes sought in his Meditations. But notice again, that whatever it is that is sought, must necessarily be internal to reason itself. Ultimately it must depend on some judgement of meaning or equivalence.

Now, note that one consequence of Godel is that there must be something assumed, some axiom that is accepted, in any formal system.

Which leads to Benacereff. I noticed a rather quirky (in my view) article called the indispensability argument for mathematics, which originated in an article by Benacereff, which is, the same in the SEP article, that 'our best epistemic theories seem to debar any knowledge of mathematical objects.' And why is that? Because:

Mathematical objects are in many ways unlike ordinary physical objects such as trees and cars. We learn about ordinary objects, at least in part, by using our senses. It is not obvious that we learn about mathematical objects this way. Indeed, it is difficult to see how we could use our senses to learn about mathematical objects. We do not see integers, or hold sets. Even geometric figures are not the kinds of things that we can sense. ...

Some philosophers, called rationalists, claim that we have a special, non-sensory capacity for understanding mathematical truths, a rational insight arising from pure thought. But, the rationalist’s claims appear incompatible with an understanding of human beings as physical creatures whose capacities for learning are exhausted by our physical bodies.

(I especially like the description of 'rationalists' - cut to David Attenborough, standing amongst rows of dusty tomes in University library, intoning 'here we see the natural habitat of the elusive and rare Rationalist Philosopher'....)

So here you have it. The Platonist view must be challenged, because it is incompatible with 'our best epistemic theories' and because the objects of mathematical reasoning are not tangible or physical - therefore, can't be real. And what are 'our best epistemic theories?' The article doesn't say, but you can bet they're based on evolutionary biology and the empirical theory of knowledge, for which anything like 'innate ideas', 'inherent reason', or 'telos' are anathema. So rather than follow the mathematical intuition where it leads, we'll devise any number of facile and tortuous arguments to rationalise our essential non-rationality.

The indispensability argument in the philosophy of mathematics is an attempt to justify our mathematical beliefs about abstract objects, while avoiding any appeal to rational insight.

Bolds added. Now, considering all of the tub-thumping and preaching from the bully pulpit of Modern Science that we're nowadays subjected to, I would have thought that this blatant rejection of 'appeal to rational insight' ought to give any actual philosopher pause for thought, considering how they continually blather about 'rational science'. So - what is the agenda here, really?

Recall that Richard Dawkins' The God Delusion opened with an appeal to Einstein as a 'very religious non-believer' (that being the name of the first chapter). But this same Einstein said in totally unequivocal terms:

I'm not an atheist. The problem involved is too vast for our limited minds. We are in the position of a little child entering a huge library filled with books in many languages. The child knows someone must have written these books. It does not know how. It does not understand the languages in which they are written. The child dimly suspects a mysterious order in the arrangement of the books but doesn't know what it is. That, it seems to me, is the attitude of even the most intelligent human being toward God. We see the universe marvellously arranged and obeying certain laws but only dimly understand these laws. — Albert Einstein, from Einstein: His Life and Universe, Walter Isaacson

But, having once posted to the Dawkins Forum, I know that any such statements are received there like chunks of bloodied meat thrown into the Piranha River. And the reason is simple: there can be nothing 'above' or 'higher than' so-called 'scientific reason'. If we can't define it in terms of evolutionary biology and empirical measurement, then it must be an archaic superstition.

I do not actually believe that mathematical equations have any causal powers. — Uber

It's important to get straight what the idea of 'final cause' actually consists of. It is more like the reason that something exists, which is very counter-intuitive in today's philosophy where all reasons are generally efficient and material, in other words, they precede their effects. But, for example, the 'final cause' of a match, is actually fire - in that 'to light a fire' is the reason that the match exists. Bear that analogy in mind for all manners of form. The forms of things express the end to which they are directed, their 'raison d'etre'.

And principles such as equilibrium can be understood as states towards which states of affairs will tend - and in that sense are 'telic'. But one of the dogmas of empiricism is precisely to reject 'reason' in that 'end-directed' sense. After all there's no final cause in Darwinian biology beyond passing on your sperm.

I share the skepticism of saying that physical things are those things covered by the laws of physics. — Uber

Which is why primarily only in Anglo-American analytic philosophy that physicalism or materialism are taken seriously (oh, apart from amongst evolutionary biologists). Physics itself has long since had to abandon it.

You seem to be obsessed with the ontological nature of constraints. ... Maybe God set them there. Maybe they are eternal and fundamental conditions of reality. Perhaps the most basic ones did not come from anywhere; they are just the default states of reality. — Uber

The simple answer is that constraints develop. They are the historical breaking of physical symmetries. The past gets fixed as the result of an accumulation of such constraints. A complex world arises as one breaking creates the ground for some further breaking in a hierarchically cascading fashion.

So to believe in a constraints-based ontology is to believe in existence as a product of development - the regulation of instabilty.

The ontology of constraints is not a great mystery. It is the ontology of a developmental, evolutionary or process view of metaphysics. That brand of naturalism, in other words.

So states of constraint become fixed in place in a historical fashion. The material organisation of the world instantiates them. The material world becomes a structure that is stable enough to remember its past and can enforce that as the persisting context which is shaping its remaining uncertainties or freedoms.

As an ontology, it contrasts with Platonism, Computationalism, and other essentially timeless views of the Cosmos. That is because constraints develop. Structure is that which emerges as a cascade of symmetry breakings.

And it contrasts with Atomism as well. Matter is regulated instability. So in the beginning, there was only instability or unregulated fluctuation. Atoms are the result of global historical contexts having developed and become relatively fixed.

So we exist because of the development of constraints. And to understand that history of symmetry-breakings, we have to melt the rather frozen block of constraints that now compose the structure of a Cosmos which is only a few fractions from its ultimate Heat Death.

Physics understands this is how it works as a practical matter. But oddly, the public metaphysics seems to have got stuck on the Platonism vs the Atomism.

We seem to have to make a choice of which team to follow - that of the timeless structures or the moving parts. Yet both are simply the complementary aspects of a Cosmos that has managed to lock in a complex state of self-regulation by growing so cold and large.

It is an argument against Platonic realism by Paul Benacerraf. — Uber

Modern Platonic realism is a form of idealism which does not, in itself, provided a good representation of dualism. Aristotle sufficiently refuted Pythagorean idealism, and the form of Platonic idealism which is basically the same as modern Platonic realism. This did not prevent the Neo-Platonists and Christian theologians from developing a form of dualism which was immune to such refutation. So we need more than just a refutation of Platonic realism to deal with dualism in general, because Platonic realism does not provide us with the principles which are fundamental to a more advanced and comprehensive dualism

It boils down to a simple question, which can be asked in different ways: how can universals communicate their properties to the human mind if not through physical causation? And if they do so through the latter, how are they not physical? — Uber

The answer to this question is what we call "final cause". Final cause is non-physical causation. That this type of causation is non-physical is the reason why the will can be said to be free. "Final cause", as a concept, allows that the non-physical interacts with the physical, in a causal way.

There is no successful refutation of this problem by dualists. — Uber

Sorry to disappoint you, but Plato put forward the principles to solve this problem thousands of years ago with the points put forward in his Timaeus. This work provides the guidelines for understanding how that which is believed to be outside of time, eternal, the forms, which we now call "non-physical", may interact with material, or "physical" existence. It involves a unique understanding of the nature of time.

You seem to be obsessed with the ontological nature of constraints. But I have already acknowledged that I don't really know where they come from or "what they are like." To echo Newton, I feign no hypothesis. Maybe God set them there. Maybe they are eternal and fundamental conditions of reality. Perhaps the most basic ones did not come from anywhere; they are just the default states of reality. I am perfectly content not knowing their "ultimate nature," to the extent that a concept like this makes any sense. To me what matters most, although it's not the only thing that matters, is that these constraints are validated through rigorous empirical observations. — Uber

The point is that the position you put forward actually falls to the very "epistemological problem" which you cited. According to your definition of "physical", constraints are necessarily non-physical, as what constrains the physical. So how can the non-physical constraints act to constrain the physical, if not through physical causation? Do you accept the free will, and final causation as the solution to this problem?

Obviously I do not actually believe that mathematical equations have any causal powers. It's not like the uncertainty principle in the form of an equation is doing any kind of constraining. — Uber

Don't you find this to be contradictory? The things which you are calling "constraints", you are now saying don't actually do "any kind of constraining". What are the real "constraints" if not the things which you call "constraints"? What kind of non-physical thing does the real constraining, the will?

But in order to make the comparison, we must know what it is that we are comparing, namely, the belief on the one hand and the reality on the other. But if we already know the reality, why do we need to make a comparison? And if we don't know the reality, how can we make a comparison? — Wayfarer

The correspondence of empirical claims with empirical reality is not made by comparing the claims to some absolute reality that we can somehow directly 'see' or 'know', but to an inferred reality that explains, and is thus assumed to provide the conditions for the possibility, and the actuality, of intersubjective agreement, as well as the agreement between subjective experience at any time with subjective experience at other times.

An independent reality is indicated, not directly known (which would be absurd, a contradiction). The irony is that we can only question the reality of that reality on the basis of data and theories which themselves presuppose that it is real; thus providing us with a nice performative contradiction.

...providing us with a nice performative contradiction. — Janus

Right! I mean, the idea that your statements 'correspond to reality' seems intuitively obvious, but when you actually consider what such 'correspondence' entails, then it gets interesting. What I'm saying is that even to assert , there is an implicit ability to grasp abstractions - 'this must mean that' - prior to an empirical claim.

Modern Platonic realism is a form of idealism which does not, in itself, provided a good representation of dualism. Aristotle sufficiently refuted Pythagorean idealism, and the form of Platonic idealism which is basically the same as modern Platonic realism. — Metaphysician Undercover

Actually - and I know we've discussed this quite a few times - what I'm starting to understand through research, is that the 'hylomorphic' (matter~form) dualism of Aristotle is what was incorporated into Thomas Aquinas. Now, Lloyd Gerson, whom as you probably know of, says that in his view, despite their differences, Aristotle remained broadly speaking Platonist and that regardless of their differences, Aristotle is still broadly Platonist.

And the only real 'modern Platonic realists' I am familiar with are neo-Thomists (although there's probably very many that I don't know of). But all of them accept the reality of abstract objects. As for your 'Aristotle refuted Pythagorean Idealism' - that is based on one sentence in the Metaphysics which refers to 'the geometers'. So - let's not muddy the waters by getting into what an arcane sub-debate about what is/is not modern/traditional Platonism/not Platonism. At issue is wholly and solely the reality of abstracts, as far as I'm concerned, and that is where Platonists of whatever stripe have a case to make.