Calibrating one ruler by means of another may well be circular, but it doesn't follow that measuring a ruler with another ruler is circular. — Arkady

True, measuring rulers with other rulers might just lead to an infinite regress, unless you come back to a prior ruler, then it's circular.

I don't see why it should be either circular or lead to an infinite regress. Again, we are not trying to calibrate or justify the reliability of a given ruler by matching it against another ruler. We are assuming that the ruler with which we're performing the measurement is reliable or accurate, and then using that to measure other items, including, perhaps another ruler.

If you believe that nothing can be reliably measured with rulers, then that is a different argument. But if you believe that we can reliably use rulers to measure objects why does it suddenly become problematic when said objects are other rulers? I think you have some 'splainin' to do, Lucy.

If there was a discrepancy between two rulers, then you would be forced to investigate further in order to discover which ruler was inaccurate. I presume this would be done by measuring both rulers against many other rulers. The one that accorded most closely with the most rulers would be the more accurate one.

Yup. I just don't see the circularity or regress that Metaphysician Undercover posited.

The whole 'circularity' issue is this: that scientific analysis of anything whatever is based on certain axioms, presumptions, and rules. When you're dealing with the nature of reason itself, then you're actually turning around and looking at that which underlies all of those axioms and presumptions - often without actually recognising that this is what you're doing. You're treating the subject of experience as an object.

This is exemplified in many ways, but Chalmers' argument about the hard problem of consciousness is one case, and Dennett's response illustrates it perfectly. Chalmers points out that consciousness has an experiential or first-person aspect which can never, even in principle, be explained in purely third-person or objective terms.

The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. When we think and perceive, there is a whir of information-processing, but there is also a subjective aspect. As Nagel (1974) has put it, there issomething it is like to be a conscious organism. This subjective aspect is experience. When we see, for example, we experience visual sensations: the felt quality of redness, the experience of dark and light, the quality of depth in a visual field. Other experiences go along with perception in different modalities: the sound of a clarinet, the smell of mothballs. Then there are bodily sensations, from pains to orgasms; mental images that are conjured up internally; the felt quality of emotion, and the experience of a stream of conscious thought. What unites all of these states is that there is something it is like to be in them. All of them are states of experience.

Now what is Dennett's response to this? Very simple: he says there is no problem. He says the problem that Chalmers talks about doesn't exist or that it isn't real.

Dennett argues that consciousness is not a fundamental feature of the universe and instead will eventually be fully explained by natural phenomena. Instead of involving the nonphysical, he says, consciousness merely plays tricks on people so that it appears nonphysical—in other words, it simply seems like it requires nonphysical features to account for its powers. In this way, Dennett compares consciousness to stage magic and its capability to create extraordinary illusions out of ordinary things.

Again, there's a hopeless circularity in Dennett's argument, as 'stage magic' and 'illusions' both rely on consciousness; a non-conscious entity cannot suffer from illusions, as an illusion is precisely a mistaken interpretation on the part of a conscious agent. It is this kind of fundamental contradiction in Dennett's arguments which lead one of his critics to declare that 'some of his declarations are so preposterous as to verge on the deranged' (D B Hart in The New Atlantis).

The problem is that science never goes, and can't go, 'all the way down'. Science relies on our cognitive faculties, the kinds of things we choose to study, the way we study them, and so on. When we turn around and look at the nature of reason or the nature of mind, we're dealing with a question of a completely different kind. Again, that doesn't rule out cognitive science, but it does throw into relief the difference between cognitive science and philosophy.

I think underlying all of this is a very simplistic kind of Darwinism, which simply accepts that reason itself is like any other natural faculty, and which can be 'explained' in the same, biological terms as the attributes of other animals. That is certainly writ large in all Dennett's thinking (after all, he writes volumes about exactly this point.) Whereas, I say, that when h. sapiens actually reached the point of reasoning, story-telling and language, then their (our) being is no longer amenable to a simply biological explanation; we're no longer 'just animals'. I know that is a shockingly atavistic utterance but there it is.

Again, we are not trying to calibrate or justify the reliability of a given ruler by matching it against another ruler. — Arkady

To measure a ruler with another ruler, is to calibrate or justify it's reliability by comparing it to another ruler. What else could measuring a ruler with another ruler possibly mean?

We are assuming that the ruler with which we're performing the measurement is reliable or accurate, and then using that to measure other items, including, perhaps another ruler. — Arkady

This doesn't make sense. What would be the point of measuring a ruler unless one was attempting to verify its accuracy?

But if you believe that we can reliably use rulers to measure objects why does it suddenly become problematic when said objects are other rulers? I think you have some 'splainin' to do, Lucy. — Arkady

Like I said, there is no reason to measure a ruler except to verify its accuracy. The ruler's measurement is already stated, that's the only reason it could be a ruler, it already has a stated measurement. So to measure it is to question that stated measurement.

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Regarding rulers, isn't the point that all rulers are judged for accuracy against a standard ruler, but you cannot judge the standard ruler itself for accuracy. That the standard ruler is 1 metre long, or whatever, is not a fact, a piece of data about the world, but a convention of language. It is only 'accurate' because '1 metre' means 'the length of the standard ruler'. (Wittgenstein)

Right, it is a convention, an arbitrary assumption adopted by human minds. Circles of logic, and infinite regress of justification are avoided by referring to such conventions in mental principles.

To measure a ruler with another ruler, is to calibrate or justify it's reliability by comparing it to another ruler. What else could measuring a ruler with another ruler possibly mean? — Metaphysician Undercover

Nope. You can measure a ruler for any reason whatsoever: for shits and giggles, because the hash marks have worn off and you no longer know how long it is, etc. You are attempting to make a logical claim (i.e. measuring a ruler with a ruler is circular) by appealing to the psychological motivations of the measurer (i.e. "why else would one measure a ruler with a ruler if not to calibrate them?").

Having said that, I don't even see an inherent circularity in using a ruler to measure another ruler in order to calibrate the measured ruler's (as opposed to the measuring ruler's) accuracy: if we have good reason to believe that the measuring ruler is well-calibrated (say, by comparing it directly against the standard unit of measurement), then we can use that to calibrate other rulers (if two rulers disagree, and we have good reason to believe that one ruler is well-calibrated, then it follows that the other ruler is probably the inaccurate one).

Whereas, I say, that when h. sapiens actually reached the point of reasoning, story-telling and language, then their (our) being is no longer amenable to a simply biological explanation; we're no longer 'just animals'. I know that is a shockingly atavistic utterance but there it is. — Wayfarer

Sure. Humans have culture, not all of which is likely reducible to evolutionary explanations. Nothing shocking about that. Most scientists would probably agree with you, actually (and I am sure that most cultural anthropologists would agree with you, as they tend to resist the infiltration of biological explanations into their field).

Having said that, I don't even see an inherent circularity in using a ruler to measure another ruler in order to calibrate the measured ruler's (as opposed to the measuring ruler's) accuracy: if we have good reason to believe that the measuring ruler is well-calibrated (say, by comparing it directly against the standard unit of measurement), then we can use that to calibrate other rulers (if two rulers disagree, and we have good reason to believe that one ruler is well-calibrated, then it follows that the other ruler is probably the inaccurate one). — Arkady

Yes, this is the point. Without comparing it to "the standard unit of measurement", the measuring of the ruler's accuracy by measuring it with another ruler will lead to an infinite regress of one ruler measuring another, or a circle of rulers measuring each other. And the standard is a convention, which is an assumption of minds. So to avoid the infinite regress, or circle, we must assume as a priority, a mental property, the principle which serves as the standard or convention. To deny the priority of the standard, the principle, (which is a property of minds), is to fall into the circle, or infinite regress.

Yes, this is the point. Without comparing it to "the standard unit of measurement", the measuring of the ruler's accuracy by measuring it with another ruler will lead to an infinite regress of one ruler measuring another, or a circle of rulers measuring each other. — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course. As I've twice pointed out, there's no problem using one ruler to measure another (even for calibration purposes), if we assume that one ruler has been calibrated. You yourself said, "It is the calibration against the defined object which removes the circularity." Hence my point that there's nothing inherently circular about using one ruler to measure another.

(I am curious: how do you think ruler manufacturers check the quality of their products if not by comparing samples of their output to some standard of measurement - in other words, using rulers to measure rulers?)

Of course. As I've twice pointed out, there's no problem using one ruler to measure another (even for calibration purposes), if we assume that one ruler has been calibrated. — Arkady

Do you recognize that the point being made is the necessity of the assumption? You say,there is nothing inherently circular, "if we assume...". Therefore I conclude that you recognize that there actually is something inherently circular about measuring one ruler with another, a circularity which is only removed by the application of that assumption.

Now what is Dennett's response to this? Very simple: he says there is no problem. He says the problem that Chalmers talks about doesn't exist or that it isn't real. — Wayfarer

Your criticism of Dennett would be more convincing if you provided an actual quote from Dennett rather than a statement from someone else talking about what Dennett says, and moreover a statement which itself provides no direct quote from Dennett.

Partook of this discussion, so I won’t bail out of it as time allows.

So what exactly that primordial experience consists in; what the necessary conditions must be for its possibility and for its actuality can become metaphysical questions. Is it fundamentally akin to what we think of as physical: some sort of blind energetic or virtual process that gives rise to this world and the beings that experience it) or is it fundamentally akin to what we think of as mental: a spiritual and/ or intentional process. Or is it somehow both at once and/or neither? — Janus

Good questions. Along with the typical answers that so often lead to as of yet irresolvable conflicts between differing groups, there are also the affixed beliefs (which can be true of false) regarding the nature of causation. I so far do not know, for example, of many physicalists that accept even as remotely possible any causal mechanism which would be required for non-illusory agency. Would be grateful for any references to any established physicalist who does accept metaphysical freewill—although I know there’s been at least one physicalist here about on the forum who upholds top-down models of causation along side panseimiotics. To better illustrate these affixed convictions, unlike what was tmk first proposed by David Hume, modern day compatibilism is really a causally deterministic physicalism dressed up in fancy language games which yet preserve the ontology of causal determinism. Name it soft determinism, it's still causal determinism without exception. Hume, btw, rejected both causal determinism and causal indeterminism on logical grounds, while acknowledging that both are in some way required for life to be as it is—however, he did not go so far as to provide a causal alternative as regards mechanisms. Still, this form of causal compatibilism proposed by Hume has been for the most part utterly forgotten in today’s philosophical discourse, unfortunately, to my mind. This to me is then in parallel to the issue of what the stuff of reality really consists of. Open mindedness is not always a bad thing.

[...] I am merely pointing out that, once you lose the lingering Cartesian dualist presuppositions, it is not inherently a self-contradictory view, as many of its critics seem to want to claim it to be — Janus

Yes, it is not an inherently self-contradictory view, since it only upholds those believed truths applicable to eliminativism and denies other experientially given facts which would contradict eliminitivism—such as that there needs to be some given to which illusions appear in order for there to be illusions in the first place, as Wayfarer has repeatedly mentioned in better ways than I just have. We’re culturally accustomed to the stance, and our so being accustomed psychologically grants it an authority of being true not held by novel ways of interpreting reality, even when the later are not self-contradictory. This, or itself, however fits in with the illusory truth effect.

That said, so too is the flat Earth theory not inherently self-contradictory—since it too only accepts those logical arguments and experienced data which do not deny the stated worldview which is maintained—and I’d venture that it too starts with different premises than what the rest of us start off with in discerning the shape of the planet. It is only self-contradictory to those who more impartially take into account data which flat-Earth theorists reject as being true.

So the eliminitivist view being coherent given its axiomatic premises does not place it on equal footing to other non-eliminitivist theories that more impartially take into consideration facts ignored by eliminativists—such as the requirement for awareness to be in order for awareness of anything (including of a theory of eliminativism) to be. It is after all not incoherent to be a non-eliminativist physicalist, for example (this having nothing to do with my potential dis/agreement with such ontological models in part or in whole). Some such are common enough frequenters of the TPF, such as in addressing physicalism from a vagueness and symmetry breaking approach (this at least to the degree that I properly understand Apo from former debates).

Thanks for this post, which I found enlightening. I'd often suspected that there was something circular in Dennett's position. Doesn't he try to dissolve the "problem" of the mind in nature by saying that it's simply a matter of taking an intentional stance in regard to the behaviour of certain animals, whereas we could (at least in principle) adopt a purely "machine" stance or "system" stance to that same behaviour? The circularity then comes in when you ask Dennett the question "What is it to take any kind of stance at all?" - which as far as I recall, he never raises himself, but perhaps someone on here knows different.

Well said. That is the kind of criticism which has been made of Dennett in the past, for example in the Wikipedia entry on him where it notes that his book ‘Consicousness Explained’ was satrically described as ‘Consciousness Ignored’ by some of his peers. And actually this is more than just a joke, as Dennett’s entire philosophical project is to somehow contrive to avoid the apodictic truth of the first-person perspective as something which can be ‘explained’ with reference to the ‘unconscious competence’ of organic molecules which somehow manage to instantiate agency whilst not themselves being conscious agents.

Dennett, in one of his characteristic remarks, assures us that “through the microscope of molecular biology, we get to witness the birth of agency, in the first macromolecules that have enough complexity to ‘do things.’ ... There is something alien and vaguely repellent about the quasi-agency we discover at this level — all that purposive hustle and bustle, and yet there’s nobody home.” Then, after describing a marvelous bit of highly organized and seemingly meaningful biological activity, he concludes:

Love it or hate it, phenomena like this exhibit the heart of the power of the Darwinian idea. An impersonal, unreflective, robotic, mindless little scrap of molecular machinery is the ultimate basis of all the agency, and hence meaning, and hence consciousness, in the universe. [From Darwin’s Dangereous Idea.]

Steve Talbot Evolution and the Illusion of Randomness.

Do you recognize that the point being made is the necessity of the assumption? You say,there is nothing inherently circular, "if we assume...". Therefore I conclude that you recognize that there actually is something inherently circular about measuring one ruler with another, a circularity which is only removed by the application of that assumption. — Metaphysician Undercover

If there are conditions under which using one ruler to measure another is not circular (which you concede that there are), then the act is not inherently circular.

The question of how we can be justified that our measuring device is well-calibrated when we use it for measuring is a valid one, but it pertains to measuring absolutely anything and everything, not just other implements of measurement (including rulers). The "necessity" of assuming that our measuring device is reliable pertains to all such measurements. If it's not viciously circular in those cases, why, then is it viciously circular in the case of measuring rulers? Again, you have not explained your case, only asserted it.

The issue, as Wayfarer explained is in the necessity of such assumptions.

The whole 'circularity' issue is this: that scientific analysis of anything whatever is based on certain axioms, presumptions, and rules. When you're dealing with the nature of reason itself, then you're actually turning around and looking at that which underlies all of those axioms and presumptions - often without actually recognising that this is what you're doing. You're treating the subject of experience as an object. — Wayfarer

If there are conditions under which using one ruler to measure another is not circular (which you concede that there are), then the act is not inherently circular. — Arkady

So you have removed the circularity of that act, of measuring one ruler with another ruler, by referring to a particular assumption. We can use "the assumption" to avoid circularity in this measuring act. Now that you understand this, we can move on to Wayfarer's concern, which I'll call the act of measuring assumptions. Let's say that we can measure an assumption by comparing it to another assumption. But this is circular. How do we remove the circularity in this case? We cannot use "the assumption" to avoid circularity because this is the very circle which we are in.

So you have removed the circularity of that act, of measuring one ruler with another ruler, by referring to a particular assumption. We can use "the assumption" to avoid circularity in this measuring act. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't even accept the premise that using a ruler to measure another ruler is circular per se. I agree that using one ruler to measure another in order to calibrate or justify the accuracy of a ruler by means of comparing it against another could be circular under certain circumstances. I was merely pointing out that you yourself accept that it is not circular to do under particular conditions (e.g. when the measuring ruler has been calibrated against some measurement standard).

Now that you understand this, we can move on to Wayfarer's concern, which I'll call the act of measuring assumptions.

The whole 'circularity' issue is this: that scientific analysis of anything whatever is based on certain axioms, presumptions, and rules. When you're dealing with the nature of reason itself, then you're actually turning around and looking at that which underlies all of those axioms and presumptions - often without actually recognising that this is what you're doing. You're treating the subject of experience as an object. — Wayfarer

Let's say that we can measure an assumption by comparing it to another assumption. But this is circular. How do we remove the circularity in this case? We cannot use "the assumption" to avoid circularity because this is the very circle which we are in.

I'm not clear on what you mean by "measuring assumptions." As I said to Wayfarer, if using our reasoning faculties to study our reasoning faculties is somehow viciously circular, then philosophy of mind is likewise vulnerable to such complaints, as phil of mind employs reason to study, inter alia, our reasoning faculties.

I also warned him against conflating the study of reason with the study of reasoning (the latter is much more in the purview of cog sci or neuroscience): they are not equivalent.

The circularity in using a ruler to measure a ruler is that the standard is arbitrary. The official 1 metre ruler has been picked as the standard, but there is no reason why any other object might not have been chosen to be the standard for '1 metre'. It is 1 metre not because we have measured it, but because we say it is. Nor is it exactly the case that the official 1 metre ruler is the same as 1 metre. The 1 metre is abstract, it is pure length, a single dimension.

If I am trying to find a particular correlation, then this is not a problem. If I am trying to discover if I can fit object A into space B and the it can be done by comparing length then that will do. But that is a different process to describing something, to saying what something is, as we might want to do for 'consciousness'. Relating consciousness to some abstraction is not the same as saying what consciousness is, and the choice of which abstraction will be dictated by the observer.

In the case of consciousness, we might try to break it up into distinct parts like 'reasoning', 'perception', 'emotion', 'imagination' or whatever. But I do not think that we can clearly separate these things even in theory. Nor (in my experience) does my consciousness neatly shift from one mode to another. So we do not have even an arbitrary 'official standard' to work from.




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The circularity in using a ruler to measure a ruler is that the standard is arbitrary. The official 1 metre ruler has been picked as the standard, but there is no reason why any other object might not have been chosen to be the standard for '1 metre'. It is 1 metre not because we have measured it, but because we say it is. Nor is it exactly the case that the official 1 metre ruler is the same as 1 metre. The 1 metre is abstract, it is pure length, a single dimension. — Londoner

And how does measuring a ruler with a ruler assume what is to be proven or demonstrated, which is the definition of circular reasoning?

Again, if this process is so viciously circular, how do ruler manufacturers perform quality checks on their products if not by some measuring implement which has been calibrated in accordance with the standard of measurement?

I'm not clear on what you mean by "measuring assumptions." As I said to Wayfarer, if using our reasoning faculties to study our reasoning faculties is somehow viciously circular, then philosophy of mind is likewise vulnerable to such complaints, as phil of mind employs reason to study, inter alia, our reasoning faculties. — Arkady

As Wayfarer explained, the circularity is only avoided by turning to first person experience. From this perspective we can ask questions such as "what is an assumption?", or "what does it mean to make an assumption?". Do you see a difference between determining the meaning of an assumption, and making an assumption?

The study found that brain scans could detect what a subject was thinking based on the physical state of his brain. If this isn't detecting the "meaning" of thoughts (in terms of propositional content), then what would constitute such a demonstration? — Arkady

I think this passage indicates that you do not apprehend "meaning" at all. That you think "meaning" may be expressed as "propositional content" betrays this. Do you not recognize that what a given proposition means to me is not the same as what it means to you? That this is the case indicates that it is impossible to express meaning as propositional content. Consider, that what Wayfarer sees as circular, you do not see as circular. Therefore the propositions involved have a different meaning for Wayfarer than they do for you

I also warned him against conflating the study of reason with the study of reasoning (the latter is much more in the purview of cog sci or neuroscience): they are not equivalent. — Arkady

I don't know what you mean by "the study of reason". Nor do I know what you mean by "the study of reasoning". I've revisited your posts in an attempt to understand this distinction, but I haven't found it explained. Perhaps you could provide me with a description?

And how does measuring a ruler with a ruler assume what is to be proven or demonstrated, which is the definition of circular reasoning? — Arkady

If we were just noting that 'ruler A is longer than ruler B' ' then we would not strictly be measuring because to measure is to apply an external standard, something that was neither A or B.

That A is longer than B is a fact, something determined empirically. The circularity would come in with our choice of external standard, because that standard is not a fact in the same way. To say ruler A is 'correct', whereas ruler B is 'too short', is an arbitrary choice. It is only true because we have all agreed that we will take ruler A as our standard, so it is a fact about human conventions. I think this can be called circular in the same way as the meaning of words is circular. 'Triangle' describes a certain shape. Why? Because we all agree that 'triangle' describes that shape.

I am not sure what to understand by 'circular reasoning'. I suppose that all reasoning is circular in that what counts as proof is something that follows the rules, but the rules themselves cannot be proved.

Again, if this process is so viciously circular, how do ruler manufacturers perform quality checks on their products if not by some measuring implement which has been calibrated in accordance with the standard of measurement? — Arkady

Ultimately they are comparing all one metre rulers with a standard metre ruler. But as Wittgenstein says, you cannot do a quality check on that standard metre. To do that would require another standard metre to compare the original standard metre against. And so on, So the standard metre is only 'accurate' because we have decided to take it as the standard for accuracy.

I would say there is a circularity in that but I do not know what to understand by 'viciously circular'.

As Wayfarer explained, the circularity is only avoided by turning to first person experience. From this perspective we can ask questions such as "what is an assumption?", or "what does it mean to make an assumption?". Do you see a difference between determining the meaning of an assumption, and making an assumption? — Metaphysician Undercover

Sorry, but you totally lost me here. I have no idea what you're getting at.

I think this passage indicates that you do not apprehend "meaning" at all. That you think "meaning" may be expressed as "propositional content" betrays this. Do you not recognize that what a given proposition means to me is not the same as what it means to you? That this is the case indicates that it is impossible to express meaning as propositional content. Consider, that what Wayfarer sees as circular, you do not see as circular. Therefore the propositions involved have a different meaning for Wayfarer than they do for you.

Firstly, it's not necessarily the case that "what a given proposition means to me is not the same as what it means to you:" different people may well glean the same meaning from the same proposition. If you wish to attribute some sort of extreme relativism to "meaning," wherein no two agents can possibly have the same understanding of a given proposition, speech act, or artifact's "meaning," then I don't even see how communication between agents would be possible. People disagree on occasion, yes, but it doesn't follow that said disagreement isn't sometimes just due to linguistic confusion on the part of one or both parties.

You seem to hold "meaning" in some sort of quasi-religious reverence. My point with regard to the brain scanning technologies discussed here was only that investigators can, with a certain degree of reliability under highly controlled experimental conditions, determine what a subject is thinking about using brain imaging. If you find it more "satisfying" to drop talk of "meaning" from any of this, then feel free to do so: I have no special affinity for the term.

I don't know what you mean by "the study of reason". Nor do I know what you mean by "the study of reasoning". I've revisited your posts in an attempt to understand this distinction, but I haven't found it explained. Perhaps you could provide me with a description?

Philosophy does the "thinking about thinking." Questions such as what reason is, which sorts of arguments and beliefs are reasonable or rational, etc. fall in the purview of philosophy. How agents reason, how the cognitive and neural mechanisms operate in their brain (and other relevant systems) when they're thinking is in the purview of cognitive science, neuroscience, and other allied fields.

Sorry, but you totally lost me here. I have no idea what you're getting at. — Arkady

Yes, it appears to be as if you have no real understanding of "meaning".

Firstly, it's not necessarily the case that "what a given proposition means to me is not the same as what it means to you:" different people may well glean the same meaning from the same proposition. — Arkady

I don't see how this is possible. What a given proposition means to me is produced according to my physical disposition, and my experiences as a human being, which are both completely different from any other human being. And this is the same with all other people. Therefore I think it is completely impossible that a given proposition can have the same meaning to different people.

If you attribute meaning directly to the physical existence of the proposition, you might claim that the proposition carries the same information to me as it does to you. But since there is a matter of interpretation, which is carried out according to the value structures of the individual, we cannot conclude that it means the same thing to you as it does to me.

...then I don't even see how communication between agents would be possible. — Arkady

Yes, I've seen this argument before, and if you would give it any thought, you would see that it is absolutely non sequitur. Communication does not require that one person produce the same idea within another person, it just requires that we get the general idea across, the gist. If you define communication as requiring that one person interprets the very same meaning from a saying as another, then you completely misrepresent what communication actually is, and your argument is based in a false premise.

People disagree on occasion, yes, but it doesn't follow that said disagreement isn't sometimes just due to linguistic confusion on the part of one or both parties. — Arkady

Agreement does not require that both parties interpret the same meaning from what has been said. Agreement just indicates that each party accepts the meaning which they have interpreted. Agreement cannot be construed to imply that each party interprets the same meaning. So we can put disagreement aside, and look at agreement directly. When two people agree to the truth of a proposition, this in no way indicates that the two attribute the same meaning to that proposition.

You seem to hold "meaning" in some sort of quasi-religious reverence. My point with regard to the brain scanning technologies discussed here was only that investigators can, with a certain degree of reliability under highly controlled experimental conditions, determine what a subject is thinking about using brain imaging. If you find it more "satisfying" to drop talk of "meaning" from any of this, then feel free to do so: I have no special affinity for the term. — Arkady

I don't see how you could possibly verify this claim. We cannot even determine what a person is thinking about by interpreting what they are saying, so how could you determine what a person is thinking about by using brain imaging? Sure, you could start with some assumptions like X image is equivalent to X thought, and proceed in this manner, but how would you know whether these assumptions are true? You could ask the patient, but it would just be a matter of interpretation, and how would you know that the patient is being honest? Would you start with a lie detector test? Doesn't the lie detector make the same claim anyway, to be able to determine what the patient is thinking? How are your referred experiments any more reliable than a simple lie detector?

Philosophy does the "thinking about thinking." Questions such as what reason is, which sorts of arguments and beliefs are reasonable or rational, etc. fall in the purview of philosophy. How agents reason, how the cognitive and neural mechanisms operate in their brain (and other relevant systems) when they're thinking is in the purview of cognitive science, neuroscience, and other allied fields. — Arkady

I still don't see the difference. If a philosopher is "thinking about thinking", isn't that person thinking about how reason operates? The question of which beliefs and arguments are reasonable is a different question, it is a question of judgement. We all have to make such judgements in our day to day life, and it seems like you are trying to restrict philosophy to the mundane. We have some innate judgement capacities and we learn others.

The matter of "thinking about thinking" is an exercise in examining such judgement making, and this is exactly the question of "how agents reason", which you say is proper to cognitive science. The problem with your approach, as wayfarer points out, is that you need to begin with some assumptions about how agents reason, derived from philosophy, in order to establish a correlation with brain imaging. If X image is equivalent to X thought, then you must start with the assumption of what X thought is. That is why the lie detector must start with a bunch of background questions to establish a baseline. But all of this relies on the assumption that a person's words are a good indication of what a person is thinking, and as I described above, in relation to "meaning", this is a false premise. When the philosopher practises "thinking about thinking", one comes to realize that words are very impotent for expressing what thought really is.

Consider this, we often think in words, we can decide what to say, we can do logic, and we do mathematics by thinking in symbols. We come to conclusions. But this is very shallow, off the top of the head stuff, it's more like recollection of memories. Meaningful thinking lies much deeper. I could tell you that two plus two equals four, and you might say that I am thinking this. But that's not really the case, I am simply recollecting it. When I am assessing different ways to apply this equation, then I am thinking. So if I tell you "my computer is on", the reason why I chose those words to say, and not something else to say represents my thinking. We really cannot get to the act of thinking, from examining the words spoken, because the words spoken are the manifestation of thought, the effect of it, not the thinking itself.

We cannot even determine what a person is thinking about by interpreting what they are saying, so how could you determine what a person is thinking about by using brain imaging? — Metaphysician Undercover

We cannot even determine what someone is thinking about by interpreting what they are saying? I'm going to stop this farce right here, because this is just such a wad of nonsense that it beggars belief. The very fact that we're having a conversation falsifies that spurious claim.

Sorry, but none of this explains why one cannot use one ruler to measure another. Yes, measurement standards are arbitrary, but once selected, it is not arbitrary as to whether or not a given artifact conforms to said standard.

We cannot even determine what someone is thinking about by interpreting what they are saying? — Arkady

That's absolutely correct. My saying this represents a very small portion of what I am thinking about at the moment, which is a very small portion of what I am thinking about in the span of five minutes. Furthermore, there is a very good possibility that I am being deceptive, and what I am saying doesn't represent what I am thinking at all. And that does not even consider the deficiencies of interpretation.

So it should be quite clear that we cannot determine what someone is thinking by interpreting what they are saying.

The very fact that we're having a conversation falsifies that spurious claim. — Arkady

The number of times I've had to reply to this non sequitur argument at this forum is amazing. That you and I can hold a conversation says nothing about your ability to know what I am thinking. The existence of deception ought to dispel this faulty conclusion.

He's basically talking about Dennett, — Wayfarer

Dennett has since responded to the article here: https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/04/03/magic-illusions-and-zombies-an-exchange/

"We say consciousness seems (to many who reflect upon the point) to involve being “directly acquainted,” as Strawson puts it, with some fundamental properties (“qualia”), but this is an illusion, a philosopher’s illusion. "

If this is Dennett's issue then I have no problem with that (and I say that as a quasi-dualist). I don't think reductionistic qualia (red, taste of coffee, ect) aka Locke's classical secondary properties are fundamental. The way they are united and the reasons why are is what is important. So far science has not touched this:

From scholarpedia:
"Because consciousness is a rich biological phenomenon, it is likely that a satisfactory scientific theory of consciousness will require the specification of detailed mechanistic models. The models of consciousness surveyed in this article vary in terms of their level of abstraction as well as in the aspects of phenomenal experience that they are proposed to explain. At present, however, no single model of consciousness appears sufficient to account fully for the multidimensional properties of conscious experience. Moreover, although some of these models have gained prominence, none has yet been accepted as definitive, or even as a foundation upon which to build a definitive model. "