I think you're neglecting an important distinction. I understand secular culture to be a (sort of) neutral background for working out one's own salvation. But you probably mean the global humanism common among atheist/agnostic intellectuals. If so, I can see that there's something shallow in all of it. It is basically a vision of a united world of healthy, amused monkeys who are satisfied with that. I'll be impressed if we can get that far. — syntax

Well, the meaning of ‘secular’ was originally to distinguish between religious and secular affairs or powers - back in the day when religious institutions were centres of power. (Actually ‘secular’ originally is a description of ‘secular time’ as distinct from the ‘sacred time’ of the Church calendar, but never mind.) Anyway, long story short, the point of ‘secular governance’ was to provide a governance framework which could deal with public utilities and laws and the like, whilst not involving itself with questions of religion.

However, over time the meaning of ‘secular philosophy’ changed, in that it is often taken to mean or imply that it’s a philosophy that is consciously non- or even anti-religious. That stance is obviously writ large in the writings of so-called ‘secular humanism’ although that spans a wide spectrum of views; but there is a strongly anti-religious strain of that kind of thinking [e.g. everything published by Prometheus Press]. But one consequence of this is, again, anthropological, in the sense that it has implications for ‘the human condition’ or what it means to be human.

If you look at Renaissance humanism - particularly Ficino, Della Mirandola, and Erasmus, who are identified as its principle voices - they have a ‘spiritual anthropology’. The first two weren’t even particularly Christian - in fact they both skirted heresy throughout their careers. But they were trying to devise a synthesis of philosophy and religion which was at once scientific and religious. And actually their influence was considerable on early modern science, for example through Bruno and then Galileo. However, as they drew on the Platonic and neo-Platonic corpus, that carries with it a kind of idea of ‘anthropos’, the meaning or significance of human existence, which is not necessarily tied at all to anything like Christian creationism. Della Mirandola was a voice for ‘universaliism’ or what is now ‘the perennial philosophy’ - which caused him trouble with the Church, predictably. But the point is, it still had the room for a spiritual dimension, a proper metaphysics, as it could draw on the Neoplatonist and other elements of the Western tradition. So ‘renaissance humanism’ does have that element.

But in any case, fast forward to the publication of Origin of Species, and all of those kinds of elements in the Western corpus were jettisoned, along with bibilicism, in my view. That, at any rate, is the practical consequence of a strictly ‘Darwinian’ account of ‘the descent of Man’ (//ps//and incidentally in this connection it's worth perusing Alfred Russel Wallace's writing on that same topic). Because it regards the entire story as being one that can be comprehended in naturalistic terms, then it is unavoidably reductionist in many of its manifestations. And a lot of that goes back to the so-called Scottish Enlightenment, which has had many profound and long-reaching consequences on modern liberalism and so throughout so-called ‘secular culture’. I find, on this forum, almost everyone will fiercely defend the view that humans are essentially animal.. There are also many normative views about the nature of mind and language that are deeply conditioned by same factors. It just seems natural and normative - and understanding that gets back to the remark you made about ‘seeing through your own presuppositions’.

So the upshot is that what often is said in the name of secular humanism IS philosophically barren. But it’s also true that it doesn’t have to be. Actually it’s got nothing to do with ‘secularism’ as such - what it comes from is taking methodological naturalism as a metaphysical principle, which it isn’t. That’s the problem in a nutshell.

The best recent book on it, is Thomas Nagel’s Mind and Cosmos.

For me, that itself is the narrative. It's one I relate to. Every nice little autobiographical tale feels wrong or false. I see that that is implied in your original impressionistic portrait, but only in retrospect. The abstract statement of your situation is far more revealing for me. — syntax

You're doing it again.... telling me my lack of a metanarrative is my metanarrative.

Yes, exactly. From my perspective, this vision of yourself of lacking a meta-narrative is indeed the kind of thing that I mean by meta-narrative. For me it's an abstract identity. Obviously I understand that my perspective is not binding for you. We can drop it, if you like. I intend no offense.

However, over time the meaning of ‘secular philosophy’ changed, in that it is often taken to mean or imply that it’s a philosophy that is consciously non- or even anti-religious. That stance is obviously writ large in the writings of so-called ‘secular humanism’ although that spans a wide spectrum of views; but there is a strongly anti-religious strain of that kind of thinking [e.g. everything published by Prometheus Press]. But one consequence of this is, again, anthropological, in the sense that it has implications for ‘the human condition’ or what it means to be human. — Wayfarer

When I think of modern humanism, I think especially of thinkers in the wake of Hegel (Strauss, Marx, Feuerbach). Christianity was made worldly and 'rational.' It was 'perfected' by being blended with philosophy and science. The preceding unworldly or 'irrational' Christianity was understood as man's alienation and as a substitute for building Heaven down here. I think anti-religious feeling largely comes from a sense that returning to old-style religion would be a regression. It is a 'religious' or 'theological' rejection. Since traditional religion is often publicly allied with conservative politics and a repression of intellectual freedom, this suspicion is not absurd.

I find, on this forum, almost everyone will fiercely defend the view that humans are essentially animal.. — Wayfarer

Is it really that simple? I do see an stronger emphasis then before on the animal foundation. But the simple fact that we worry about being virtuous and good in abstract terms already suggests that we hold ourselves to different standards than the other animals. Now this is indeed a fascinating tension in the intellectuals' conception of humanity. If we are 'only' animals, then isn't all this hand-wringing just animal prudence? Even if that's an oversimplification, it's the kind of dark thought that goes with a vision of humans being just one more piece of replicating ooze. As I see it, this is just part of the usual doublethink. We don't have the time or energy to get around to all of our contradictions, largely because of those same animal foundations. If I wasn't subject to violence, starvation, or the treacherous spontaneous deterioration of my own body that makes me dependent on modern healthcare, oh what a tale I might tell. And everyone else is also stapled to this matrix. But that of course supports the significance of our animal foundations, even if it doesn't specifically enforce a broader interpretation of that significance. We are, after all, free to have this conversation.

So the upshot is that what often is said in the name of secular humanism IS philosophically barren. But it’s also true that it doesn’t have to be. Actually it’s got nothing to do with ‘secularism’ as such - what it comes from is taking methodological naturalism as a metaphysical principle, which it isn’t. That’s the problem in a nutshell. — Wayfarer

I'm sympathetic to this. I think some so-called secular humanism is bad or shallow. And then I also think that it's natural to find any rational/scientific approach a little cold and dead. We crave mystery and miracle in a way that makes any adult/reasonable approach to life a little unsatisfying. I personally think that this dangerously touches the lurking inner tyrant.

One thing that we didn't touch on is communism. For me this is a great example of a rational mysticism. It was intensely loaded with righteous fervor, despite a metaphysics that one might expect to make such fervor ridiculous. I think it's a great example of how 'spirituality' can be blended with a 'scientific' self-conception. And maybe this goes back to Plato, in a parodic manner. The fantasy is that knowledge and moral virtue can be one and the same thing. I question this fantasy. I think one roughly has to choose between an amoral accuracy and a righteous faith. Of course that is a position that can be questioned or criticized, and it's one of the reasons I don't quite fit in with my self-righteous, liberal peers. The idea that knowledge and innocence/purity go together leads to intellectual bubbles, in my view.

I will reply more at length, but while the thought is with me - have you ever run across Horkheimer’s book The Eclipse of Reason? It’s about the only ‘Frankfurt school’ text I’m familar familiar with and says a lot about this theme. — Wayfarer

Yeah, I've looked into the Frankfurt School, though only briefly into that book. I most recently dipped into Adorno's The Jargon of Authenticity. I like just about any post-Hegelian German philosopher I've looked into, even if (or especially because) I'm never completely seduced by their perspective. Of course this kind of complete seduction is usually one of the great pleasures of being in one's 20s.

Yes, exactly. From my perspective, this vision of yourself of lacking a meta-narrative is indeed the kind of thing that I mean by meta-narrative. For me it's an abstract identity. Obviously I understand that my perspective is not binding for you. We can drop it, if you like. I intend no offense. — syntax

Not offended at all. Just enjoying the irony. I think my particular idiosyncratic understanding has taken up enough room in the discussion. It has struck me that what Sloterdijk is talking about in the text that's been quoted is not too different from what I'm saying, is it?

It has struck me that what Sloterdijk is talking about in the text that's been quoted is not too different from what I'm saying, is it? — T Clark

Right. You and I and he all seem to understand the value of a kind of 'nobodiness.'

I think anti-religious feeling largely comes from a sense that returning to old-style religion would be a regression. It is a 'religious' or 'theological' rejection. Since traditional religion is often publicly allied with conservative politics and a repression of intellectual freedom, this suspicion is not absurd. — syntax

Well, a major part of my meta-narrative is 'institutional religion getting it wrong from the outset'. At the time of the formation of the Church there were many competing meta-narratives, and the victors were not necessarily the more enlightened. But, history is written by the victors, and maybe that regressive tendency is one of the consequences.

When I studied comparative religion and history of ideas, I was struck by the fact that there seemed to be no obvious equivalent to the Indian understanding of mokṣa (spiritual liberation) in the Western religious traditions. There is a convergence in the teachings of the mystics, which is subject of many volumes of comparative mysticism by the likes of Huston Smith and Aldous Huxley. But the view I came to, was that this was because of the role that religion assumed in Western culture, which was that of gatekeeper, rather than enabler. 'No-one comes to the father but by Me' became 'We are the sole custodians of truth'. Whereas the model in Buddhism was vastly different - centrifugal, rather than centripetal, as it were. The model was 'the passing of the torch', the imparting of Prajñā, the empowerment of successive generations.

But knowledge is a much harder thing to manage than belief.

I find, on this forum, almost everyone will fiercely defend the view that humans are essentially animal..
— Wayfarer

Is it really that simple? I do see an stronger emphasis then before on the animal foundation. But the simple fact that we worry about being virtuous and good in abstract terms already suggests that we hold ourselves to different standards than the other animals. — syntax

Well, I agree - deep down, we suspect that we're not, but it's a dogma of a lot of secular thinkers nonetheless. The Greeks said 'rational animals', but a lot of modern thinking tends to reduce rationality to adaption (for which see Nagel's essay, Evolutionary Naturalism and the Fear of Religion.)

What has been lost in the transition to modernity, is the sense of the basic fallibility of human reason, corrupted as it is by the 'original sin'. I don't subscribe to the Augustinian interpretation of this myth, which arguably the most influential reading (mainly by virtue of Calvin.) In the East, the understanding is not 'original sin' but 'beginningless ignorance' or (avidya or unawareness), which is endemic to the human condition. The Christian vision is volitional, 'corruption of the will', the Eastern gnostic, 'corruption of the intellect, but both pinpoint a sense in which humans will inevitably miss the mark (which is the original meaning of 'sin') if they are not transformed. That is what is usually missing in secular philosophies.

It has struck me that what Sloterdijk is talking about in the text that's been quoted is not too different from what I'm saying, is it?
— T Clark

Right. You and I and he all seem to understand the value of a kind of 'nobodiness.' — syntax

We should probably bear in mind what Sloterdijk said about how deeply embedded our identity is.

The mania for "identity" seems to be the deepest of the unconscious programmings,
so deeply buried that it evades even attentive reflection for a long time. A formal somebody, as bearer of our social identifications, is, so to speak, programmed into us.

It's one thing to conceptualize this nobodiness, it's quite another to embody or realize it. Nobodiness can easily be written into the fabric of our personal narrative.

Well, a major part of my meta-narrative is 'institutional religion getting it wrong from the outset'. — Wayfarer

Ah. OK. That's helpful.

When I studied comparative religion and history of ideas, I was struck by the fact that there seemed to be no obvious equivalent to the Indian understanding of mokṣa (spiritual liberation) in the Western religious traditions. — Wayfarer

I've studied a little bit of religion from the East, especially the Tao and some of the popularizers. I was personally surprised to experience Richard Rorty as something like a Taoist. He strikes me as trying to wake people up from being trapped in word-games and useless dualisms. I'm not seconding every thing he ever wrote, but I think that he is profoundly anti-profound, let's say. He paints of vision of clinging to nothing, of no longer reaching for foundations, of a centerless creative culture where love is pretty much the only law.

What has been lost in the transition to modernity, is the sense of the basic fallibility of human reason, corrupted as it is by the 'original sin'. — Wayfarer

I look at it mostly in a different way. Science has such prestige because we are so wary about the other approaches to truth. While we can doubt interpretations of science, none of us can really doubt technology. Of course thinkers will therefore tie themselves to the prestige of technology to be taken more seriously. A philosophical or religious tradition may have prestige for a sub-community, but this is not at all binding on those whose identities are not already entangled in such traditions. An engineer might scoff at the philosophy major as a pretentious idealist wasting time on old books. I don't agree, but I have seen this contempt. And our philosophy major can exaggerate the importance the longwinded expressions of ideas that are actually pretty simple. If we really only respect technological power, then a nihilistic pragmatism fits on an index card.

If the philosophy is supposed to serve a religious/moral purpose, then that looks suspect through the lens of the cynic who lives in a polarized environment. In short, it looks like venerable old books being used for this or that contemporary political purpose. After all, students are graded to some degree for ideological purity --or that's my prejudice. In short, we live in a chaos of voices that call one another liars and creeps. Technology is the one thing that cuts through all this noise.

It's one thing to conceptualize this nobodiness, it's quite another to embody or realize it. Nobodiness can easily be written into the fabric of our personal narrative. — praxis

Right. I agree. I think you missed what I wrote beneath my original quote of Sloterdijk. Here is is, for convenience:

The 'problem' is that this 'nobodiness' easily becomes another sophisticated ego-narrative. Has this or that person achieved a sense of personality being an illusion? Something like the 'noble savage' seems to reappear. — syntax

I saw it and considered including it somehow in my cautionary note, which was intended for a general audience.

I generally agree, but I don't know about technology 'cutting through all the noise'. (Although, that said, I'm writing this on a brand spanking new PowerBook, and by gosh I like it. :smile: )

[Rorty] paints of vision of clinging to nothing, of no longer reaching for foundations, of a centerless creative culture where love is pretty much the only law. — syntax

Haven't got around to Rorty yet, although he's been mentioned by quite a few posters over the years. My favourite of the current US philosophers is Nagel.

I generally agree, but I don't know about technology 'cutting through all the noise'. (Although, that said, I'm writing this on a brand spanking new PowerBook, and by gosh I like it. :smile: ) — Wayfarer

I just mean that it cuts through all the ambiguity. It's the one thing that just about everyone 'believes in.'
Just imagine if the physicists weren't associated with working technology or falsifiable predictions (if they were useless to those who didn't find their math intrinsically fascinating.)

Right on. :smile:

An artwork may or may not say anything of importance. A Thomas Kinkade painting may appeal to norms of beauty and generally be perceived as pretty but it may not really show much. The subject matter of a Kinkade painting, the little cottage in the woods or whatever, may have special meaning for the artist, and he may therefore feel that the subject matter says volumes about him. He is privy to a narrative that the audience lacks.
— praxis

I don't buy that, but thanks for giving me a chance to bring out one of my favorite quotes from Emerson. I seem to use it in some post every week or so
— T Clark

"To believe your own thought, to believe that what is true for you in your private heart is true for all men, — that is genius. Speak your latent conviction, and it shall be the universal sense; for the inmost in due time becomes the outmost,—— and our first thought is rendered back to us by the trumpets of the Last Judgment."
— Emerson — T Clark

Bored at work and distraction seeking, I've come back to this, TClark. Incidentally, I noticed your participation in the 'games people play' topic so I know the notion of adult to adult interaction is top of mind.

So I looked up the Emerson quote. It's essentially about self-reliance. Indeed the essay is titled "Self-Reliance." A foolish consistency... blah blah blah. How is this a foundation for your objection?

In the example that I provided, the little cottage in the woods doesn't reflect a TRUTH that others have sensed but for some reason haven't cognized or voiced themselves. It has meaning to the artist because that's where his child was born, or whatever. It has personal meaning to the artist and doesn't signify any kind of universal truth, much less a truth that is contrary to the prevailing meta-narrative of the culture.

To sum, you don't appear to have an objection, and this was not an opportunity to trot out your Emerson quote. But I suspect that you know this and that's why you refused to explain yourself.

Shame on you for intellectual dishonesty. [said the parent]

Shame on you for intellectual dishonesty. — praxis

I am sometimes, too often, dishonest, but I'm almost never intellectually dishonest. Maybe we have a misunderstanding.

Thinking back, my memory is that we started out with me saying that I find a poetic, artistic way of presenting myself more effective, satisfying than what we are calling metanarratives. My interpretation of your discussion of Kincaid was that such artistic ways of looking at things can be personally satisfying but may not help others understand what and who I am because they are too ideosyncratic and individual. That's when I brought up Emerson. His point, mine, that I have to trust that the connections I see will be understandable to others whether they are rational or intuitive. That is the essence of communications.

Does that make sense, or am I missing something.

Metanarratives are like:

I'm a victim because I'm X.
I'm a badass because of X.
Jesus is my co-pilot.
I'm a humanist.
I'm a single mother.
I'm a drug addict.

Logically, all narratives are rooted in the common worldview because they're exchanged as people meet one another in work or leisure. I think it's possible to have a personality that's just averse to being pigeon-holed. I read once that there's a link between having a poorly formed personality and being a mystic.

We live in a time that's rich in information (or overloaded depending on your point of view.) We often don't have a lot of time to get to know people: to ask them open-ended questions and listen. We just want the whole thing summed up quickly and easily so we can understand and move on.

Isn't it true that a sort of pre-made identities are out there and there's reason to grab one and wear it just because not having a proper tag makes it harder for people to process you?

I have to trust that the connections I see will be understandable to others whether they are rational or intuitive. — T Clark

I've envisioned your list as a field of dots on a canvas (cuz you've framed it as art). I can connect the dots with lines and make a shape. Will the connection you see form the same shape? No. Do the connection you see comprise a form of something that I've sensed but haven't cognized yet? No. Is it possible that I might have this sense in the future? No. I don't believe the Emerson essay applies to personal meaning.

These connections you speak of is the narrative that connects the items on your list.

I've envisioned your list as a field of dots on a canvas (cuz you've framed it as art). I can connect the dots with lines and make a shape. Will the connection you see form the same shape? No. Do the connection you see comprise a form of something that I've sensed but haven't cognized yet? No. Is it possible that I might have this sense in the future? No. I don't believe the Emerson essay applies to personal meaning. — praxis

How is this any different than any other attempt at communication between people? Of course there is the possibility that the other won't understand. Of course Emerson was talking about personal meaning:

....to believe that what is true for you in your private heart is true for all men

There is nothing unconventional about showing your favorite food or whatever. Social media is replete with stuff like this. There's nothing the least bit against the grain about it. I can hear the hooves as they march down the well trodden path in perfect sonance.

There is nothing unconventional about showing your favorite food or whatever. Social media is replete with stuff like this. There's nothing the least bit against the grain about it. I can hear the hooves as they march down the well trodden path in perfect sonance. — praxis

I don't understand your objection and I don't understand why this seems to be such a big deal.

Isn't it true that a sort of pre-made identities are out there and there's reason to grab one and wear it just because not having a proper tag makes it harder for people to process you? — frank

Is that really how you experience yourself?

Applying the Emerson quote, you’re essentially claiming that your list expresses self-reliance. How does it do this?

Applying the Emerson quote, you’re essentially claiming that your list expresses self-reliance. How does it do this? — praxis

I'm not claiming anything. I'm just saying I have confidence that, if I express what's in my heart, others will understand me. Doesn't always work out, but it usually does.

So... why is this such a big deal?

Is that really how you experience yourself? — T Clark

I experience myself as boundless. How does your experience of yourself relate to the story you tell about who you are?

I experience myself as boundless. How does your experience of yourself relate to the story you tell about who you are? — frank

You're not paying attention. I claim not to have a story about who I am. You, and others, have expressed skepticism.

I don't think I expressed any skepticism. It's kind of like watching a person who can obviously see claiming to be blind. Why would you argue about it?

I don't think I expressed any skepticism. It's kind of like watching a person who can obviously see claiming to be blind. Why would you argue about it? — frank

Don't get it, which is ok with me. We can leave it here if you'd like.

We often don't have a lot of time to get to know people: to ask them open-ended questions and listen. We just want the whole thing summed up quickly and easily so we can understand and move on.

Isn't it true that a sort of pre-made identities are out there and there's reason to grab one and wear it just because not having a proper tag makes it harder for people to process you? — frank

All of these are fine points, but I think you are neglecting an important situation. The philosopher or poet or comedian is only truly successful if he or she adds to or creates a narrative either for the community at large or for rebellious individuals perhaps. The anxiety of influence drives (among other things) the endless fine differentiations of and the occasional revolutions in group and individual identity. (Or such do I opine.)

So I'd say that a minority of people strongly embrace the general idea of being a culture creator, and then those in this minority wrestle with their self-consciousness in an especially intense and creative way. Non-creatives don't feel ashamed to be one more good mother or brave soldier, etc. They don't feel that being one more copy of a good thing is shameful. They are just glad to align with an ideal created by others, probably long ago. But the creative who is just one more copy thereby precisely fails to align with his or her creative ideal (to be one more copy of the artist in a higher, more complicated sense.)