I agree.The content of non-linguistic belief cannot be propositional. — creativesoul
That's a big "if"... — Sapientia
The content of non-linguistic belief cannot be propositional.
— creativesoul
I agree.
All beliefs are meaningful to the one who has them, but I don't see how this adds anything to the discussion. — Sam26
My position doesn't require mentalese...
— creativesoul
Yes. It doesn't seem to require or involve an explanation in any form. — apokrisis
The point I'm attempting to make here, with you, is that some things that we call "concepts" are prior to language. Others not.
Do you agree? — creativesoul
Well, that's what the conventional historical notion of belief claims... that the content of belief is propositional. — creativesoul
Given that Witty worked from the conventional notion of JTB, and that notion claims that the content of belief is propositional, then what I've been arguing ought add some understanding with regard to that... — creativesoul
I don't think it's accurate to say that W. worked from the conventional notion of JTB. He examined the notion of knowing using a variety of language-games, and not all of them can be neatly fit into JTB, some can, but some not. I use JTB because it generally works. — Sam26
Do you agree that we need to determine as precisely as possible what non-linguistic belief contains and/or consists of; the content? — creativesoul
Well no. I have no burden in this thread regarding that. It's not about the differences between our notion of "concepts". It's about belief. If you want to say that it is a concept that does not require language, then we agree in part at least. Some belief requires language, some not. — creativesoul
A belief is a propositional attitude.
That is, it can be placed in a general form as a relation between someone and a proposition. So "John believes that the sky is blue" can be rendered as
Believes (John, "The sky is blue")
B(a,p)
There's ill will in some circles towards this sort of analysis. Think of this as setting up a basic structure or grammar for belief. A belief is a relation between an individual and a proposition. That there is much more to be said about belief is not in contention; this is just a place to start. This is set as a falsifiable proposition. If there are any examples of beliefs that are not relations between individuals and propositions, this proposal would have to be revisited. — Banno
It has been suggested that animal and other non-linguistic beliefs are a falsification of this suggestion. The argument is that non-linguistic creatures can have beliefs and yet cannot express these beliefs as propositions, and that hence beliefs cannot be propositional attitudes.
But that is a misreading of what is going on here. Any belief, including that of creatures that cannot speak, can be placed in the form of a propositional attitude, but those who can speak. A cat, for example, can believe that its bowl is empty, but cannot put that belief in the form B(a,p). — Banno
The content of non-linguistic belief cannot be propositional.
— @creativesoul
I agree.
All beliefs are meaningful to the one who has them, but I don't see how this adds anything to the discussion. — Sam26
Do you agree that we need to determine as precisely as possible what non-linguistic belief contains and/or consists of; the content?
— creativesoul
For my purposes I don't see the need. — Sam26
Yes. We can report upon non-linguistic creature's belief. — creativesoul
Any belief, including the beliefs of creatures that do not have the capacity for language, can be placed in the form of a relation between an individual and a proposition, by a creature with the capacity for language. — Banno
You avoid talking about mind like the plague... — creativesoul
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